Abstract
What constraints should the protection of political equality place on the design of electoral systems? With the exception of requiring approximate population equality across a jurisdiction’s districts, the U.S. voting rights regime accepts substantial disproportionality in voting strength. This Article addresses the current Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Second Reconstruction’s “one person, one vote” standard with regard to both racial and partisan gerrymandering, and assesses the role that Congress and political science have played in this transition. This Article argues that an unabridged voting rights regime must recognize a standard of proportional representation derived from the protection of individual political equality.
Recommended Citation
Michael Latner,
Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Equality, Proportionality, and Our Abridged Voting Rights Regime,
2
Fordham L. Voting Rts. & Democracy F.
33
(2023).
Available at:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/vrdf/vol2/iss1/2
Included in
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons
