Abstract
This Note examines the legal conflicts in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that developed due to the Agency's attempt to verify North Korea's compliance with the NPT. Part I reviews the history of the nonproliferation regime, as well as the pertinent textual provisions of the IAEA Statute, the NPT, and the North Korean-Agency Safeguards Agreement. Part II reviews the events leading up to North Korea's alleged withdrawal from the NPT and discusses the DPRK's and the Agency's legal arguments concerning North Korea's rights under the regime. Part III argues that the Agency has the right to inspect the DPRK's facilities because: (i) every law in the regime must be read in light of the other regime laws, and (ii) the regime as a whole mandates that an NPT signatory relinquish its sovereign rights as necessary to ensure global collective security. This Note concludes that delegates attending the upcoming 1995 NPT renewal conference should develop regime laws that: (i) regulate the Agency's administration of intelligence received from third parties, and (ii) unify the regime's emphasis on global rights to collective security over national rights of sovereignty.
Recommended Citation
Susan Carmody,
Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea's Nuclear Facilities?,
18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 229
(1994).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol18/iss1/7