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A NEW WAVE OF SIXTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS: THE USE OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS AS ADVISERS

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THE fifth 1 and sixth 2 amendments to the United States Constitution exemplify the balance which exists between effective law enforcement and fundamental constitutional rights. These amendments incorporate the fundamental protections for the criminally accused that are held paramount to society's interest in prosecuting criminals. The protections granted by the Constitution, however, are not ironclad. Often the accused may be asked or induced to give up, or waive, its protections. On such occasions, the interaction between constitutional rights and criminal prosecution is sharply defined because societal restraint implicit in the constitutional guarantees defers to the successful use of evidence. Yet, the courts, wary of involuntary or unintentional waivers of fundamental rights, have attempted to safeguard those rights. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to discuss waiver under the fifth and sixth amendments and to explore the alternatives that exist to insure a proper balance between prosecution and waiver.

I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRE-PROSECUTION STAGE

The fifth amendment, perhaps the paradigmatic constitutional provision, stands as a cornerstone of the fundamental protections afforded to the criminally accused. By providing protection against self-incrimination, the amendment emphasizes the adversarial design

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1. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).

2. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-42 (1963).
of the judicial system and the rejection of inquisitional processes.\textsuperscript{3} By freeing the accused from aiding in his own prosecution,\textsuperscript{4} the accuser must carry the burden of proof through independent sources of incriminating evidence.\textsuperscript{5}

The Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Miranda v. Arizona}\textsuperscript{6} embellished the simply phrased self-incrimination clause with monumental significance.\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Miranda} dealt with the issue\textsuperscript{8} of protection against self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation\textsuperscript{9} of the accused by law enforcement authorities. Given a factual situation in which an individual in custody made incriminating statements without the as-

\begin{enumerate}
\item 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
\item The Court framed the issue before it as “deall[ing] with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 439.
\item Custodial interrogation was defined by the Court as “questioning initiated . . . after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444 (fornote omitted). Subsequent decisions, however, demonstrate that the relative nature of both “custody” and “interrogation” varies, thereby creating uncertainty over the scope of the terms and the periphery of \textit{Miranda’s} protections. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2186-90 (1980) (incriminating statements made by defendant to an undisclosed, undercover government informant while in prison and after indictment are inadmissible as violative of the sixth amendment); United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980) (questioning by a law enforcement official in a public place does not constitute a seizure of person); Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980) (express questioning or its functional equivalent triggers the \textit{Miranda} safeguards for a suspect in custody). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and \textit{Miranda}: What is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1 (1979).
sistance of counsel, the Court found that the presence and assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation were essential elements of the privilege.\textsuperscript{10} The problems inherent in secret or incommunicado interrogation procedures\textsuperscript{11} necessitated the establishment of standards to protect the individual's guarantee against self-incrimination.\textsuperscript{12} Accordingly, the Court required that, prior to any questioning, the interrogators must inform the subject that he is entitled to an attorney.\textsuperscript{13} If an attorney is requested, the interrogators are required to cease questioning until the attorney is present and to afford the individual an opportunity to confer with his attorney.\textsuperscript{14} The failure to provide these guarantees would result in the exclusion of statements taken from the individual.\textsuperscript{15}

An ancillary issue that the Court raised and resolved concerned the waiver of these fifth amendment rights. Recognizing the state's interest in interrogation,\textsuperscript{16} the Court granted that waiver would be permissible,\textsuperscript{17} but only after emphasizing the heavy burden carried by the state to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver.\textsuperscript{18} A silent record or a statement ultimately given would not indicate that a waiver had occurred.\textsuperscript{19}

Following \textit{Miranda}, it appeared that only an express statement would suffice.\textsuperscript{20} Recently, the Court rejected that notion in \textit{North}

12. \textit{Id.} at 467-74.
13. The Court delineated the now renowned "Miranda warnings" as follows: "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." \textit{Id.} at 479.
14. The Supreme Court had previously guaranteed the right to the appointment and assistance of counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). This guarantee was later extended to situations in which a general investigation has been narrowed to a specific inquiry focusing on a particular suspect already in custody. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). \textit{Miranda}, by entitling the assistance of counsel to a suspect in custody before he becomes the object of a prosecution or the subject of a specific inquiry, was a logical culmination of this trend of judicial thinking.
16. \textit{Id.} at 475.
17. A suspect in custody can waive his \textit{Miranda} rights even after he has asserted them. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-04 (1975); see United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 444 U.S. 855 (1979); United States v. Corral-Martinez, 592 F.2d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1979). A post-assertion waiver is violative of the suspect's rights only if the questioning officers do not scrupulously honor the suspect's right to remain silent. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
19. \textit{Id.} at 475-76.
20. The language in \textit{Miranda} suggested this conclusion. \textit{Id.} at 475. ("An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.").
Carolina v. Butler. In Butler, the state court had ruled that in the absence of an express statement of waiver, all statements made were per se inadmissible. The Court, after examining its holding in Miranda, found that an express statement is not indispensable to a valid waiver. Rather, if an individual is properly advised of his rights and implies by word or action that he wishes to waive those rights, he may properly do so. The Court, therefore, adopted an ad hoc approach to waiver that would focus on the facts and circumstances of each case. Although an attorney is an important part of the fifth amendment safeguards, no requirement for his presence at the time of waiver is imposed.

