The Right to Assurance of Performance Under § UCC 2-609 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251: Toward a Uniform Rule of Contract Law

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INTRODUCTION

The idea that a contract involving mutual covenants contains an implied promise that neither party will repudiate its duties has been accepted in Anglo-American law since its announcement as the doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation in Hochster v. De la Tour over one hundred years ago. Ideally, the doctrine permits a contracting party who determines that the bargained for performance is not going to be forthcoming to rescind the contract and arrange substitute performance. The notion underlying the doctrine is that a contracting party bargains for performance, not merely for a promise and the right to win a lawsuit if the promise is breached.

Breach by anticipatory repudiation occurs when a party, by words or conduct, manifests his intention not to perform a substantial part of the bargain when the time for performance arrives. Thus, a contract may be repudiated by a positive statement of inability or unwillingness to perform, or by any affirmative act by which a party renders performance of his duties impossible.

When the manifestations of prospective inability are equivocal, indefinite or uncertain, but sufficient to cause the promisee to fear a repudiation, the common law provides the promisee no clear guidance as to how to proceed. Section 251 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which is modeled after section 2-609 of the Uniform Com-

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1. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853). "[W]here there is a contract to do an act on a future day, there is a relation constituted between the parties in the meantime by the contract, and that they impliedly promise that in the meantime neither will do any thing to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with that relation." Id. at 926; accord Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 16 (1900); Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1886); Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D. 460, 467 (1886).


5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 comment a (1979); Restatement of Contracts § 380 (1932); see Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 9, 20 (1900); Union Ins. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 157 N.Y. 633, 643, 52 N.E. 671, 674 (1899).

6. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1979). The tentative draft of the Second Restatement placed the right to assurance at § 275. Restatement (Second) of
mmercial Code (UCC), is designed to deal with this problem. Both of these sections create a new form of repudiation: failure to provide adequate assurance of performance within a reasonable time after receiving a demand therefor from a justifiably insecure party.

This Note urges acceptance of the right to assurance into the common law of contracts. It examines some of the questions surrounding the Second Restatement formulation of this right, and analyzes its theoretical underpinnings in light of experience under the corresponding UCC rule. It recommends a formulation of the assurance device that will promote the certainty of outcome and uniformity of decision which are essential to contract law.

I. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANTICIPATORY BREACH DOCTRINE

A. The Early Doctrine

Early in the history of anticipatory repudiation, the courts developed a strict interpretation of the doctrine, under which repudiation is found only if its manifestation is "definite" and "unequivocal," and the covenant breached is "substantial" or "material." Unfor-
nately, a body of inconsistent precedent has developed as courts have applied their own ideas of "definiteness" and "substantiality." Consequently, insecure promisees cannot determine with certainty whether a court will consider the conduct of a promisor to be an anticipatory repudiation.12

There are several courses of action open to such a promisee. He may: (1) rescind the contract and sue for restitution; (2) ignore the repudiation and continue preparation for performance in the hope that the promisor will perform, risking reduced recovery because of the avoidable consequences rule, which requires a plaintiff to minimize his damages; or (3) suspend performance and immediately sue for breach.13

Because the burden of proving breach is always placed on the insecure party,14 he acts at his peril. If he protects himself by refusing to perform, he runs the risk of being adjudged to have committed a material breach should a court determine that the promisor did not repudiate.15 If he fails to act, he risks being denied full damages by operation of the avoidable consequences rule.16


12. Wardrop, supra note 11, at 392-93, 399 & n.90; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 comment d (1979); Note, A Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance in all Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1358 passim (1975) [hereinafter cited as A Right to Adequate Assurance].


B. The Restatement of Contracts Solution

Section 280 of the original Restatement of Contracts was designed to resolve the insecure promisee's dilemma. It permits promisees to change position in reasonable reliance on the other party's equivocal manifestations as to willingness or ability to perform. The rule is based on the sound proposition that an obligee should not be required to bear a risk of failure of consideration created by the words or actions of the obligor. When the manifestations are equivocal, however, the insecure party will not easily prove reasonable reliance; he is always subject to second guessing by the fact finder. If the rule is interpreted in a manner lenient to the insecure party, the potential injustice is merely shifted to the promisor. Although the equivocal signals may be explainable, the promisor, given no opportunity to account for his conduct or assure the insecure party, can be robbed of his legitimate contract rights by a simple, unilateral change of position by the insecure party.

