The International Task Force On Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution: Exploring The Interplay Between Mediation, Evaluation And Arbitration In Commercial Cases

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THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON MIXED MODE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN MEDIATION, EVALUATION AND ARBITRATION IN COMMERCIAL CASES

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INTRODUCTION—INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDELINES: IMPERATIVES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

A. The Need for International Practice Guidelines for Commercial Dispute Resolution

Today as never before, opportunities and challenges are presented to business planners by trends toward globalization and the expansion of international commerce as well as our growing experience with varied, often multifaceted processes for the management and resolution of conflict. These complexities are reinforced by differences in culture and legal systems. Given present trends, there is a critical and growing need for dialogue and deliberation among practitioners and thinkers from different cultures and legal systems regarding the management and resolution of conflict in both public and private spheres and the roles of third party
interveners (which for the sake of convenience we will refer to throughout this paper as “neutrals”).

As mediation and other settlement-oriented intervention strategies have come into broader use in commercial dispute resolution, different views have emerged regarding the nature and purpose of some of these processes as a result of both individual choice and apparent cultural or systemic factors. For example, a recent study of commercial mediators from different parts of the world suggests that while mediators frequently have different perspectives and employ different “default practices,” identifiable trends have emerged from region to region. These realities, underpinned by cultural and legal traditions, contribute to difficulties

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1. The term “neutral” is often used as a term of convenience to describe mediators, arbitrators and other third parties in the resolution of disputes. See, e.g., Neutral, in DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Douglas H. Yarn ed. 1999). Its wide use may be attributed primarily to prevailing norms and standards that establish requirements or aspirations of even-handedness, impartiality and independence for mediators and arbitrators. See, e.g. IMI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2.2 (IMI); IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB. Part 1 (2014); MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II (ABA & AAA, 2005); CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARB. IN COMM. DISP., Canon I (AAA, 2004). However, particularly in US tradition, there are situations in which the agreement of the parties or surrounding circumstances make it permissible for third party interveners to be predisposed toward a party or perhaps even take an advocacy role as arbitrator. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 368-74 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519084 (discussing perceptions and practices of party-appointed arbitrators on tripartite panels in US domestic arbitration and in international arbitration).


4. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler & Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration, supra note 2, at 479-82. See also Michael Mellwrath & Henri Alvarez, Common and Civil Law Approaches to Procedure: Party and Arbitrator Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVES 2-1 - 2-4 (Horacio A. Grigera Naon & Paul E. Mason eds., 2015); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The
in mutual understanding, at the most basic level, of concepts such as “mediation” and “conciliation.”

B. Challenges Associated with Complex Dispute Resolution: “Mixed Mode” Scenarios

The potential for divergent perspectives or practices is enhanced when dispute resolution processes are mixed or matched. A varied spectrum of complex situations, which may be described collectively as “mixed mode scenarios,” includes several kinds of interplay between arbitration (or public adjudication), evaluation and mediation, or other processes aimed at facilitating an agreement of some kind. Mixed mode approaches are an increasingly important feature of both international and domestic commercial dispute resolution, but they are sometimes viewed from dramatically different perspectives by those of different cultures and legal systems. Thus, a lawyer, arbitrator, or mediator from the United States, and counterparts from China, Germany, or Brazil may respond in very different ways to questions that are of growing import in our increasingly global society, including the following:

- In what circumstances, if ever, should mediators engage in forms of non-binding evaluation, or make proposals for the resolution of disputes in the course of promoting settlement?
- In what ways might neutrals appropriately help parties tailor better dispute resolution processes, as, for example, where mediators help “set the stage” for arbitration?

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6. See infra Section I.


8. See supra note 4.
• Since, according to some recent data, settlement appears to be becoming increasingly likely during the course of commercial arbitration, should arbitrators be more deliberate about helping to set the stage for potential settlement? If so, what are appropriate methods of accomplishing this goal?

• Under what circumstances, if any, might it be appropriate for a mediator to “switch hats” and become an arbitrator or judge, or for an arbitrator or judge to become a mediator, during the course of resolving a dispute?

• What is the proper protocol for arbitrators or institutions to follow when parties ask them to convert a settlement agreement into an arbitration award?

• In what ways, if any, might mediators and other “non-adjudicative neutrals” and adjudicative neutrals appropriately communicate in the course of resolving disputes, whether sequential, parallel or integrated?

With such questions in mind, the International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution (“Task Force”) was established as a joint initiative of the International Mediation Institute (“IMI”), the College of Commercial Arbitrators (“CCA”), and the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine Law School (“Straus Institute”).


10. See Section II.A.1. for a basic taxonomy of dispute resolution terminology.

11. See generally Joint International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution, IMI INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, available at https://imimediation.org/immi-mixed-mode-mediation-task-force (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) (Note, the correct name of the Task Force is as stated in this article). The Executive Committee of the Task Force has primary responsibility for coordinating and overseeing this effort. The members of the Executive Committee, comprised of designees of the sponsoring organizations, include: Jeremy Lack, a member of IMI’s Independent Standards Commission, Switzerland and UK; Deborah Masucci, Chair, Board of Directors, International Mediation Institute; Prof. Moti Mironi, Haifa University, Law Faculty, Israel; Kathleen Paisley, Ambos NBGO, Belgium and UK; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Academic Director, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution, and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, USA; and Edna Sussman, President, College of Commercial Arbitrators (2015-16). In support of the work of the Task Force, the Straus Institute is developing white papers on some related subjects under the supervision of Prof. Stipanowich and Prof. Veronique Fraser, Sherbrooke University Faculty of Law, Quebec, Canada with valuable contributions by Straus Research Fellow Karinya Verghese, an experienced attorney from Australia who completed her LL.M in 2015 and a team of graduate students, most of whom are obtaining LL.Ms in international commercial arbitration. The first meeting of the Task Force was conducted at Pepperdine University in September, 2016. See generally Summary of Proceedings, International Task
The Task Force brings together more than sixty scholars, lawyers and dispute resolution professionals from countries around the world to engage in dialogue and mutual exploration to promote understanding and appreciation of our varied practices and perspectives regarding many different kinds of complex commercial dispute resolution scenarios, including:

Situations in which non-adjudicative neutrals who are charged with helping to facilitate settlement (for example, mediators) “mix modes” by:

- not only facilitating interest-based bargaining, but also using some form of nonbinding evaluation as a means of encouraging settlement;
- helping parties to design a dispute resolution process, or “setting the stage” for a tailored dispute resolution process that may ultimately be adjudicative or non-adjudicative or a combination of the two; or even
- “switching hats” by shifting from the role of mediator to that of adjudicator (as in “med-arb”).

Situations in which adjudicators (arbitrators or judges) “mix modes” by:

- facilitating discussions and possible agreements on scheduling, discovery and other procedural matters;
- helping “set the stage” for settlement through management of the prehearing process, making decisions on information exchange, ruling on dispositive motions, and the like; promoting use of mediation; and offering preliminary views on a case or presenting proposals for settlement;
- rendering consent awards based on settlement agreements; or
- “switching hats” by shifting from the role of adjudicator to that of mediator on substantive issues (sometimes referred to under the heading “arb-med”);
- Scenarios involving the interplay between non-adjudicative neutrals (e.g., mediators/conciliators/facilitators) and adjudicators (arbitrators and judges)

Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution Inaugural Summit (Pepperdine University, Sept. 23-24, 2016) [hereinafter International Task Force Summary].
including, for example, sequential use of mediation and arbitration, simultaneous (parallel) mediation and arbitration, and integrated “team” approaches, as well as the use of independent experts.

- Relational platforms such as “project partnering” (used in government, construction, technology and other significant long-term contracts) in which third parties facilitate better communication and mutual trust at the beginning of (and perhaps during) the contractual relationship, thereby helping to manage conflict and promote more effective use of adjudicative and non-adjudicative processes.

The Task Force’s efforts to facilitate research, investigations, and discussions regarding the management and resolution of business disputes in different settings and cultures may contribute to the development of useful practice guidelines, form agreements and educational tools to advance mutual understanding, and improve the management and resolution of commercial disputes around the world.

In Part I of this paper, we will provide a novel overview of the spectrum of scenarios that might be advantageously examined collectively for the first time under the rubric of “mixed modes.” In Part II we will offer a blueprint for more systematically examining and comparing our varied practices and perspectives to these scenarios in light of disputes resolution process goals; culture, legal tradition, and other factors. Part III will explore the development of guidelines and other materials to facilitate more informed and effective international practice.

I. COMMON SCENARIOS INVOLVING MIXED MODE PROCESSES

A variety of dispute resolution processes might be characterized as involving a “mixing of modes.” However, the notion of

12. Jeremy Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR): The Spectrum of Hybrid Techniques Available to the Parties, in ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND CULTURES, Vol. II, 339, 371 (Arnold Ingen-Housz ed., 2010) [hereinafter Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution] (“It can thus be seen that ADR, if seen as a collection of Appropriate Dispute Resolution tools, can be used sequentially, in parallel or in combination, to create a broad range of hybrid processes. The type of process used should depend on the parties’ circumstances and needs.”).
attempting to systematically group together and analyze such processes is novel. Our discussion will focus on scenarios falling into six general categories (we also allude to a possible seventh category comprising “relational platforms”). These six mixed mode scenarios are discussed in the following pages.

Throughout this discussion, considerable emphasis is placed on arbitration. It should be understood, however, that (at least in some jurisdictions) many of our observations and reflections regarding arbitration and arbitrators may apply to some degree (or perhaps with equal force) to other forms of adjudication, including court litigation and administrative procedures.