The Supreme Court has expressed its views concerning the procedures necessary to implement the guarantees of the fifth amendment and has set standards for waiving those protections. Essential guidance for the suspect and the attorney has been provided on the critical issues—nature of the rights, the trigger mechanism for those rights, and waiver—concerning the fifth amendment. Although the Court has been equally diligent in delineating a defendant’s sixth amendment rights, the waiver issue remains the subject of controversy and debate.

II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: WAIVER AT CRITICAL STAGES OF PROSECUTION

While the fifth amendment guarantees attach to all incidents of custodial interrogation, the sixth amendment guarantees attach only at critical stages of prosecution. A critical stage has been held to exist at arraignment, at a preliminary hearing, at post-indictment iden-

22. Id. at 370.
23. Id. at 373.
24. Id. at 373-74.
25. Id. at 374-75.
27. Professor Kamisar has posed some interesting questions concerning the scope of these Miranda rights when the focus is shifted to different constitutional guarantees. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 69-101. For example, can Miranda rights be scrupulously honored if a police officer “deliberately elicits” information under a sixth amendment standard? Id. at 73.
tifications, and after indictment. Once an accused has reached a critical stage of his prosecution, protection of his sixth amendment rights is guaranteed, including the right to the presence and assistance of counsel. Any further attempts by law enforcement authorities to extract statements will be closely scrutinized and a violation of the guarantees will cause the exclusion of the statements.

Three cases illustrate the nature and scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel in post-critical stage interrogations. In *Massiah v. United States*, the defendant was under indictment and had re-

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35. The guarantee is personal to the defendant, and therefore, only his statements will be excluded. As the Court noted in *Massiah v. United States*, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), "in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." *Id.* at 207. Given the applicability of the fourth amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), to fifth amendment circumstances, *Brown v. Illinois*, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975); *Michigan v. Tucker*, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974), it seems apparent that evidence improperly obtained through police questioning and any evidence gathered as a result of those answers is inadmissible under *Massiah*. Thus, *Massiah's* proviso may eventually be expanded to instances in which the primary illegality against the interrogated defendant will work to exclude evidenc concerning other parties involved in the crime. *See Brewer v. Williams*, 430 U.S. 357, 413-14 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
36. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The roots of the majority opinion in *Massiah* can be traced to the concurring opinions in *Sparo v. New York*, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See *Grano*, *supra* note 7, at 19-22; *Kaminsar*, *supra* note 9, at 34-41. The *Sparo* Court held that the admission into evidence of a coerced confession from an indicted suspect, who was held in custody and interrogated without the assistance of his retained counsel, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. *Sparo*, 360 U.S. at 323-24. Justice Douglas argued that the police behavior violated the suspect's right to counsel. *Id.* at 324-26 (Douglas, J., concurring). "[T]he right of counsel extends to the preparation for trial, as well as to the trial itself." *Id.* at 335 (Douglas, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Stewart believed that the absence of counsel alone was sufficient to render the confession inadmissible under the fourteenth amend-
tained an attorney. During the defendant's release on bail, law enforcement agents enlisted the assistance of his confederate to engage the defendant in conversation. Unaware of the plan, the defendant made incriminating statements which were used at his trial and which aided in his conviction. Examining the admissibility of these statements on fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment grounds, the Court opted for a sixth amendment analysis, holding that the defendant was entitled to the assistance of his attorney when agents "deliberately elicited" such statements from him after indictment. The indictment, therefore, clearly served as the triggering device for the defendant's sixth amendment right to an attorney.

Although Massiah indicated that any attempt to use covert methods of questioning to procure incriminating statements would constitute deliberate elicitation, the criteria to judge more subtle variations of questioning were left undefined. The answers were long delayed as Massiah's significance was unexplored during a period of judicial activism in other areas. The full impact of Massiah was resurrected in Brewer v. Williams.

In Brewer, the defendant had been arraigned and had received the assistance of counsel. During the defendant's transfer to another jail, however, the police officers who accompanied him elicited incriminating statements concerning the commission of the crime by
inflaming his religious fervor. 48 Williams challenged the use of these statements on the bases of his sixth amendment right to counsel and his fifth amendment Miranda guarantees. 49 Faced with an interesting option, 50 the Court decided that a resolution of the Miranda claim was unnecessary in light of the sixth amendment-Massiah violation of the right to counsel. 51 The Court, following the "deliberate elicitation" test enunciated in Massiah, 52 determined that the officers' questions were designed to produce incriminating statements. 53 Because Williams had entered a critical stage of his prosecution—arraignment—the absence of counsel rendered the statements inadmissible. 54

Finally, in United States v. Henry, 55 "situations by design" were included in an extended "deliberate elicitation" test. The defendant had been indicted and was in custody. An informant was asked to listen to his conversations, but not to engage in direct conversations concerning the crime. 56 Nevertheless, when incriminating statements were made, the Court found that they were deliberately elicited by the compelling circumstances of incarceration and the presence of an informant. 57

The facts and constitutional issues in the Massiah, Brewer, and Henry trilogy bear a striking resemblance to those underlying a Miranda-fifth amendment analysis. Although a Miranda analysis could easily be adapted to those cases, 58 a sixth amendment analysis has been followed because a critical stage of prosecution had been reached. 59 Whenever a critical stage is presented in a particular fac-

48. Id. at 391-93.
49. Id. at 394-95. Williams had been advised of his Miranda rights prior to the statements being made. Id. at 391-92.
50. Brewer could have been discussed in terms of either a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis or a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 3-14. Moreover, with current fourth amendment analysis, an option now available is a motion to suppress under the fourth amendment. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
51. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
52. See note 42 supra.
53. 430 U.S. at 399-400. The Court noted "[t]hat the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant." Id. at 400 (citations omitted); see United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2185-86 (1980).
54. 430 U.S. at 399-401, 406.
55. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
56. Id. at 2184-85.
57. Id. at 2187-89; accord United States v. Sampol, Nos. 79-1541, -1542, -1808 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1980) (per curiam).
58. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 28-33.
59. Professor Kamisar explored the fifth amendment option and analyzed Brewer under a fifth amendment-Miranda approach. See id. at 24-41. Subsequently, the Court implied in Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), that Williams' state-
tual pattern, a Massiah analysis is appropriate regardless of whether a 
Miranda interrogation analysis would seemingly apply and mandate a 
different result. 60 While the protections seem almost indistinguish-

ments would be admissible under a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis. Id. at 1689-90 & n.4. Innis involved a police ploy similar to the action taken in Brewer. In both Brewer and Innis, incriminating statements were made. Miranda warnings were is-

sued to both suspects before the ploy was initiated. Innis held that such conduct falls far short of the “interrogation” required to trigger a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis. As a result, the answers to the “questioning” were admissible. A similar result could have been reached in Brewer under a fifth amendment analysis. Yet, by adopting a sixth amendment analysis, the Brewer Court avoided the complexities that now arise in light of Innis’ fifth amendment analysis. Because Brewer involved a post-arraignment setting, however, a critical stage had been reached in the prosecu-

tion, thereby initiating a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis. Significantly, the com-

parison of the facts in Brewer and Innis indicates the willingness of the Court to 
extend the “deliberately elicited” test of Massiah beyond the Innis “interrogation” 
definition despite the factual similarities. When the police, as in Innis, are still in the 
investigative stage, no one suspect is the focus of police efforts to gather evidence. The necessity to solve crime demands a shifting of the balance between the public and private interests to the police. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has fashioned a lenient “interrogation” test to aid the police. When the police power is concentrated on the conviction of a single individual, however, the individual needs added protection against the full power of the state. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1980) (per curiam). The Massiah “deliberately elicited” test shifts the balance to the private interest to shield the individual from governmental action. Grano, supra note 7, at 19-25. By distinguishing the two standards in Innis, the Court implicitly demonstrates its intent to protect individuals by creating a wide and seemingly impenetrable zone around Massiah rights. Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) with United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).

