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Is the Privacy Act an Exemption 3 Statute and Whose Statute is it Anyway?

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IS THE PRIVACY ACT AN EXEMPTION 3 STATUTE AND WHOSE STATUTE IS IT ANYWAY?

Introduction

Since the enactment of the Privacy Act in 1974, commentators have recognized its potential for conflict with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosure provisions. Both statutes provide for disclosure of government records: The Privacy Act grants the subject of the record (first-party requester) access to information about himself; the FOIA mandates disclosure to the public. A major dispute centers on whether Privacy Act disclosure exemptions may be incorporated into the FOIA automatically to bar disclosure under the FOIA. If so, a further question arises as to whether the incorporated Privacy Act exemptions should be applied only to individuals requesting information about themselves, or to all persons requesting information under the FOIA. Conversely, if Privacy Act exemptions are not incorporated into the FOIA, the issue must still be resolved whether individuals are limited to Privacy Act access provisions.

4. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982) (government agencies to publish or make available their records); id. § 552a(d) (government agencies to make available their records).
5. Id. § 552a(d). Review and copying to be permitted "upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system." Id. § 552a(d)(1).
6. Id. § 552(a). Public disclosure encompasses making records available to "any person" who requests them. See id. § 552(a)(3).
7. Compare Shapiro v. DEA, 731 F.2d 215, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1983) (exemption under Privacy Act bars disclosure under FOIA because of FOIA's Exemption 3), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984) and Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) and Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (The FOIA cannot disclose information exempt under Privacy Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980) with Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (exemption under Privacy Act does not bar disclosure under
The FOIA, enacted in 1966, requires disclosure unless the requested information falls into one of nine exempted categories. The third of these categories (Exemption 3) exempts from the FOIA’s disclosure requirement material that other statutes specifically require to be withheld. If the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute, material that is exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act would also be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.


11. Exemption 3 exempts disclosure of materials that are:

(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.


The Privacy Act was enacted to protect individuals from the gathering and dissemination of personal information by the federal government.13 While the FOIA also protects individuals’ privacy interests,14 an individual’s rights under the Privacy Act are broader than those of the general public under the FOIA.15 The Privacy Act, however,

\[\text{granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (exemption under the Privacy Act bars disclosure under the FOIA), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 531 (same). But see Provenzano v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (exemption under the Privacy Act does not bar disclosure under the FOIA), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Greentree v. United States Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 132-33 (Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute); see also Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum) (questions whether exemptions under Privacy Act foreclose disclosure determination under the FOIA).}


14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7) (1982). The FOIA’s privacy protections exempt personnel or medical files disclosure of which would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” id. § 552(b)(6), and investigatory records if their disclosure would constitute an “invasion of personal privacy,” id. § 552(b)(7)(C). These protections supercede those of the Privacy Act. Id. § 552a(b)(2); see Crooker v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. 83-1687, slip op. at 20-21 (1st Cir. Mar. 21, 1984); Jafari v. Department of the Navy, No. 83-1629, slip op. at 4-6 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 1984); Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (M.D. Tenn. 1975); Privacy Exemption, supra note 3, at 629-30. One court has noted that “the Privacy Act was not intended to override the FOIA and in operation only prohibits the release of information not covered by the FOIA or the discretionary release of material which, while exempt from the FOIA, the agency might have previously chosen to release.” Antonelli v. FBI, 536 F. Supp. 588, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1981); Florida Medical Ass’n v. HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 1979).

15. Under the Privacy Act, an individual has a right of access, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (1982), and a right to request amendment of his record; id. § 552a(d)(2), (3), (4). The FOIA requester only has a right of access. Id. § 552(a). Additionally, the Privacy Act imposes agency requirements in the maintenance, collection and dissemination of personal records. Id. § 552a(e). The FOIA imposes no similar requirements. See id. § 552. Although both the Privacy Act and the FOIA provide for de novo judicial review of agency withholding decisions and grant attorney fees and litigation costs if the requester “substantially prevail[s],” id. § 552a(g) (Privacy Act civil remedy), (g)(2)(B) (Privacy Act attorney fees and litigation costs); id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (FOIA civil remedy), (a)(4)(E) (FOIA attorney fees and litigation costs), only the Privacy Act grants damages to the individual if the agency intentionally or willfully violates the Privacy Act provisions, id. § 552a(g)(4).
permits exemption from disclosure of certain specified types of records without regard to the actual contents of the record requested. 16 CIA records, for example, are completely exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act. 17 The FOIA, on the other hand, contains more flexible exemptions that are applicable only when disclosure of a particular record 18 would bring about specific dangers identified by Congress. 19 CIA records, then would be withheld only to the extent that disclosure would pose one of the dangers indentified in the ex- emptions to the FOIA. 20 Thus, in some instances the FOIA will pro- vide greater access than will the Privacy Act. 21 Further, if the enact-


16. The Privacy Act allows the exemption of entire systems of records. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982). If the system of records is exempt by virtue of a blanket exemption, inquiry into the nature of the requested file is not required. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 227-29 (1978); Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974). In order to exempt a system of records, the agency must first promulgate and publish rules, giving reasons for the exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984). Thus, the decision to exempt a system of records must be made prior to a request for files within that system in order for the exemption to be valid. See id.


18. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978) (blanket exemptions do not apply to FOIA, although "generic" determination of harm as specified by Congress is proper).

19. Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement proceedings, for example, are exempt under the FOIA only to the extent that they:
   (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.


20. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.

21. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir.
ment of the Privacy Act signals the demise of individuals’ access under the FOIA,\(^2\) the occasional greater FOIA access could disclose to any other member of the public information unavailable to the subject of the file.\(^3\)

In an attempt to determine whether the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute or may otherwise bar disclosure under the FOIA, courts and commentators have repeatedly analyzed the statutory language and legislative history of the two acts.\(^4\) The contradictory conclusions of these analyses\(^5\) indicate that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history is conclusive.\(^6\) Further, these analyses fail to distinguish the secondary issue—whether, if the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute, the same result nonetheless may be achieved by limiting individuals to Privacy Act disclosure provisions when they request information about themselves. In order to resolve the primary dispute it is also necessary to resolve the secondary issue, going beyond traditional methods of statutory construction to an analysis of the operation of the two statutes.

Part I of this Note briefly presents the alternative analyses, both of which utilize traditional methods of statutory construction—interpretation of statutory language and legislative history. Part II discusses

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22. See infra notes 101, 102 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218-22 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 793-99 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1979); Government Information, supra note 3, at 1336-40; Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 516-26; Privacy Exemption, supra note 3, at 624-28; Statutory Conflict, supra note 3, at 590-92; Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 140-49.
25. Judicial acceptance of both analyses has led to an ongoing split in circuit court opinions. See supra note 7.
26. See Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983) (“There is a certain amount of ambiguity in the legislative history of the Privacy Act, with statements by members of Congress in which each side purports to find support.”); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The legislative history is not without ambiguities.”); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 146 (Neither the Privacy Act nor the FOIA show “Congress at its best in documenting the contours and boundaries of the legislation.”).
the operation of the two statutes under the alternative analyses. First, it examines the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute, distinguishing between its application to either first-party requesters only, or to all requesters. Second, it examines the operation of the Privacy Act as an independent statute, distinguishing between limiting first-party access to Privacy Act provisions and allowing first-party requesters to utilize FOIA access provisions as well. This Note concludes that the FOIA and the Privacy Act operate most efficiently as independent statutory frameworks and that first-party access should not be limited to Privacy Act provisions.

I. THE ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY ANALYSES

A. The Privacy Act: An Exemption 3 Statute

The FOIA's Exemption 3 allows non-disclosure of records specifically exempted from disclosure by other statutes. Congress included this exemption to reconcile the FOIA with the withholding statutes already in existence. Post-FOIA statutes, such as the Privacy Act, also must be reconciled with the FOIA. Indeed, Congress recognized the potential for overlap between the Privacy Act and the FOIA. The original Senate version of the Privacy Act contained two distinct provisions that would have reconciled the Privacy Act with the FOIA: (1) exemption under the Privacy Act will not impair FOIA disclosure, and (2) exemption under the FOIA will not impair Privacy Act disclosure. As enacted, however, the Privacy Act contains only the second provision. Because Congress omitted the provision prohibiting use of Privacy Act exemptions to impair FOIA disclosure, it may be inferred that Congress rejected this prohibition. A determination

27. See supra note 11.
28. Exemption 3 was intended to reconcile other withholding statutes with the FOIA, as "[t]here are nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified . . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2427; see FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 263-65 (1975); Government Information, supra note 3, at 1338-39.
29. See King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1982); Washington Post Co. v United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Scalia, J., statement on denial of rehearing), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Government Information, supra note 3, at 1337-40; Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1029 n.5 (1976).
32. See id. § 205(b), 120 Cong. Rec. at 36,920.
33. See id. § 205(a), 120 Cong. Rec. at 36,920.
35. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
that the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute impairs disclosure 
under the FOIA, and thus is consistent with this implied legislative 
intent.

Withholding statutes must meet one of two criteria before they fall 
within Exemption 3.\footnote{36} The statute must either leave no room for 
agency discretion in the withholding of the information, or “[estab-
lish] particular criteria for withholding or [refer] to particular types of 
matters to be withheld.”\footnote{37} The Privacy Act does not satisfy the 
first criterion because its exemptions are solely at the discretion of the 
agency.\footnote{38} The second criterion, however, has been the basis for 
holding the Privacy Act an Exemption 3 statute\footnote{39} because the act “refers 
to particular types of matters to be withheld.”\footnote{40}

\footnote{36} 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). Subsections (A) and (B) of Exemption 3 are 
distinct from one another and only one need be satisfied. Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 
F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1979), \textit{cert. denied}, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); American 
Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see 122 Cong. Rec. 
24,212-13 (1976) (colloquy between Representatives McCloskey and Fascell); 122 
Ad. News 2244, 2250.


\footnote{38} \textit{Misinterpretation}, \textit{supra} note 7, at 554 n.155. The Privacy Act’s exemptions 
are permissive: “The head of any agency \textit{may} promulgate rules . . . to exempt any 
system of records within the agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982) (emphasis 
added). The first prerequisite “is too rigorous to tolerate any decisionmaking on the 
administrative level.” American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978).

\footnote{39} \textit{See} Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1983), \textit{cert. granted}, 104 S. 
Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Terkel v. 
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (no express holding that Privacy Act is 
Exemption 3 statute; FOIA cannot disclose information that Privacy Act exempts), 
552a(j)(1) (1982), law enforcement investigatory records maintained by agencies 
performing law enforcement functions, \textit{id.} § 552a(j)(2), classified state secrets, \textit{id.} § 
552a(k)(1), law enforcement investigatory material not held by law enforcement 
agencies, except that the material will be provided to an individual if he would 
otherwise be deprived of “any right, privilege, or benefit” if disclosure would not 
reveal the identity of a confidential source who furnished information to the govern-
ment under a promise of confidentiality, \textit{id.} § 552a(k)(2), information regarding 
providing protective services to the President of the United States, \textit{id.} § 552a(k)(3), 
statistical information required by statute to be used only as such, \textit{id.} § 552a(k)(4),}
If the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute, the FOIA may provide access to information that is exempt under the Privacy Act and thereby limit the efficacy of the Privacy Act's exemptions.\(^{41}\) The investigatory material regarding qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts or access to classified information, to the extent that disclosure would reveal a confidential source, id. § 552a(k)(5), materials for the testing of qualification for appointment or promotion in Federal service to the extent that disclosure would prejudice fairness of the testing process, id. § 552a(k)(6), and armed services evaluational material to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source, id. § 552a(k)(7).

40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1982). An Exemption 3 statute, however, also may be required to establish criteria by which information is to be withheld. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept' of State, 685 F.2d 698, 701-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Privacy Act does not establish criteria for withholding; its exemptions are at the discretion of the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1982); cf. Church of Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 633 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980) (Postal Service withholding provision does not satisfy Exemption 3 because it allows complete discretion to disclose or withhold all investigatory files). One commentator has suggested that identifying materials in the statute is sufficient to establish a method by which agencies are to exercise discretion in withholding information. Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 524 n.155. This reasoning, however, is flawed. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept' of Justice, 685 F.2d 698, 702 (referring to particular types of matters may not be enough; every withholding statute will refer to something), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983).

Alternatively, a very narrow category indicates that Congress was aware of the dangers inherent in disclosing that particular type of information, and criteria for withholding were not necessary. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept' of State, 685 F.2d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 616-17 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 127 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1056 (1975). Finally, a withholding statute may satisfy Exemption 3 if an examination of the statute and its legislative history reveals "congressional appreciation of the dangers" in disclosure. Founding Church of Scientology v. National Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The legislative history of the Privacy Act exemptions indicates that the identified files should not be disclosed to the subject of the files. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.

The scope of the investigatory records exemption under the Privacy Act, for example, was the subject of much debate, and was resolved in favor of an exemption broader than the corresponding FOIA exemption. Greater deference, therefore, should be given the Privacy Act because it is the most recent expression of congressional intent.

B. The Privacy Act: An Independent Statute

Courts and commentators concluding that the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute rely heavily on the language and purpose of the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act was intended to increase access by


The Senate Committee proposed Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records only if disclosure of the records would seriously impede the purposes for which the information was maintained. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(b), 120 Cong. Rec. 36,885, 36,888 (1974). The proposed exemption was amended to mirror that of the corresponding exemption under the FOIA, Exemption 7. Id. at 36,890, 36,920 (1974). This provision was ultimately rejected in favor of a blanket exemption. See infra note 43.


45. See Porter v. United States Dep't of State, 717 F.2d 787, 796-99 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 152-56.

The FOIA contains a broad mandate for disclosure and its exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1982) (FOIA embodies broad disclosure and narrow exemptions); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (dominant purpose of FOIA is disclosure); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (FOIA embodies broad disclosure and narrow exemptions), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (same), reprinted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source Book 36, 38 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as FOIA Source Book]. Early commentators concluded that the FOIA's policy of broad disclosure precluded the Privacy Act from being an Exemption 3 statute. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Courts concluding that the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute have not considered whether the Privacy Act meets the requirements of Exemption 3. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797
individuals to information about themselves.\textsuperscript{46} Congress' decision to limit such access with exemptions, however, does not necessarily reflect a desire to withhold this exempted information under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{47} The Privacy Act and the FOIA should operate separately.\textsuperscript{48}

Moreover, several provisions contained in the Privacy Act preclude its operation as an Exemption 3 statute. The Privacy Act's disclosure exemptions apply only to persons seeking access under the Privacy Act,\textsuperscript{49} and not to those seeking access under other statutes.\textsuperscript{50} In addition, the Privacy Act's "Conditions of Disclosure" provision waives the consent requirement for required disclosures of personal information under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{51} This waiver arguably "reinstates the essence" of the provision omitted from the final version of the Privacy Act, providing

\textsuperscript{46} Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980); see Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982); H.R. Rep. No. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. 36,643 (1974) (Privacy Act intended to increase government accountability and responsibility in protecting individuals' privacy); 1974 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6916, 6916-6917 (same); see also Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 798 (3d Cir. 1983) (no congressional intent for Privacy Act to limit access under the FOIA). The rights granted by the Privacy Act implement this governmental intent. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The access requirement is important to enable an individual to monitor the information concerning him maintained by an agency. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).

\textsuperscript{47} See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81, 83, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Antonelli v. FBI, 536 F. Supp. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Privacy Act was not intended to override the FOIA."). rev'd on other grounds, 721 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1983).

\textsuperscript{48} Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 798-99 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 160-61.

\textsuperscript{49} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (l) (1982). Exemptions are made only from the provisions of “this section,” id., namely the Privacy Act.

\textsuperscript{50} Id.; see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

\textsuperscript{51} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982). Disclosure is required under the FOIA if the information does not fall within one of FOIA's exemptions, id. § 552(b) (specifying 9 exemptions). See infra note 62 and accompanying text. If the information falls within one of the exemptions, however, disclosure is not barred, because the FOIA is a disclosure statute—not a withholding statute. Planning Research Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 555 F.2d 970, 973 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, although the material is exempt under the FOIA, the agency has discretion to release it. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 800 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979)), aff'd, 447 U.S. 102 (1980). It is this discretionary release of information that the Privacy Act would prohibit unless the subject of the file granted consent to its release. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
that exemption under the Privacy Act would not affect FOIA disclosure.\textsuperscript{52} Congress noted that the waiver was intended to “preserve the status quo as interpreted by the courts regarding the disclosure of personal information under [the FOIA].”\textsuperscript{53} Thus, the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute because the FOIA’s disclosure provisions were to remain in effect, and the Privacy Act’s exemptions are “self-contained.”\textsuperscript{54}

These opposing statutory analyses and determinations of legislative intent are not conclusive in resolving the question whether the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute. Examination of the practical operation of the two acts under each alternative may yield the interpretation most consistent with the legislative intent of both statutes.

II. OPERATION OF THE FOIA AND THE PRIVACY ACT

A. Analyzing the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 Statute

Designation of the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute requires a distinction to be drawn between application of the Privacy Act exemptions to only the subject of a file or to all requesters.\textsuperscript{55} The Privacy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797, 798 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{53} 120 Cong. Rec. 40,406, 40,882 (1974). The status quo, which the consent waiver was to maintain, was disclosure under the FOIA to “any person”—first- and third-party requesters alike—without “plac[ing] the Privacy Act in the path of ‘any person’ seeking access to information under FOIA.” Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 796 (3d Cir. 1983). Contra Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) (“status quo” at time of enactment of Privacy Act gave third parties very little access to personal files), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 526 & n.175 (consent waiver does no more than waive consent if FOIA requires disclosure, it does not determine whether Privacy Act exemptions bar FOIA disclosure).
\item \textsuperscript{54} Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord Porter v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983).
\item \textsuperscript{55} See Government Information, supra note 3, at 1339; Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 530-31. This distinction has not been drawn by the courts that apparently would restrict the application of the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute to first-party requesters. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) (third parties have access under FOIA notwithstanding Privacy Act exemptions), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 691 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (Privacy Act is Exemption 3 statute yet court does not address scope of exemption). The Terkel court did not expressly designate the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute, but merely stated that the FOIA and the Privacy Act must be considered together, and that material exempted by the Privacy Act should be withheld under the FOIA. Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). Thus, it is unclear whether that court would rule that the Privacy Act prevents third- as well as first-party requesters from obtaining information exempted under the Privacy Act.
\end{itemize}
Act applies only to first-party requesters. Exemption 3, therefore, may incorporate the Privacy Act exemptions only as to first-party requesters. The FOIA, however, applies to "any person." Thus, once Privacy Act exemptions are incorporated into the FOIA, they may be applied to all persons despite the application of the Privacy Act only to the subject of a file. The operation of the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute depends upon which requesters are subject to the Privacy Act exemptions.