A. SCENARIO 1: Mediators Using Nonbinding Evaluation or Mediator Proposals as a Means of Encouraging Settlement

One of the most common forms of mixed mode practice occurs when mediators or conciliators engage in forms of evaluation in addition to using non-evaluative techniques and approaches. For example, in the United States as well as some other jurisdictions, mediators not only facilitate discussions regarding the parties’ interests and concerns to promote settlement, but also offer their predictions as to likely litigation or arbitration outcomes and assessments of the parties’ factual or legal arguments. Some mediators may also offer their own proposals for the resolution of the dispute. In other cultures and legal systems, however, case evaluations and neutral proposals are viewed as beyond the province

13. The present grouping was foreshadowed by Stipanowich & Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement, supra note 9, at 1, 16-19. The term “mixed mode” and the spectrum of scenarios was first offered during a presentation by Professor Stipanowich. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Settlement: Can We Develop Principled Approaches to Mixed Mode Processes?, at the College of Commercial Arbitrators Annual Meeting (Oct. 24, 2015) (categorizing groups of scenarios similar to those now used by the Task Force).


of mediators; they are instead often seen as within the domain of “conciliation” processes.\textsuperscript{16}

Because perspectives on mediation and mediator practices vary greatly, there has been considerable debate regarding employing evaluative methods, whether any process involving evaluation should fall within the definition of mediation,\textsuperscript{17} and even what constitutes “evaluation.”\textsuperscript{18} As mediation practice develops around the globe, these issues become ever more compelling subjects for deliberation and debate.

\textbf{B. SCENARIO 2: Mediators “Setting the Stage” for Adjudication and Other Dispute Resolution Options}

Although discussions of the roles of mediators often focus on the resolution of substantive disputes, many experienced mediators bring their skills to bear on process management—not just in regards to the


\textsuperscript{17} For some early and differing perspectives from the US, see, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is An Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996); L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not. That is Not the Question!, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATIONCTS. REV. 48 (2000); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155 (1998). For an example of this debate through a comparison of the processes of early neutral evaluation and mediation, see Wayne Brazil, Early Neutral Evaluation or Mediation - When Might ENE Delivery More Value, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2007, at 10 (2007). For general considerations regarding the use of different approaches in mediation—whether directive or facilitative, non-evaluative or evaluative—and the consequences of moving from one approach to another, see Jeremy Lack, A Mindful Approach to Evaluative Mediation, 3 TIJDSSCHRIFT CONFLICTIANTERING 18, 20-21, fig. 1 (2014); Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 353-57.

\textsuperscript{18} At the inaugural Summit of the Task Force on Mixed Modes Dispute Resolution, a group discussion highlighted a spectrum of mediator activities that could be considered to fall within the rubric of “evaluation,” from (1) forms of questioning (including non-leading questions, leading questions, “devil’s advocacy” questions, and pointed questions), to (2) comments on substantive aspects of a dispute, to (3) evaluations (to an individual party in caucus) of the strength of their case or its chances in adjudication. See International Task Force Summary supra note 11, at 9.
mediation process, but also with respect to alternative process options that may be necessary or appropriate steps in the final resolution of disputes.\textsuperscript{19} In this way, mediators sometimes help “set the stage” for adjudication of a dispute, by working with parties to tailor procedures for arbitration or litigation.\textsuperscript{20}

This may take a variety of forms. Where mediation fails to resolve some or all of the issues in dispute, for example, a mediator is sometimes able to facilitate an agreement on appropriate arbitration procedures or assist the parties in selecting the arbitrators.\textsuperscript{21} In other situations, parties retain mediators for the sole purpose of facilitating the tailoring of an appropriate dispute resolution process. An example of the latter is “Guided Choice.”\textsuperscript{22} These scenarios are most likely to


\textsuperscript{20} See STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 19 (discussing possible roles for mediators in facilitating arbitration procedures).

\textsuperscript{21} Author Tom Stipanowich recounted a pertinent personal experience at the inaugural Mixed Mode Task Force Summit:

Tom acted as standing mediator on a construction project, facilitating weekly or bi-weekly discussions about emerging issues from a date mid-way through construction to the end of the project. He was able to help the parties prevent issues turn into legal disputes and keep the project on track. However, the foundation for a major delay claim had been established before Tom’s appointment. Tom approached counsel and asked if he might be able to help resolve the claim. The parties were far apart, but agreed to have Tom help them create an arbitration procedure to resolve the matter. (There was no arbitration provision in the contract and neither party was enthusiastic about an institutionally-administered arbitration.) Each side had very different preferences for arbitrators, and they ended up with a three-member panel in which each party picked a wing arbitrator. But the approach was novel because Tom helped them find arbitrators based on what they wanted, but, after discussing the matter with the parties, Tom made the approaches to the potential arbitrators so the latter did not know who picked them. This “screened” approach has been incorporated as an option in the CPR Non-administered Arbitration Rules.

International Task Force Summary, supra note 11. See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES § 5.4 (2007).

\textsuperscript{22} See Lurie & Lack, supra note 19, at 168. According to Lurie and Lack:

Guided Choice is a mediation process in which a mediator is appointed to initially focus on process issues to help the parties identify and address proactively potential impediments to settlement. Mediation confidentiality is a powerful tool to help the parties safely explore ways of setting up a cheaper, faster and better process to explore and address those impediments. Although this person works essentially as a mediator, in Guided Choice the mediator does not focus initially on settling the case. Instead, the mediator works with the parties to first facilitate a discussion on
occur where mediators facilitate arbitration procedures.\textsuperscript{23} However, there may also be instances in which a mediator is empowered to facilitate and promote the exploration of settlement in the course of managing a case headed for litigation.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{C. SCENARIO 3: “Switching Hats”: Mediators Shifting to the Role of Arbitrator; Arbitrators Shifting to the Role of Mediator or Conciliator}

Of all of the forms of mixed mode processes, none have stirred more debate than those where neutrals assisting parties in a settlement-oriented process shift roles and become adjudicators (or vice-versa).\textsuperscript{25} Perceptions of these approaches—which are closely procedural and potential impasse issues, and help them analyse the causes of the dispute and determine their information needs for settlement. Id. See also Paul M. Lurie, \textit{Using the Guided Choice Process to Reduce the Cost of Resolving Construction Disputes}, \textit{9 Constr. L. Int’l} 18, 19 (2014). Providing further explanation:

The Guided Choice system recognizes that not all disputes can be settled without some formal or informal information exchange process. \ldots Under Guided Choice, when it is apparent that information is necessary for position change, but not voluntarily available to break impasse, the Guided choice mediator facilitates the customization of arbitration, litigation or dispute review board processes focused on the impasse issues, which require more information – or even decisions.

Id.

23. US neutral Laura Kaster offered the following example at the inaugural Mixed Mode Task Force Summit:

Laura applied a Guided Choice process in a court-mandated mediation involving the sale of an orthodontic practice. The parties were a professor at dental school and a student. There were allegations that the business had been fraudulently evaluated, and the purchaser was misled in the belief that she was buying a valuable practice but instead ended up facing significant claims from patients. Using the Guided Choice process, Laura was able to help the parties establish a novel process arrangement to deal with patient claims: it was agreed that a knowledgeable practitioner would both parties trusted would evaluate claims and determine what amount should be paid [by the seller to the buyer] for its satisfaction up to a ceiling amount.

International Task Force Summary, \textit{supra} note 11.

24. In some US court systems, for example, magistrates or special masters have played these roles as a part of their responsibilities for case management. \textit{See} Thomas J. Stipanowich, \textit{The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities}, \textit{13 Ohio State J. on Disp. Res.} 303, 324-28 (1998).

related to, and overlap to some extent with, situations in which arbitrators “conciliate” (Scenario 4.3 below)—are heavily influenced by culture and legal tradition.26 However, the subject has attained

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26. See Shahla F. Ali, The Arbitrator’s Perspective: Cultural Issues in International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21st CENTURY PERSPECTIVES § 6.01-6.08 (Horacio A. Grigera Naon & Paul E. Mason eds., 2010); see also Bernd Ehle, The Arbitrator as a Settlement Facilitator, in WALKING A THIN LINE 79 (Olivier Caprasse et al. eds., 2010). As explained by Ehle:

Based on varying practices and traditions in diverse legal cultures, the perceived role of the arbitrator ranges from absolute approval to unconditional rejection of the arbitrator’s encouragement of settlement negotiations. In general, while most civil law legal systems have traditionally considered it a primary duty of judges and arbitrators to promote settlement, their common law counterparts have not been allowed to be actively involved in settlement facilitation, or at least have not dared to actively contribute to the amicable settlement of the dispute out of fear of being perceived as impartial if the settlement efforts fail.

Id. at 79-80. On the other hand, Chinese practice takes a different approach:

For the Chinese, the problem of caucusing is much less serious in practice than it is in theory, as they believe that the parties are not likely to reveal to the mediator damaging facts during the mediation phase that the mediation/arbitrator could not have found out from the record. . . . The Chinese believe that if the judge are trusted to be capable of disregarding inadmissible evidence when they make the adjudication, there should be no reason to doubt those well-trained arbitrators in their ability to remain impartial despite the information obtained during mediation.
enhanced importance in recent years, as reflected in recent changes to *UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings*.\(^{27}\)

Sometimes, a mediator charged with facilitating the settlement of disputes shifts to the role of adjudicator. For example, where mediation is unsuccessful in resolving some or all disputes, mediators sometimes “switch hats” and take on the role of arbitrator in order to

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\(^{27}\) On 7 July 2016, the UNCITRAL Commission adopted a revised and updated version of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings. The Notes are non-binding but aim to flag procedural issues typically associated with arbitral proceedings. UNCITRAL, Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, para. 72 (UNCITRAL 2016, pre-release publication). This publication provides: “. . . Where the applicable arbitration law permits the arbitral tribunal to facilitate a settlement, it may, if so requested by the parties, guide or assist the parties in their negotiations.” *Id.* Facilitating the settlement of the dispute is a case management technique recognized by the ICC that can be used by the arbitral tribunal and (the parties) for controlling time and cost. See ICC, ICC RULES OF ARB., append. IV, para. h(ii) (2012) (“. . . where agreed between the parties and the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal may take steps to facilitate settlement of the dispute, provided that every effort is made to ensure that any subsequent award is enforceable at law.”). Earlier, the London based mediation institution CEDR developed procedures for the facilitation of settlement in the context of arbitration. CEDR, RULES FOR THE FACILITATION OF SETTLEMENT IN ARBITRATION 1.3 and 1.4 (CEDR, 2009). The procedures state:

1. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal may, if it considers it helpful to do so, take one or more of the following steps to facilitate a settlement of part or all of the Parties’ dispute:

   . . .

