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TRACKING TERRORIST FINANCING THROUGH SWIFT: WHEN U.S. SUBPOENAS AND FOREIGN PRIVACY LAW COLLIDE

Patrick M. Connorton*

This Note examines the jurisprudence surrounding production orders that require the ordered party to violate foreign law, using the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program—better known as the SWIFT Program—as a case study. This Note recommends that courts excuse or punish noncompliance with such production orders based solely on the good or bad faith acts of the ordered party. Although this approach will clarify the law in this area, in certain circumstances it may make it more difficult for the United States to obtain information abroad. Consequently, this Note urges the United States to pursue formal and informal information-sharing agreements with its allies in the war on terror.

INTRODUCTION

We are caught between complying with the U.S. and European rules, and it's a train wreck.1

—Leonard Schrank, Chief Executive Officer of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States has made tracking terrorist financing a top priority.2 The most ambitious of these efforts is the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, more commonly known as the SWIFT Program.3 Under the SWIFT Program, the U.S. Treasury uses administrative subpoenas to access the vast database of financial information gathered by the Society for

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Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgium-based banking cooperative that supplies messaging services to thousands of financial institutions around the world. Those familiar with SWIFT’s database have dubbed it “the mother lode, the Rosetta stone’ for financial data.”

Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, has called the counterterrorism benefits of accessing this information “incalculable.”

Unfortunately, until June 2007, in order to grant the United States access to its financial records, SWIFT had to violate Belgian and E.U. privacy laws prohibiting the transfer of personal data to nations with relatively lax privacy laws, such as the United States. It was not until U.S. newspapers exposed the formerly classified SWIFT Program in the summer of 2006, however, that Belgian and E.U. officials became aware of these violations. Though SWIFT argued that it had complied with all relevant privacy regulations, Belgian and E.U. data protection authorities harshly reprimanded the group and demanded that it stop complying with the U.S. subpoenas. SWIFT subsequently found itself in the unenviable position of deciding whether to comply with U.S. law or Belgian and E.U. law.

11. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 25 (calling SWIFT’s compliance with U.S. subpoenas “a serious error of judgment”); Press Release, European Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 8 (stating that SWIFT had violated “fundamental European principles” as well as Belgian and E.U. law); see also, Bilefsky, supra note 1 (noting that Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt “took Swift to task for passing on confidential
SWIFT remained torn between these conflicting obligations until June 27, 2007, when the United States and the European Union reached an agreement (the U.S.-E.U. Compromise) that allowed the SWIFT Program to continue operating in modified form. Under the U.S.-E.U. Compromise, the United States agreed to use information obtained from SWIFT only for counterterrorism purposes and to retain the information for no longer than five years.

The trials and tribulations of the SWIFT Program highlight a problem that continuously threatens U.S. initiatives in the war on terror: The United States' unquenchable thirst for information and intelligence often puts it at odds with countries that highly value privacy, such as most European nations. This clash of principles explains, among other examples, the dispute between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the European Union over the use of air-passenger manifests by U.S. intelligence agencies. As evidenced by the recent agreement regarding the SWIFT Program, compromise is a potential solution to such clashes. But what if the cost of compromise is too high? Can the United States simply gather the desired information unilaterally? In the case of the SWIFT Program, could the United States have brought SWIFT before a U.S. court and demanded compliance with its subpoenas even though doing so would require SWIFT to violate foreign law?

The answer depends, in part, on where the suit is brought. Over the past fifty years, U.S. courts have taken wide-ranging positions on orders that require a party to violate foreign law. The financial information without adequate safeguards that European privacy rules would be respected.

12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. See Jane Perlez, U.S. Asks Europe to Ensure Continued Access to Air Passenger Data, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2007, at A3 ("In order to reduce the odds that terrorists will enter the United States, the Bush administration is asking the European Union to lift its objections to the sharing of airline passenger information with American intelligence agencies, said the secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff.").
position that such orders should never be enforced,\textsuperscript{17} while others required the ordered party to make a good faith effort to comply.\textsuperscript{18} Today, courts have largely abandoned these per se rules. Instead, courts now employ a balancing test that weighs, among other things, the conflicting national interests at stake and the hardship imposed on the ordered party.\textsuperscript{19} Courts differ, however, on how best to balance the relevant factors.\textsuperscript{20} Some courts have even suggested that meaningfully balancing these factors is impossible.\textsuperscript{21}

Courts today also consider the extent to which the ordered party has acted in good or bad faith in determining whether sanctions, such as fines or default judgments, are appropriate for noncompliance.\textsuperscript{22} Again, courts disagree on what qualifies as good or bad faith and what significance, if any, good or bad faith should have in determining sanctions for noncompliance with an order that requires violation of foreign law.

This Note examines U.S. courts’ treatment of orders that require violation of foreign law using the SWIFT Program as a case study. This Note argues that the balancing test used to determine whether to enforce such orders has proven unworkable. Instead, this Note encourages courts to look solely to the good or bad faith acts of the ordered party. Since this approach will make it difficult for the United States to unilaterally gather information under certain circumstances, formal agreements like the U.S.-E.U. Compromise will become increasingly important. However, this Note argues that the United States should also make use of more informal agreements that offer greater flexibility.

\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that courts should not cause violations of foreign law); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960) (same); First Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959) (same).


\textsuperscript{19} See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474–75 (9th Cir. 1992) (conducting a balancing test to determine the validity of an order requiring violation of foreign law); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1279–83 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542–43 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (same); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. g (1987) (advocating the use of a balancing test); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40 (1965) (same).

\textsuperscript{20} These differences are discussed at length in Part II.A.3.


Part I of this Note introduces the SWIFT Program and addresses Belgium’s and the European Union’s findings that the program forced SWIFT to violate their laws. Part I also discusses the U.S.-E.U. Compromise, which will keep the SWIFT Program operational in modified form.

Part II examines the case law regarding orders that require violation of foreign law. Part II.A traces the evolution of U.S. courts’ approach to such orders, focusing on the development of the balancing test. This history explains the terms of the current debate and details the conflicting approaches courts take. Part II.B examines the good faith standard and the varying degrees of significance that courts attach to good or bad faith acts. Part II.C discusses various attempts to circumvent the problems posed by orders requiring violation of foreign law with formal and informal international agreements.

Part III argues that a noncompliant party’s good or bad faith acts in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law ought to be the sole factor in determining whether sanctions are appropriate for noncompliance. This part concludes that, under this approach, the United States would have been unable to compel SWIFT to comply with its subpoenas. As such, Part III encourages the United States to employ both formal and informal information-sharing agreements with its allies in the war on terror.

I. SWIFT AND THE SWIFT PROGRAM

This part gives background information on both SWIFT and the SWIFT Program. Part I.A traces the history of SWIFT, explaining its importance to the banking and finance industries. Part I.B addresses the development and operation of the SWIFT Program and details foreign objections to the program, focusing on Belgium’s and the European Union’s findings that the SWIFT Program violated their laws. Part I.B also discusses the U.S.-E.U. Compromise that will keep the SWIFT Program operational.

A. SWIFT

In 1973, a group of 239 banks from 15 different countries founded SWIFT as a financial-industry-owned cooperative in Brussels, Belgium. Through SWIFT, the banks hoped to create “a shared worldwide data processing and communications link and a common language for international financial transactions.” More specifically, they envisioned SWIFT as a network to carry messages containing instructions for international transfers of money between banks. Today, SWIFT has nearly 2300 member organizations in 208 countries and provides transfer...
instructions to 8147 financial institutions. Its network carries up to 12.7 million messages a day. "[V]irtually every major commercial bank, as well as brokerage houses, fund managers and stock exchanges, uses its services." 

B. The SWIFT Program

1. Creation and Operation

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush administration made “cut[ting] off the flow of money to Al Qaeda,” and similar organizations, a top priority. On September 23, 2001, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat of terrorism. The declared emergency granted the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) authority to issue administrative subpoenas to obtain financial records related to terrorism investigations.

Shortly after President Bush signed Executive Order 13224, OFAC began using its new administrative subpoena powers on SWIFT in a secret effort that developed into the SWIFT Program. OFAC can subpoena SWIFT because “SWIFT has substantial business and operations in the United States, including data storage.” By September 29, 2006, sixty-four

27. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6.
28. See id.; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
31. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 (“The [Office of Foreign Asset Control’s] administrative subpoenas are issued under authority granted in the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act.”); Press Release, supra note 4 (“The legal basis for this subpoena is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a statute passed in 1977, which allows the government to compel the production of information pursuant to Presidential declarations of national emergency.... In this case, our subpoena is issued pursuant to President Bush’s declaration of an emergency with respect to terrorism after September 11th in Executive Order 13224.”).
32. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 (noting that the first administrative subpoenas were issued “[w]ithin weeks of 9/11”). The idea to target SWIFT “grew out of a suggestion by a Wall Street executive, who told a senior Bush administration official about Swift’s database.” Id. Before then, “[f]ew government officials knew much about the consortium... but they quickly discovered it offered unparalleled access to international transactions.” Id.
33. Swift.com, Update and Q&A to SWIFT’s 23 June 2006 Statement on Compliance (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=60275; see also Belgian Opinion supra note 8, at 3 (noting that one of SWIFT’s two “operation centres” is in the United States). A detailed analysis of U.S. jurisdiction over SWIFT is beyond the scope of this Note. It warrants mentioning, though, that no one has challenged the SWIFT Program on jurisdictional grounds, particularly not SWIFT itself.
administrative subpoenas had been served on SWIFT, generally at monthly intervals. These subpoenas allowed OFAC to retrieve customers' names, bank account numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and other identifying information.

The physical transfer of information and documents from SWIFT to OFAC took place in two phases. First, messages subject to the SWIFT Program's subpoenas were delivered from SWIFT's operation center in the United States to the U.S. Treasury, where they were stored in a "black box" or "production database." Next, OFAC used software to search the production database for predetermined names related to terrorism investigations. OFAC conducted these searches in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other interested agencies. According to Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, "tens of thousands" of such searches were conducted during the first five years of the program. U.S. intelligence agencies analyzed information gleaned from these searches "to detect patterns, shifts in strategy, specific 'hotspot accounts,' and locations that had become new havens for terrorist activity."