17. Restatement of Contracts § 280 (1932).
18. Id. Section 280 of the Restatement provides: "(1) Where there are promises for an agreed exchange, if one promisor manifests to the other that he cannot or will not substantially perform his promise, or that, though able to do so, he doubts whether he will substantially perform it, and the statement is not conditional on the existence of facts that would justify a failure to perform, and there are no such facts, the other party is justified in changing his position, and if he makes a material change of position he is discharged from the duty of performing his promise. (2) The party making a statement within the rule stated in Subsection (1) has power to nullify the effect of the statement by a retraction, as long as the other party has not materially changed his position." Id.; see id. § 280 comment b; id. § 318 comment d; id. § 323 comment b.
19. Id. § 280 comment a. Comment a states: "A promisor may justly be required to take large risks as to the possibility of getting what he bargained for in return for his own performance, where this risk is due to circumstances over which the other party has no control . . . but where the risk is due to a statement by the other promisor that he will not perform his duty, or even to a statement by him of a doubt whether he will perform it, the risk of failure of consideration is wrongfully imposed and . . . discharges the other party." Id.
20. Truly equivocal actions will logically yield a fifty-percent chance that a fact finder will decide for the other party. See 6 A. Corbin, supra note 13, § 1260; id. § 1259 (Supp. 1980).
21. Change of position operates to prevent a retraction of repudiation, Restatement of Contracts § 318 comment d (1932), prevents a supposed repudiator from putting an insecure party in breach by tender of conforming performance on the date due, id. § 323 comment b; see First Nat'l Bank v. Indian Indus., 600 F.2d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 1979), and operates as an excuse of condition. Restatement of Contracts § 280 comment b (1932); see First Nat'l Bank v. Indian Indus., 600 F.2d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 1979); Diskmakers, Inc. v. De Witt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1977). The right of an insecure promisee to unilaterally terminate the contract is one of the injustices the drafters of the Second Restatement aim to abruptly end. The reporter's note to § 251 makes it clear that the section is intended to stand in place of, not in addition to, the right to create an estoppel by changing position under Restatement of Contracts § 280. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 reporter's note (1979).
Thus, rather than increasing certainty, section 280 merely alters the insecure party's dilemma.\textsuperscript{22} If the promisee acts to protect himself, he is likely to have to litigate the issue of reasonable reliance on the manifestations of the promisor.\textsuperscript{23} If he fails to act, he may improperly increase his damages.\textsuperscript{24} This uncertainty of outcome promotes increased litigation and a corresponding increase in transaction costs.\textsuperscript{25}

C. The UCC Solution

The approach of the UCC to the problems of the common-law rule is to permit an insecure party to demand adequate assurance of performance when the manifestations of a promisor cause reasonable insecurity.\textsuperscript{26} The promisee may treat failure to provide such assurance as a repudiation.\textsuperscript{27}

The right to assurance rule of section 2-609 was an innovation in contract law,\textsuperscript{28} based more on policy than on precedent.\textsuperscript{29} There was no such right at common law.\textsuperscript{30} The right does, however, share a common practical justification with the Hochster v. De la Tour\textsuperscript{31} decision that first introduced the anticipatory breach doctrine.\textsuperscript{32} A perceptive expression of these concerns on which modern contract law focuses is found in Hawkinson v. Johnston:\textsuperscript{33}

[When there is a dispute] it is far better . . . for the individuals and for society, that the rights and obligations between them should be promptly and definitely settled . . . . The commercial world has long since learned the desirability of fixing its liabilities and losses as quickly as possible, and the law similarly needs to remind itself that, to be useful, it too must seek to be practical.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{22} See Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obligation to Communicate, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosett II]; supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{23} See Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D.S.C. 1977); Idaho Falls Bonded Produce & Supply Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 952, 955 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Restatement of Contracts § 280 comment a (1932); id. § 323(2).

\textsuperscript{24} See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1900); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528 & n.5 (1978); supra note 16 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{26} See U.C.C. § 2-609 & official comment 1 (1977).

\textsuperscript{27} Id. § 2-609(4) & official comment 2.


\textsuperscript{31} 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853).

\textsuperscript{32} Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Case of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1978); Wallach, supra note 15, at 48-49; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{33} 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941).

\textsuperscript{34} Id. at 729-30.
Commentators, concentrating on the economic effects of contract law and the essentially economic justification for its existence, extend the reasoning of Hawkinson v. Johnston and Hochster v. De la Tour. They contend that the legal rules governing contract formation and disputes should promote certainty among contracting parties and encourage speedy and efficient fixing of liabilities and losses without direct judicial intervention—though the threat of sure if not swift judicial enforcement of the bargain must always be present. These policies have been effectively implemented through the Uniform Commercial Code, which is designed to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." 

D. The Second Restatement Solution

Although Article 2 of the UCC applies specifically to transactions in goods, it has been applied by analogy to a variety of contracts. Applicability of the Article by analogy is usually determined by whether the contract is sufficiently like a transaction in goods. Most courts, however, have applied section 2-609 only to cases involving contracts strictly or primarily for the sale of goods. These courts do not extend the rationale of the section to those cases most appropriate for its application—cases involving the combined sale of goods and services. This focus on the subject matter of the transaction empha-

38. Id. § 2-102. "'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract . . . ." Id. § 2-105(1).
42. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me. 1977); Ranger Constr. Co. v.
sizes form over substance. Rather than focusing on whether the contract is analogous to a sale of goods, the analysis should determine whether the contract problem sought to be resolved is analogous to the problem resolved by the Article 2 assurances rule. Thus the rule, designed to solve the problems of equivocal anticipatory repudiation in sales contracts, should be applied by analogy to the problems of equivocal anticipatory repudiation in all contracts.

The American Law Institute, recognizing that the problem of party insecurity in contract law is substantially identical to the problem resolved by section 2-609, has rejected the original Restatement of Contracts solution as inferior in practice to the demand for assurance device of the UCC, and has replaced section 280 with Second

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45. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1977). Section 2-609 provides: (1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return. (2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
Restatement section 251. Modeled after section 2-609, section 251 similarly provides insecure parties a right to adequate assurance of performance, though the formulation of the rule does differ in some respects from that of section 2-609.

II. APPLICATION OF THE ASSURANCE DEVICE

Many problems of insecurity and uncertainty that are not satisfactorily resolved by the traditional doctrine of anticipatory repudiation can be efficiently resolved by utilization of the assurance device.

and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards. (3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party’s right to demand adequate assurance of future performance. (4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.”

46. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1979). Section 251 provides:

“(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach under § 243, the obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance. (2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor’s failure to provide within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as is adequate in the circumstances of the particular case.”

47. Id. § 251 reporter’s note; see id. § 251 comment a.

48. Id. § 251(1). Section 251 has not been widely followed since its introduction in 1974. See id. § 251 (app. 1982). Research has revealed only three cases applying the assurance device and citing § 251, or its predecessor § 275, as authority. David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (per curiam); L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213, 216-17 (Alaska 1978); Carfield & Sons v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Colo. App. 1980); see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. One circuit court has characterized the right to assurance as “basic contract law . . . codified in the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-609.” Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1979). In one Hawaii intermediate appellate decision, the court utilized the device in a real property sale, citing UCC § 2-609 by analogy. Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152-53 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). At least one jurisdiction has expressly declined to accept the Second Restatement rule into the common law of contracts. Mollohan v. Black Rock Contracting, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 813, 816 n.1 (W. Va. 1977). The court in Mollohan did say, however, that failure to provide assurance after a demand can be presented to the jury as evidence of unequivocal and positive repudiation. Id. This use of the assurance device eviscerates it. Failure to provide assurance after a justifiably insecure promise must be treated as sufficient proof of a repudiation to eliminate the present anomalies and concomitant uncertainty that are associated with the doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation. Treating such a failure merely as evidence of a repudiation adds to the list of elements that the insecure party may prove but does not decrease the risks involved in treating ambiguous conduct as a repudiation.