60. Unless the critical stage factor is incorporated into the analysis, the Massiah-Miranda distinctions would be in disarray. Massiah’s “deliberately elicited” test is clearly more subtle, but more comprehensively applied, than the Miranda “interrogation” test. Assuming the absence of the critical stage factor, if the Massiah type questioning were subject to a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis, it is clear that the questioning would not constitute an interrogation. Innis defined interrogation as “either express questioning or its functional equivalent... [This includes] any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980) (footnotes omitted). The Court noted that “interrogation” under the fifth and sixth amendments is not an interchangeable term. Id. at 1689 n.4. Although the ploys used in both Rhode Island v. Innis and Brewer v. Williams are almost indistinguishable, the Massiah test extended far beyond a Miranda test to exclude the statements in Henry and Brewer. It seems, therefore, that an interface exists between a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis and a sixth amendment-Massiah analysis. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). In Henry it was argued that “a less rigorous standard [should apply] under the Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be government officers.” Id. This argument was rejected, however, because it attempted “to infuse Fifth Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. Once a Massiah analysis attaches, it is
a critical stage of prosecution that will trigger the right to counsel in a sixth amendment setting provides the analytical line of demarcation between the two constitutional standards. The Massiah analysis commands a powerful position in any sixth amendment questioning setting. Consideration of the open waiver question may be the best demonstration of its significance. Although the Miranda waiver issue is resolved, the Massiah waiver issue was left unresolved in Brewer. Consequently, questions exist concerning the propriety of the accused waiving rights that have attached, the characteristics of the waiver, and the necessity of an attorney’s presence and consent to the waiver. While the answers to these questions are unclear, some guidance does exist in precedent.

III. THE MASSIAH WAIVER

A. Is a Sixth Amendment Waiver Permissible?

Historically, constitutional guarantees have been deemed to be personal to the individual. A fortiori, the individual can choose not to
exercise these rights. This option has been recognized under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments.

When constitutional guarantees under the sixth amendment are involved, a strict standard for waiver is applied. To preserve the integrity and fairness of the trial, the courts require that waiver of sixth amendment rights be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. This standard has been applied in waiver situations concerning the right to confront witnesses, the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel at trial, the right to counsel during the entry of a guilty plea, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to enter a plea of guilty and withdraw a not guilty plea. In view of the significant body of case law that allows waiver of important sixth amendment rights, it seems clear that a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of counsel during questioning that follows a critical stage of the prosecution. If waiver is permitted at stages of the prosecution as critical as the circumstances presented in Massiah, Brewer, and Henry, it would be anomalous to reject the potential for waiver in the post-critical stage questioning setting as well.

65. Under a fourth amendment analysis, the decision not to invoke an individual’s right is viewed as “consent” rather than “waiver.” See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).


68. The sixth amendment waiver standard is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). A heavy burden is on the government to demonstrate that the right to counsel has been waived because of the great responsibility on the trial judge to evaluate the validity of the waiver. Id. at 464-65; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)


71. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); see United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1978); Badger v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lawrw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978).


75. See Grano, supra note 7, at 34-36.
B. What Type of Waiver Is Required?

Assuming that waiver is permissible, the next issue that arises is whether the waiver must be explicitly made or whether the waiver may be implied from the circumstances. Although either an explicit or implicit waiver is permissible under a fifth amendment analysis, a sixth amendment analysis apparently precludes an implied waiver of the right to counsel in post-critical stage settings. The courts have recognized that the sixth amendment demands a higher standard of waiver of the right to counsel than is required for waiver of fifth amendment-Miranda rights because the purpose of the criminal investigation has shifted from investigatory to accusatory. Therefore, the conceptual underpinning of the sixth amendment does not support an implied waiver analysis because cooperation at a critical stage may increase the likelihood of conviction. An express waiver is permitted because the intent to cooperate is clearly and unambiguously demonstrated.

Moreover, given the application of a higher standard of waiver under a sixth amendment analysis, case law supports the proposition that implicit waivers are unacceptable under that analysis. For example, the factual patterns in Massiah v. United States, United States v. Henry, and Hoffa v. United States are fundamentally indistinguishable. In each case, the government utilized an informant as a

76. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1980); Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980); United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971). The Supreme Court has yet to define the characteristics of a Massiah waiver under the sixth amendment, although certain justices have made their positions known. Justice White found no distinctions between Massiah and Miranda rights. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 435-38 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). He, therefore, would not perceive a higher standard for sixth amendment waivers. Justice Blackmun, however, has implied that the sixth amendment demands a higher waiver standard. When the Court permitted implied waivers of Miranda rights, the majority supported their rationale through the use of the sixth amendment waiver standard. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Justice Blackmun noted that applying the Johnson standard in a fifth amendment context was inappropriate. 441 U.S. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Grano, supra note 7, at 35 n.215.


78. The dissenters in Brewer found a waiver of the suspect's right to counsel. Chief Justice Burger noted that the waiver was valid because the incriminating statements were made voluntarily and in full awareness of the Miranda rights. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417-20 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White stated that a waiver was implied by the suspect's actions. Id. at 433-37 (White, J., dissenting).

80. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
means of obtaining incriminating statements. Nevertheless, the results differed dramatically. In Massiah and Henry, the incriminating statements, being "deliberately elicited," were excluded under a sixth amendment analysis, whereas Hoffa's statements were found to be admissible. Although the decisions are difficult to justify factually, the salutary distinguishing factor is that Massiah and Henry had entered critical stages of prosecution, while Hoffa had not.

Because the three cases differed on the main issue of application of sixth amendment rights, it seems to follow that different results would be reached on the ancillary issue of waiver. In light of Rhode Island v. Innis and North Carolina v. Butler, it seems clear that Hoffa could have waived his right to counsel, even though unaware of the informant's status, because the questioning would not constitute deliberate elicitation or interrogation. In stark contrast, the lack of knowledge concerning the nature of the informant in Massiah and Henry precluded waiver because an individual is incapable of waiving that fundamental sixth amendment guarantee if knowledge of important factors bearing on that right was lacking. A higher standard of waiver would seem mandatory in the sixth amendment setting because of the greater protection afforded under the Massiah analysis than a Miranda analysis in identical circumstances.

82. See notes 37-40, 55-56 supra and accompanying text. In Hoffa, an undisclosed government informer reported on the activities of suspect's counsel during preparation of a Taft-Hartley trial. The incriminating statements, however, were used for a subsequent bribery trial. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966). See also Kamisar, supra note 9, at 55-63.

83. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2187-89 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-06 (1964). Hoffa also fits easily into a fifth amendment-Miranda analysis because Hoffa was not "in custody" and was not the subject of "interrogation." See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980). Massiah was also not "in custody." Because he was under indictment, however, a sixth amendment analysis using the "deliberately elicited" test was adopted. In a sixth amendment situation, "[c]ustody . . . is not controlling." Id. at 1689 n.4.


85. Massiah and Henry were under indictment at the time they made incriminating statements. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2184 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03 (1964).

86. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966). The incriminating statements were used at a subsequent trial even though they were made during a critical stage of an unrelated prosecution. Id. at 309-10; see note 82 supra.

87. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).


89. See notes 59-60 supra.

90. In Henry, the Court stated that "the concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in the context of communication with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the government." United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980); accord, United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure to inform defendant of crucial facts concerning indictment renders waiver inadmissible).
Rhode Island v. Innis\textsuperscript{91} and Brewer v. Williams\textsuperscript{92} also involved similar factual patterns with different legal results. In both Innis and Brewer, the defendants were engaged in conversations with police officers who were escorting them in a police car.\textsuperscript{93} As a result of those conversations, each defendant made incriminating statements.\textsuperscript{94} Even though both defendants were informed of their Miranda rights,\textsuperscript{95} the Court reached different conclusions. In Innis, the conversation did not even amount to "interrogation."\textsuperscript{96} As a result, there was no violation of Innis' fifth amendment rights because they had not attached; the incriminating statements were, therefore, admissible.\textsuperscript{97} The questioning in Brewer, on the other hand, was designed to elicit incriminating testimony from the accused without the presence of counsel.\textsuperscript{98} Consequently, Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel was violated and the statements were inadmissible.\textsuperscript{99}

If the police conversation in Innis had been an interrogation, an implicit waiver would seem apparent under the analysis in North Carolina v. Butler.\textsuperscript{100} In both cases, the defendants, after being apprised of their Miranda rights,\textsuperscript{101} made statements that were admissible despite the lack of a specific acknowledgment of each element of those rights.\textsuperscript{102} The statements in Brewer were not admissible, however, because the defendant did not, and could not, explicitly waive a guarantee when the elements of that guarantee were not specifically explained.\textsuperscript{103}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
\item \textsuperscript{92} 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
\item \textsuperscript{93} The Rhode Island policemen, having a conversation that the suspect could obviously overhear, expressed concern that the hidden shotgun involved in the crimes could be found by retarded children from a nearby school, who might hurt themselves. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. The Iowa policeman in Brewer specifically addressed the suspect, delivering the "Christian burial speech" to persuade the defendant to reveal the location of the body of the murdered girl. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 391-93.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1687; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 393.
\item \textsuperscript{95} The suspect in Innis was given his Miranda rights three times—twice at arrest and once before he brought the police to the hiding place of the gun. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. The accused in Brewer was also given his Miranda rights three times—when booked, when arraigned, and when met by the officer who eventually questioned him. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 390-91.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
\item \textsuperscript{97} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{100} 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
\item \textsuperscript{101} Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (1980); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371 n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{102} "[T]he defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may . . . support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402 (1977).
\end{itemize}
The distinction between these results demonstrates that a sixth amendment waiver analysis requires an explicit acknowledgment of each element of the guarantee and the specific circumstances in which it attaches.104 Because the inference of knowledge from the simple recitation to the defendant of his Miranda rights does not satisfy the higher standard, it logically follows that the waiver of those rights will not be implied under the more stringent standard.105 To preserve a semblance of conceptual consistency between the fifth and sixth amendment analyses, the higher standard of waiver under the sixth amendment requires express statements of waiver for each specific element under the guarantee, thus adding credence to the purportedly greater protections afforded under a sixth amendment Massiah analysis. A lesser standard would distort the balance that the courts have attempted to create in this area.

