Abstract
This Essay proceeds in four steps. Part I summarizes the quantitative evidence on the pattern of escalation and outcomes of more than 600 GATT/WTO disputes from 1948 through 1999. Part II elaborates on our theory of settlement bargaining within the context of an institution lacking enforcement power and shows how the hypotheses are consistent with the evidence introduced earlier. Part III discusses the theory's expectations regarding the effect of the 1989 and 1995 dispute settlement reforms and likewise compares those predictions with the evidence. Part IV highlights the implications of our perspective for proposed future reforms dealing with transparency and developing country participation
Recommended Citation
Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes,
24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 158
(2000).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol24/iss1/9