1. The Incorporated Privacy Act Exemptions Applied Only to First-Party Requesters

If Exemption 3 incorporates Privacy Act exemptions only as to first-party requesters, the limited incorporation creates what has been termed the third-party anomaly. Third parties may receive more information about an individual under the FOIA than that individual could obtain under either the Privacy Act or the FOIA with incorporated Privacy Act exemptions. The problem arises because of the differences between the disclosure provisions of the two acts. FOIA exemptions concerning personal information require that disclosure decisions utilize a balancing test on a case-by-case basis. The agency

56. See supra note 5.
57. This is the approach taken by those holding the Privacy Act an Exemption 3 statute. See supra note 55.

61. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
must weigh the potential harm of disclosure to the government or individual\textsuperscript{63} against the public interest in disclosure.\textsuperscript{64} The FOIA also has a provision for the release of segregable portions of requested information if all of the information need not be disclosed.\textsuperscript{65} The Privacy Act has no balancing test and no provision for the release of segregable portions of requested information.\textsuperscript{66} If the information is contained in the types of files that have been prospectively exempted, the information need not be released.\textsuperscript{67} Therefore, it is possible that a specific record exempt under the Privacy Act would be available in whole or in part under the FOIA.

All Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) records, for example, are exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act.\textsuperscript{68} Thus, the first-party requester would never have access to CIA records.\textsuperscript{69} Under the FOIA, however, CIA records are exempt only to the extent provided by the FOIA's exemptions.\textsuperscript{70} In particular, Exemption 7 withholds investiga-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{63} The individual may be either the subject of a file or any person mentioned in the file. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Source Book 333 (Comm. Print 1975); see Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), \textit{cert. denied}, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
  \item \textsuperscript{64} See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976) (weighing potential harm to government and concerned individuals against public interest in disclosure); Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1983) (weighing privacy interest against public interest in disclosure); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982) (personnel and medical files); \textit{id.} § 552(b)(7) (investigatory records).
  \item \textsuperscript{65} 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
  \item \textsuperscript{66} The Privacy Act "does not require that a regulation's rationale for exempting a record from disclosure apply in each particular case. It is sufficient that the system of records be exempted properly . . . " Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), \textit{cert. granted}, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j), (k) (1982).
  \item \textsuperscript{67} See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), \textit{cert. granted}, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984). See \textit{supra} note 16 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (1982). This section provides that:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part of this section . . . if the system of records is—(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency . . .
    \end{itemize}
    \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{69} The operation of Exemption 3 is similar to that of the Privacy Act exemptions in that "the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and inclusion of the withheld material within that statute's coverage." Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), \textit{cert. denied}, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
  \item \textsuperscript{70} 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982). CIA records have additional protection from disclosure for information regarding intelligence sources and methods. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3), (g) (1976). Section 403(d)(3) and (g) are Exemption 3 withholding statutes. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), \textit{cert. denied}, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The CIA may not, however, "refuse to provide any information at all about anything it does." Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
\end{itemize}
tive records that would harm either the government or an individual. Specifically, it withholds investigative records that would jeopardize an enforcement proceeding or the right to a fair trial, would reveal the source of confidential information, would reveal secret investigative techniques, would endanger the life or safety of law enforcement personnel, or would result in an invasion of privacy. If the record or a portion thereof does not violate one of these provisions, it must be disclosed to the third-party requester. The first party's access, however, is barred by the Privacy Act's blanket exemption, an absurd result.

Those supporting Exemption 3 status for the Privacy Act dismiss the potential effect of the third party anomaly as unlikely to occur with any frequency. The infrequency of occurrence, however, should not support an interpretation that creates this anomaly. The mere possibility that a member of the general public could obtain information about an individual, that the individual himself could not, is inconsistent with the Privacy Act's main purpose—to protect the individual's privacy. It would be ironic to interpret the Privacy Act to allow greater dissemination of personal information to the public than to the concerned individual.

