Regulating Habit-Forming Technology

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Tech developers, like slot machine designers, strive to maximize the user’s “time on device.” They do so by designing habit-forming products—products that draw consciously on the same behavioral design strategies that the casino industry pioneered. The predictable result is that most tech users spend more time on device than they would like, about five hours of phone time a day, while a substantial minority develop life-changing behavioral problems similar to problem gambling.

Other countries have begun to regulate habit-forming tech, and American jurisdictions may soon follow suit. Several state legislatures today are considering bills to regulate “loot boxes,” a highly addictive slot-machine-like mechanic that is common in online video games. The Federal Trade Commission has also announced an investigation into the practice. As public concern mounts, it is surprisingly easy to envision consumer regulation extending beyond video games to other types of apps. Just as tobacco regulations might prohibit brightly colored packaging and fruity flavors, a social media regulation might limit the use of red notification badges or “streaks” that reward users for daily use.

It is unclear how much of this regulation could survive First Amendment scrutiny; software, unlike other consumer products, is widely understood as a form of protected “expression.” But it is also unclear whether well-drawn laws to combat compulsive technology use would seriously threaten First Amendment values. At a very low cost to the expressive interests of tech companies, these laws may well enhance the quality and efficacy of online speech by mitigating distraction and promoting deliberation.

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INTRODUCTION

Tech products from Facebook to Candy Crush apply well-tested behavioral techniques to make their products as habit-forming as possible. Industry gurus, until recently, bragged openly about these practices in industry bestsellers with titles like Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming
Products and Evil by Design. A tech consultancy called Dopamine Labs went so far as to advertise that: “Dopamine makes your app addictive. Lift your engagement and revenue up to 167% by giving your users our perfect [hits] of dopamine. . . . High ROI. PhD tested, CEO approved.”

These efforts appear to have paid off. One recent study discovered that average Americans use their smartphones 76 times a day and touch their phones 2,617 times per day. Among young adults, five hours of phone use a day is typical. And in 2018, the World Health Organization (WHO) took an unprecedented step by including “gaming disorder,” a behavioral addiction, among its International Classification of Diseases.

Regulators have begun to pay attention. Washington State’s gambling laws have been interpreted to cover certain casino-themed mobile games. Other states’ gambling laws, however, have been interpreted more narrowly. The WHO defines “gaming disorder” as a “pattern of gaming behavior (‘digital-gaming’ or ‘video-gaming’) characterized by impaired control over gaming, increasing priority given to gaming over other activities to the extent that gaming takes precedence over other interests and daily activities, and continuation or escalation of gaming despite the occurrence of negative consequences.”

6. 6. The WHO defines “gaming disorder” as a “pattern of gaming behavior (‘digital-gaming’ or ‘video-gaming’) characterized by impaired control over gaming, increasing priority given to gaming over other activities to the extent that gaming takes precedence over other interests and daily activities, and continuation or escalation of gaming despite the occurrence of negative consequences.” Gaming Disorder, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2018), https://www.who.int/features/qa/gaming-disorder/en/ [https://perma.cc/4P6D-UPQZ].
investigate that same practice.\textsuperscript{10} International regulators have gone further, with South Korea requiring online gaming platforms to deter extended play and to kick minors off after midnight.\textsuperscript{11}

In principle, these efforts might someday extend beyond gaming to a much wider world of habit-forming technology. A growing number of tech insiders have expressed strong reservations about social media’s addictive potential, with some calling for the industry to be regulated “like tobacco or alcohol.”\textsuperscript{12} It is easy to imagine a legislative push to protect minors, at least, from tech products that are understood to encourage compulsive use. And as tech products become more sophisticated and intrusive, we may eventually see calls to protect adults from certain aggressive forms of behavioral manipulation.