C. What Procedures Will Insure a Proper Waiver?

While a defendant may waive the guarantees of the fifth amendment in the absence of his attorney, sixth amendment procedure is muddled because the federal and state courts have developed three alternative standards for waiver.

1. The Per Se Rule

Some federal and state courts have opted for a strict per se standard of waiver for the sixth amendment right to counsel in a post-critical stage setting.106 Under this standard, waiver is impermissible in the absence of, and without the advice or consent of, the attorney, even though Miranda warnings may have been given.107 This posi-

107. Support for the adoption of a per se rule exists in Supreme Court opinions. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
tion, however, is beyond the periphery of the rights enunciated under Massiah and its progeny. In adopting this stance, these courts have provided considerable protection to the defendant by significantly restricting the prosecution's ability to question the defendant.

2. The Super-Miranda Rule

The majority position among federal and state courts is that waiver is permissible in the absence of counsel if appropriate procedural safeguards exist to insure a knowing and intelligent waiver. Initiation, however, is beyond the periphery of the rights enunciated under Massiah and its progeny. In adopting this stance, these courts have provided considerable protection to the defendant by significantly restricting the prosecution's ability to question the defendant.

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tially, the courts mandate that the requirements of *Miranda v. Arizona* be met.\(^\text{110}\) Thereafter, the courts will examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine whether additional safeguards were provided to insure a knowing and intelligent waiver.\(^\text{111}\) If protections in addition to those set forth in *Miranda* are provided to guarantee that the higher standard for the sixth amendment waiver is met, the courts that follow this position generally will recognize the permissibility of waiver. This stance, therefore, is aptly termed the "super-*Miranda* rule" because it requires a showing that safeguards beyond *Miranda* were provided.\(^\text{112}\) In these jurisdictions, a per se rule is deemed inappropriate because of the sufficiency of the additional safeguards to protect the defendant. Furthermore, the per se rule has been specifically rejected under this line of reasoning for the courts can find no support under *Massiah* for requiring the presence of counsel for waiver.\(^\text{113}\)

3. The New Second Circuit Rule

Prior to its decision in *United States v. Mohabir,*\(^\text{114}\) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted a "super-*Miranda*" rule of


\(^{111}\) See, e.g., *Carvey v. LeFevre*, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980); *United States v. Satterfield*, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976).

\(^{112}\) No uniform set of standards to implement this rule exists, however, and the sufficiency of additional requirements varies among the courts. Compare *United States v. Satterfield*, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976) with *Coughlan v. United States*, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 870 (1968). Some dissatisfaction with the approach was, therefore, inevitable. As the court noted in *Coughlan*, "[I]t may well be that the day is approaching when the right to counsel may be expanded to the point where an accused may only be interrogated by the police in the presence of his lawyer." 391 F.2d at 372.

\(^{113}\) Representative of this position are the Second Circuit decisions under *United States v. Satterfield*, 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1976). *See Carvey v. LeFevre*, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980); *United States v. Lord*, 565 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1977). After considering the requirements of *Massiah* and after reviewing other waiver principles, the circuit holds that, if a defendant is properly advised of his rights and the options available to him, he may knowingly, voluntarily, and explicitly waive his right to counsel. The circuit relies upon precedent that acknowledges the permissibility of waiver in other circumstances. The circuit, however, has acknowledged that explicit statements of waiver are required. *See United States v. Mohabir*, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980); pt. IV(B) supra. Therefore, in addition to the recital of *Miranda* rights, the Second Circuit requires that the nature of the proceedings and the available alternatives be explained to the defendant in terms that he understands. If the defendant acknowledges that he understands his rights and asserts his desire to waive them, the waiver is permissible. Although the Second Circuit recognizes that the standard for waiver under the sixth amendment is more stringent than under the fifth amendment, statements received in the absence of counsel and during critical stages of prosecution will be deemed proper. *United States v. Satterfield*, 558 F.2d at 657.