The scope of the SWIFT Program was not unlimited, however. For example, before conducting a search, analysts first had to "articulate[] the specific link between the target of the search and a terrorism investigation." Search requests were also reviewed by the U.S. Treasury's assistant secretary for intelligence and were subject to oversight by an outside auditor. Furthermore, "SWIFT officials [were]... allowed..."

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34. Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 5.
35. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
36. Id.; see also Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 (calling SWIFT's database "a rich hunting ground for government investigators"); Simpson, supra note 9.
37. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 5.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 6.
40. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
41. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
42. Id.
43. Actually, at the outset, there were few if any limitations on the program. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 ("At first, they got everything—the entire Swift database,' one person close to the operation said.").
44. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 4. "[T]here had been one instance of abuse in which an analyst had conducted a search that did not meet the terrorist-related criteria. The analyst was subsequently denied access to the database." Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
45. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 ("A SWIFT representative said that Booz Allen Hamilton, an international consulting firm, is the auditor but provided no further details on how the oversight process works.").
to be present when analysts search[ed] the data and to raise objections with top officials.”

2. Reaction to the SWIFT Program in the United States

On June 23, 2006, *The New York Times, Los Angeles Times*, and *The Wall Street Journal* published stories revealing the existence of the SWIFT Program. Initially, critics likened the program to the Bush administration’s controversial use of warrantless wiretaps. Some of those who leaked information regarding the SWIFT Program did so out of concerns "that they were exploiting a ‘gray area’ in the law" and might be violating Fourth Amendment protections against illegal searches and seizures. Critics considered the program’s use of administrative subpoenas particularly problematic.

Members of the Bush administration quickly defended the program, calling it "a vital tool" in the war on terror. Supporters pointed to specific successes of the SWIFT Program: the capture of Hambali, the mastermind of the 2002 resort bombing in Bali; the conviction of Brooklyn resident Uzair Parchara on terrorism-related charges; and, generally, the SWIFT investigations, that the scrutinizers . . . had access to everything the [U.S. Treasury] analysts were inquiring and to force continuing improvements to the system.


46. Meyer & Miller, *supra* note 9; see also Belgian Opinion, *supra* note 8, at 7 (discussing the role of SWIFT officials on-site at the U.S. Treasury). It is unclear what weight SWIFT’s objections would carry. As SWIFT takes pains to point out on its web site, SWIFT is not volunteering information to the United States but rather is being compelled to produce it through administrative subpoenas. See Swift.com, *supra* note 33.


48. See, e.g., Editorial, *Following the Money*, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 26, 2006, at B8 (“To the list of the Bush administration’s constitutionally dubious efforts to track terrorism suspects now add tapping international banking records without judicial subpoena.”); Editorial, *Following the Money, and the Rules*, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2006, at A14; Meyer & Miller, *supra* note 9 (“[The SWIFT Program] is part of an arsenal of aggressive measures the government has adopted since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that yield new intelligence, but also circumvent traditional safeguards against abuse and raise concerns about intrusions on privacy.”).


50. See, e.g., id. (referring to the use of administrative subpoenas as a “significant departure from typical practice in how the government acquires Americans’ financial records”); Meyer & Miller, *supra* note 9 (calling it “a major departure from traditional methods of obtaining financial records”).


52. See Lichtblau & Risen, *supra* note 6 (“The Swift data identified a previously unknown figure in Southeast Asia who had financial dealings with a person suspected of being a member of Al Qaeda; that link helped locate Hambali in Thailand in 2003 . . . ”).

53. See id. (describing Parchara’s conviction for aiding “a Qaeda operative in Pakistan by agreeing to launder $200,000 through a Karachi bank”).
Program's ability to monitor "lower- and mid-level terrorist operatives and financiers" as well as certain militant groups.\textsuperscript{54}

The Bush administration further contended that the program stood "on rock-solid legal ground."\textsuperscript{55} While some debate this claim,\textsuperscript{56} many of the program's critics do not dispute its legality.\textsuperscript{57} The ombudsman for \textit{The New York Times} even wrote that his newspaper rushed to judgment on the program's legality under U.S. laws.\textsuperscript{58} Perhaps the best evidence of the SWIFT Program's legality is SWIFT's decision not to challenge the program's subpoenas in a U.S. court.\textsuperscript{59}

3. International Reaction to the SWIFT Program

Reaction to the SWIFT Program in Europe and other foreign nations, many of which have stronger privacy protections than the United States,\textsuperscript{60} was and still is decidedly negative. Most notably, the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission concluded that SWIFT violated Belgian and E.U. law when it cooperated with OFAC's administrative subpoenas: \textsuperscript{61} "[It] must be considered a serious error of judgment on the part of SWIFT to subject a massive quantity of personal data to surveillance in a secret and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] Meyer & Miller, supra note 9. According to Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, the SWIFT Program is particularly useful in monitoring “Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.” Id. Other officials claim, however, that it has “been only marginally successful against Al Qaeda.” Id.
\item[56] See Business Briefing, Legal: SWIFT Ordered to Face Lawsuit, Wash. Post, June 16, 2007, at D2 (noting that a lawsuit filed against SWIFT for the alleged violation of privacy rights had survived a motion to dismiss); Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 (interviewing a leading banking and privacy law expert who was troubled by the program's broad subpoena powers).
\item[57] See, e.g., Editorial, Bank Surveillance, Wash. Post, June 24, 2006, at A20 (noting that the SWIFT Program "appears to be legal"); Byron Calame, Op-Ed., Can 'Magazines' of The Times Subsidize News Coverage?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2006, at A22 (faulting \textit{The New York Times} for rushing to judgment on the SWIFT Program's legality); see also Eric Lichtblau, Controls on Bank-Data Spying Impress Civil Liberties Board, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2006, at A26 (noting that a Democratic member of Congress’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was impressed “with the lengths to which [the SWIFT Program has] gone to avoid infringing on people's civil rights”).
\item[58] See Calame, supra note 57.
\item[60] See Bilefsky, supra note 1 (“The European Union does not consider the United States to be a country that offers sufficient legal protection of individual data.”).
\item[61] Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 26.
\end{footnotes}
systematic manner for years without effective grounds for justification and without independent control in accordance with Belgian and European law.”

The Belgian Privacy Protection Commission found fault with SWIFT’s actions on a number of grounds. As a preliminary matter, the commission categorized SWIFT as a “data controller” as opposed to a “data processor,” a distinction that subjects SWIFT to greater liability for privacy violations under Belgian law. According to the commission, SWIFT ignored its legal duty as a data controller to inform affected parties that it was providing their financial data to the United States. Further, the commission faulted SWIFT for transferring personal data to a country with inadequate privacy protections, namely the United States.

Though the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission admitted that SWIFT had a “legitimate interest” in complying with valid U.S. subpoenas, it held nonetheless that this did not “justify a secret, systematic and large scale violation of the basic European principles of data protection.” The commission chastised SWIFT for simply complying with the subpoenas rather than challenging them in a U.S. court. Alternatively, the commission suggested that SWIFT could have appealed to international organizations that were developed to resolve conflict of laws problems related to tracking terrorist financing.

The Belgian Privacy Protection Commission did not recommend what action should have been taken against SWIFT for its infractions, stating instead merely that it would “remain[] available to issue further guidance.” Other Belgian authorities similarly refrained from announcing plans for legal action against SWIFT. In fact, after the commission announced its findings, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt called the SWIFT Program “an absolute necessity” and suggested that the United

62. Id.
63. Id. at 8. Under Belgian and E.U. law, a data controller “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data,” whereas a data processor “processes personal data on behalf of the data controller.” Id. at 9. “The distinction between both qualifications has very important consequences . . . [since] the processor has in principle a limited liability and [concerned persons] can in principle only assert their rights on the data controller.” Id. SWIFT has called this aspect of the Commission’s finding its “principal defect.” SWIFT’s Response, supra note 59, at 1. For further information on this topic, compare Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 8–15 (arguing that SWIFT is a data controller), with SWIFT’s Response, supra note 59, at 4–6 (arguing that SWIFT is a data processor).
64. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 17.
65. See id. at 18–19.
66. Id. at 20–21.
67. See id. at 21.
68. Id. In its response to the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission’s findings, SWIFT observed that such international organizations merely make recommendations to member states and are not available as forums in which private entities can file grievances. See SWIFT’s Response, supra note 59, at 8.
70. See Anderson, supra note 51.
States work with European nations to bring the program into line with E.U. law. 71

Two months after the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission issued its findings, an E.U. Article 29 Working Group—a panel composed of representatives from each E.U. member country—reached largely the same conclusions. 72 Like the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission, the working group considered SWIFT a “data controller.” 73 It also concluded that SWIFT had violated its “duty to provide information, the notification of the processing [of personal data], [and] the obligation to provide an appropriate level of protection to meet the requirements for international transfers of personal data.” 74 The working group continued,

[We are] of the opinion that the hidden, systematic, massive and long-term transfer of personal data by SWIFT to the [U.S. Treasury] in a confidential, non-transparent and systematic manner for years without effective legal grounds and without the possibility of independent control by public data protection supervisory authorities constitutes a violation of the fundamental European principles as regards data protection and is not in accordance with Belgian and European law. 75

Unlike the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission, the Article 29 Working Group issued a list of “immediate actions” meant to address SWIFT’s infractions. 76 Among other mandates, the working group called on SWIFT to cease its infringements of Belgian and E.U. law and to “[r]eturn to lawful data processing.” 77 According to E.U. officials, the working group’s findings caused the European Commission to consider taking Belgium to court for failing to force SWIFT to uphold E.U. data protection rules. 78 Some E.U. lawmakers even advised SWIFT to move its North American operation center to Canada, where it would be more insulated from U.S. subpoena power. 79

71. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Bilefsky, supra note 72.
79. See Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank Group and Overseer for U.S. Access to Data, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. Even with the political compromise in place, SWIFT is partially following this advice. See Melander, supra note 13 (“The financial network announced earlier this month that it would modify its messaging system to ensure that intra-European data are stored only in Europe and not in the United States.”).
4. Subsequent Action by SWIFT

On the day the U.S. media exposed the SWIFT Program, SWIFT issued a press release to assure its clients that it had complied with the privacy laws of all affected nations. In the press release, SWIFT stressed that, although it had voluntarily taken part in the negotiations that established the SWIFT Program, the subpoenas were ultimately compulsory. In the months after the program's initial exposure, SWIFT sought to convince Belgian and other E.U. officials that its compliance with the SWIFT Program was permissible under their laws. SWIFT also called on U.S. officials to engage their E.U. counterparts in the hopes that they would reach a mutually agreeable solution.

