Abstract
Part I of this Note examines the case law that addresses the issue of U.S. bank home office liability. Part II analyzes U.S. monetary policy provisions that affect deposits held in foreign branches of U.S. banks and the conditions under which a U.S. bank may become a guarantor. Part III argues that the case law holding the U.S. bank home office liable implies a guaranty term into the deposit account contract and frustrates efforts to regulate U.S. monetary policy. This Note concludes that unless appropriate arragements are made between the foreign depositor and the U.S. bank home office, the home office should not be liable for the return of deposits held in its foreign branches.
Recommended Citation
Marvin J. Miller Jr.,
Holding U.S. Bank Home Offices Liable for Deposits in Their Foreign Branches,
11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 621
(1987).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol11/iss3/6