73. Id. § 552(b)(7)(D).
74. Id. § 552(b)(7)(E).
75. Id. § 552(b)(7)(F).
76. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980); Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 530-31.
79. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see also Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledges anomaly but concludes that Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute); cf. Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 530-31 (third party anomaly should be solved by applying Privacy Act exemptions to all requesters).
80. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court confronted with "rare case" holds that because of anomaly Congress could not have intended Privacy Act to be an Exemption 3 statute). This is consistent with the rule that when the language of a statute is subject to differing interpretations, the words should be construed to produce a rational result. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.12 (4th ed. 1973); see Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1977).
81. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
82. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Further, designating the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute to be applied only to the subject of the file may not always prevent his access to material exempt under the Privacy Act. The first-party requester may circumvent Exemption 3 by requesting information through a third party.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, Privacy Act exemptions could be undermined even if the Privacy Act were designated an Exemption 3 statute but applied only to the first-party requester.\textsuperscript{84} If the primary rationale behind applying the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute is to maintain the effectiveness of the Privacy Act exemptions, these exemptions must be applied to all requesters.\textsuperscript{85}

2. The Incorporated Privacy Act Exemptions Applied to all Requesters

If the Privacy Act exemptions are applied through Exemption 3 to all requesters, the third-party anomaly is avoided because both first and third parties would have equal access.\textsuperscript{86} Other problems arise, however, that affect the scope of disclosure under the FOIA.

Applying Privacy Act exemptions to all requesters reduces disclosure under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{87} All CIA records, for example, are completely

\textsuperscript{83} See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Consent by the subject of the file may accomplish release of information to the public even if the information would not have been available under the Privacy Act, or would be an invasion of privacy under FOIA provisions. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D.D.C. 1980) (dictum).

\textsuperscript{84} See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The third-party anomaly enables third parties to obtain information that the individual could not. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The individual would undoubtedly obtain the information because if the information were available to the public, "how could it be kept from the party whom it concerned?" Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

\textsuperscript{85} Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 531. If the first-party requester ought never to have access to information exempted under the Privacy Act, this material must be withheld under the FOIA because the first-party could otherwise gain access through a third party. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court acknowledges that first-party requesters could circumvent Privacy Act exemptions and holds Privacy Act not an Exemption 3 statute); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (FOIA cannot compel release of information exempt under the Privacy Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). But see Government Information, supra note 3, at 1338 (Privacy Act does not require that certain records be kept confidential from the subject, it allows exemption from its own subject access requirement).

\textsuperscript{86} First and third parties would have equal access because both are subject to the Privacy Act exemptions as incorporated into the FOIA. See Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 530-31.

\textsuperscript{87} See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984).
exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act;\(^8^8\) incorporating Privacy Act exemptions into the FOIA would include this total exemption. CIA records, however, may be disclosed under the FOIA\(^8^9\) if the information does not fall within one of the FOIA exemptions.\(^9^0\) There is no indication that Congress intended to insulate the CIA completely by enacting the Privacy Act.\(^9^1\) Thus, this interpretation goes beyond legislative intent.

Incorporating Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records would further undermine the FOIA's Exemption 7 when applied to non-CIA investigatory records. The Privacy Act's exemptions are predicated on the nature of the records.\(^9^2\) If the records are investigatory in nature and compiled for law enforcement purposes, the records may be exempted.\(^9^3\) By contrast, Exemption 7 bases its determination on the nature of the records' contents.\(^9^4\) The blanket exemptions under the Privacy Act that enable agencies to withhold entire systems of records would preempt the case-by-case approach of Exemption 7.\(^9^5\)

Preempting the utilization of Exemption 7's disclosure test through the incorporation of these two Privacy Act exemptions would repeal Exemption 7 by implication.\(^9^6\) The disclosure test in Exemption 7 was


\(^{89}\) See supra notes 19, 70 and accompanying text.

\(^{90}\) See supra note 62. The CIA's Exemption 3 withholding statutes do not provide complete immunity from disclosures. See supra note 70. Further, Congress is currently considering a bill that would broaden CIA disclosure exemptions, yet does not contemplate removing all CIA records from disclosure. See Statement of Mary C. Lawton, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Before House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, on H.R. 3460 and H.R. 4431 (available in files of Fordham Law Review).

\(^{91}\) If Congress' intent is to insulate all CIA records from disclosure, proposed H.R. 3460 and H.R. 4431 are meaningless because CIA records are already exempt.

\(^{92}\) See supra note 16 and accompanying text.


\(^{94}\) See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

\(^{95}\) The factual determination of the contents of the requested file, required by Exemption 7, is not necessary when dealing with a valid Exemption 3 statute. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).