5. The U.S.-E.U. Compromise

The United States and the European Union heeded these calls and reached an accord regarding the SWIFT Program on June 27, 2007. Under the compromise, the United States agreed to (1) use data obtained through the SWIFT Program exclusively for counterterrorism purposes; (2) delete information unrelated to counterterrorism investigations on an ongoing basis; (3) retain data for no more than five years; (4) permit an E.U. official to monitor the program; and (5) publish the provisions of the agreement in the Federal Register. Though the compromise assuaged the fears of E.U. officials, certain details still must be approved by E.U. member states.

81. See id. For the purposes of liability, SWIFT has stressed that its cooperation with the SWIFT Program is ultimately compelled by U.S. law and, thus, not actually voluntary.
83. Swift.com, US Bi-Partisan Panel “Impressed” by SWIFT’s Controls to Protect Civil Liberties (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=60966 (“SWIFT, which is caught between serious interpretation issues surrounding current US and EU laws, has called repeatedly for a global solution for providing financial intelligence for counterterrorism purposes with adequate data protection safeguards.”).
85. See id. European Commission Vice President Franco Frattini stated, “The EU will have now the necessary guarantees that [the] US Treasury processes data it receives from Swift’s mirror server in [the United States] in a way which takes account of EU data protection principles.” Id.
86. See Melander, supra note 13.
The E.U.-U.S. Compromise provided a mutually agreeable solution to a difficult legal and political conflict. However, some of the concessions that the United States made to preserve the SWIFT Program will almost certainly hamper U.S. counterterrorism efforts. For example, the U.S.-E.U. Compromise’s requirement that the U.S. Treasury delete information unrelated to counterterrorism investigations may result in the irrevocable deletion of the financial records of terrorists who have not yet been identified as threats. While the compromise may have been necessary to maintain important allies in the war on terror, it raises the question of whether the United States had other options. Specifically, did the United States have legal recourse to enforce its subpoenas against SWIFT in a U.S. court even though doing so would force SWIFT to violate foreign law? Part II’s examination of the jurisprudence surrounding orders requiring violation of foreign law reveals that there is no easy answer to this question.

II. U.S. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF ORDERS REQUIRING VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW

This part traces the evolution of U.S. courts’ treatment of orders requiring violation of foreign law and then addresses the current divide over the appropriate roles of the balancing test and good faith analysis. Part II.A examines attempts by U.S. courts to reconcile the Supreme Court’s only relevant holding regarding such orders with the subsequent issuance of two restatements, both of which endorsed the use of a balancing test. Part II.B focuses on the good faith standard and the varying significance that courts attach to good and bad faith acts in response to orders requiring violation of foreign law. This section identifies three distinct approaches to the significance of good and bad faith acts. Finally, Part II.C discusses various attempts to circumvent the problem of orders requiring violation of foreign law through formal and informal international cooperation.

A. Evolution of U.S. Courts’ Treatment of Orders Requiring Violation of Foreign Law

1. The Supreme Court Lays the Foundation: Societe Internationale

The Supreme Court last confronted the enforceability of orders requiring violation of foreign law in the landmark 1958 case Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.\(^7\) In Societe Internationale, Societe, a Swiss holding company, sued to recover assets seized by the U.S. government in World War II pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act.\(^8\) In preparing its defense, the U.S. government moved for an order requiring Societe to produce banking records relevant to

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\(^7\) 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
\(^8\) See id. at 198–99.
the ownership of the assets in question. Though it partially complied with the order, Societe asked for relief from full compliance on the grounds that producing certain bank records would violate Swiss law. In response, the U.S. government filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, holding, "Swiss law did not furnish an adequate excuse for [Societe's] failure to comply with the production order, since [Societe] could not invoke foreign laws to justify disobedience to orders entered under the laws of the forum." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed on appeal.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the threat of violating a foreign law could justify noncompliance with an otherwise valid production order. The Court first addressed the propriety of the production order's issuance, questioning whether Societe could be said to "control" the restricted materials for the purpose of production when Swiss law prohibited their disclosure. After considering the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act, the importance of the materials to the litigation, and Societe's nationality, the Court found that Societe had control over the materials and that the issuance of the production order was

89. See id. at 199-200.
90. See id. at 200.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 201-02.
93. See id. at 202. Initially, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit altered the dismissal order to allow Societe an additional six months to ask the Swiss government for permission to produce the restricted materials. See id. at 202-03. The district court directed final dismissal after these efforts failed to comply sufficiently with the production order. See id. at 203. The court rejected Societe's suggestion that an independent investigator be given access to the restricted materials in order to identify relevant documents without compromising their confidentiality. See id. Interestingly, this plan bears some resemblance to the structure of the SWIFT Program in that both utilize an independent investigator/auditor as a means of straddling the line between disclosure and secrecy. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
94. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 213.
95. See id. at 204.
96. Id. ("The question then becomes: Do the interdictions of Swiss law bar a conclusion that petitioner had 'control' of these documents within the meaning of Rule 34 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]?") The Swiss Federal Attorney had actually confiscated the restricted materials in this case to preserve their secrecy. See id. at 200. The Court held that this fact "add[ed] nothing to the dimensions of the problem," instead finding that the true bar to control was "the possibility of criminal prosecution" in Switzerland. Id. at 204.
97. See id. at 204-05 ("[The] possibility of enemy taint of nationals of neutral powers, particularly of holding companies with intricate financial structures, which asserted rights to American assets was of deep concern to the Congress.").
98. See id. at 205 ("The District Court here concluded that the [restricted materials] might have a vital influence upon this litigation insofar as they shed light upon [Societe's] confused background.").
99. See id. ("[Societe] is in a most advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of plans which will at the least achieve a significant measure of compliance with the production order.").
The Court noted, however, that its holding was limited to the circumstances of the case at hand. In conducting this analysis, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the district court’s finding that Societe had not “conspired” to take advantage of Swiss secrecy laws and had made “good faith” efforts to comply with the production order. The Court found that “[Societe’s] failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control.” Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that these circumstances could potentially excuse noncompliance: “It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.” The Court found that Societe was effectively asserting a defense of “inability to comply because of foreign law.” The Court concluded that the sanction of dismissal was improper where the “failure to comply [with a production order was] due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of [Societe].”

2. Deferring to International Comity: Societe Internationale Disregarded

Ironically, the first line of cases to emerge post-Societe Internationale completely disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling. In a series of cases,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that courts should never order the production of materials that require violation of foreign law. In *First National City Bank of New York v. I.R.S.*, the first of these cases, the Second Circuit confronted an Internal Revenue Service summons—a type of administrative subpoena—requiring a New York bank to produce records located in Panama allegedly in violation of Panamanian law. The Second Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that production would actually violate Panamanian law, but noted that, in cases where foreign illegality could be proven, "the production of the . . . records should not be ordered."  

The Second Circuit cited this dictum in two subsequent cases, effectively establishing a ban against orders requiring violation of foreign law. In *Ings v. Ferguson*, the court modified a subpoena duces tecum that would have required a bank to produce financial records allegedly in violation of Canadian law. Rather than enforce the subpoena, the court advised the party seeking production to ask for assistance from Canada's courts via a letter rogatory. (A letter rogatory is essentially a request that a foreign court take evidence on behalf of a U.S. court.) Two years later, in the case of *In re Chase Manhattan Bank*, the Second Circuit again modified a subpoena duces tecum that would have required a New York bank to violate Panamanian law. As in *Ings*, the court stated it would not order a production in violation of foreign law and advised the party seeking production—the U.S. government—to request assistance from Panamanian authorities in obtaining the documents.

e.g., United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1388–89 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying the logic of *Societe Internationale* to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum).

109. See *In re Chase Manhattan Bank*, 297 F.2d at 613; *Ings*, 282 F.2d at 152 ("Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures."); *First Nat'l City Bank of New York*, 271 F.2d at 619 (holding that the production of records should not be ordered where production would require violation of foreign law).

110. *First Nat'l City Bank of New York*, 271 F.2d at 618.

111. See *id.* at 619 ("[T]he only evidence [that production would violate Panamanian law] was contained in the affidavit of the Bank's expert . . . which in our view constituted insufficient basis for nonenforcement of the subpoena.").

112. *Id.*

113. *Ings*, 282 F.2d at 150–53.

114. See *id.* at 152–53. The court reasoned that a Canadian court would either enforce the production order or rule that production would be illegal, in which case the Second Circuit would quash the order. See *id.* at 152–53.

115. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Obtaining Discovery Abroad 9 (2005) ("[Letters rogatory] are formal communications sent by a court in which an action is pending to a court of a foreign country, requesting the foreign court to take the testimony of a witness resident within that court's jurisdiction and transmit a transcript to the issuing court.").

116. *In re Chase Manhattan Bank*, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).

117. Specifically, the court noted that the subpoena duces tecum was left outstanding to "insure [the bank's] cooperation with the [U.S. government] when and if the [U.S. government] seeks to obtain the records by application to the Panamanian authorities." *Id.* at
The guiding principle in these decisions was deference to international comity. According to the Second Circuit, "[U.S. courts] have an obligation to respect the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in economic and legal philosophy from our own."\textsuperscript{118} The Second Circuit was not concerned that this strong deference to international comity invalidated all orders requiring violation of foreign law since alternative evidence-gathering techniques existed.\textsuperscript{119}

Subsequent holdings in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have limited the significance of these cases.\textsuperscript{120} But, even as courts have moved toward a more flexible approach, some commentators believe that deference to international comity remains an influential principle.\textsuperscript{121}

3. The Restatement (Second): Introducing the Balancing Test

The next major shift in courts' thinking came in 1965, with the American Law Institute's (ALI) publication of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The Restatement (Second) instructed courts to balance several important factors when assessing the validity of an order requiring violation of foreign law, specifically

(a) [the] vital national interests of each of the states,

\textsuperscript{613} The court appeared to advise the U.S. government to file a letter rogatory with the appropriate Panamanian authorities.

\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 613; see also White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 369, 372 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("Comity, in the international sense, is defined as courtesy demonstrated between nations involving the mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.").

\textsuperscript{119} See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613 (discussing the possibility that a party might "[ask] the [foreign] authorities to authorize ... [production of] the documents"); Ings, 282 F.2d at 151 ("For many years the time honored custom of seeking evidence in foreign countries, particularly in cases in which the aid of foreign courts may be necessary to secure the production of records, has been by letters rogatory."). But see U.S. Department of State, Preparation of Letters Rogatory, http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited July 28, 2007) ("Letters rogatory are a time consuming, cumbersome process and should not be utilized unless there are no other options available.").

\textsuperscript{120} See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that the Second Circuit has disavowed these cases and "has clearly moved to a more flexible position"); infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{121} See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We do not here decide the general issue of whether a court may ever order action in violation of foreign laws, although we should say that it causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law, particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question."); Feagle, supra note 16, at 302–03 ("[International] comity-driven decisions have never been explicitly overruled and comity jurisprudence continues to be influential, appearing not only in dicta, but also in applications of the current balancing analysis."). But see Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 39(1) (1965) ("A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct."); Brodeur, supra note 16, at 585–86 (claiming that deference to international comity has "ceased to be influential").
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,

(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,

(d) the nationality of the person, and

(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.  

Commentators disagree as to whether the Restatement (Second) codified the Supreme Court’s holding in *Societe Internationale* or moved in an entirely different direction altogether.  

Regardless, courts quickly embraced the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test, beginning with the Second Circuit in the watershed case of *United States v. First National City Bank*. There, the court addressed a grand jury subpoena issued against Citibank pursuant to a government antitrust investigation of some of the bank’s customers. Citibank refused to comply with the subpoena on the grounds that production of the requested materials—documents located in Citibank’s New York City and Frankfurt, Germany, branches—would violate its contractual obligations to these customers under German law, opening the bank to civil liability claims.

In assessing whether these circumstances excused Citibank’s noncompliance, the court adopted the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test, overturning its prior holdings that such production orders were per se invalid. The court held, “Mechanical or overbroad rules of thumb are of little value; what is required is a careful balancing of the interests involved and a precise understanding of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

122. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40 (1965).
123. Compare Feagle, supra note 16, at 303–05 (arguing that *Societe Internationale*’s “balancing test” has been “expanded and codified in two versions of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States”), with Brodeur, supra note 16, at 588 (arguing that a “close reading [of] *Societe Internationale* reveals no ‘balancing’ unlike the Restatement (Second)).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
125. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
126. See id. at 898.
127. See id. at 898–99.
128. See id. at 902 (“In evaluating Citibank’s contention that compliance should be excused because of the alleged conflict between the order of the court below and German law, we are aided materially by the rationale of the recent Restatement [(Second)].”).
129. Id. at 901.
The Second Circuit focused on two of the Restatement (Second)'s factors, namely the conflicting national interests at stake and the hardship facing Citibank. In balancing national interests, the court gave great weight to the United States' interest in enforcing subpoenas generally and in antitrust actions in particular. Turning to Germany's interest in bank secrecy, the court admitted that assessing the importance of a foreign national interest was inherently difficult. Nonetheless, the court questioned the importance of bank secrecy to Germany given that it can be waived and is not codified. The court also noted that the German government did not expressly object to the subpoena in this case as endangering German interests. The court then considered the hardship facing the bank—potential foreign civil liability—and found it too "slight and speculative" to excuse noncompliance with the subpoena. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's contempt order against Citibank for noncompliance.

The Restatement (Second)'s balancing test has proven highly influential following its use in First National City Bank, but courts disagree over many of its features. For example, courts disagree over whether to apply the test in two phases—first to the propriety of the order and then to the propriety of enforcing the order with sanctions—or simply to conduct a unitary analysis. In First National City Bank, the Second Circuit drew no

130. See id. at 902 (limiting its inquiry to the "national interests of the United States and Germany" and "the hardship, if any, Citibank will suffer").

131. See id. at 902–03. The court quoted Judge Learned Hand in support of the importance of subpoenas as an evidence-gathering tool: "The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more especially where as here the inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified at all only where the opposing private interest is supreme." Id. The court did not appear troubled that avoiding "suppression of truth" could be offered as a vital national interest to justify any subpoena (or any civil discovery order) requiring violation of foreign law. Id. at 903 ("We would have great reluctance... to countenance any device that would place relevant information beyond the reach of this duly impaneled Grand Jury or impede or delay its proceedings.").

132. See id. ("We examine the importance of bank secrecy within the framework of German public policy with full recognition that it is often a subtle and difficult undertaking to determine the nature and scope of the law of a foreign jurisdiction."). Critics of the balancing test argue that U.S. courts are no better positioned to assess the importance of U.S. national interests than they are of foreign ones. See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.

133. See First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903 ("[I]t is surely of considerable significance that Germany considers bank secrecy simply a privilege that can be waived by the customer and is content to leave the matter of enforcement to the vagaries of private litigation.").

134. See id. ("Indeed, bank secrecy is not even required by statute.").

135. See id. at 904 ("[I]t is noteworthy that... the German Government has [not] expressed any view on this case or indicated that, under the circumstances present here, enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy or embarrass German-American relations.").

136. Id. at 905.

137. See id.

138. Compare id. (assessing the propriety of the subpoena and enforcement together), and SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), with
distinction between the propriety of the subpoena and the propriety of enforcing it with a civil contempt citation.\textsuperscript{139} Other circuits criticize this approach, preferring a bifurcated analysis.\textsuperscript{140} These courts construe \textit{Societe Internationale} as advocating separate analysis of the order and its enforcement.\textsuperscript{141} Courts employing the bifurcated approach first examine the validity of the production order, and then, if the order is valid and the party fails to comply, whether sanctions are appropriate. Though this is a seemingly insignificant distinction,\textsuperscript{142} there are some cases in which it would alter the analysis.\textsuperscript{143} In fact, some commentators suggest that this distinction must be made to conduct the good faith analysis mandated by \textit{Societe Internationale}.\textsuperscript{144}

Different courts also emphasize different factors of the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test. For example, in \textit{First National City Bank}, the Second Circuit only considered two of the Restatement (Second)’s five

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.}, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (separately assessing the propriety of the production order and sanctions), \textit{and} Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976) (same).
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{First Nat’l City Bank}, 396 F.2d at 897; see also \textit{Banca Della Svizzera Italiana}, 92 F.R.D. at 117 n.3 (“One way in which the Second Circuit has not moved in line with other courts has been its failure thus far to distinguish the analysis used for deciding to issue an order compelling discovery and that for imposing sanctions.”); \textit{Brodeur}, supra note 16, at 589 (noting that the Second Circuit “merged the propriety of the production order and the propriety of contempt sanctions into a single issue in \textit{First National City Bank}”).
\item \textsuperscript{140} See, e.g., \textit{Arthur Andersen}, 546 F.2d at 341 (“The failure of [the Second Circuit] to recognize the distinction between power to compel discovery and imposition of sanctions for noncompliance has been criticized.”).
\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{In re Westinghouse}, 563 F.2d at 997 (“In our view [\textit{Societe Internationale}] holds that, though a local court has the power to order a party to produce foreign documents despite the fact that such production may subject the party to criminal sanctions in the foreign country, still the fact of foreign illegality may prevent the imposition of sanctions for subsequent disobedience to the discovery order.”); \textit{Arthur Andersen}, 546 F.2d at 342 (“\textit{Societe Internationale} does not say that a discovery order mandating violation of foreign law is invalid. It only indicates that the foreign law question goes to the imposition of a sanction for noncompliance with local law.”).
\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana}, 92 F.R.D. at 117 n.3 (“Such a distinction in analysis makes little, if any, practical difference.”).
\item \textsuperscript{143} Consider the following example: A bank is ordered to disclose records in violation of foreign law. The circumstances of the order are such that any court using the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test would excuse the bank’s noncompliance. The merged analysis approach taken by the Second Circuit would thus excuse noncompliance. Under the bifurcated approach advocated by the Tenth Circuit, however, the court would find the issuance of the subpoena proper and expect the bank to make a good faith effort to comply as mandated by \textit{Societe Internationale} (e.g., asking the foreign government to permit disclosure of records deemed essential by an independent investigator). If the bank’s good faith efforts still fail to comply fully with the order, the court would find that the balancing test weighs in the bank’s favor and that sanctions are therefore inappropriate. This bifurcated approach requires the bank to attempt to comply and, as such, has a better chance of compelling partial or full compliance than the unitary approach.
\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{See} \textit{Brodeur}, supra note 16, at 589 (“Importantly, [the Second Circuit’s merged or unitary approach in \textit{First National City Bank},] precluded an examination of the bank’s good faith.”). \textit{Brodeur} notes that \textit{First National City Bank} may ignore good faith analysis since the Restatement (Second) does the same. \textit{Id.} at 589 n.143. For further discussion of good faith, see \textit{infra} Part II.B.
factors: "[We must] balance the national interests of the United States and Germany and . . . give appropriate weight to the hardship, if any, Citibank will suffer." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the first factor alone—the vital national interests—is the "most important factor." Some courts even introduce additional factors into the balancing test, such as the importance of the evidence sought.

The most troublesome of the Restatement (Second)'s balancing factors—the conflicting vital national interests at stake—presents courts with an array of problems. As a preliminary matter, courts must identify what qualifies as vital national interests. As seen in First National City Bank, the archetypal conflict of interest in these cases is between the United States' far-reaching evidence-gathering tools and foreign secrecy laws. Though courts balance these principles abstractly, they also consider the specific nature of the underlying action. For example, courts employing the Restatement (Second) have held that broad evidence gathering is necessary to properly enforce antitrust, tax, securities, and narcotics laws.

145. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 902 (omitting or glossing over any discussion of the Restatement (Second)'s other factors); accord Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Courts in [the Second Circuit] have characterized the first two factors—the competing interests of the countries involved and the hardship imposed by compliance—as far more important in the balancing test than the last three.").

146. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (omitting analysis of any factor save the interests of the states involved).

147. See Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) ("In addition to the factors that ordinarily must be considered by the court in deciding whether to order a disclosure prohibited by the law of another state . . . the relative unimportance of the information . . . was entitled to be considered."); see also Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522 (noting that courts should also consider "the importance of the information and documents requested").

148. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.

149. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983) (weighing U.S. interest in evidence gathering against a foreign nation's interest in bank secrecy); United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Field, 532 F.2d at 407 (same); see also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998–99 (10th Cir. 1977) (weighing U.S. interest in affording litigants adequate discovery against a foreign nation's interest in regulating access to sensitive documents); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (same).

150. See First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903 ("[Antitrust laws] have long been considered cornerstones of this nation's economic policies."); Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 651 (D. Conn. 1985) ("The vital national interest of the United States in the enforcement of its antitrust laws is unquestionable.").

151. See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346 (discussing the importance of tax investigations); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981) ("There is a strong American interest in collecting taxes from and prosecuting tax fraud by its own nationals operating through foreign subsidiaries."); Field, 532 F.2d at 407 ("In this case, the United States seeks to obtain information concerning the violation of its tax laws.").

152. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted.").

153. See United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 827 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Stemming the narcotics trade has long been a concern of paramount importance to our nation.").
all of which protect vital national interests in their own right. Courts also examine the underlying purpose of foreign secrecy laws, according them little or no weight if their purpose is simply to frustrate U.S. evidence gathering.\textsuperscript{154} Such laws are termed "blocking statutes."\textsuperscript{155}

Courts also disagree over how to balance the conflicting national interests in a given case. Specifically, courts disagree over the significance of statements of interest—or the lack of such statements—by the United States and foreign nations. In \textit{First National City Bank}, the Second Circuit attached great significance to the German government’s failure to object to the subpoena at issue: “We are fully aware that when foreign governments, including Germany, have considered their vital national interests threatened, they have not hesitated to make known their objections to the enforcement of a subpoena to the issuing court.”\textsuperscript{156} On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that such statements are significant only if they are made “prior to the litigation in question.”\textsuperscript{157}

Some courts have even suggested that balancing competing national interests is all but impossible. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit summed up the sentiment of these courts when it called this aspect of the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test a “ridiculous assignment.”\textsuperscript{158} Courts complain that they lack the expertise to properly balance national interests,\textsuperscript{159} and that they are uncomfortable making judgments traditionally

\textsuperscript{154.} See Remington, 107 F.R.D. at 651 (“Frustration of the law enforcement efforts of another country is not a legitimate national interest which can justify the failure to enforce a valid Court order.”).


\textsuperscript{156.} United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding it “noteworthy” that “neither the [U.S.] Department of State nor the German Government has expressed any view on this case or indicated that, under the circumstances present here, enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy or embarrass German-American relations”); accord United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The absence of any objection by the Cayman government to the subpoena and subsequent order . . . is significant.”); Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 525 (attaching significance to two official statements related to the importance of Swiss bank secrecy laws). Some courts have also looked to foreign courts to assess the importance of a given national interest. See \textit{In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.}, 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (“That Canada has a legitimate ‘national interest’ in this matter is perhaps best illustrated by reading the opinion of the Ontario Supreme Court . . .”); see also Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976) (“If the problem involves a breach of friendly relations between two nations, Andersen should call the matter to the attention of those officers and agencies of the United States charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, and they could make such representation to the court as they deemed suitable.”).

\textsuperscript{157.} Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992) (according little weight to China’s expression of interest since it was made after litigation commenced).

\textsuperscript{158.} Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990); accord id. at 1284 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“If I thought we had to do such balancing, I would be at sea.”).

\textsuperscript{159.} Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (“Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority,
left to the political branches of government. Though these courts generally try to balance the competing national interests nonetheless, at least one district court has refused to attempt the analysis, calling it "inherently unworkable."

Finally, some courts employing the Restatement (Second)'s test are more deferential to government subpoenas than to civil discovery orders, while other courts do not draw this distinction. In *United States v. Davis*, the Second Circuit held that subpoenas issued pursuant to government investigations deserve "some deference." Yet courts in other circuits have failed to note this distinction even when particularly applicable.

Partially as a result of these various disagreements, the Restatement (Second)'s approach has yielded some unsatisfactory results. One of the most cited examples is *In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation*, in which the majority and the dissent both relied on the Restatement (Second)'s balancing test, but reached opposite conclusions. Critics view *In re Westinghouse* as emblematic of courts' inability to employ the balancing test in a consistent manner. Foreign
commentators have been equally harsh in their assessment of the Restatement (Second), claiming that it fails to adequately value the foreign interests at stake.\textsuperscript{167}

4. The Restatement (Third): The Balancing Test Refined

The ALI's 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States attempts to address some of the issues raised by the Restatement (Second). First, the Restatement (Third) endorses the bifurcated or two-phased approach used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in \textit{In re Westinghouse} and \textit{Arthur Andersen}. "In the first phase, the requesting party seeks an order to compel compliance with the request, and the responding party seeks to have it set aside."\textsuperscript{168} The Restatement (Third) instructs courts to use a modified version of the balancing test during this first phase to determine the validity of the order.\textsuperscript{169} "If the first phase is decided in favor of production and the responding party fails to comply, there may be a second phase to determine the consequences of noncompliance."\textsuperscript{170} Though courts "should not ordinarily impose sanctions," the Restatement (Third) advises that sanctions are appropriate "in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort [to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available]."\textsuperscript{171}

Second, the Restatement (Third) advocates a modified balancing test for assessing the validity of the order in the first phase of analysis:

[A] court or agency ... should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{167} Lawrence Collins, Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws 337 (1994). Collins writes, It is sufficient to say that whilst by the mid-1960s the case-law was perceived as indicating a way in which conflicts between US law and foreign law could be resolved, it no longer provides such a resolution. The positions have become entrenched. The balancing required by the cases ... has come down heavily in favour of US law.

\textit{Id.} (citations omitted); see also \textit{In re} Grand Jury Subpoena, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Courts consistently hold that the United States interest in law enforcement outweighs the interests of the foreign states in bank secrecy and the hardships imposed on the entity subject to compliance.").

\textsuperscript{168} Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. g (1987).

\textsuperscript{169} See \textit{id.} § 442(1)(c).

\textsuperscript{170} Id. § 442 cmt. g.

\textsuperscript{171} Id. § 442(2)(b).

\textsuperscript{172} Id. § 442(1)(c).
Notably absent from this new list of factors is the extent and nature of the hardship that the foreign state would impose on the party for violation of its laws.\textsuperscript{173}

Finally, the Restatement (Third) prescribes a relatively specific method for balancing the vital national interests at stake:

In making this determination, the court or agency will look, \textit{inter alia}, to expressions of interest by the foreign state, as contrasted with expressions by the parties; to the significance of disclosure in the regulation by the foreign state of the activity in question; and to indications of the foreign state’s concern for confidentiality prior to the controversy in connection with which the information is sought.\textsuperscript{174}

The Restatement (Third) created disagreement of its own, however, especially as to whether it replaces or just supplements the Restatement (Second). A number of courts now use a balancing test combining all of the factors from both Restatements.\textsuperscript{175} Others use only the Restatement (Third).\textsuperscript{176} Still others continue to use only the Restatement (Second).\textsuperscript{177} Though the Restatement (Second), unlike the Restatement (Third), does not discuss the significance of good faith efforts,\textsuperscript{178} courts employing only the Restatement (Second) still conduct good faith analysis as mandated by Societe Internationale.\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{itemize}
    \item[173.] This is notable in that some courts considered the nature and extent of the hardship to be the most important factors of the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test. See \textit{supra} note 145 and accompanying text.
    \item[174.] Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. c (1987).
    \item[175.] See, \textit{e.g.}, Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474–75 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing both the Restatement (Second)’s and Restatement (Third)’s balancing tests); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1279–83 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542–43 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (same).
    \item[176.] See, \textit{e.g.}, White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 369, 374–75 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (balancing only the Restatement (Third)’s factors); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 285–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991) (same). In \textit{Madanes} the district court claimed that the Supreme Court specifically endorsed the Restatement (Third)’s test. \textit{Madanes}, 186 F.R.D. at 286; \textit{see also Richmark}, 959 F.2d at 1474–75. It is true that, in \textit{Aérospatiale}, the Supreme Court called the Restatement (Third)’s factors “relevant to any comity analysis,” \textit{Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court}, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987). However, the Court did not hold that the Restatement (Second)’s factors should be disregarded.
    \item[178.] See \textit{Reinsurance Co. of Am.}, 902 F.2d at 1282 (“[The Restatement (Third)] does make one significant change to the old standard by introducing an element of good faith to be included at the court’s discretion.”).
    \item[179.] See \textit{RNW Assocs., Inc.}, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *7–8 (discussing good faith in the context of the Restatement (Second)).
\end{itemize}
B. Good Faith Analysis

In *Societe Internationale*, the Supreme Court ultimately found that noncompliance with an order requiring violation of foreign law did not justify dismissal of Societe's claim, in light of Societe's good faith efforts to comply with the order. Since then, lower courts have recognized the importance of conducting good faith analysis in cases involving orders requiring violation of foreign law. However, courts are unable to agree on a good faith standard or how much weight to attach to evidence of good or bad faith.

1. The Good Faith Standard

In *Societe Internationale*, the Supreme Court's good faith analysis involved two steps: (1) finding a lack of bad faith "collusion" with the foreign government in question and (2) assessing Societe's affirmative good faith efforts to comply with the production order.

a. Lack of Bad Faith

The Supreme Court initiated its good faith analysis in *Societe Internationale* by asking whether sanctions were appropriate “despite the findings that [Societe] had not been in collusion with the Swiss authorities to block inspection of the [requested documents]...” The Court suggested that, had Societe colluded with the Swiss government, it would weigh heavily in favor of enforcing the production order through sanctions. Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in holding that a party that seeks out foreign legal impediments or colludes with foreign governments generally will not be considered to have acted in good faith. Such collusion is relevant even if it occurred long before the litigation at issue.

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180. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
183. *Id.*
184. *Id.* at 209 ("[Courting foreign legal impediments] would have a vital bearing on justification for dismissal of the action.").
185. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting *Societe Internationale*’s discussion of bad faith); RNW Assocs. v. Corporate Underwriters, Ltd., No. 93-6327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1994) (“[T]o meet the good faith test, the party resisting discovery... must not have deliberately courted legal impediments to the production of the documents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *In re Westinghouse*, 563 F.2d at 998 (noting that there was no evidence of collusion by the ordered party and the foreign government in question); *Banca
Not all courts agree on what degree of collusion is necessary for a finding of bad faith. As a result, even courts within the same circuit have reached disparate decisions.\textsuperscript{187} A comparison of two decisions from the Southern District of New York illustrates this point. In \textit{SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana}, a district judge set an extremely low bar for findings of bad faith. In this case, the court addressed Banca Della Svizzera Italiana's (BSI) refusal to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission with the identities of the principals for whom it had purchased stock options allegedly in violation of insider trading laws.\textsuperscript{188} BSI claimed that this disclosure would violate foreign bank secrecy laws.\textsuperscript{189} The court held that BSI's expectation of being shielded from liability in the United States by foreign bank secrecy laws was enough to support a finding of bad faith:

A party's good or bad faith is an important factor to consider, and this Court finds that BSI, which deposited the proceeds of these transactions in an American bank account in its name and which certainly profited in some measure from the challenged activity, undertook such transactions fully expecting to use foreign law to shield it from the reach of our laws. Such 'deliberate courting' of foreign legal impediments will not be countenanced.\textsuperscript{190}

In \textit{Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.}, a district judge employed a far more selective approach to bad faith.\textsuperscript{191} The case concerned a civil suit alleging a conspiracy to drive up the price of silver.\textsuperscript{192} The defendant sought documents from Banque Populaire Suisse (BPS)—a settling defendant—to support his defense that BPS was the true culprit.\textsuperscript{193} BPS refused to comply on the grounds that production would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws.\textsuperscript{194} After conducting its good faith analysis, the court observed that BPS "may be viewed as having courted legal impediments to production [of the requested documents and information]."\textsuperscript{195} The court particularly criticized BPS's failure to secure secrecy waivers from certain
customers as mandated by relevant regulations and BPS’s own internal policies. Nonetheless, the court held that BPS’s conduct did “not ris[e] to the level of bad faith.”

b. Affirmative Good Faith Efforts

The Supreme Court’s second step in its good faith analysis in Societe Internationale was to assess whether Societe had “made diligent efforts to execute the production order.” The Court discussed but did not explicitly endorse the test used by the special master at the district level: “[T]he test of good faith [is] whether petitioner [has] attempted all which a reasonable man would have undertaken in the circumstances to comply with the order.”

Lower courts are in agreement that Societe Internationale requires affirmative good faith acts on the part of the ordered party. Some have seized on the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “diligent effort” as establishing the good faith standard, while others prefer the “reasonable man” language of the special master.

As with bad faith, there is some disagreement among lower courts as to what really qualifies as a “diligent effort” or “all which a reasonable man would have undertaken.” For example, some courts have found that the ordered party must, at the very least, inquire into the scope of the foreign law in question and the status of the requested documents to confirm that production actually would violate foreign law. Others expect the ordered party to request permission from the foreign government to produce the

196. See id. (“Prior to litigation, BPS 1) engaged in transactions on the United States silver market without securing secrecy waivers from its customers, as necessary for [Commodity Exchange Act] reporting requirements and 2) granted [another defendant in this suit] an exception to BPS’ internal policies that required its customers, prior to trading on U.S. markets, to execute bank secrecy waivers.”).

197. Id. BPS’s affirmative good faith efforts appear to have further persuaded the court that BPS’s courtship of foreign legal impediments did not rise to the level of bad faith. See id. (“BPS has attempted to secure waivers of bank secrecy from its customers, it has produced volumes of documents, and it has not relied on a sham law to refuse disclosure.”).


199. Id. at 201.

200. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing the noncompliant party’s affirmative good faith efforts).

201. Id.

202. Id. (“The record indicates that [the ordered party] has made diligent effort to produce materials not subject to the [foreign] regulation.”).

203. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that Arthur Andersen’s failure to investigate the status of the requested documents and the law allegedly barring their production “places in substantial doubt . . . that it had proceeded in good faith to do the best it can” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that the trial judge “based his finding of lack of good faith on the fact that Citibank . . . had failed to even make a simple inquiry into the nature or extent of the records available at the Frankfurt branch.”).
requested documents or to develop alternative means of disclosure.\textsuperscript{204} For example, in \textit{In re Westinghouse} the Tenth Circuit found that the ordered party’s efforts to obtain permission from Canadian authorities to produce restricted documents were “in the best of faith.”\textsuperscript{205} Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held that sanctions for noncompliance were not justified.\textsuperscript{206}

It is unclear how courts should resolve situations where there is evidence of both affirmative good faith acts and bad faith collusion. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California confronted just such a scenario in \textit{General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co.}\textsuperscript{207} In this matter, General Atomic brought suit against Exxon to enforce a uranium contract.\textsuperscript{208} Exxon argued that the contract was null and void as violative of U.S. antitrust law and counterclaimed against General Atomic for antitrust damages for General Atomic’s participation in an illegal uranium cartel.\textsuperscript{209} Exxon requested documents from General Atomic pertaining to the cartel, but General Atomic refused to comply with the discovery orders on the grounds that doing so would violate the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations, subjecting General Atomic to criminal penalties.\textsuperscript{210}

Initially, the court noted that, during the course of the instant lawsuit, General Atomic had made “several good faith attempts to overcome the prohibitions of the Security Regulations.”\textsuperscript{211} Specifically, General Atomic retained Canadian legal counsel to explore ways around the regulations and repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, petitioned the Canadian government for an exemption.\textsuperscript{212} General Atomic next appealed to the Canadian courts, filing letters rogatory with the Supreme Court of Canada, again without success.\textsuperscript{213} The district court held that, together, these efforts constituted a “\textit{prima facie} showing of good faith to comply with the production orders.”\textsuperscript{214}

Nonetheless, the court found these good faith efforts were outweighed by acts of bad faith taken prior to the litigation.\textsuperscript{215} According to the court,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{204} See \textit{In re Westinghouse}, 563 F.2d at 998; \textit{see also} Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1972) (“There remains the question of whether the district court erred in not ordering the Bank . . . to make a good faith effort to obtain a waiver of that restriction from the customers involved.”).
\item \textsuperscript{205} \textit{In re Westinghouse}, 563 F.2d at 998.
\item \textsuperscript{206} \textit{See id.} at 999 (“A ‘balancing’ of all of these various factors leads us to conclude that the trial court’s order of contempt and the sanctions imposed in connection therewith are, on the basis of the present record, not justified.”).
\item \textsuperscript{207} 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
\item \textsuperscript{208} \textit{See id.} at 291.
\item \textsuperscript{209} \textit{See id.} at 291–92.
\item \textsuperscript{210} \textit{See id.} at 294.
\item \textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{212} \textit{See id.} at 294–95.
\item \textsuperscript{213} \textit{See id.} at 295.
\item \textsuperscript{214} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{215} \textit{See id.} at 304 (“The destruction or disappearance of the [General Atomic] cartel book when combined with [General Atomic’s] housing of documents in Canada constitutes a
shortly after joining the uranium cartel, General Atomic established a policy of housing cartel-related documents at the offices of its Canadian subsidiary so that the documents’ “transmittal to the United States would be avoided.” This “cartel concealment policy” also involved the transfer of certain employees to the Canadian offices. The court was further troubled by General Atomic’s lack of good faith in a related state suit and the possibility that General Atomic had destroyed some relevant documents. These facts, when combined, led the court to conclude that General Atomic had ultimately acted in bad faith.

2. The Significance of Good Faith

U.S. courts are divided on the significance of a party’s showing of good or bad faith in response to orders requiring violation of foreign law. This disagreement is a critical one, given that, in some cases, a finding of good or bad faith determines whether the court will sanction the noncompliant party, regardless of the Restatements’ balancing tests. Courts have adopted three basic approaches in their treatment of good faith: (1) bad faith acts require sanctions per se; (2) good faith acts make sanctions inappropriate per se; (3) good or bad faith acts are a factor that courts should consider when deciding whether sanctions are appropriate.

sufficient basis of fault under [Societe Internationale] to conclude that harsh sanctions against [General Atomic] are not precluded.”).

