Keywords
collateral sanctions, ex post facto clause, conviction, conduct, hawker v. new york, abortion
Abstract
Traditionally, collateral sanctions are viewed as civil measures designed to prevent undue risk by proven lawbreakers. If a collateral sanction were a criminal penalty instead, that would trigger constitutional provisions like the Ex Post Facto Clause, which would mean the sanction could not be imposed retroactively. This Article argues that collateral sanctions based on conduct and not conviction indicate a civil regulatory measure, but that when the sanctions only apply in the event of conviction, the sanction looks more like punishment. Conviction is not the only way to show risky conduct, and it is the conduct that civil sanctions should target.
Recommended Citation
Gabriel J. Chin,
Are Collateral Sanctions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?: The Case of Abortion Doctors,
30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1685
(2003).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol30/iss5/7