Keywords
Article III; Article III standing; Art. III; Art. III standing; standing; standing doctrine; case or controversy; multi-plaintiff; multi-plaintiff litigation; multi-party; multi-party litigation; multiple plaintiff; multiple party; multiple plaintiffs; multiple parties; class action; Rule 23; commonality; typicality; adequacy; Rule 19; Rule 20; joinder; litigation device; litigation mechanism; barebones; separation of powers; judicial restraint; constitutional law; civil procedure; complex litigation; irreducible minimum; concrete; particularized; concrete and particularized; rulemaking; circuit split; one-plaintiff rule; one plaintiff rule; disjuncture; class certification; forms of action; equity; justiciability; procedural fairness; access to justice; standing reform; federal jurisdiction; procedural threshold; purpose of standing
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the absolute core requirements of standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution on several occasions. However, the Court has not clearly articulated what purpose standing serves relative to Article III’s limitations on the exercise of judicial power to only “cases” or “controversies,” and this has led to major downstream effects in the realm of multi plaintiff litigation. Specifically, the Court has not explained whether standing is meant to ensure (1) that all potential plaintiffs demonstrate that they are properly parties to the same case or controversy before a federal court or (2) that at least one plaintiff can make out a case or controversy before a federal court. Should courts consider questions of commonality and adequacy in their standing analyses, or should they be analyzed at a later stage?
This Note discusses the history of standing as a doctrine and its interstitial development alongside the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). It then explores both potential articulations of standing’s purpose through two distinct circuit splits that have arisen in the multi-plaintiff context, examining how those splits are fueled by this overarching confusion about standing’s purpose. Ultimately, this Note will advocate for the adoption of a barebones conception of standing that aligns with the second purpose outlined above. It will demonstrate that adopting the barebones conception would resolve both highlighted splits, as well as other issues related to standing. This will result in less confusion, more equal access to federal courts nationwide, and honor the separation of powers principles that motivated the restraint on judicial power at the core of Article III.
Recommended Citation
Dominic Signa,
Defining “Cases” or “Controversies”: A Fundamental Confusion in Article III Standing Doctrine and Its Consequences in Multi-Plaintiff Litigation,
94 Fordham L. Rev. 793
(2025).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol94/iss2/15
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