216. Id. at 296.

217. Id. (“Although [General Atomic] contends that the Gregg transfer to Toronto was for sound business reasons, there is evidence that the purpose of the transfer was to implement the cartel concealment policy.”).

218. See id. at 299–300 (“By failing to provide cartel information prior to the passage of the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations [in a New Mexico state case], and then relying on these Regulations as an excuse for nonproduction, [General Atomic] is ‘in the position of having slain [its] parents and then pleading for mercy on the ground that [it] is an orphan.’

219. See id. at 303 (“In addition to charging that Roger Allen shipped cartel-related documents to Canada in 1972 to make them unavailable in anticipated litigation... Exxon further claims that Gulf destroyed or altered cartel documents which had entered the United States.”).

220. See id. at 304.

221. The Restatement (Third) was aware of this split, though it offered no opinion on it: As of 1987, the implications of the good faith requirement in the United States were still evolving. Good faith efforts to secure release of information subject to foreign secrecy laws will in some instances relieve a party or intermediary of exposure to contempt sanctions. In other instances, good faith effort to comply will be taken into account in deciding whether to issue the order to produce the information, and in framing such an order... If the respondent does not meet the test of good faith, some courts have taken the position that balancing of interest is not required, and that sanctions for noncompliance, including heavy fines, should be imposed.

a. The Bad Faith Approach: Bad Faith Acts Require Sanctions Per Se

A number of courts have taken the position that a party that fails to meet the good faith standard must be sanctioned, regardless of the outcome of either Restatement’s balancing test. Essentially, under this Bad Faith Approach, bad faith acts preclude further analysis that might excuse noncompliance. Since courts following this approach can end their analysis after finding a lack of good faith efforts, they typically make good faith their first issue of inquiry.

General Atomic is an example of this approach. In determining whether General Atomic’s noncompliance with the discovery orders merited sanctions, the district court focused largely on good faith analysis. The court stated that sanctions would be appropriate for noncompliance with an order requiring violation of foreign law where “(1) the failure to fully comply with the production orders was caused by ‘willfulness, bad faith, or any fault’ of [General Atomic]; (2) the withheld documents [are] crucial to the outcome of this litigation; (3) Exxon is prejudiced by the failure of discovery in the presentation of its case; and (4) the sanctions sought are commensurate with the prejudice to Exxon and the degree of fault attributable to [General Atomic].” Notably, aside from considering the importance of the requested documents to the litigation—one of the Restatement (Third)’s balancing factors—the court made no reference to the restatements’ balancing tests. Instead, after concluding that General Atomic had acted in bad faith and that the requested

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222. See id.
223. For the purpose of clarity, this Note coins the terms “Bad Faith Approach,” “Good Faith Approach,” and “Factor Approach” to denote the three main approaches to the significance of an ordered party’s good or bad faith acts in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law.
224. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Guided by the Supreme Court and the criteria of courts that have considered similar issues, we start our analysis with the sound general rule that the person charged must have made a good faith effort to comply with the discovery order.”); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“[U]nder the Restatement (Third), [a]s a rule, parties are entitled to seek information and, without regard to balancing national interests, the foreign party must make a good faith effort to secure its release.”); see also Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Fed. Mar. Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (“Prior to determining whether these foreign laws do in fact forbid the production of documents ... the appropriate procedure is to require these petitioners to make a good faith attempt to obtain a waiver of such restrictions from their respective governments.”). Contrary to what the majority opinion in Cochran Consulting claims, considering good faith efforts as a preliminary matter deviates from Supreme Court precedent. See Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (analyzing good faith last).
227. Id. at 296.
228. The word “balancing” never appears in the opinion.
229. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
documents were crucial to the litigation, the court imposed sanctions on General Atomic for noncompliance with an order requiring violation of foreign law.

Even though only a handful of courts explicitly endorse the Bad Faith Approach, a far greater number appear to follow it in practice: Generally, courts will impose sanctions against a party that acts in bad faith in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law.

The rationale for the Bad Faith Approach is that it minimizes reliance on balancing tests while nonetheless ensuring that courts will pressure parties to comply with production orders without actually violating foreign law. In the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, "Such an approach is a careful accommodation of the legitimate interests of the parties and the nations alike, all without authorizing unconfined ‘balancing’ of the ‘importance’ of the nations’ policies."

The Bad Faith Approach, however, does not entirely circumvent the balancing tests. If the ordered party makes a good faith effort to comply but nonetheless fails to comply fully, courts following this approach conduct a balancing test to determine whether sanctions are appropriate.

230. See Gen. Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 307 ("The withheld documents are relevant and crucial to a fair trial.").

231. See id. at 309. The court did not impose the sanction of dismissal and default judgment as Exxon requested, but rather stated that it would sanction General Atomic by presuming that certain of Exxon’s allegations were true subject to rebuttal. See id.

232. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1226–27 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]o avoid sanctions the party that is unable to comply with a valid discovery request must have acted in good faith."); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Gen. Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 296.

233. See, e.g., RNW Assocs., Inc. v. Corporate Underwriters, Ltd., No. 93-6327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *8–9 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1994) (affirming sanctions where ordered party did not act in good faith in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 825–26 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming a $25,000 per day fine against a bank that demonstrated a “lack of good faith” in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law); United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming civil contempt sanctions against a party that “had not made a good faith effort to comply” with an order requiring violation of foreign law); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming sanctions where ordered party acted in bad faith by conducting “one of the greatest delaying actions [in recent memory]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming monetary sanctions against a party that acted in “flagrant bad faith” in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law); Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 644 (D. Conn. 1985) (imposing sanctions on a party whose refusal to provide discovery was in bad faith); see also SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enforcing an order requiring violation of foreign law against a party that acted in bad faith, but reserving the issue of sanctions to give the ordered party another chance to comply).

234. See Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1284 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).

235. Id. Judge Easterbrook was discussing his interpretation of the Restatement (Third), which closely resembles the Bad Faith Approach. Id.

236. See Cochran Consulting, 102 F.3d at 1227 ("In considering whether to sanction nonproduction the court must seek a fair balance of the interests and litigation needs of the

Under the Good Faith Approach, good faith acts make sanctions inappropriate per se. A limited number of courts expressly endorse this approach. Nevertheless, some courts appear to follow the Good Faith Approach in practice: Courts generally do not impose sanctions against parties that have acted in good faith in response to orders requiring violation of foreign law.

There are several rationales for the Good Faith Approach. First, it greatly reduces reliance on the restatements' balancing tests. Second, this approach meets the Restatement (Third)'s goal of "not ordinarily impos[ing] sanctions" when a party has made a good faith effort to comply. Third, it comports with the spirit of Societe Internationale, at least for commentators who view that case as "aim[ing] to vindicate the good faith custodian from the dilemma caused by a legal conflict between two sovereigns."

A number of courts have criticized the Good Faith Approach. These critics point out that Societe Internationale did not hold that good faith efforts always excuse compliance with a production order requiring violation of foreign law, only that they excuse compliance under the specific facts of that case.

c. The Factor Approach: Good or Bad Faith Acts Are a Factor to Consider When Determining Whether Sanctions Are Appropriate

Under the Factor Approach, courts treat a party’s good or bad faith acts as another factor in their balancing test. This approach is prevalent in the Second Circuit, particularly in the Southern District of New York.

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237. See, e.g., Richmark Corp., 959 F.2d at 1479 ("It is true that contempt is inappropriate where a party has taken ‘all the reasonable steps’ it can take to comply.").
238. See, e.g., Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208–12 (1958) (refusing to impose sanctions against an ordered party that acted in good faith); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998–99 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 93 F.R.D. 840, 843 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to impose harsh sanctions, but reserving the right to make adverse inferences, against the noncompliant party that acted in good faith).
240. See Brodeur, supra note 16, at 591.
241. See Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 647 (D. Conn. 1985) ("[In Societe Internationale,] [t]he Court did not hold that no sanctions were appropriate where good faith inability to comply is shown."); In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 1002 (Doyle, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that good faith justified avoiding [production].").
Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, for example, the district court simply listed “the good faith of the party resisting discovery” as the final factor in the Second Circuit’s four-part balancing test.\textsuperscript{243} Similarly, the district court in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana treated good faith as if it were actually an aspect of the hardship factor of the Restatement (Second)’s balancing test.\textsuperscript{244}

The rationale for the Factor Approach is a desire to leave the issue of sanctions to the courts’ discretion rather than forcing courts to employ a per se rule. This desire is drawn from the permissive language of the Restatement (Third).\textsuperscript{245} Theoretically, given this discretion, courts employing the Factor Approach could impose sanctions on a party that acted in good faith or refuse to impose sanctions on a party that acted in bad faith. Such outcomes are possible due to the role of the other factors in the balancing test. For example, a court using the Factor Approach could find that the U.S. interest at stake is so vital that this factor would outweigh the ordered party’s good faith efforts to comply. In such a case, the court could impose sanctions notwithstanding the ordered party’s good faith acts. Conversely, a court using the Factor Approach might find that the foreign interest at stake is so vital that the court could refuse to sanction a noncompliant party that acted in bad faith.\textsuperscript{246}
C. International Cooperation

The United States has been able to circumvent the problems posed by orders requiring violation of foreign law, to a certain extent, through formal and informal international agreements.

1. Formal International Agreements on Evidence Gathering

Recognizing that conflicts between U.S. court orders and foreign law have far-reaching foreign-relations implications, the political branches of the U.S. government have tried to diffuse the potential for friction through formal international agreements. Such agreements generally provide for mutual assistance in the collection of evidence in a manner acceptable to all parties. The most prominent of these agreements is the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague Convention), which governs extraterritorial evidence gathering in “civil and commercial matters.” The Hague Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, assists U.S.-based parties—including the U.S. government—in acquiring evidence that might otherwise be inaccessible, while protecting foreign states from what they consider “the limitless scope of U.S.-style pretrial discovery.”