\(^{96}\) See Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

included by an amendment enacted to broaden disclosures of investigatory records\textsuperscript{97} and passed while Congress was considering the Privacy Act.\textsuperscript{98} It is unlikely that Congress would amend Exemption 7 to broaden disclosure, only to repeal the amendment a few weeks later when the Privacy Act was enacted.\textsuperscript{99}

Applying Privacy Act exemptions to "any person" who requests information under the FOIA avoids the problems that arise when the application is limited to first-party requesters. If the Privacy Act is rationally to be construed as an Exemption 3 statute, its exemptions must be applied through the FOIA to all requesters. This interpretation, however, seriously delimits the scope of disclosure under the FOIA, thus frustrating Congressional intent that the FOIA compel disclosure unless the information falls within narrowly drawn exemptions.

**B. Analyzing the Privacy Act as an Independent Statute**

When the Privacy Act operates independently of the FOIA, it is also possible to distinguish between first- and third-party requesters in determining which statute may be used to obtain access. By its terms,
the Privacy Act would remain applicable only to first-party requesters. The FOIA, on the other hand, may apply either to all requesters or only to third-party requesters.

If the Privacy Act is not characterized as an Exemption 3 statute, first-party requesters may be limited to access under the Privacy Act. This, however, produces the third-party anomaly because third parties have access to the more liberal FOIA disclosure provisions.

Alternatively, the first-party requester may request the records under the Privacy Act or the FOIA. This approach eliminates the third-party anomaly, as both first and third parties would have equal access. Additionally, FOIA disclosure provisions would not be limited by incorporation of the broader Privacy Act exemptions. Allowing a first-party requester to avoid Privacy Act exemptions by making a request under the FOIA, however, limits the effectiveness of Privacy Act exemptions.

The exemptions to the Privacy Act were included in recognition that certain types of files are not appropriately released to the subject of the file. Thus, use of the FOIA to disclose Privacy Act-exempted

100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1982).
101. The FOIA, however, applies to "any person," a term that should not exclude first-party requesters. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
102. This was the position taken by the Office of Management and Budget, see OMB Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,742 (1975), and by the Justice Department, see 28 C.F.R. § 16.57 (1983); Letter from Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Mary C. Lawton to Meade Whitaker, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (July 30, 1975), reprinted in 121 Cong. Rec. 32,889-90 (1975). Porter held that first-party requesters are not limited to Privacy Act provisions. Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Misinterpretation, supra note 3, at 527 ("[N]othing in [congressional] debates indicates that Congress intended to allow individuals to obtain their investigatory records through means other than the access provisions of the Privacy Act.").
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. See Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
106. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
107. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 23 ("[I]t would not be appropriate to allow individuals to see their own intelligence or investigative files.")., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6938; H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974); 1974 House Report, supra note 44, at 18 (Broad CIA and investigative records exemptions are "permissible . . . because [such records] contain particularly sensitive information.").
information to a first-party requester may contravene the legislative 
intention underlying the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act, however, was 
intended to protect the individual from government invasions of pri-

vacy. Thus, the individual is afforded greater access, in some in-
stances, under the Privacy Act than under the FOIA.

The Privacy Act exemptions represent Congress' unwillingness to 
extend the additional access of the Act to the types of materials 
indicated in the exemptions, rather than an intent to withhold those 
materials completely. The individual is granted a right under the 
Privacy Act to challenge the contents of the files. Further, the 
Privacy Act dictates the manner in which agencies must obtain, verify 
and store personal information. This framework enables an individ-
ual to monitor the information collected, maintained, and dissemi-
nated about him, thus preventing governmental intrusions into his 
privacy.

108. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); see Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); 

109. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

110. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Government Information, supra note 3, at 1336-37. See supra notes 15, 46 and accompanying text. An individual will have greater access under the Privacy Act than would "any person" under the FOIA if the record he requested was not in a system of records which had not been exempted prior to the request. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.71-.103 (1983) (agency regulations exempting systems of records under the Privacy Act). Additionally, under the FOIA, the identity of the requester is not considered when making disclosure decisions. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); see Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Under FOIA access provisions, a first-party requester has the same right to information about himself as would "any person" requesting the same file. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); Moorefield v. United States Secret 

111. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Government Information, supra note 3, at 1338.


113. Id. § 552a(d), (e).

114. See id. § 552a(g)(1). Although § 552a(i) provides criminal penalties for agency violations of the Privacy Act, enforcement of the Privacy Act is generally left to the injured first-party requester. The addition of a civil remedy was one of the improvements afforded by the FOIA when it amended the Administrative Procedure
On the other hand, if the Privacy Act's main purpose is to ensure that its exemptions prevent any first-party access to exempted material, the Privacy Act's exemptions must be incorporated into the FOIA and applied to all requesters. This, however, undermines FOIA disclosure. Clearly, a choice must be made as to which statute is to take precedence.

