Antitrust Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison
This Article will discuss the historical context in which the competition law enforcement structures of the European Union and United States were created, describe the dual enforcement structures, and explain current efforts to coordinate the two levels of enforcement. It will conclude with observations about the nature of dual enforcement under the two systems. More specifically, it will argue that the European Union should create an enforcement system, which might allow more collaboration and cooperation between the Commission and the European Union Member States.
Barry E. Hawk and Laraine L. Laudati,
Antitrust Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison,
20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 18
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol20/iss1/2