When parties have more than one contract with each other, for example, a breach of one contract may be grounds for insecurity as to the others. It is a generally accepted rule of contract law, however, that breach of another and separate contract cannot be pled as a defense to a breach of contract action. Nevertheless, it would be clearly unjust to expect a party in such a position to await actual breach under each successive contract. The assurance device would allow the promisee to determine with reasonable certainty the prospects for performance of the other contracts. Failure to provide such assurance would be an anticipatory breach of the contracts yet to be performed, allowing the insecure party to suspend his performance, make alternative arrangements for performance and avoid the necessity of expensive judicial proceedings. Repudiation of the future contracts could be litigated in one proceeding, and because the failure to provide assurance makes the repudiation unequivocal, the claim could be disposed of by motion for summary judgment.

When a party disputes the nature of his obligations under a contract, or questions the enforceability or validity of a contract term without absolutely refusing to perform, the other party is caught in the classic anticipatory repudiation dilemma. Using the assurance device, a promisee can be reasonably assured of performance, or can

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54. See CopyLEASE Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 403 F. Supp. 625, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213, 217 (Alaska 1978). In L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, a dispute arose between the parties to a joint venture agreement when the written contract provided by defendant failed to accurately reflect the oral agreement under which work on defendant's construction project had already begun. Plaintiff's demand for assurance that defendant would honor the oral contract was met by a refusal. Id. at 217.
55. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
prove repudiation merely by showing reasonable grounds for insecurity, a demand for assurance and a failure to receive assurance. Once these elements are proved, it follows inevitably that there has been a repudiation by the promisor.

Injustices inherent in traditional installment land sales contracts can be eliminated by use of the assurance device. In an installment land sale contract, the vendor retains title to the property until payment of the final installment. Because the covenants of the vendor and vendee are independent, the vendee must continue to make installment payments, even if there is a possibility that the vendor will be unable to produce marketable title. Thus, if a vendor fails to provide the bargained-for title insurance within a reasonable time, the vendee may not suspend payment, nor sue for rescission, even after repeated demands for performance. In such a case the vendee has no means of ensuring that he will receive that for which he bargained. The assurance device would permit the vendee either to receive adequate assurance of performance, or to suspend his own performance without the risks of default.

A related problem in non-installment sales is faced by a vendee who discovers, while the contract is executory, that there are defects in


60. Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1977) (Bistline, J., dissenting); M. Madison & J. Dwyer, supra note 59, ¶ 8.03. Should a vendee default with respect to payment, the vendor may bring an action in ejectment and retain as liquidated damages any payments made. Id.; Forfeiture, supra note 57, at 79-91.


vendor's title to the property. Under the traditional rule, if the vendor can clear the defects within a reasonable time, the vendee must tender the purchase price and demand clear title. The vendor is then entitled to a reasonable time after the contract closing date to cure any defects in title and tender a valid deed. If the vendee fails or refuses to tender the purchase price until the vendor cures the defects, he will be held to have repudiated the contract.

Insecure vendees are thus expected to continue preparation for performance without being sure of receiving the agreed return. Moreover, financing for such transactions, which must usually be arranged in advance of the contract closing date, may not be available without a certificate of unencumbered title from a title guaranty company. A vendee may therefore be unable to tender the purchase price on the closing date. The assurance device would allow a

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70. See M. Madison & J. Dwyer, supra note 59, ¶ 3.04[15].

71. Of course, any vendee hindered or prevented from performing through the fault of the vendor will have a defense to any action by the vendor for damages or specific performance and will have a right to sue the vendor for breach. 4 A. Corbin, supra note 13, § 947. However, it must be remembered that parties bargain for performance, not for a promise and the right to a law suit if it is not fulfilled. U.C.C. § 2-609 comment 1 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979). Utilization of the assurance device before the closing of the transaction would indicate to the vendor the need for due performance and shift the risk of noncompliance to him.
vendee to receive assurance of performance, or enable him to sue for breach without the necessity of arranging expensive financing or risking loss of any deposit paid on account. These problem cases, typical of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, demonstrate how the right to assurance allows an insecure party to "force a crystallization of the situation so that he can determine his own future course of conduct." In contrast to traditional common-law rules, the assurance device reduces uncertainty of outcome in litigation and thereby promotes settlement.

III. INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVICE

To derive maximum benefit from the assurance device, the rule available for contracts in general should be substantially identical to the one developed for sale of goods. If a largely identical formulation is used, courts and parties can freely draw on the valuable, though limited, fund of decisional precedent behind section 2-609 as an aid to interpretation and application of the device. This practice will build a unified body of precedent in which there is no unnecessary distinction made between contracts for sale of goods and those that are not. The assurance device is designed to, and does, solve a

72. In this case it appears that the only adequate assurance that the vendee will receive clear title on the closing date would be a certificate of clear title from a title guaranty company. Thus, to provide adequate assurance, the vendor would probably have to clear the defects in title.

73. Wallach, supra note 15, at 55.


problem common to all contracts and should apply to all contracts without regard to subject matter.  

The evident superiority of the UCC assurance device stems from the efficiency with which it protects the expectation interest of contracting parties. This results from several aspects of its language and operation, each of which invite analysis and comparison to the corresponding clauses proposed for the common law in the Second Restatement formulation.

A. Grounds for Insecurity

The UCC is applied to any "insecurity . . . with respect to . . . performance," whether or not it is by nonperformance, or would give rise to a claim for damages for total breach.

In contrast, the language in section 251 of the Second Restatement limits the basis of reasonable grounds for insecurity to prospective breaches by nonperformance that would give rise to a claim for damages for total breach. The potential grounds for insecurity are much broader than this. If courts adopt such limited grounds for

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80. See id. § 2-609 official comment 3 (suggesting that minor breaches such as defective or delayed delivery can operate as sufficient insecurity with respect to performance); Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (late delivery when time is not of the essence).

81. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(1) (1979); Rosett I, supra note 15, at 105. But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment c (1979). Actual minor breaches can be reasonable grounds to suspect more serious breaches in the future, and an obligee can base a demand for assurance on such minor breaches whether or not he brings suit for damages. Id.; see Carfield & Sons v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008, 1009-10 (Colo. App. 1980) (involving minor breach and applying tentative draft of § 251).

82. Rosett II, supra note 22, at 1087 n.5.
seeking assurance, insecure parties will be faced with the pre-UCC dilemma;\textsuperscript{83} they must accurately predict whether the court will find the anticipated breach sufficiently "material" or "substantial" to warrant the demand for assurance. The focus should be on whether, in any given case, the party is reasonable\textsuperscript{84} in his belief that he will not receive all that he bargained for under the contract. Broadening grounds for insecurity would promote the primary benefit to be gained from use of the assurance device—the reduction of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{85}

B. Time Certain to Respond

A further source of certainty in the UCC provision is the inclusion of a specific time within which assurances must be given.\textsuperscript{86} The thirty-day limit of section 2-609 is a maximum which may be varied by agreement.\textsuperscript{87} The drafters of the UCC considered it necessary to "free the question of reasonable time from uncertainty in later litigation" by including a specific time limit.\textsuperscript{88} In this respect, nonsales

\textsuperscript{83} J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 6-2, at 211 (2d ed. 1980); see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{84} Reasonableness is a concept that varies from case to case. With respect to claims of insecurity under § 2-609 of the UCC, courts have generally adopted an objective standard of reasonableness. E.g., Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1179 (3d Cir. 1977) (criteria for insecurity are to be judged by commercial standards); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1976) (reasonable grounds for insecurity must be determined on objective factual basis; subjective insecurity is not sufficient); Turntables, Inc. v. Gestetner, 52 A.D.2d 776, 777, 382 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (1976) (court noted a number of objective commercial criteria underlying insecurity of defendant as justifying demand for assurance under § 2-609). Incorporation of a practical business standard also provides a measure of flexibility responsive to short-term changes in the economic environment that can cause insecurity. In Harris v. Hine, 232 Ga. 183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974), for instance, the promisee claimed an increase in the market price as a reasonable ground for insecurity due to the unusual situation that caused the price of cotton to more than double in six months. Id. at 184, 205 S.E.2d at 847-48. Thus, the buyer was able to ascertain long before actual default by nonperformance that the seller intended to default and was able to take legal action to ensure his supply of the raw material. Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (E.D. La. 1981) (request for additional compensation held to be reasonable ground for insecurity).


\textsuperscript{86} U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1977). It is not clear, however, whether the drafters intended that the 30-day limit could be extended as well as shortened by agreement. Although the text states that a reasonable time may not exceed 30 days, id., the comments seem to authorize any commercially reasonable limitation. Id. § 2-609 official comment 6.

