Section 1983 and Voting Rights: A Case Study on the Materiality Provision and the Future of Private Enforcement

Authors

Paul Feingold, Fordham University School of Law

Keywords

civil rights; voting rights; Title I; Section 1983; Materiality Provision

Abstract

A recent ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stating that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not enforceable by private litigants under an implied private right of action has many voting rights advocates rightfully concerned about the future of federal voting rights protections. Indeed, that ruling appears partly motivated by signals from the U.S. Supreme Court. However, not all hope is lost. In Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its Gonzaga University v. Doe test for enforcing a statute under § 1983. The Talevski opinion provides a clear path for private litigants to enforce voting rights under § 1983 should an implied private right of action be unavailable.

This Note considers how several circuit courts have applied the Supreme Court’s § 1983 test to the materiality provision—a voting rights protection in Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, this Note argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—the only court to consider whether the materiality provision is enforceable under § 1983 since Talevski—came to the correct conclusion. That is, the materiality provision is enforceable under § 1983. This Note concludes, however, that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was incomplete. Talevski provides stronger support for enforcing voting rights under § 1983 than the Fifth Circuit suggested.

Recommended Citation

Paul Feingold, Section 1983 and Voting Rights: A Case Study on the Materiality Provision and the Future of Private Enforcement, 93 Fordham L. Rev. 149 (2024).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol93/iss1/4