\(^{114}\) 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980).
Mohabir represents a distinct shift in that position and provides a unique procedure for sixth amendment waiver. Following his indictment but prior to his arraignment, Mohabir was brought to an office of an Assistant United States Attorney for questioning pursuant to a routine practice. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Mohabir made incriminating statements that were instrumental in obtaining his conviction. On appeal, the use of Miranda warnings to satisfy the sixth amendment waiver standard was attacked.

Tracing the circuit's decisions after Judge Friendly's influential dissent in United States v. Massimo, the Mohabir court noted its consistent reliance on a higher standard of waiver under the sixth amendment. Those cases uniformly held that Miranda warnings were insufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment waiver standards and that the sixth amendment required additional inquiry into waiver. Despite the recital of Miranda warnings, no sixth amendment waiver could result if the defendant was emotionally unprepared to waive or if the defendant was not informed of the nature of the indictment. Prior precedent, therefore, indicated that a sixth amendment waiver was impermissible in the absence of a "super-Miranda" type procedure.

Mohabir altered that thinking. The circuit court, after analyzing the existing rationales, held that waiver of the sixth amendment

115. See note 113 supra.
117. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1146.
118. Id.
120. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1146-50.
122. Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980).
123. Id. at 22.
124. The circuit court initially examined the adoption of a per se rule to exclude all statements in the absence of counsel. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1152 (2d Cir. 1980). Consideration of this restrictive approach was deferred. "Such a course would be the most drastic. . . . [I]t might run counter to the policy that a defendant constitutionally can insist upon proceeding without counsel even though he has been fully advised of the folly of doing so." Id. at 1153 (footnote omitted). The court further analyzed a "super-Miranda" procedure that would insure a knowing and intelligent waiver, id. at 1151-52, but it rejected this rationale because of the serious ethical conflicts that exist when a prosecutor or law enforcement official advises a defendant in an adversarial context. Id. at 1152-53. Many courts have expressed their concern over the ethical conflicts inherent in this situation. See United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236, 249-51 (5th Cir. 1978) (Simpson, J., dissenting); United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975);
right to counsel will be invalid unless an impartial judicial officer administers “super-Miranda” type warnings and advice\(^ {125}\) to assure full comprehension of that right.\(^ {126}\) By adopting that procedure, the Second Circuit panel instituted a unique and innovative test for weighing sixth amendment waivers.\(^ {127}\)

**IV. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH**

To date, little guidance has flowed from the Supreme Court concerning sixth amendment waivers. Thus, a definitive method for insuring a proper balance between the defendant’s constitutional guarantee and the need for effective law enforcement does not exist. The judicial officer rule of the Second Circuit should be uniformly adopted not only because it incorporates the benefits of the per se rule and the “super-Miranda” rule without their respective drawbacks, but also because it will effectively satisfy the higher waiver standard of the sixth amendment.

The per se rule shrouds a defendant in maximum sixth amendment protections. Yet, by failing to recognize a defendant’s ability to exercise his choice in the absence of counsel, the rule overly restricts a defendant’s freedom, doing a disservice to his right to the advice and consent of counsel.\(^ {128}\) Furthermore, assuming the absence of a per

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125. ‘‘To avoid the ethical problems inherent in imposing on the prosecutor this obligation to inform and to secure the benefits of the neutral intervention of a judicial officer at this critical stage, we conclude, in the exercise of our supervisory power, that a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during post-indictment interrogation must be preceded by a federal judicial officer’s explanation of the content and significance of this right. Normally, this would occur at the appearance before the court or magistrate required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(c)(1). In addition to the advice of rights given at an appearance required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a), following an arrest upon a complaint, a defendant arrested after indictment should be shown the indictment and told by the judicial officer that he has been indicted, the significance of the indictment, that he has a right to counsel, and the seriousness of his situation in the event he should decide to answer questions of any law enforcement officers in the absence of counsel.’’ United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1153.

126. Id. at 1153.

127. No other court has adopted the Second Circuit approach to sixth amendment waivers.

128. ‘‘The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. . . . An un-
Sixth Amendment Waivers

Se standard in the wide range of permissible sixth amendment waivers, it would seem anomalous to impose a narrower restriction for similar guarantees under Massiah. Precedent indicates that a defendant may embark on a course of folly if it is his knowing and intelligent choice to do so. The rejection of a per se rule of waiver under a fifth amendment analysis and the emphasis placed on the extent of the defendant's knowledge, irrespective of the presence of counsel, under sixth amendment analysis leads to the conclusion that a per se rule of waiver would extend unjustifiably beyond the requirements of Massiah.