\textsuperscript{87} Id. § 1-102(3); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:3.

\textsuperscript{88} U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 5 (1977). The first proposed final draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act contained a ten-day limit for the provision of assurance. Uniform Revised Sales Act § 99(4) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944) (current version at U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1977)).
contracts are no different from sales contracts. The framers of the Second Restatement rule, however, rejected a time certain as too rigid for a common-law rule.

To promote certainty and uniformity, a presumption should be created that the thirty-day limit of the UCC represents a reasonable time within which assurance must be given, absent agreement or circumstances requiring a different time for response. Of course, careful contract drafters will include specific time limits in any right to assurance clause.

C. Adequacy of Assurance

A principal source of uncertainty in both section 251 and section 2-609 is the notion of "adequate assurance." Although the cases decided under section 2-609 are few, they are sufficient to provide a basis for interpretation of this ill-defined concept. The drafters of both the UCC and Second Restatement rules apparently intended that commercial or business standards should apply. The UCC comments require an objective factual basis for adequacy—or inadequacy—of assurance just as for determination of reasonable grounds for insecurity. Although neither section attempts to define adequacy, it is clear that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is as applicable to the assurance as to the demand.

Adequacy of assurance can range from a mere promise to perform to the posting of a guaranty bond. If there are broad bases for

89. Cf. U.L.T.A. § 2-403 comment 3, 13 U.L.A. 621 (1977) (time limit provides certainty in real estate transactions). Because the concepts of "insecurity" and "assurance" are indefinite, and "reasonableness" can vary from contract to contract, commentators suggest that the parties include clauses defining all three concepts and limiting the time for acting. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:3.


91. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979); see Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach—Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 553, 592 (1976).


94. Id. § 2-609 official comment 3; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment d (1979); see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).

95. See U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 4 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment e (1979); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:8; see, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 1978) (promise to perform inadequate because of erratic behavior of promisor); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D. La. 1981) (belated and qualified offer of performance is not adequate assurance); Uarco,
insecurity, there must be a flexible interpretation of adequacy of assurance. A reasonable but tenuous basis for insecurity such as rumor of insolvency\(^9\) should not require the strongest of assurances. Insecure parties should not be allowed to rewrite the contract to allow them to get more through the assurance than was bargained for under the contract.\(^7\)

**D. Form of the Demand for Assurance**

Some recent decisions under the UCC rule have recognized that the policy of the section is better served by permitting oral demands for assurance in some situations,\(^9\) despite the section 2-609 requirement of a written demand.\(^9\) Section 251 has adopted the better rule reflected in these decisions: Although the comments to section 251 indicate that a written demand is preferable, the section requires only a demand that is reasonable under the circumstances.\(^10\)

Questions may still remain as to what actions other than a straightforward written or oral demand will constitute a demand for assurance sufficient to satisfy the rule. A mere demand for monies due and owing, even though in writing, has been held insufficient to constitute a demand for assurances under section 2-609.\(^10\) Similarly, a request for advance payment of part of the contract price to enable the seller to perform has been found insufficient because such a request did not require any act assuring performance.\(^10\) On the other hand, an oral demand for payment overdue combined with a threat to cancel future, unrelated contracts has been held to be sufficient demand for adequate assurance of due performance of the future, unrelated contracts.\(^10\)

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98. See AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1976); Kunian v. Development Corp. of Am., 165 Conn. 300, 312, 334 A.2d 427, 433 (1973).


100. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(2) & comment d (1979).


In *United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc.*,\(^{104}\) a federal contract law case applying section 2-609 by analogy, notice that strict compliance with the contract would be required was construed as a demand obligating the promisor to provide adequate assurance.\(^{105}\) At no time, however, did the promisee make any formal demand for assurance.\(^{106}\) The case illustrates a practice followed by a number of courts\(^{107}\) that could lead to unjust applications of the right to assurance device. These courts view a demand for strict compliance as somehow equivalent to a demand for assurance.\(^{108}\) In such a case, the promisor may not have sufficient notice that the failure to respond with adequate assurance will place him in breach. Courts should require that an actual demand for assurance be made rather than decide after the fact that equivocal actions constitute such a demand. One of the advantages of the assurance device is that it promotes communication between the parties.\(^{109}\) Consequently, the device should be applied only when the promisor is given to clearly understand that a demand for assurance has been made, and therefore has reasonable notice and opportunity to respond.\(^{110}\)

