criminal law; neuroscience; neurolaw


Much of the public debate surrounding the intersection of neuroscience and criminal law is based on assumptions about how prosecutors and defense attorneys differ in their use of neuroscience evidence. For example, according to some commentators, the defense’s use of neuroscience evidence will abdicate criminals of all responsibility for their offenses. In contrast, the prosecution’s use of that same evidence will unfairly punish the most vulnerable defendants as unfixable future dangers to society. This “double- edged sword” view of neuroscience evidence is important for flagging concerns about the law’s construction of criminal responsibility and punishment: it demonstrates that the same information about the defendant can either be mitigating or aggravating depending on who is raising it. Yet empirical assessments of legal decisions reveal a far more nuanced reality, showing that public beliefs about the impact of neuroscience on the criminal law can often be wrong. This Article takes an evidence-based and multidisciplinary approach to examining how courts respond to neuroscience evidence in capital cases when the defense presents it to argue that the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime was below the given legal requisite due to some neurologic or cognitive deficiency.