International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: Discrimination, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Negotiations
This brief Essay summarizes, updates, and integrates work I have done elsewhere in order to suggest, first, why cost-benefit analysis is not used in dispute settlement, second, how to evaluate substitute formulae that are available for use within dispute settlement, and finally, how dispute settlement and treaty-making relate to one another in this field. This Essay considers the role of international discipline by dispute resolution bodies, in comparison to multilateral treaty-making or other legislation. Treaty-making or other legislation may take the form of harmonization to one degree or another, or importantly, may take the form of agreed rules of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as mutual recognition or national treatment.
Joel P. Trachtman,
International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: Discrimination, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Negotiations,
24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 726
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol24/iss1/26