Keywords
antitrust, coercion, restraints, economic efficiency, tying
Abstract
With the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach and its emphasis on competitive prices and output, coercrion--the use of force or threat; to copel another to act against one's will--seemingly no longer has a role to play in antitrust analysis. Professor Burns argues that coercion is indeed still relevant in antitrust analysis, though its role has changed from the central character it once played in the early antitrust cases. After analyzing the evolving role of coercion, Professor Burns concludes that the concept is still useful in vertical restraints and tie-ins distinguishing between efficient restraints and inefficient ones and in evaluating the antitrust-injury standing requirement.
Recommended Citation
Jean Wegmen Burns,
The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust,
60 Fordham L. Rev. 379
(1991).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/1