This Article outlines the various forms that these regulatory interventions might take. These include light-touch, limited-range policies that are already under official consideration in American jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{13} They also include aggressive policies that seem unthinkable today, but that over the long-term may appear proportionate as tech companies become more sophisticated at manipulating user behavior.\textsuperscript{14}

Even the more modest policies will raise quick constitutional challenges if enacted. Social media,\textsuperscript{15} video games,\textsuperscript{16} and even computer code itself\textsuperscript{17} have received First Amendment protection in past case law. One might


\textsuperscript{12} Alex Hern, Facebook Should Be “Regulated Like Cigarette Industry,” Says Tech CEO, \textsc{Guardian} (Jan. 24, 2018, 7:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/24/facebook-regulated-cigarette-industry-salesforce-marc-benioff-social-media [https://perma.cc/RQ34-GLGN] (“[T]echnology has addictive qualities that we have to address, and that product designers are working to make those products more addictive, and we need to rein that back as much as possible.” (quoting Marc Benioff, chief executive officer of Salesforce)); Roger McNamee, Why Not Regulate Social Media Like Tobacco or Alcohol?, \textsc{Guardian} (Jan. 29, 2018, 4:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/29/social-media-tobacco-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/P6BG-Q9CN].

\textsuperscript{13} See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3 (proposing labeling strategies and bans on video game “loot boxes”).

\textsuperscript{14} See infra Part II.A.4 (proposing mandatory design features to slow down and de-intensify the user experience).


\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446–52 (2d Cir. 2001).
assume from this record that even the most modest attempts to regulate habit-forming design should fail First Amendment scrutiny.

Instead, the question is wide open—courts have hardly begun to address the First Amendment status of software’s technical and nonexpressive components. Is the choice to use an “infinite scroll” in the Facebook News Feed a form of “speech”? What about Twitter’s strategic deployment of a “loading” wheel to build anticipation after a Twitter user “pulls to refresh”? And if they are speech, then how should courts balance the equities? It is forbidden to burden speech on the basis that the speech is too persuasive. Is it any better to burden habit-forming design—sometimes called “persuasive technology”—because it succeeds in building user habits?

Courts’ answers to these questions will carry heavy consequences for media policy at large. On the one hand, most free content online is monetized by a huge behavioral advertising ecosystem that includes Google, Facebook, and scattered smaller advertising networks. The business model requires enormous amounts of data, which in turn requires users to spend enormous amounts of time on their devices. Policies that cut into that time may improve users’ health while impairing their access to information.

On the other hand, the addiction-driven nature of social media probably harms the quality of public discourse and deliberation. First, developers’ efforts to drive constant user engagement encourage an emotional, hair-trigger style of public expression. Second, by training users to respond to stimuli out of habit rather than by considered choice, social media engineers prime the public discussion for manipulation by “trolls” and saboteurs.

18. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578 (2011) (“That the State finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”).
19. See, e.g., B. J. Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do 1 (2003) (defining “persuasive technology” as “any interactive computing system designed to change people’s attitudes or behaviors”).
20. See infra Part I.B.
population better able to resist its news and social media interfaces may well produce a political culture that is harder and more stable.  

Part I discusses the economic incentives that have made addictive design such a pervasive phenomenon in the tech world. Then, it briefly discusses some techniques that tech designers use to encourage habit formation, along with the harms, both mundane and profound, that these habits cause. Part II lays out the prospects for regulation: what the range of possible strategies would be and which institutions may be equipped to implement some of them. Part III turns to a broad discussion of the First Amendment considerations.

I. THE RISE OF HABIT-FORMING DESIGN

A. Why Drive Compulsive Use?

Over the past twenty years or so, consumers have come to expect low prices—and more often no price at all—for most of the software and media they consume online. This is basic economics: the internet has reduced the marginal cost of distributing (and copying) content to practically zero, and prices have followed close behind.

Zero-price markets force content producers and distributors to extract value from users in ways that do not offend the zero-price expectation up front. Most firms have two options: micropayments and advertising. These techniques make up for a lack of up-front payment by collecting value over a long and limitless series of consumer interactions. Hence the obsession at companies like Facebook and Twitter with “driving engagement”—more interactions lead to more user “engagement,” which leads to more value the firm stands to capture.


