William and Mary Law Review
jury, fiduciary law, fiduciary political theory, fiduciary duties, representation, jury nullification, deliberative democracy
This Essay argues that because jurors exercise state power with wide discretion over the legal and practical interests of other citizens, and because citizens repose trust and remain vulnerable to jury and juror decisions, juries and jurors share important similarities with traditional fiduciary actors such as doctors, lawyers, and corporate directors and boards. The paradigmatic fiduciary duties – those of loyalty and care – therefore provide useful benchmarks for evaluating and guiding jurors in their decision-making role. A sui generis public fiduciary duty of deliberative engagement also has applications in considering the obligations of jurors. This framework confirms much of what we know about the jury’s form of political representation and also recommends some practical directions for jury reform.
Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota, and David L. Ponet,
Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1109
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/542