   1.3. where requested by the parties in writing, offer suggested terms of settlement as a basis for further negotiation.

   1.4. where requested by the Parties’ in writing, chair one or more settlement meetings attended by representatives of the Parties at which possible terms of settlement may be negotiated.

*Id.*
render a binding decision—a process often referred to as “med-arb.”28 Such procedures include variants such as mediation followed by last-offer arbitration (sometimes referred to by the acronym “MEDALOA”), in which the discretion of the mediator-turned-arbitrator is limited to adopting one or the other of the parties’ final offers in his/her award.29

In other cases, an adjudicator shifts to the role of mediator (a scenario sometimes designated by the acronym “arb-med”) or the role of conciliator.30 For example, in some arbitration proceedings arrangements may be made for the arbitrator to switch hats and act as a mediator or conciliator in order to try to help the parties attain an amicable settlement of disputes.31 If settlement is not thereby achieved, the neutral may in some cases be authorized to resume the arbitral role (essentially, “arb-med-arb”).32 In one form of arb-med, however, the arbitrator does not shift to the role of mediator until after hearings are concluded and an award is written but not yet published or disclosed to the parties.33

29. Stipanowich & Kaskell, supra note 19, at §§ 20-24 (describing the process of MEDALOA and explaining its potential advantages and concerns); Dendorfer & Lack, supra note 7, at 76, 82, 92-94 (providing an analysis of the implications, advantages, and disadvantages of “MEDALOA”).
33. Michael Leathes, formerly head of intellectual property for British-American Tobacco and a leading proponent of mediation, employed this approach and widely touted the experience. See Michael Leathes et al., Einstein’s Lesson in Mediation, MANAGING IP 24 (July-Aug. 2006). For a general description of the procedure, see also McIlwrath &
In some situations, the possibility of the neutral shifting roles is agreed to by participants, or understood as a matter of practice or procedure, before the neutral is engaged.\textsuperscript{34} Sometimes the approach is enshrined in well-established procedural rules, such as the Chinese practice of “conciliation within arbitration” as defined by the rules of official arbitration commissions like the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”)\textsuperscript{35} and the Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC”)\textsuperscript{36}—a process sometimes referred to as “arb-med.”\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, German arbitrators sometimes engage in what some might describe as forms of conciliation.\textsuperscript{38} In practice, however, a Chinese arbitrator-conciliator (or arbitrator-mediator) may function somewhat differently from a German counterpart.\textsuperscript{39} In other situations, a “change of hats” is requested by


\textsuperscript{35} CIETAC ARB. RULES art. 47 (CHINA COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INT’L TRADE/CHINA CHAMBER OF INT’L COMM., 2014).

\textsuperscript{36} BAC ARB. RULES art. 42 (BEIJING ARB. COMM’N, 2014).


\textsuperscript{38} DIS ARBITRATION RULES §32.1 (GERMAN INSTITUTION OF ARB., 1998) (“... at every stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal should seek to encourage an amicable settlement of the dispute or of individual issues in dispute.”) Such practice is described by Professor Hilmar Raeschk Kessler an experienced German arbitrator in Hilmar Raeschk-Kessler, \textit{The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator}, 21 ARB. INT’L 523, 534-36 (2005). It is also consistent with judges acting as conciliator as provided for in Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE), §278(2) (Ger.), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p1021. Moreover, it has been reported that there is a longstanding tradition of German judges facilitating settlement as it can be traced back in Jinger Reichsabschied, § 110 (1654), the text of which was integrated in Section 278 of the German Code of Civil Procedure. See Kaufmann-Kohler, \textit{supra} note 25, at 190 n.6.

\textsuperscript{39} Arbitration law and the rules of leading Chinese institutions sponsoring private arbitration provide that arbitrators may try to conciliate the dispute at some point in the arbitration process prior to rendering a decision on the merits. See Arbitration Law (promulgated by Order No. 31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on August 31, 1994), art. 51, 1994 P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); BAC ARB. RULES, \textit{supra} note 36; CIETAC ARB. RULES, \textit{supra} note 35. For a description of the practice of arb-med in China, see Kun, \textit{supra} note 37; Weixia Gu, \textit{The Delicate Art of Med-Arb and Its Future Institutionalisation in China}, 31 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 97 (2014).
one or both parties or proposed by the third party neutral during the course of dispute resolution.

As reflected above, attitudes toward an outright shifting of roles are heavily colored by the cultural traditions of participants. In China, for example, long-standing emphasis on the stability and harmony of the society and on deference to authority have underpinned the practice of conciliation by arbitrators or judges, and in Germany, there is a long tradition of adjudicators engaging in settlement-oriented activities. In the United States, however, heavy emphasis on individualism, personal autonomy, and related concerns about assent, self-determination, and procedural due process lead many attorneys and neutrals to avoid situations in which neutrals switch roles during the course of resolving a dispute, or in which arbitrators

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40. See STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 19, at 39-45 (proposing “Guidelines for situations where parties desire a mediator to assume the role of arbitrator”). But see INT’L BAR ASS’N [IBA], IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB. § 4(d) (Oct. 23, 2014) (“Informed consent by the parties to such a process prior to its beginning should be regarded as an effective waiver of a potential conflict of interest . . . . In addition, in order to avoid parties using an arbitrator as mediator as a means of disqualifying the arbitrator, the General Standard makes clear that the waiver should remain effective, if the mediation is unsuccessful. In giving their express consent, the parties should realise the consequences of the arbitrator assisting them in a settlement process, including the risk of the resignation of the arbitrator.”).

41. Many commentators have reported a common practice of Chinese arbitrators of systematically asking the parties whether they would like assistance in settling the dispute. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler & Kun, supra note 2, at 487; Michael Hwang, The Role of §1q Arbitrators as Settlement Facilitators – Commentary, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 571 (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed., 2005); Johannes Trappe, Conciliation in the Far East, 5 ARB. INT’L 173, 176, passim (1989); Raeschke-Kessler, The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator, supra note 38, at 525.


43. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.

44. Deason, supra note 25 at 228-29; Blankley, supra note 25, at 332-37; Pappas, Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 27, at 176-78; Carlos de Vera, supra note 42, at 185, 192-193; Antaki, supra note 4, at 113; M. Scott Donahue, Seeking Harmony - Is the Asian Concept of the Conciliator/Arbitrator Applicable in the West?, DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 76-77 (Apr. 1995).
focus on settlement-oriented activities.\textsuperscript{45} Even in the United States, however, parties may in specific circumstances still embrace the opportunity for neutrals to wear multiple hats. There is evidence that many neutrals have been given opportunities to employ such approaches, and they often have accepted the challenge.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{D. SCENARIO 4: Arbitrators Setting the Stage for Settlement}

It is generally understood that, within the bounds of the parties’ agreement, arbitrators have a good deal of authority respecting the handling of procedural matters in arbitration.\textsuperscript{47} A recent study of experienced arbitrators surfaced a good deal of information regarding the role of arbitrators in facilitating (or, as some arbitrators indicated, re-framing) issues leading to settlement.


\textsuperscript{46} Those fifty-nine Survey respondents who indicated they were at least “sometimes” concerned with the informal settlement of cases before them were asked about their experiences changing roles or playing multiple roles (that is, as both an arbitrator and mediator) in a particular case. Of those fifty-nine individuals, just under half (45.8\%) indicated that they had “sometimes” mediated a dispute in which they had been appointed an arbitrator. Additionally:

The respondent sub-group was also asked, “Have you served as both a mediator and arbitrator with respect to the same dispute, where during arbitration, the parties asked you to switch to the role of an arbitrator?” More than nine-tenths of the group (25 of 27, or 92.6\%) answered, “Yes.” In response to the further question, “Have you served as both a mediator and arbitrator with respect to the same dispute, where the parties agreed beforehand to have you first mediate and then arbitrate, if necessary?” two-thirds of the group (18 of 27, or 66.7\%) responded affirmatively. Thus, there is support for the notion that despite conventional concerns among U.S. advocates and arbitrators respecting neutrals wearing multiple hats, quite a few arbitrators have experience with forms of single neutral med-arb.

“mediating”) discussions between counsel in the course of helping to “flesh out” the agreement of the parties respecting arbitration procedures. In the event no agreement can be reached on a particular issue, arbitrators typically resolve the issue by making a decision.

The precise dynamics of arbitrators’ management of procedural matters might be better understood; in particular, there are important questions surrounding the roles of arbitrators (or judges) in helping to set the stage for settlement through negotiation or mediation. Such activity may take a variety of forms. Arbitrators and other adjudicators are sometimes able to enhance the possibility of settlement by making decisions on discovery/information exchange issues, or by ruling on motions which dispose of some aspect(s) of the dispute. Moreover, adjudicators sometimes advance the use of mediation by working with the parties to arrange “mediation windows” in the adjudication timetable. Others may go so far as to suggest, encourage, or even order mediation or some other non-adjudicative procedure to promote settlement. Finally, adjudicators in some jurisdictions have been known to encourage settlement by offering parties preliminary views on issues in dispute or issuing preliminary findings of fact or conclusions of law. However, many

48. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 46, at 444-448 (reporting the results of a survey indicating that experienced U.S. arbitrators frequently engaged in various pre-management activities in order to set the stage for settlement).


52. In the United States, there is a general understanding that the arbitrators can go as far as encouraging the use of mediation, but to order mediation would fall beyond the scope of their ethical obligations. See, e.g., AAA, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARB. IN COMM. DISP. (2004) (Canon IV(F): “Although it is not improper for an arbitrator to suggest to the parties that they discuss the possibility of settlement or the use of mediation, or other dispute resolution processes, an arbitrator should not exert pressure on any party to settle or to utilize other dispute resolution processes. An arbitrator should not be present or otherwise participate in settlement discussions or act as a mediator unless requested to do so by all parties.”). For a discussion on this subject, see Ehle, supra note 26, at 84-85; see also Daniele Favalli & Max K. Hasenclever, The Role of Arbitrators in Settlement Proceedings, 23 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 1, 3 (July 2008).

53. Such practice has been reported to exist in Germany. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The possibility for an arbitrator to offer preliminary views about the parties’ dispute is explicitly provided for in CEDR RULES FOR THE FACILITATION OF SETTLEMENT IN INT’L ARB. PROC. art. 5.1 (CEDR, 2009):
arbitrators view their role strictly as a matter of preparing a case for adjudication, and therefore regard settlement as a collateral prospect. The role of arbitrators in setting the stage for settlement has been a focus of discussion only recently, and is ripe for thoughtful deliberation and debate. Specific scenarios involving arbitrators include the following:

SCENARIO 4.1: Arbitrators Setting the Stage for Settlement of Substantive Disputes by Handling Key Procedural Issue(s)

Responses to a recent survey of experienced US arbitrators indicate that, generally speaking, arbitrators are perceiving increased

Art. 5.1: Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal may, if it considers it helpful to do so, take one or more of the following steps to facilitate a settlement of part or all of the Parties’ dispute:

1.1. provide all Parties with the Arbitral Tribunal’s preliminary views on the issues in dispute in the arbitration and what the Arbitral Tribunal considers will be necessary in terms of evidence from each Party in order to prevail on those issues;

1.2. provide all Parties with preliminary non-binding findings on law or fact on key issues in the arbitration.

It has been reported that VIAC is currently working on drafting new rules on early neutral evaluation. See Revision of the VIAC Conciliation Rules, VIAC, http://www.viac.eu/en/photogallery/image.raw?type=img&id=79 (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). The acceptability of such practice differs among common law and civil law jurisdictions. See Ehle, supra note 26, at 80-84. According to Ehle:

In certain civil law countries, the parties and their lawyers clearly expect that the arbitrator will at some stage in the procedure – ex officio – express a preliminary but clear view on the merits of the case and explicitly encourage an amicable settlement. . . . The common law approach differs from the civil law approach in that even the arbitrator’s preliminary views of the merits of the case create discomfort. If the settlement attempt fails, the parties may consider that the arbitrator was unduly influenced by this prior assessment. Those in favor of such practice argue that it allows the parties to be given indications about the arbitrator’s view and give the parties the opportunity to adapt their argument and strategy accordingly. See Michael E. Schneider, Combining Arbitration with Conciliation, ICCA Congress Series 8, International Arbitration Conference (Seoul, Oct.10-12, 1996) 61, http://www.lalive.ch/data/publications/mes_combining_arbitration_with_conciliation.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2017); Favalli & Hasenclever, The Role of Arbitrators in Settlement Proceedings, supra note 52, at 2-3.

54. See Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 46, at 459-60 (“Survey participants were also asked, ‘How often, if ever, are you concerned with informal settlement of the cases before you as an arbitrator?’ . . . [M]ore than half of participants responded, ‘Never.’ . . . For some or all of the foregoing reasons [not transcribed here], many experienced commercial arbitrators are reticent about the arbitral role in settlement. However, the Survey results also indicate that many arbitrators tend to recognize and actively embrace opportunities to promote settlement of arbitrated cases through their management of the arbitration process.”)
levels of settlement in the cases they arbitrate in recent years. Moreover, many arbitrators see a connection between their process management activities, particularly at the pre-hearing stage, and the possible settlement of the underlying dispute. Arbitrators regularly work with parties to identify and address important issues to be decided including key discovery issues and dispositive motions; some arbitrators perceive that the way they address these issues sometimes plays a role in settling a case, while others do not.

SCENARIO 4.2: Arbitrators Setting the Stage for Settlement of Substantive Disputes by Promoting Use of Mediation

In jurisdictions where mediation is an established element of the dispute resolution landscape, arbitrators often include mediation on the agenda for a preliminary hearing or prehearing conference. The Survey also asked respondents, “Roughly what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator settled at any time prior to award?” Chart PP [not reproduced] shows results comparing respondent estimates of settlement rates for the past five years with their estimates of settlement rates for earlier years.

Id.

The findings showed that:

Each of the 59 respondents who reported concerning themselves with informal settlement at least “sometimes” were asked to estimate the frequency with which they engage in particular behaviors that may increase the likelihood of informal settlement. As reported in Table 7 [not reproduced], the large majority of this group indicated that their management of the pre-hearing process, summary disposition of issues, and rulings on discovery matters prompt settlement in at least some cases. Indeed, nearly one-fourth of respondents (23.7%) indicated that their summary disposition of issues prompts informal settlement in about half or more of their cases, and more than a quarter (25.4%) responded that their management of pre-hearing processes plays an important role in pre-hearing settlements in about half or more of their cases.

Id.

See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
resulting timetable for the arbitration process may include one or more windows for mediation. Some arbitrators may go so far as to encourage or order parties to mediate the dispute, although others regard such activity as inappropriate.59

SCENARIO 4.3: Arbitrators Setting the Stage for Settlement of Substantive Disputes by Issuing Preliminary Views, Etc.

Is it ever appropriate for arbitrators to offer parties preliminary views on issues in dispute, including information regarding what additional proof the arbitrator believes might be necessary for parties to establish their case, in order to help stimulate settlement? Should they ever issue preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law with the same end in mind, or even offer proposals for settlement? As discussed above, culture and legal tradition may play an important role in determining how neutrals and counsel answer these questions,60 much the same way that they affect perceptions of neutrals switching roles in med-arb.61

Although the final report of a commission convened by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (“CEDR”) offered affirmative support for such activities,62 there are indications that arbitrators in some jurisdictions, including the United States, may be extremely reluctant to take such steps.63

59. Paragraph 72 of UNCITRAL’s recently revised 2016 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings now recognized that it may be appropriate, in some circumstances, for the arbitral tribunal to raise the possibility of a settlement between the parties. See 2016 UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARB. PROC. para. 72 (UNCITRAL 2016, pre-release publication). See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.

60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Favalli & Hasenclever, supra note 52, at 2 (“The arbitration practices in England and the U.S. have never given much consideration to the role of the arbitral tribunal in regard to settlements. On the contrary, the possibility of the arbitral tribunal’s involvement was excluded. […] In other jurisdictions, such as Germany or Switzerland, the arbitrator’s involvement in settlement proceedings is a common practice.”).

61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For a critique of the rules provided by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (“CEDR”) based on a psychological perspective, see Nappert & Flader, A Psychological Perspective on the Facilitation of Settlement in International Arbitration, supra note 26.

63. See Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 359 (“Some civil law arbitrators will hold a meeting at some stage of the process to provide preliminary views, or to provide a draft or oral version of the tribunal’s award in order to promote the opportunity of a final settlement before issuing its award. This process is relatively unknown, however, in most common law jurisdictions and may even be frowned upon by common law arbitrators as an improper form of ‘appeal before verdict’ or risking exposure of a subsequent award to possible attack for bias, depending on when the preliminary views were given”).
E. SCENARIO 5: Arbitrators Rendering Decision Based on a Settlement Agreement (Consent Awards)

Arbitrators sometimes encounter requests from parties that have reached a negotiated settlement agreement to incorporate or convert the terms of their settlement into an arbitral award—a consent award.64 This step may afford parties the opportunity to avail themselves of the enforcement mechanisms under arbitration law.65 However, depending on the circumstances, such arrangements may raise questions of enforceability66 and even public policy.67

64. The possibility of consent award is explicitly provided for in a number of international arbitration rules. See, e.g., ICC, ICC RULES OF ARB. art. 32 (2012); HKIA, ADMINISTERED ARB. RULES art. 36.1 (2013); ICDR, INT’L ARB. RULES art. 32.1 (2014); LCIA, LCIA ARB. RULES art. 26.9 (2014); SIAC, ARB. RULES OF THE SING.INT’L ARB. CTR., art. 28.8 (2013); SCC, ARB. RULES OF THE ARB. INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMM. 39.1 (2010); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL L ON INT’L COMM. ARB. art.30 (1985, with amendment as adopted in 2006); VIAC, VIENNA INT’L. ARB. CTR. RULES OF ARB. art.38 (2013). See also Yaraslau Kryvoi & Dmitry Davydenko, Consent Awards in International Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827 (2015) (providing a detailed analysis of the concept of consent award).

65. The greatest appeal of consent awards is their potential for enforceability under the 1958 New York Convention, which allows cross-border enforcement of arbitration awards, i.e. the recognition and enforcement of awards made in other contracting states in the state where recognition and enforcement sought. See New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. I, (June 10, 1958), 21 U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Settlement agreements, on the other hand, are simple contracts between the parties to a dispute (or an arbitration procedure), and therefore, do not benefit from cross-border enforcement and recognition under international law. For a general discussion concerning the avenues of enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, see Edna Sussman, Combinations and Permutations of Arbitration and Mediation, supra note 25, at 391-98.

66. The issue of the enforceability of a consent award remains unclear in international arbitration See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3021 (2d ed. 2014); Kryvoi & Davydenko, Consent Awards in International Arbitration, supra note 64, at 850 (“The New York Convention neither defines the term “arbitral award” nor mentions consent awards. This silence raises the question of whether consent awards qualify as arbitral awards under the Convention. The answer to this question may depend on whether a consent award is a genuine arbitral award, or whether it remains merely a contract.”); see also Giacomo Marchisio, A Comparative Analysis of Consent Awards: Accepting Their Reality, 32 ARBITRATION INT’L 331 (2016) (discussing the enforceability of consent awards in light of a comparative study of French and English law).

67. Kryvoi & Davydenko, Consent Awards in International Arbitration, supra note 64, at 856. The authors state:

Nearly all arbitration rules allow a tribunal to decline recording a settlement agreement as a consent award only if a tribunal has a good reason to believe that the arbitration or the settlement agreement is used for an improper cause. For instance, such improper cause can consist of an abuse of one’s rights, money laundering, bribery, financing terrorism, and breaches of competition law or covering other illegal activities. [footnotes omitted]
F. SCENARIO 6: Other Kinds of Interaction between Evaluation, Mediation, Arbitration, or Litigation

When multiple discrete dispute resolution processes, each involving separate neutrals, are being employed in the course of resolving a particular dispute, what special opportunities and concerns come into play? Much depends on the nature of the processes, roles the neutrals play, the relative timing of their activities, and their level of interaction.

Scenario 6.1: Interplay Between Mediation and Arbitration or Litigation

Similarly, it is appropriate to consider the potential interplay between mediation and arbitration, and the level of interaction between mediators and arbitrators. Where mediation is an accepted element of commercial dispute resolution, mediation may precede arbitration or take place during the course of arbitration proceedings. In some cases, special arrangements are made to

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[1] In order to determine whether the settlement agreement serves an improper purpose and should not be recorded as a consent award, a tribunal needs to consider public policy, the law of the seat of arbitration, the substantive law of the transaction and perhaps the law of the jurisdiction in which enforcement is likely to be sought. Id. at 860. See also Marchisio, A Comparative Analysis of Consent Awards, supra note 66, at 334-35 (discussing the concerns that consent awards may be used for facilitating tax deductions or money laundering through the creation of a fictitious dispute designed to create a payment obligation).

68. The Centre for Mediation and Arbitration of Paris (CMAP) makes available a set of rules, referred to as “Simultaneous Med-Arb Rules” specially tailored specifically to a process where mediation takes place simultaneously with arbitration during a period of three months, except otherwise agreed by the parties, see RÈGLEMENT DE MED-ARB SIMULANTÈS Arts. 8.1 and 9 (CMAP 2007) [as translated in Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 363-65]:

Article 9: INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROCEDURES. The mediation and arbitration take place independently of one-another. The Centre does not allow the mediator to know the name(s) of the arbitrator(s) and vice versa. The mediator and the arbitrator(s) are forbidden to discuss the matter between themselves should they happen to know one-another.

In addition to simultaneous mediation and arbitration, parallel processes can take a variety of forms, such as “carve-outs” and “shadow mediation.” See Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 364-65; see also Michael E. Schneider, Combining Arbitration with Conciliation, ICCA Congress Series 8, International Arbitration Conference (Seoul, Oct. 10-12, 1996) 71-77, http://www.lalive.ch/data/publications/mes_combining_arbitration_with_conciliation.pdf (recommending steps to follow for a simultaneous mediation and arbitration process).
coordinate the activities of mediators and arbitrators. Again, questions abound.

Where mediation is an accepted element of commercial dispute resolution, mediation may precede arbitration or litigation, or take place during the course of arbitration proceedings or litigation. Where mediations take place in parallel to ongoing litigation or arbitration, conventional wisdom in some countries is that what happens in mediation (and sometimes the very fact of mediation) is not disclosed to judges or arbitrators. Furthermore, interactions between mediators and judges or arbitrators, if any, should be subject to parties' express consent. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to consider the potential interplay between mediation and litigation/arbitration, and the appropriate level of interaction between mediators and judges/arbitrators. What historical examples are there? What kinds of interactions might be appropriate? Can such interactions contribute to better and/or more cost-effective resolutions of particular disputes?

SCENARIO 6.2: Interplay between Nonbinding Evaluation and Mediation, Arbitration or Litigation

Parties also sometimes agree to a nonbinding evaluation of some kind in order to promote settlement of disputes between parties; examples of such approaches include: advisory appraisal, advisory expert determination, advisory/nonbinding arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and mini-trial. In such situations it is appropriate to

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69. This is notably the case of a process that has been referred to as “shadow mediation”: [The shadow mediator] may follow and advise on what is happening in another process and possibly also make procedural suggestions that may help the parties and the neutrals in the other process. An example of this is a shadow mediator monitoring arbitration proceedings, receiving a copy of all the pleadings and possibly auditing the hearings with the tribunal. The shadow mediator (with the consent of the parties and the other neutrals) may even speak to the tribunal or actively participate in the arbitration process.

Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 364-65; see also Dendorfer & Lack, The Interaction Between Arbitration and Mediation, supra note 9, at 91-92.

70. See, e.g., RÈGLEMENT DE MED-ARB SIMULTANÈS Art. 9 (CMAP, 2007); Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 363-64.

71. In appropriate cases, long-time mediator Jonathan Marks arranges for the parties to have an agreed protocol for limited communication with the court respecting mediation proceedings. See International Task Force Summary, supra note 11.

72. Although third parties are sometimes retained by a single party for the purpose of providing a confidential evaluation to that party in the course of preparing for dispute resolution, our focus here is on nonbinding evaluations provided to both/all parties. See, e.g.,
consider what relationship, if any, such activities have (or should have) to discrete efforts to mediate or to arbitrate the same matter, or to ongoing litigation of the matter. This includes what level of interplay, if any, is appropriate between the respective processes or the neutrals.73

G. Special Considerations Involving Relational Platforms

Finally, there are approaches that place special emphasis on addressing conflict in the course of commercial relationships—that is, in “real time”—and may even promote greater trust and respect among business partners or co-venturers.74 Much more needs to be understood about the operation and potential benefits of these relational platforms, including opportunities to use these mechanisms to tailor other appropriate dispute resolution approaches.75

Stipanowich & Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution, supra note 46, at 461-62 (reporting the results of a survey with experienced US arbitrators regarding their experience with non-binding or advisory arbitration, as well as early neutral evaluation, case assessment); Thomas J. Stipanowich & Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471 (summarizing the findings of survey with Fortune 1,000 corporate counsel in 2011 indicating a newfound reliance on early neutral evaluation and early case assessment process, with respectively 36 and 66 percent of respondents indicating having had recent experience respectively with such processes); JAY FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & LISA KLOPPENBERG, RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE & LAW (2d ed. 2010) (discussing National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus’ non-binding evaluation and court-connected arbitration processes); Brazil, Early Neutral Evaluation or Mediation, supra note 19 (for a general description of the process of early neutral evaluation).

73. Eric Green, Re-Examining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Litigation: Lessons From Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1171 and 1201-06 (2006) (noting that the author, a mediator with extensive experience, argues that big cases present huge challenges and that their resolution and management “require a re-examination of the roles played by neutrals – judges and mediators.” He raises questions and presents possible avenues of development to replace traditional models, “requiring a passive and detached judge and a non-evaluative mediation”, by “a more expansive and flexible paradigm.”); Green Eric & Jonathan B. Marks, Mediating Microsoft, BOSTON GLOBE, November 15, 2001, at A23, Section Op-Ed (describing Microsoft’s settlements with the Department of Justice and with at least 9 states due to the decision of the Judge to suspend litigation and order settlement negotiations); Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 369-73 (providing a discussion of a process referred to as Combined Neutrals, which is not used frequently, and general considerations regarding future development of hybrid processes).


75. See generally Stipanowich, The International Evolution of Mediation, supra note 2, at 1233-43.
Standing Neutrals

Standing neutrals or neutral panels are sometimes employed on construction projects. The appointment of a “standing” dispute resolution professional to mediate issues as they arise during the course of a construction project has proven valuable in keeping the job on track and helping to limit the number of claims that must be subjected to more formal and expensive dispute resolution procedures.76 Standing dispute boards frequently offer advisory decisions on current controversies affecting major infrastructure projects.77

Construction projects also furnished a setting for other approaches aimed at proactive management of conflict within commercial relationships. “Project partnering”, a concept borrowed from the manufacturing and distribution sectors and pioneered by the US Army Corps of Engineers, was designed to encourage collaboration and teamwork by implementing deliberate early efforts to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation on projects.78 “Facilitated partnering workshops were commonly conducted shortly after contract signing and attended by owner representatives and key members of the design and construction team. The aim was stronger individual bonds, better understanding of each other’s objectives and expectations, and non-adversarial approaches for resolving problems

on the job." There were also indications that partnering might be useful in other kinds of long-term commercial relationships. However, partnering usage has not expanded beyond its early roots.

Another exemplary relational conflict management platform was a customized program with tight time frames for jobsite decision-making and handling of claims, and a flexible, dynamic dispute resolution system centered upon the figure of a Dispute Resolution Advisor ("DRA"): a construction expert with dispute resolution skills who would remain throughout the project. The DRA first met with job participants to explain and build support for a cooperative approach to problem solving. Thereafter, the DRA made monthly visits to the site to monitor the status of the job and facilitate discussions regarding emerging issues. If negotiation failed, the DRA could make arrangements for mediation, mini-trial or expert fact-finding. Although the DRA model has apparently not been widely replicated, many of its benefits may be achieved through the use of an approach like Guided Choice.

II. PHASE ONE: DEVELOPING A TEMPLATE FOR IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING VARIATIONS IN MIXED MODE COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In Part I of this article we identified a range of situations that might be termed mixed mode scenarios in light of the fact that they all involve one or more dispute resolution neutrals engaged in a mix of

79. Stipanowich, Managing Construction Conflicts, supra note 77, at 4 Partnering is principally used in United-States, United-Kingdom, The Netherlands, and in Switzerland. See Clive Seddon, Partnering: The UK Experience, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 73 (1999); Geert Dewulf & Anna Kadefors, Trust Development in Partnering Contracts, in WORKING PAPER PROCEEDINGS, ENGINEERING PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS CONFERENCE, SOUTH LAKE TAHOE 1, 1 (Nov. 4-7, 2010).


81. Partnering has been used principally in the construction and engineering sectors. See Erik Eriksson, Brian Atkin & Tor Björn Nilsson, Overcoming Barriers to Partnering through Cooperative Procurement Procedures, 16 EVIDENCE-BASED COMPLEMENTARY & ALTERNATIVE MED. 598 (2009).


83. See supra text accompanying text note 24.
activities. Most of these entail some kind of effort to facilitate mutual agreement on substantive or procedural issues in the course of arbitration or litigation. These situations are increasingly visible in domestic and international commercial dispute resolution, but they have inspired highly varied, often conflicting perspectives and practices in different regions and legal systems. These realities inspired the creation of the International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution, for which this white paper was prepared.

In this Part, we propose an analytical construct for achieving an unprecedented appreciation of not only very different practices and perspectives respecting mixed mode approaches in different countries and regions, but also the process goals and cultural values and dimensions that underpin them. These descriptive and analytical aspects are to be addressed in Phase One of the Task Force’s efforts. Once that signal task is accomplished, the Task Force will hopefully be equipped—in Phase Two—to consider the development of more effective guidance for the employment of mixed mode approaches in international commercial settings.

A. Developing “Basic Building Blocks” to Promote Mutual Understanding and Facilitate Analysis of Our Varying Approaches to Mixed Mode Processes

1. A Basic Taxonomy of Dispute Resolution Processes

As noted previously, a primary international barrier to mutual understanding with regard to dispute resolution has to do with the difficulty of agreeing on basic terminology. There is no commonly accepted glossary of terms identifying conflict resolution processes, and a variety of descriptors are employed with various degrees of precision, masking areas of fundamental divergence. The most notorious example of the latter involves the confusion surrounding use of the terms “conciliation” and “mediation.” Both terms refer to processes involving a third-party neutral who engages in activities aimed at helping to promote settlement but who does not render a legally binding decision. However, although the terms are sometimes used synonymously, they are also frequently perceived as distinct
practices involving different activities—perceptions sometimes reflected in positive law.  

To some extent, these areas of divergence are produced by different legal traditions and various national, professional, industry and organizational cultures—subjects touched upon above. Whatever their origin, differences in the language we use to describe different ways third parties intervene in conflict stand in the way of understanding each other. For that reason, we need to develop a common dispute resolution language or taxonomy that systematically captures the spectrum of dispute resolution processes and serves as a foundation for discussion. Agreement on basic terms is, among other things, a critical first step to deconstructing and understanding our perspectives and practices regarding mixed mode processes.

For the purpose of this study, then, an initial step was to develop a basic taxonomy of dispute resolution processes, including key terms and definitions. As indicated in the chart on the following page, the two basic groupings are adjudicative processes, which include arbitration and court litigation, and non-adjudicative processes, which include a wide range of non-binding evaluative processes (e.g., advisory appraisal, advisory expert determination, advisory/non-binding arbitration, conciliation, evaluative mediation, dispute boards, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial) and non-evaluative processes (e.g., non-evaluative forms of mediation). As explained above, moreover, some mediators “mix modes” and engage in both non-evaluative and evaluative activities during the course of attempting to assist parties reach informal resolution of disputes.

The following terms and definitions are intended to provide a basis for mutual discussions regarding important practice issues. Some of the definitions overlap and some definitions take account of differences in practice among jurisdictions, programs, or personal practices. It is expected that they will be further refined during the course of the Task Force’s work.

84. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of the term “conciliation,” under non-adjudicative processes).
85. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
86. The authors thank Jeremy Lack for his contributions to the development of the taxonomy depicted in Chart A.
87. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; Section I.C., notes 54, 62-63 and accompanying text.
A Taxonomy of Basic Dispute Resolution Terms

*Third party neutral:* An individual who assists parties in resolving issues in dispute (e.g. mediator, conciliator, fact-finder, arbitrators, etc.) The term “neutral” reflects the normal expectation that the third party will act independently and impartially.\(^8\)

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8. *Neutral,* in *Dictionary of Conflict Resolution* (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999). These golden standards are found across the board in all codes of ethics of mediators or arbitrators in Western societies. *See e.g.* IMI, IMI CODE OF PROCEDURAL CONDUCT § 2.2; IBA, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB. Part 1 (2014); ABA & AAA, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II (2005); AAA, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARB. IN COMM. DISP., Canon I (2004).
CHART A. BASIC TAXONOMY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES

Dispute Resolution Processes

Adjudicative Process

Arbitration

Binding Expert Determination

Litigation

Advisory Appraisal

Advisory Expert Determination

Advisory/Non-binding Arbitration

Bidding Evaluations

Conciliation

Dispute Boards (decisions may in some cases be binding)

Early Neutral Evaluation

Evaluative Mediation

Non-Evaluative Process (some forms of mediation)

Mint-Trial

Facilitative/Non-Evaluative Mediation

Transformative Mediation

Non-Adjudicative Process

Evaluative Processes (non-binding evaluations)
Adjudicative Processes

Adjudicative processes refer to dispute resolution processes leading to a binding decision in arbitration or in court.  

- **Arbitration (binding arbitration):** A process in which the parties to a dispute present arguments and evidence to a third party neutral or a panel of neutrals (the arbitrator/s) who make/s a determination (the award). Commercial arbitration agreements typically provide for the arbitral award to be binding and enforceable in court.  

   In this survey, the term “arbitration” is intended to refer to “binding arbitration” unless otherwise noted.

- **Litigation:** The process of bringing a dispute to court for resolution.

Non-Adjudicative Processes

- **Binding Evaluations:** Binding evaluations involve an assessment by an independent third party with specific expertise of a disputed issue that is binding on the parties.

- **Binding expert determination:** A process that is extensively used for international commercial disputes in a variety of sectors in order to provide a contractually final and binding decision on technical issues, such as accounting, gas pricing, engineering, and the like. (Some processes involving binding determinations by experts may be treated as binding arbitration under applicable law.)

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Evaluative Processes (Processes involving non-binding evaluation): Non-adjudicative (nonbinding) evaluative processes involve an advisory assessment by a third party neutral of the likely outcome of a dispute being adjudicated, the merits of the case, and/or the value of an asset or claim. They include the following assortment of processes, which may overlap in concept:

- **Advisory appraisal**: A process in which a third party neutral offers advice on the valuation of assets and/or property in dispute between the parties. “Case appraisal,” on the other hand, is often understood to mean a process in which a third party neutral investigates the dispute and provides advice on possible and desirable outcomes and the means by which these may be achieved.

- **Advisory expert determination**: A process in which a third party neutral with relevant expertise makes a non-binding decision on a specific (often technical) issue in dispute.

- **Advisory / Nonbinding arbitration**: A type of arbitration in which the arbitrator makes a decision regarding issues in dispute, which decision does not constitute a binding or legally enforceable award. The “award” is in effect an advisory opinion.

- **Conciliation**: A process in which the third party neutral, while facilitating settlement negotiations between disputing parties, offers some form of evaluation of parties’ “cases” or of

93. Although third parties are sometimes retained by a single party for the purpose of providing a confidential evaluation to that party in the course of preparation for dispute resolution, the focus of this study is uniquely on nonbinding evaluations provided to both/all parties.

94. *Cf.* note 94 (referring to binding appraisal processes).


possible outcomes in adjudication, or offers the parties a proposal for settlement of the dispute. Conciliation may be understood as

98. This definition reflects a broadly shared view among several jurisdictions and corresponds to the concept of conciliation embraced at the international level. See e.g. Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra note 12, at 352-53, in which the author describes the distinction between the processes of mediation and conciliation from a Swiss perspective:

[Mediation is a non-evaluative process in which no coalition is being sought with the neutral, whereas in conciliation, the neutral’s subject matter expertise is typically being sought to set norms or make proposals in a somewhat evaluative manner [...]. Conciliation is thus a process that can be procedurally facilitative, but that is substantively evaluative, because possible outcomes are identified and resolved by means of objective norms and criteria. In mediation, there is no ZOPA [Zone of Possible Agreement] and the neutral should refrain from making proposals.]

Id. See also Alessandra Sgubini, Mara Prieditis & Andrea Marighetto, Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation: differences and similarities from an International and Italian business perspective (Aug. 2004), http://www.mediate.com/articles/sgubiniA2.cfm, which describes the concept of conciliation as found in Italy:

Conciliation tries to individualize the optimal solution and direct parties toward a satisfactory common agreement. Although this sounds strikingly similar to mediation, there are important differences between the two methods of dispute resolution. In conciliation, the conciliator plays a relatively direct role in the actual resolution of a dispute and even advises the parties on certain solutions by making proposals for settlement. In conciliation, the neutral is usually seen as an authority figure who is responsible for the figuring out the best solution for the parties. The conciliator, not the parties, often develops and proposes the terms of settlement. The parties come to the conciliator seeking guidance and the parties make decisions about proposals made by conciliators.

Id. See also Robert Virasin, Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation in Thailand (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.siam-legal.com/thailand-law/arbitration-mediation-and-conciliation-in-thailand/, which describes the process of conciliation in Thailand as follows:

Conciliation is different from mediation. In mediation, the mediator is a neutral third party. While in conciliation, the conciliator is an active party in the discussion to bring the parties to an agreement. In contrast to just listening and being empathetic, a conciliator is generally an expert in the field and will actively discuss the issue with each party. The conciliator attempts to bring the parties from the issue of what they “want” to what will probably happen if the dispute is placed in front of the court. The conciliation procedure is outlined in Section 22 of the Labor Protection Act.

Id. See also JEAN-PIERRE COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 9 (R. Myers trans., 1972), which defines the process of conciliation as understood as the international level:

[Intervention in the settlement of an international dispute by a body having no political authority of its own, but enjoying the confidence of the parties to the dispute and entrusted with the task of investigating every aspect of the dispute and of proposing a solution which is not binding on the parties.

Id. See also CEDR, Guidance Notes for Customers: Conciliation (2015) at 1, https://www.cedr.com/idrs/documents/151029172414-conciliation-guidance-notes-for-consumers.pdf, which states:

Conciliation is an informal process for settling disputes through direct negotiations. A conciliator contacts the parties directly, usually by telephone, to attempt to encourage a negotiated settlement between them. The conciliator allows the parties
functionally equivalent to a kind of early neutral evaluation discussed below under “Evaluative mediation.” In some places, conciliation may be employed as a general synonym for mediation, including non-evaluative as well as evaluative mediation processes, but distinctions usually emerge on careful examination. For example, in France, it has been observed that the legal distinction between the concepts of mediation and conciliation is unclear due to a confusion created by positive law codification and literature. In practice, however, mediation is generally understood as a process taking place in multidisciplinary fields (such as psychology, philosophy, medicine and law) where the mediator is focused on reestablishing communications between the parties, finding a solution and reestablishing the parties’ relationship. On the other hand, conciliation is a term used exclusively in the legal field, wherein the neutral is either a judge or a legal practitioner who assists the parties to resolve their legal dispute. Similarly, in Brazil, as well as in Canada, the concepts of “conciliation” and “mediation” are understood as synonyms, with the important distinction that the term “conciliation” is generally reserved for the function of the judge (the conciliator judge) who assists the parties in reaching a negotiated solution, a process also referred to as “settlement conference” in the Canadian context.

