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Keywords

Voting Rights Act; section 2; section 208; voting; statutory interpretation; legislative history; circuit split; private right of action; private enforcement; voting rights; implied private right of action; election law

Abstract

For six decades, private plaintiffs have stood at the center of Voting Rights Act (VRA) enforcement, bringing an overwhelming majority of the suits challenging discriminatory voting practices nationwide. Most federal courts have allowed private plaintiffs to sue for relief under the VRA. However, in 2023 and 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit broke from this pattern, holding that neither section 2 nor section 208 of the VRA permits private litigants to sue for relief. The Eighth Circuit’s decisions rest on a narrow reading of congressional intent, a rigid application of Alexander v. Sandovaland Gonzaga University v. Doe, and a selective textual analysis.

This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s rulings misconstrue the Voting Rights Act’s structure, history, and purpose. Drawing on the VRA’s remedial design, its 1975 and 1982 amendments, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, this Note contends that Congress envisioned shared public and private enforcement as indispensable to protecting the Voting Rights Act’s purpose. It further distinguishes section 208’s explicit individual guarantees from section 2’s systemic focus, explaining why section 208 should remain privately enforceable even if the Court restricts suits under section 2. Finally, this Note warns that eliminating private enforcement would leave the VRA’s vitality to the limited resources of the U.S. Department of Justice, undermining the statute’s democratic design and the constitutional promise it was enacted to fulfill.

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