The independent operation of the Privacy Act, in combination with FOIA access for all requesters, is consistent with the primary purposes of both the FOIA and the Privacy Act. Moreover, such a holding is not inconsistent with the Privacy Act's exemptions. The use of FOIA access provisions by first-party requesters is not a guarantee of disclosure. There are a number of obstacles under the FOIA that prevent access to information which should not be disclosed. The information that is not disclosed under the FOIA is similar to the type of information exempted by the Privacy Act. The information that would be disclosed under the FOIA, but exempted under the Privacy Act, is information that Congress has determined to be properly disclosed to the public. The first-party requester should not be distinguished from the general public and, therefore, the information should also be available to him.

For example, the FOIA may not be used as a discovery tool. First-party requesters have been denied access to investigatory records.
concerning themselves before, during, and to some extent, after an investigation. The Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records are directed towards withholding the same type of materials. Moreover, the first-party requester may not have greater access under the FOIA even when FOIA disclosure decisions are based on protection of the privacy interest because the privacy interest is not necessarily only that of the subject of the file. FOIA’s Exemption 6, for example, exempts personnel files if disclosure would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The corresponding Privacy Act exemptions permit the withholding of all personnel files that relate to employment or promotion decisions, but “only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence . . . .” Although access to this type of information under the FOIA may not constitute an unwarranted invasion of the requester’s privacy, revealing the identity of a confidential source of informa-


122. Investigatory records are exempt under Exemption 7 if their disclosure would interfere with an enforcement proceeding or deprive a person of a fair and impartial adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (B) (1982). These exemptions permit the withholding of information before and during an investigation or enforcement proceeding. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 241 (1978); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 601-03 (5th Cir. 1977); Fruehauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253, 1254 (6th Cir. 1974). Several courts have withheld information even after the investigation or enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 618, 619 (7th Cir. 1983); Stein v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1981).

123. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 601-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (neither the Privacy Act nor the FOIA provide supplemental discovery rights).


126. Id. § 552a(k)(5) (employment decisions), (7) (promotions).


128. See Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (invasion of source’s right to privacy warrants withholding information under Exemption 7), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); Attorney General’s Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom
tion may be an invasion of the source's privacy right. Thus, the information could be withheld under Exemption 6.

Some material that is exempt under the Privacy Act, however, may be disclosed under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{129} This is a result of the Privacy Act's broader exemptions, which are made on the basis of the nature of the file, rather than on the contents.\textsuperscript{130} The breadth of the Privacy Act exemptions eases disclosure decisions and other administrative requirements imposed by the Act, but may encompass material that could be disclosed harmlessly.\textsuperscript{131} The FOIA's exemptions withhold information whose disclosure would harm the government. Because the FOIA mandates disclosure of non-exempt files to "any person," the Privacy Act should not operate to withhold harmless information from any person unless Congress has unequivocally so stated.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the statutory language and legislative intent is not determinative in resolving whether the Privacy Act impairs FOIA disclosure. A major issue that must be resolved is the identification of the policies underlying the two acts. After these policies have been determined, it becomes simple to resolve whether the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute, whether first-party access is limited to Privacy Act provisions, or whether the Privacy Act may in any other way impair FOIA disclosure. The alternative policies should be based upon allowing all requesters equal access to government information, as it is absurd to allow third-party requesters to obtain more information about an individual than could the individual himself. Thus, the real dispute is whether the Privacy Act amends the FOIA's mandate of broad disclosure to mirror the Privacy Act's blanket exemptions, or whether the Privacy Act is a grant of additional rights to first-party requesters and the exemptions merely boundaries limiting that grant. Incorporating Privacy Act exemptions into the FOIA necessarily implies that Congress intended to drastically limit FOIA disclosure of government information. Congress, however, has consistently maintained a policy of broad disclosure and has repeatedly rejected the

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\textsuperscript{129} See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{130} See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{131} See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984).
blanket application of FOIA exemptions. Because there is no express indication that the Privacy Act was intended to either narrow FOIA disclosure or to impose blanket FOIA exemptions, the logical conclusion is that the Privacy Act should not be construed to do so. Rather, the Privacy Act should be characterized as an additional grant of privacy safeguards to the individual, having no effect on FOIA disclosure either to first- or third-party requesters. Thus, the Privacy Act is neither an Exemption 3 statute, nor does it restrict first-party requesters to its access provisions.

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