Emory Law Journal
This Article aims to give the relational theory of contract new life, sharpening some of its claims against its competitors by refracting its theory of relational contracts through an analogy to friendship. In drawing the analogy between friendships and relational contracts and revealing their morphological similarities, this Article offers a provocative window into friendship's contractual structure--and into relational contracts' approximation of friendships. The analogy developed here is poised to replace the “relational contract as marriage” model prevalent among relationalists. This new model is more honest to relational contract theory and to marriage--and helps relational contract theory produce some new insights, support old ones, and revise some of its normative agenda.
Ethan J. Leib,
Contracts and Friendships, 59 Emory L.J. 649
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/82