**E. Modification of the Rule by Agreement**

Under both the UCC and the Second Restatement rules, the implied right to assurance “may be modified by agreement of the par-

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104. 426 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d, 625 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. *Id.* at 298.
106. *See id.*
108. *See, e.g.*, United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1977), *aff’d*, 625 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1980); David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (per curiam). No clear demand for assurance as required by the various formulations of the demand for assurance rule was made in either *Humboldt Fir*, see 426 F. Supp. at 298, or *Nassif*. See 644 F.2d at 12. Until there has been a demand for assurance, there can be no suspension of performance under § 2-609(1), Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.W.2d 346, 354 n.4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), or under § 251. *See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(1)-(2) (1979).*
110. *See AMF, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.*, 536 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1976). The *AMF* court held that lack of a written demand was excusable if the seller had a “clear understanding that [buyer] had suspended performance until it should receive adequate assurance of due performance.” *Id.* at 1171; *see ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc.*, 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
ties.  Unlike the UCC provision, however, section 251 offers no express limitation on the extent of modification.

Any clause seeking to give the protected party overbroad powers to cancel or adjust the contract, or setting up arbitrary standards for action by the protected party, should be ineffective. The parties should not be allowed to frustrate the policy underlying the right to assurance rule by modifying the right out of existence. Neither should the rights granted be expanded to such an extent that the protected party is given the right to cancel or alter the contract upon any arbitrary claim of insecurity. It must be made certain that the right to assurance will not be a device giving protected parties authority, in the name of "insecurity," to rewrite the contract to receive more than was originally bargained for.

F. Retraction of Repudiation and the Right to Assurance

Section 256 of the Second Restatement also bears on the operation of section 251. Under section 256, a repudiation can be nullified by a timely retraction or by an end to the events or circumstances which had caused the insecurity or repudiation.

111. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979); accord U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977); id. § 2-609 official comment 6.
113. Any security clause setting up arbitrary standards for action or otherwise frustrating the policy of the rule is likely to run afoul of the good faith obligation of the UCC, U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977), or the Second Restatement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979). The obligations imposed by § 2-609 and § 251 are implied in every contract. Any security clause found to abrogate that obligation should thus be unenforceable, and the implied obligation should be utilized in its place.
117. Id. Section 256 provides: "(1) The effect of a statement as constituting a repudiation under § 250 or the basis for a repudiation under § 251 is nullified by a retraction of the statement if notification of the retraction comes to the attention of the injured party before he materially changes his position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final. (2) The effect of events other than a statement as constituting a repudiation under § 250 or the basis for a repudiation under § 251 is nullified if, to the knowledge of the injured party, those events have ceased to exist before he materially changes his position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final." Id.
Section 2-611(2) of the UCC provides the better rule that a repudiator may retract a repudiation but must give adequate assurance of performance upon demand.118 This is the logical rule because a repudiation is sufficient cause for insecurity and warrants a demand that assurance be provided.119 The right to continuing security that performance will be forthcoming when due120 requires that the insecure party be permitted to demand adequate assurance of performance as a condition precedent to an effective retraction of repudiation.

CONCLUSION

Contracting parties bargain for performance, not merely for promises. When faced with prospective failure of consideration, parties to sales and nonsales contracts share a common problem of insecurity with respect to performance and require similar relief. The assurance device dispels such insecurity and should be accepted into the common law of contracts in a form virtually identical to that contained in the UCC. A uniform right to assurance rule will avoid arbitrary distinctions between contracts that are for sale of goods and those that are not, and will promote judicial efficiency and uniformity of decision in contract law.

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118. U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (1977). The Reporter's note to § 256 says the section accords with § 2-611, which also allows retraction of repudiation in certain circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 256 reporter's note (1979); see U.C.C. § 2-611 (1977). The latter section includes a clause to the effect that any retraction "must include any assurance justifiably demanded under the provisions of this Article." Id. § 2-611(2). The comments to this section make it clear that failure to provide assurances demanded under the assurance section will render the retraction ineffective. Id. § 2-611 official comment 2.


120. Id. § 2-609 official comment 1; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979); see Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 926 (1853).