This Article is broken into five sections. Part I defines political risk. Part II provides a brief review of the academic literature showing the work that has been done in this area of law. Part III argues that there have indeed been oscillations in the degree of political investment risk in the world and explains that investment risks rise when changes in the world power structure cause temporary power vacuums. Once new institutions emerge for the protection of investments, the level of risk declines. Part IV discusses the current trend, in which the world is witnessing the emergence of a new institutional design for the protection of investments: A network of international legal institutions, and bilateral and multilateral treaties. Part V revisits the literature, showing that the results of previous scholarly studies support the theory of this Article.
Filling the Void: International Legal Structures and Political Risk in Investment,
31 Fordham Int'l L.J. 230
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol31/iss1/4