Rethinking Aquaculture Regulation in a Post-Chevron World

Authors

Kamaile A. N. Turčan

Abstract

After the Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, commentators warned of the detriment to federal agencies resulting from the loss of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they administer. This Essay takes a different approach and examines how advocates for agency authority can use this shift away from judicial deference to their advantage—by refocusing litigation strategy toward congressional delegations. Statutory interpretation arguments need no longer focus on whether an agency is intruding on the judicial prerogative to interpret the law and can now focus instead on whether a court is intruding on the congressional prerogative to delegate discretionary authority to agencies. This is a powerful shift in framing.

Using marine aquaculture regulation as an analytical reference, this Essay makes the affirmative case for agency regulation. Even while overruling Chevron, the Court did not take the most restrictive approach to agency authority and instead reaffirmed that authority in the form of discretion. The Loper Bright delegation is thus a forceful legal mechanism through which agencies may exercise the full extent of their statutory authority and defeat major questions doctrine challenges to that authority. At a time when anti-regulatory sentiment pervades the federal Executive and Judicial branches, Loper Bright enables agencies to accomplish their substantive congressional mandates—a role critical to a functioning democracy.

Recommended Citation

Kamaile A. N. Turčan, Rethinking Aquaculture Regulation in a Post-Chevron World, 36 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. (2025).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr/vol36/iss3/1