Keywords
Corporate law, business organizations, transaction costs, competition, corporate governance, corporate governance structures, corporate finance, corporate finance patterns, market mechanisms, ownership structures, historical legal origins, enforcement, convergence, corporate codes, political factors, corporate law legislation, political history, Israeli corporate law, political theory, interest groups, legislative process, American corporate law, interrelationships, legal regimes, market reality, Israeli Companies Law, Companies Ordinance, English Act of 1929, Uriel Procaccia, Aharon Barak, Knesset, Israeli Parliament, The Bar, Israel Securities Authority, political structure, legal arrangement, Barak committee, parliamentary discussions, private interests, regulated market, legislation, corporate law legislation, economic background, political process, policy, public choice theory, interest group theory, political influence, economic theory of legislation, public interest legislation, Levine, Forrence, Schlozman, Tierney, agency theory, slack, corporate legislation, Berle-Means, shareholders, managers, Macey, Miller, Delaware, Carney, Israeli capital market, stock exchange, regulators, business service providers, control holders, creditors, non-participating groups, new corporate law, rules, standards, mitigating provisions, delegation, minister of justice, media, legislators’ ideology, Companies Law of 1999, Companies Bill, Companies Law
Recommended Citation
Yael T. Ben-Zion,
The Political Dynamics of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From Israel,
11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 185
(2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol11/iss2/2