Abstract
Part I of this of this Note will describe the evolution of United States antitrust laws and their application to international joint ventures. Part II of this Note will then demonstrate, through an analysis of the GM-Toyota decision, that the FTC's settlement of its proceedings against GM and Toyota embodies an industrial policy. Part III will show that implementation of an industrial policy through the antitrust laws is logical, necessary, and above all, preferable to protectionist legislation as a means of stimulating United States industrial competitiveness in world markets. Finally, this Note will propose a program of restrictions, similar to those imposed in GM-Toyota, designed to maximize the procompetitive benefits of international joint ventures.
Recommended Citation
Paul C. Curnin,
United States Antitrust Law and Industrial Policy: International Joint Ventures and Global Competition After GM-Toyota,
9 Fordham Int'l L.J. 257
(1985).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol9/iss2/3