Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Yale Law Journal Forum
Volume
135
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
Some subordinate federal prosecutors faced a challenging professional dilemma in the early days of the second Trump Administration. It arose from the tension between their role as public officials and lawyers who owe fiduciary duties to the public and their role as Department of Justice (DOJ) employees who take direction from higher-ups. The DOJ leadership directed these subordinate prosecutors to use their considerable power in ways evidently designed to advance partisan political objectives. This was contrary to the clear understanding previously expressed by courts, the legal profession, and the DOJ itself that prosecutors have a duty to seek justice, which requires excluding partisan politics from charging decisions. This Essay considers how federal prosecutors should navigate this dilemma consistently with their fiduciary obligations, which are paramount to their employment obligations. It also analyzes what more Congress and the courts can do to enable subordinate prosecutors to carry out their fiduciary obligations. We conclude that Congress can better protect prosecutors who resist questionable demands, and that in the gaps left by federal legislation, courts should use their supervisory authority to reinforce federal prosecutors' ability to seek justice in the face of contrary pressure or direction from the DOJ leadership.
Recommended Citation
Bruce A. Green and Rebecca Roiphe,
Under Political Pressure: How Courts and Congress Can Help Prosecutors Do Justice, 135 Yale L. J. F. 138
(2025)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/1422