- **Dispute boards:** Dispute boards are used to provide a relatively quick and efficient method for resolving disputes on construction and other large, long-term projects. There are two

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100. Audrerie, Médiation et conciliation, supra note 5, at 124-27.
103. Id. By way of contrast, one US source defines the term conciliation as a more “passive, less structured form of intervention than mediation”, where the conciliator encourages the parties to reach an agreement on their own and may act as a “go-between” to facilitate communication. See Conciliation, in DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1999).
main forms of dispute boards, Dispute review boards (“DRB”) and Dispute adjudication boards (“DAB”). Dispute boards are most often employed on large public infrastructure projects and other sophisticated long-term projects and may consist of a single person, or a panel of three or five members (often with relevant expertise in the type of project/industry). The individual or panel is appointed at the commencement of a project before any disputes arise, permitting the board to become familiar with project personnel, technical aspects, and project progress. When disputes arise, the panel hears presentations from the parties. This process is informal and typically does not involve legal arguments and witness examinations. Following its inquiry into a dispute, the panel deliberates and produces a decision complete with supporting rationale.\(^{104}\) DRBs typically produce decisions that are treated as nonbinding recommendations or proposals.\(^{105}\) DAB decisions are typically preliminarily binding on the parties, subject to the right of either party to “appeal” the matter to determination by a court or arbitration tribunal.\(^{106}\)

- **Early neutral evaluation:** A non-binding process usually conducted early in litigation (before much discovery has taken place) in which a third party neutral (the evaluator) conducts a session with the parties and counsel to hear both sides of the case and offers a non-binding assessment of the case. If the parties so agree or the applicable rules so provide, the evaluator may also help with case planning by helping to clarify arguments and issues, and may even mediate settlement discussions.\(^{107}\)

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104. For more detailed information about dispute boards, see RANDY HAFER & CPR CONSTRUCTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BOARD SUBCOMMITTEE, DISPUTE REVIEW BOARDS AND OTHER STANDING NEUTRALS. ACHIEVING “REAL TIME” RESOLUTION AND PREVENTION OF DISPUTES, CPR Dispute Prevention Briefing (2010); GWYN OWEN, DISPUTE BOARDS: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE (2007); see also CYRIL CHERN, CHERN ON DISPUTE BOARDS (2d. ed. 2011).

105. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration, supra note 77, at 126; see also Dispute Review Board (DRB), DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999).

106. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DISPUTE BOARD RULES, Article 5 Dispute Adjudication Board (Effective Oct. 1, 2015).

Evaluative mediation: A process in which a third party neutral (the mediator) uses a directive approach to move the parties toward settlement.\(^{108}\) To achieve this aim, the mediator may adopt a variety of techniques, such as urging the parties to accept settlement, proposing or developing an agreement for the parties to accept, predicting adjudication outcome or the impact of not settling in terms of parties’ interests, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ respective legal case, or evaluating parties’ options in light of their interests.\(^{109}\) Several techniques used in evaluative mediation converge with what is understood as “Conciliation” as described in this taxonomy.

Mini-trial: A settlement process in which the parties present tightly summarized versions of their respective cases to a panel comprised of principals of each party who have authority to negotiate a settlement of the dispute and a third party neutral. After the parties have presented their best case, the panel convenes and tries to settle the matter. In some cases the third party neutral offers an advisory evaluation of the dispute.\(^{110}\)

Non-evaluative Processes: Non-evaluative processes include forms of mediation that do not involve nonbinding evaluation.

Non-evaluative mediation (sometimes referred to as “facilitative mediation”): A process in which a third party neutral (the mediator) assists disputing parties by facilitating settlement negotiations and, perhaps, improving the parties’ relationship or
ability to communicate. In this form of mediation, the mediator elicit the parties’ stories, their sense of meaning, and their solutions. The mediator may use reality-testing techniques to help the parties understand their interests or the strengths and weaknesses of their legal case, assist them to evaluate proposals, generate options that respond to their interests, or develop and exchange proposals. One form of non-evaluative mediation, sometimes referred to as “transformative mediation,” aims to empower parties to more effectively communicate in order to resolve disputes and improve their relationship.

2. Identifying goals and values that underpin practices and perspectives on commercial dispute resolution processes

The first objective of the Task Force is to fill the many gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the range of current approaches and attitudes toward mixed mode practices. Forming a coherent and meaningful picture of the “crazy quilt” of practices and perspectives regarding mixed mode dispute resolution processes requires a systematic approach: a detailed assessment of the character of mixed mode practice in the international sphere and in a representative range of countries. We must take account not only of the international spectrum of published norms and observed practices, but also dig deeper, to underlying motivations and their root causes—be they the manifestations of longstanding national or regional cultural traditions and legal cultures, industry or organizational cultures, or creative adaptations to specific circumstances.

111. See Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 108, at 30-33.

112. See id.


114. Culture is acquired through the process of socialization and underpins shared values, norms, customs, ideologies and roles within the members of a group. It can have a considerable conscious or unconscious impact on the parties’ motivations in conflict resolution and their attitudes toward neutrals’ practices. See George Peter Murdock, The Cross Cultural Survey, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 361 (1940) (providing more information on the sources of culture from an anthropologist and sociologist perspective); RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 34 (1934); Edward Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, 74 SCIENCE 578
In order to “deconstruct” present dispute resolution practices and provide a basis for comparison among divergent approaches, we will focus on the process goals and values that underlie these practices. In the four decades since the advent of the Quiet Revolution in dispute resolution, the growing use of mediation and other intervention strategies aimed at informal resolution of disputes and the dramatic expansion of consensual binding arbitration offered commercial parties a wide range of process choices. Moreover, these developments fundamentally provided opportunities to more effectively address the various aims, priorities, and agendas parties bring to the table. We have become accustomed, therefore, to speak of processes in terms of how they serve, or may be designed to serve, various goals or values. A list of process goals or values that serve

(1951); SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIETY 5 (JOHN A. CLAUSEN ed.,1968). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of culture on conflict resolution).

115. The legal profession exercises far-reaching influence on dispute resolution processes, which are often controlled by lawyers actively involved in negotiating contracts with dispute resolution clauses and in post-dispute counseling and advocacy See Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration, supra note 1, at 313-14. Moreover, neutrals’ and lawyers’ perceptions about their role in dispute resolution is largely influenced by the professional culture and the legal system from which they belong. See Michael McIlwrath & Henri Alvarez, Common and Civil Law Approaches to Procedure: Party and Arbitrator Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVES 2-1, 2-4 (Horacio A. Grigera Naon & Paul E. Mason eds., 2015).

116. Industry has had a leading influence on the development of dispute resolution processes. The construction industry has been on the cutting edge of conflict management practices, including partnering, standing neutrals and dispute boards. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.

117. Organizations’ preferences regarding dispute resolution processes may be influenced by a number of factors, including the specific circumstances surrounding the business’ activities, the national macro-culture(s) with which it is affiliated through its geographical location, as well as the national and preferences of its head management executives and/or employees, the company’s industry or line in business, its conflict history and orientation toward risk-taking, etc. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & Veronique Fraser, “Mixing Modes” in International Commercial Dispute Resolution: Forms of Interplay between Mediation, Arbitration and Evaluation, and the Impact of Culture, Legal Tradition and Choice (publication forthcoming) (on file with authors).

118. Dispute resolution processes can be tailored to fit the specific parties’ needs, their relationships, and the nature of and the circumstances surrounding a conflict. See Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration, supra note 1, at 348-59; Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,”(Symposium Keynote Presentation),” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 383 (2009).

119. See, e.g., Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration, supra note 1, at 308-321; Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice, supra note 118.

120. See, e.g., Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution, supra, note 12, at 339. The author provides, at page 372, a “check-list of factors that can be taken into account when designing such combined processes” (figure 17-17 entitled “Process Design: Combining ADR Options”).
as criteria for shaping processes for the resolution of commercial disputes might include the following:

a. Party control over the process and outcome (informed decision-making and consent; self-determination; flexible / dynamic / tailored process);

b. Independent and impartial neutral;

c. Competent and/or authoritative neutrals (neutrals with necessary skills, experience, authority, respect);

d. Fair process and outcome;

e. Cost-effective / efficient / “proportional” process and outcome;

f. Avoidance of adjudication; promotion of a negotiated outcome;

g. Confidentiality

h. Finality; enforceability of outcome

i. Maintaining or improving relationship; reconciliation

j. Maintaining community or societal stability and harmony.121

In a separate article, we will explore the ways in which the priorities assigned to different process goals and values by national cultures and legal traditions, as well as industries and organizations, factor into parties’ practices and perspectives in dispute resolution.122

See also Jean François Guillemin, Reasons for Choosing Alternative Dispute Resolution, in ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND CULTURES, VOL. II, 13 (Arnold Ingen-Housz ed., 2010); Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice, supra note 118.

121. The list includes many of the process goals and criteria discussed at the inaugural Summit of the International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution, September 23-24, 2017. See International Task Force Summary, supra note 11. Other process goals discussed at the Summit included: “transparent process”; “inclusive process” (including all stakeholders whose interests are affected); “legitimate outcome”; “predictable outcome”; and “feasible outcome” (potential to create clear obligation). The authors elected not to include these in the present discuss either because they overlapped with other listed goals or because they were not as likely to be among the priorities for parties to commercial disputes.

