Oklahoma Law Review
Stockholder litigation remains in crisis, with over seventy percent of major mergers and acquisitions subject to litigation. A contributing factor is the breakdown of the adversary process at settlement, when former opponents join hands in favor of a compromise that too often expends corporate resources for no real recovery to the plaintiff class. One obvious corrective is the shareholder’s objection to settlement, which restores adversarial character to the settlement process. Shareholders, however, face substantial difficulties in making such objections. In this article, the authors detail the problem and share their experiences in addressing these obstacles, providing a how-to manual for future shareholder objections to class action settlements in merger litigation.
Sean J, Griffith and Anthony A. Rickey,
Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A How-To Guide, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 281
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/875