The Supreme Court, however, has severely limited the Hague Convention’s efficacy. In Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the Supreme Court held that the Hague Convention’s procedures are merely an optional alternative to traditional orders of production. The Court’s 5–4 decision

247. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 reporter’s note 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”).
248. See generally ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 115; David McClean, International Co-operation in Civil and Criminal Matters (2002).
249. The Hague Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory are the only international agreements pertaining to the conduct of discovery in foreign jurisdictions that the United States has ratified. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 115, at 27. The United States has also ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which requires mutual assistance in the “transmittal of documents, reports, information, and evidence” related to criminal investigations. McClean, supra note 248, at 223.
251. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 115, at 30.
was based largely on its finding that the "plain language of the Convention" made clear that its procedures were neither exclusive nor mandatory.\textsuperscript{254} In his dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun observed that the Hague Convention "provides effective discovery procedures that largely eliminate the conflicts between United States and foreign law on evidence gathering."\textsuperscript{255} As such, he argued that there should be a "general presumption that, in most cases, courts should resort first to the [Hague] Convention procedures."\textsuperscript{256} Justice Blackmun made it clear that he preferred the Hague Convention's procedures to the continued use of either restatement's "case-by-case comity analysis."\textsuperscript{257}

2. Informal International Cooperation

The United States has also taken advantage of informal methods of obtaining evidence abroad. Such methods have obvious advantages, but may present legal problems. According to Professors Bruce Zagaris and Jessica Resnick, "Informal requests usually secure assistance more quickly and flexibly than formal ones, but they do not always conform to the Federal Rules of Evidence."\textsuperscript{258}

The U.S. Department of Justice has identified six methods of obtaining evidence abroad through informal means: (1) persuading foreign authorities to gather evidence and share it with their U.S. counterparts as part of a joint investigation;\textsuperscript{259} (2) requesting documents through diplomatic channels;\textsuperscript{260} (3) taking depositions from voluntary witnesses at U.S. embassies and consulates;\textsuperscript{261} (4) making a "treaty-type request that, even though no treaty is in force, the requested country decides to execute";\textsuperscript{262} (5) making police-to-police requests through U.S. federal law enforcement agents working abroad;\textsuperscript{263} and (6) making a request through INTERPOL.\textsuperscript{264}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{254} Id. at 529.
  \item \textsuperscript{255} Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
  \item \textsuperscript{256} Id. at 548–49.
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Specifically, Justice Blackmun wrote:
  "The Court ignores the importance of the Convention by relegating it to an "optional" status, without acknowledging the significant achievement in accommodating divergent interests that the Convention represents. Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity analysis now to be permitted by the Court, will be performed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infrequently."
  \item \textsuperscript{259} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{260} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{261} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{262} Id. at 11. According to Bruce Zagaris and Jessica Resnick, "This is what happened during the investigation of the murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena, which took place in Mexico. Although no mutual assistance legal treaty was in place], the United States and Mexico cooperated as if there was a treaty." Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{263} See id.
\end{itemize}
Though formal and informal agreements on information and evidence sharing are widely used, they have not eliminated legal conflicts arising out of orders that require violation of foreign law. Consequently, the need for a well-reasoned approach to such orders is as pressing today as it was at the time the Supreme Court decided Societe Internationale.

III. MAKING GOOD OR BAD FAITH ACTS DETERMINATIVE AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INFORMATION-GATHERING EFFORTS

The best approach to orders requiring violation of foreign law is one in which the ordered party’s good or bad faith acts, and not a balancing test, determine the party’s fate. Part III.A explains how such an approach works and suggests that a number of courts already use it implicitly. Part III.B concludes that a court employing this approach likely would have excused SWIFT’s noncompliance with U.S. subpoenas. In light of the difficulty of unilaterally gathering information, Part III.C encourages the United States to employ both formal and informal information-sharing agreements with its allies in the war on terror.

A. The Good or Bad Faith Acts of a Noncompliant Party Ordered to Produce Materials in Violation of Foreign Law Should Determine Whether Sanctions Are Appropriate

The proper approach to orders requiring violation of foreign law must follow the spirit of the Supreme Court’s holding in Societe Internationale while minimizing reliance on unworkable balancing tests. Sanctioning an ordered party for noncompliance based solely on the party’s good or bad faith acts accomplishes both goals. This approach essentially merges the Bad Faith Approach with the Good Faith Approach.265

In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court recognized that “inability to comply because of foreign law” could be a valid excuse for noncompliance with a production order.266 The Court found that the sanction of dismissal was improper since the “failure to comply [with a production order was] due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith or any fault of [Societe].”267 The Court was further impressed by Societe’s affirmative good faith efforts to produce the documents.268 In the end, the Court protected Societe because Societe acted in good faith.269 By making a noncompliant party’s good or bad faith acts determine whether sanctions are appropriate, lower courts will honor the Supreme Court’s desire to vindicate parties that act in good faith.

264. See id.
265. See supra Part II.B.2.a-b.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
This approach to good faith will greatly reduce reliance on the restatements' balancing tests. A court will impose sanctions regardless of any balancing if it finds that a party has acted in bad faith or failed to make sufficient affirmative efforts to produce the requested materials. Conversely, a court will not impose sanctions regardless of any balancing if it finds that a party has made sufficient affirmative efforts to produce the requested materials and has not acted in bad faith.

Reducing reliance on the restatements' balancing tests is desirable given that they have proven largely unworkable.270 The tests have numerous shortcomings, but the most egregious is their assumption that courts can fairly and meaningfully balance U.S. interests against those of foreign nations.271 Although courts have gamely applied these tests, they have protested while doing so,272 and with good reason, considering that the restatements' tests have yielded unsatisfactory results.273

Arguably, this approach simply makes explicit what courts have done in practice. Even when courts nominally use the restatements' balancing tests to determine the propriety of sanctions, they rarely sanction a party acting in good faith or fail to sanction a party acting in bad faith. The approach endorsed by this Note would simply streamline courts' reasoning, eliminating extraneous factor balancing.

B. Application to the SWIFT Program

Prior to the U.S.-E.U. Compromise, SWIFT was faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to comply with U.S. or Belgian and E.U. law.274 At the time, it seemed unlikely that the United States would drag SWIFT into court to enforce its subpoenas. Such a drastic step undoubtedly would have estranged European allies, not to mention SWIFT executives who had been extremely cooperative up to that point. However, if the United States did have the legal authority to demand that SWIFT continue to comply with its subpoenas, it would have had a much stronger position during the compromise negotiations. If the cost of compromise ever became too high, the United States could have threatened to abandon negotiations in favor of continuing the program unchanged.

Given the muddled nature of case law on orders requiring violation of foreign law, it is difficult to say whether the United States could have enforced the SWIFT Program's subpoenas in a U.S. court. This is principally because the balancing tests of both the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) yield unpredictable results.275 On the one hand, a court employing either of these tests could find that the United

270. See generally supra Part II.A.3–4.
271. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
272. See id.
273. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
States' interest in tracking terrorist financing tipped the scales in favor of compelling SWIFT to disclose its financial records. On the other hand, a court could reach the opposite conclusion or could even decline to undertake the balancing at all.

What is clear, however, is that SWIFT acted in the best of faith once it found itself caught between conflicting legal obligations. First, SWIFT did not court the foreign legal impediments that led to the conflict. Second, it took numerous affirmative steps to try to remedy the situation, such as trying to convince Belgian and E.U. officials that its disclosures under the SWIFT Program were legal under all relevant laws. Third, the fact that SWIFT complied with SWIFT Program subpoenas for five years, enabling tens of thousands of searches to be conducted, strongly supports a finding of good faith.

The significance of this finding would vary from court to court. Courts employing the Good Faith Approach or the approach advocated in Part III.A of this Note would excuse SWIFT's noncompliance based on SWIFT's good faith acts. Courts employing the Bad Faith Approach or the Factor Approach would turn to one of the restatements' balancing tests to determine whether sanctions were appropriate. In theory, they might find that SWIFT's good faith was outweighed by other factors that favored disclosure.

C. The United States Should Take Greater Advantage of Informal Information-Sharing Agreements

Whether or not courts adopt this Note's approach to orders requiring violation of foreign law, the United States should recognize that it has limited power to gather information abroad. Formal agreements like the U.S.-E.U. Compromise reinforce these limitations in that they often require the United States to make substantial concessions. As such, it is imperative that the United States take greater advantage of informal information-sharing agreements, which are relatively more flexible.

Informal agreements between U.S. administrative agencies—such as the Treasury, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, or Central Intelligence Agency—and their E.U. counterparts may be particularly helpful given the ease with which they can be instituted. Such arrangements could supplement the information that the United States

276. See supra notes 122 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
282. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
283. See supra Part I.B.5.
284. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
gathers through the modified SWIFT Program. For example, a Belgian investigative agency, in theory, would be able to access SWIFT’s financial database without raising the same privacy concerns as the SWIFT Program.\textsuperscript{286} They could then share this information with the relevant U.S. agency through a joint investigation.\textsuperscript{287} Such an arrangement might enable the United States to access the financial data of individuals who are linked to terrorist activities only after the United States has deleted their data in accordance with the U.S.-E.U. Compromise.\textsuperscript{288}

CONCLUSION

When confronted with orders requiring violation of foreign law, U.S. courts should sanction a noncompliant party based only on the party’s good or bad faith acts. This approach meets the Supreme Court’s goal of vindicating parties that act in good faith while reducing reliance on unworkable balancing tests. Under this approach, SWIFT, which acted in the best of faith after receiving U.S. subpoenas under the SWIFT Program, would have been immune from sanctions for noncompliance. Though the U.S.-E.U. Compromise largely diffused this thorny legal issue, the United States should also pursue more informal—and more flexible—information-sharing agreements with its European allies.

\textsuperscript{286} European privacy concerns have been triggered in part because SWIFT has provided financial information to a nation that Belgium deems to have inadequate privacy laws. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. Presumably, these concerns would not come up if Belgium accessed the information itself.

\textsuperscript{287} See supra note 259 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{288} See supra Part I.B.5.