Finally, a per se rule does not foreclose collateral attacks on a purported waiver. Because a per se rule would operate without the necessity for, or benefit of, a uniform set of standards for waiver, the defendants will rely on the advice of different attorneys, which may vary the requirement to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of sixth amendment rights. In this situation, a defendant's waiver may still be invalid despite the presence of an attorney because faulty or insufficient information will not satisfy the higher standard of sixth amendment waiver. Therefore, a per se rule may serve merely to complicate the waiver mechanism without guaranteeing the effectiveness of the waiver or providing actual benefits to either the defendant or the justice system.

wanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975) (citations and footnote omitted).

129. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.

130. Massiah relied upon Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), although it apparently did not adopt the per se approach recommended by the concurring justices. See note 107 supra.


133. For example, in both Massiah and Henry, the defendant's ignorance of the informant's role precluded a finding of a knowing waiver. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188-89 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); see Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979) (failure to inform defendant of nature of indictment), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980).


136. The per se rule merely excludes statements made in the absence of counsel. The flaw in the rule is that it provides defense counsel with minimal specific guidance concerning the exact scope of his duties in a waiver situation.

137. See United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980); Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1858 (1980).
The "super-Miranda" standards represent a more balanced alternative than the per se rule. This approach accommodates both the defendant's right to waive counsel and the government's duty to solve crimes. Because the "super-Miranda" warnings would be issued by the prosecutor or his agents, however, serious ethical problems would arise in the inherently adversarial context of the questioning session. Unnecessary pressure is placed on the prosecutor to play the dual role of fair and impartial advisor to the defendant and staunch advocate for the government. In addition, by allowing the prosecutor to gain access to pertinent information, even through a "super-Miranda" procedure, the defendant's leverage to seek a grant of immunity or lesser plea is diminished. Cooperation prior to an agreement with the government concerning those amenities will necessarily restrict the defendant's bargaining position.

The defendant's ability to contest the validity of a waiver taken in the adversarial context of prosecutorial interrogation further diminishes the desirability of the "super-Miranda" rule. Due to the court's careful review of these arguments, additional efforts will be needed to hear the claims of invalid waivers. That time and effort could be better utilized by providing a procedure that would assure knowing and intelligent waivers and minimize the frequency of claims of invalidity.

The Second Circuit approach represents the most practical alternative. That procedure guarantees that proper safeguards will be used to assure a valid waiver and relieves the prosecutor of the severe ethical conflicts inherent in the "super-Miranda" context. The procedures provided for the acceptance of guilty pleas, the choice of a non-jury trial, and the option to proceed at trial without counsel strongly support the Second Circuit's posture. Those procedures not only recognize a defendant's right to waive these guarantees, but also set forth specifically drawn standards, administered by the trial judge, that adequately apprise the defendant of his position. The safeguards proposed by the Second Circuit, therefore, would require

138. See note 124 supra.
139. A mechanism for de novo judicial review of these claims has been provided. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
140. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). Rules 11(c) and 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth the procedure concerning guilty pleas. For example, the court must inform the defendant of the nature of the charge, the possible sentences, the right to counsel, and the ramifications of his pleadings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). The court must also insure that the plea is voluntarily entered. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). But see United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979) (failure to advise defendant about every step under Rule 11 is not basis for overturning plea).
143. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
no greater effort to administer than those administered in other similar critical situations.

Moreover, the procedure would not impose undue hardship or inconvenience on any party. In light of the uniform procedure for presenting a person before a judicial officer, the awarding of additional safeguards would not pose any extraordinary burden on the system. In fact, any judicial officer—whether from the state or federal system—could initiate the waiver procedure.

The Second Circuit judicial officer rule would unify federal waiver practice under Massiah, thereby insuring that the higher standard for waiver under the sixth amendment is met. By assuring both the existence of these safeguards and their uniform application by impartial advisors, the additional effort and time needed to process claims of invalid waiver will be reduced substantially, if not entirely. The clear benefits of the judicial-officer rule demonstrate that this procedure is the best method for insuring proper waivers.

CONCLUSION

The courts have developed different tests and requirements to deal with the rights safeguarded by the fifth and sixth amendments. Specifically, the government must clearly meet a higher standard when sixth amendment rights are implicated than when fifth amendment rights are involved. The courts act like doting parents when the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings triggers the application of the sixth amendment. Different standards for waiver should be appropriately developed for each amendment because the very integrity of the trial process is challenged in the context of a sixth amendment analysis. Beyond that realization, however, the sixth amendment remains an enigma. Clarification must be forthcoming from the United States Supreme Court.

It is submitted that a demarcation between constitutional and unconstitutional waivers of rights should be clear and exact. An acceptance of uncertainty and ambiguity by the courts would forcibly diminish the role that the law should play in locating the proper balance between the competing demands for effective law enforcement and the protection of fundamental constitutional rights.

145. Id.