B. Exploring the Landscape: Developing Profiles of International Practice and Representative National Cultures / Legal Systems

Although much has been written on various mixed mode approaches, the bulk of published treatments and guidance tend to reflect the values and preferences of particular national cultures or legal traditions.123 Therefore, the most critical element of Phase I is the examination of norms, practices and perceptions within exemplary countries around the world, laying the groundwork for an eventual comparison of variations in practice and the different process goals and values that underlie these variances.

A range of countries with different traditions and legal systems may be selected as exemplars for comparison of practices and perspectives regarding specific mixed mode scenarios. The investigation would develop relevant information from each country in several key categories:

- **Published norms and standards** would include pertinent provisions of statutes/civil codes and case law; public and private institutional procedures affecting commercial disputes, and ethical standards.124
- **Practices and perspectives**, a considerably more elusive category of information, must be garnered from a variety of sources including published materials offering comparisons of mediation practice in different countries125 and input from experienced individual lawyers, neutrals or practice-oriented scholars.
- **Underlying motivations and values**. Efforts should be made to identify the interests, goals and values that inspired the use of

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123. Although the CEDR Commission was an important step forward in addressing roles arbitrators might play in the settlement of related disputes, portions of the Commission’s findings were reflective of practice in countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Austria, but would raise concerns among practitioners in some other countries. See Stipanowich, *Commercial Arbitration and Settlement, supra* note 9, at 14-15.


125. See *The Variegated Landscape of Mediation, supra* note 124; *Global Trends in Mediation* (Nadja Alexander ed., 2d ed., 2006).
particular mixed mode approaches. To restate the point, although in some cases these drivers may be the product of deliberate choices made by parties in particular circumstances, they are most likely to reflect preferences and priorities associated with national or regional cultures and legal traditions, or industry or organizational cultures. In looking at particular practices, and the extent to which, within a given legal system, use of a mixed mode approach may be the product of active choice at the time of contracting or after disputes arise, as opposed to a “default” process determined by, or strongly encouraged (or discouraged or prohibited) by, legal traditions and cultural influences.

C. Challenges for Phase One

First, as stated above, there is the challenge of learning about and “capturing” experiences with private dispute resolution. It is one thing to capture published norms, but another to explore the broader realm of practice and the motivations and agendas that underlie mixed mode approaches in a particular legal and cultural milieu. Moreover, many such experiences are cloaked in secrecy, or remain undocumented in any level of detail.

Second, surveys with specific questions designed to ferret out perspectives and practices can become very cumbersome, especially given the scope of this initiative and the wide range of mixed mode practice. Moreover, surfacing reasonably detailed information about pertinent experience has proven difficult, apparently because, for all of the talk about mixed mode approaches, most people have little or no experience with some of the scenarios. A preliminary survey of Task Force members revealed a relatively high degree of interest in, and a strong acknowledgement of, the practical significance of mixed mode approaches. However, even within this group of individuals selected on the basis of their experience as legal advocates, dispute resolution professionals, and/or scholars, the level of actual experience with mixed mode approaches was surprisingly low.126 Therefore, although considerable effort was devoted to drafting detailed templates for extensive surveys of members of leading institutions, the nuggets of useful data are likely to be mere needles in a haystack.

A more promising alternative to a highly detailed survey instrument may be to reach out widely to stakeholder groups and use open-ended questions to invite input on specific scenarios regarding which individuals have relevant experience and/or perspectives. This might be done by means of an interactive platform like Google Docs. Respondents providing comments might be prompted to address a series of more targeted follow-up queries, and might also be asked if they would be willing to provide further information if asked.

Third, input should be sought from all of the stakeholder groups represented on the Task Force (namely, dispute resolution professionals, legal advocates and corporate counsel, and scholars) as well as business users.) Based on recent experience, dispute resolution professionals are likely to be the most accessible, along with legal advocates. However, individuals in each of these groups may have personal agendas that are different from those of the business parties with whom they interact. Moreover, there may be a degree of interest bias in reporting positive personal dispute resolution experiences. Unfortunately, based on our experience, corporate in-house counsels tend to be less willing to participate in empirical studies, and business clients with any level of knowledge and interest in dispute resolution are extremely difficult to identify and engage.

Finally, personal interviews or facilitated discussions are other sources of potentially useful information regarding mixed mode approaches. These might be designed as facilitated, videotaped conversations of small groups of interested invitees (who have

127. Task Force members suggested employing listservs, blogs (such as the Wolters Kluwer blog), and the websites of, or outreach through, leading international and national dispute resolution institutions (including IMI and the Global Pound Conference (“GPC”) series; International Academy of Mediators; International Bar Association; Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group (“CClAG”); Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; College of Commercial Arbitrators; American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section on Dispute Resolution; Maryland Mediation & Conflict Resolution Office (“MACRO”); Strauss Institute for Dispute Resolution; Resolution Systems Institute (“RSI” (Chicago)); Dispute Resolution Institute (“DRI” (Carbondale)); Singapore International Mediation Academy, and other interested organizations (such as, for example, Association of Corporate Counsel (“ACC”); International Judicial College, Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (“CLM”); United States Council for International Business, The Business Roundtable, Society of Construction Lawyers; ABA Forum on the Construction Industry, American College of Construction Lawyers; ABA Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section ABA Section on Business Law).


129. Id.
perhaps been pre-screened using the procedure above) from specific countries or regions.

III. PHASE TWO: DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MIXED MODE PRACTICE

The ultimate goal of the International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution is to provide practical tools to help business users and counsel make the most effective use of mixed mode processes, and avoid common pitfalls and problems. The intent is to create user-friendly guidance in several forms or formats, ranging from a relatively short and succinct statement of very basic, concrete, and persuasive insights to more extensive supporting commentary, including treatment of subjects touched upon in this article.

A. Preliminary Considerations

Our abiding self-admonition is first, to do no harm. Because the current initiative was motivated in part by encouraging more effective use of the autonomy that parties in dispute resolution enjoy in tailoring processes to needs and circumstances, and because in many places mediation and mixed mode practice are still in the early stages of evolution, it is critical that impediments to choice be avoided as much as possible. To the extent possible, the emphasis should be not on hard and fast rules or limitations, but signposts and templates that promote good decisions by users and counsel.

Another priority of the Task Force is to pay deliberate attention to and seek to accommodate fundamental cultural differences in the guidance we develop. For this reason, it is important to surface cultural biases and ensure that our product is not driven to an inappropriate degree by a particular set of cultural preferences.

Finally, our intent is to produce international guidelines that are authoritative. For this reason, a number of organizations and widely diverse group of experienced practitioners and scholars from all over

130. The concerns associated with rulemaking in a complex environment in which dispute resolution practice is still in the early stages of evolution may be appreciated by examining the recently passed Brazilian mediation law, which establishes a number of limitations on mediation process that many practitioners might consider unnecessary or unwise. See Stipanowich, The International Evolution of Mediation, supra note 2, at 1208-09.

131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
the world have been assembled. In the coming months, additional organizations and individuals may be enlisted in order to further strengthen the bona fides of the Task Force.

B. Guidelines for Practice

Following the comparative analysis of and reflections on the materials assembled in Phase One, the Task Force will establish a set of guidelines for practice for each of the mixed mode scenarios within the scope of our initiative. Step-by-step, straightforward guidance should be offered for the negotiation and drafting of appropriate contract provisions, and, separately, for post-dispute arrangements or issues that arise in the course of dispute resolution. The intent will be to provide practical responses to address key questions, including: (1) What approaches may be broadly acceptable or even preferable, regardless of the cultural backgrounds and interests of parties? (2) How do cultural preferences, legal traditions or other factors that place priorities on different goals and values in dispute resolution affect what process choices are permissible/appropriate or preferable?

Given the fact that several groups of stakeholders play active roles in the drafting of dispute resolution provisions and post-dispute discussions regarding process, it is appropriate to provide guidance aimed at each of these groups: neutrals, business users and counsel, legal advocates, and institutions that sponsor or administer dispute resolution services. The guidelines will be presented first in short and succinct statements that set forth clear practical steps. They will be accompanied by an in-depth commentary supporting each element of the guidelines. Supporting materials will include the products of Phase One, including (a) the basic taxonomy of dispute resolution approaches, with clarifying definitions; (b) treatment of the relationships between mixed mode approaches and different process goals and values; and (c) summaries of, and comparisons between, practices and perspectives in different representative countries, with appropriate emphasis on the role of culture and legal tradition.

C. Forms and Procedures

In order to put the guidelines into practice, the Task Force will also develop exemplary templates, including suggested formats for contractual dispute resolution provisions or guidance in the form of a “clause generator.” These will be accompanied by suggested mixed mode procedures adaptable for use with leading institutional mediation and/or arbitration procedures.

D. Training and Education

The products of the Mixed Mode Task Force will be readily adaptable for academic courses or training programs. It is possible that these may form the basis of credentialing by sponsoring institutions.

E. Other Possible Results

At the inaugural Summit, Task Force members discussed a number of other possible outcomes of the initiative. These include international ethical standards addressing mixed mode scenarios, a database of arbitrators and institutions with experience in or resources focused on mixed mode practice, and collected summaries of experiences of different kinds with mixed mode scenarios.

CONCLUSION

The launching of the International Task Force on Mixed Mode Dispute Resolution in 2016 demonstrated the impetus for encouraging further examination of an international dialogue to enhance our understanding of perceptions and practices involving a mixing of modes in dispute resolution. More than sixty experienced lawyers, scholars and dispute resolution professionals from six continents are now participating in the Task Force, nearly all of these individuals responded to a preliminary survey last summer; fully two-thirds gathered for the inaugural Summit of the Task Force in September, 2016. The active engagement of this group of experts will lead to the systematic collection of information about existing norms, standards, practices and perspectives regarding mixed modes, and the development of new analytic tools to create a platform for the comparison of approaches on the basis of underlying process goals and values associated with national culture and legal tradition,
industry and organizational culture. The hoped-for result will be guidelines to assist dispute resolution professionals and users in the use of mixed modes, as well as information to strengthen active choice making in dispute resolution.