24. Rafet Sifa et al., Profiling in Games: Understanding Behavior from Telemetry, in SOCIAL INTERACTION IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 337, 345 (Kiran Lakkarahu et al. eds., 2018) (“The rise of F2P games has notably added to the industry’s focus on behavior analysis. These are games with no up-front cost to the customer, with revenue depending on In-App Purchases (IAPs) (and sometimes associated branded products). Revenue is thus dependent on the ability of the developer to convince some portion of the customer base to purchase virtual items for real money. In order to be successful as a business model, these games require continued analysis of player behavior . . . .”).

25. See The State of Intellectual Freedom in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2018) (statement of Ari Ezra Waldman, Director, Innovation Center for Law and Technology, New York Law School) (“The more we like, the more we comment, the more pictures we upload, and the more we simply browse the internet, the more Facebook knows about us, . . . and the more money it can charge those who want to target us for advertisements.”); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 56–62 (2018) (describing Facebook’s data-driven advertising model).
In the casino industry—another sector where few would pay up front for what they get at the end of the day—26—the imperative to drive the slot machine gambler’s engagement for hours on end has a more straightforward name: “time on device.”

1. Time on Device: The Advertising Model

Advertising is a time-worn technique for drawing in revenue without charging a high price to the customer. The newspaper and magazine industries collect most of their revenue from advertisers, and broadcasters depend on them.28 The concept today is ultimately the same as in the mid-nineteenth century when the “penny presses” invented it: content producers draw consumers’ attention and “sell” their ad exposure to the merchant.29

Advertising-based business models have always valued “time on device,” whether the device is a television or a magazine. Twentieth-century mass media strove to keep viewers’ and listeners’ attention through cliff-hangers, promotions, call-in contests, and the like.30 Advertisers targeted audiences demographically. TV networks would use soap operas to drive demand for soap and other household products that women of the day were more likely to purchase.31 Rolling Stone magazine, at least in its early days, ran advertisements aimed at young adults.32

Today’s online advertising industry has grown much more sophisticated. Modern ad networks target individuals based on real-time behavioral profiling.33 In many cases, ad networks monitor the individual’s response to

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an ad: Did the individual follow through by visiting the merchant’s website, viewing the advertised items, putting the item in a “cart” or a “save for later” list, or consummating the purchase?34

This fine-grained control over consumer behavior vastly improves the “yield” of an online ad placement,35 and it has to. Many web users use ad-blockers.36 Users who do not use ad-blockers are not generally inclined to click; studies have demonstrated that internet ads are among the least effective forms of advertising.37 And if nobody clicks, then advertisers must strive harder to put “relevant” ads in front of consumers.38


35. See Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Targeting 3 (2009), https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5AX-CRLR] (showing behaviorally targeted advertising has over twice the clickthrough rate of “run-of-network” advertising, and significantly greater conversions). Some critics have dismissed this account as “investor storytime,” arguing that ad networks excel not at driving sales but at showing ads to people who are just about to make a purchase anyway. See Ethan Zuckerman, The Internet’s Original Sin, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-original-sin/376041/ [https://perma.cc/NFH7-KVZV?type=image]. But note that in either case, the incentive to drive compulsive engagement is the same.


Today’s advertisers therefore have two reasons to drive time on device. First, the user must be exposed to as many ads as possible. The more time on device, the more ad exposures. The second requirement—one that emerged in the internet era—is to target the ads as closely as possible to the individual user. This targeting requires advertisers to collect as much data as possible about the user—not only demographic data, but minute-by-minute data about the user’s location, mood, and desires. The more time on device, the richer the dossier.

Behaviorally targeted advertising underwrites free online media on the web and in apps. Facebook and Google run the largest advertising networks, tracking user behavior and using the data to place ads on their own sites and across the web. They may also buy or otherwise obtain data from other sources, such as brick-and-mortar customer reward programs, credit bureaus, or from other app developers who collect data for the purpose of selling it.

Advertisers pay Facebook, Google, and the other ad networks to place ads, and the ad networks split this payment with the owners of the website or app where the ad is placed. Everyone’s revenue stream—that of the content producers, app developers, and social and search platforms that place ads—depends on maximizing time on device.

2. The Microtransactions Model

Only a few years ago, the video game industry captured most of its revenue at the point of sale. Gamers might purchase a game in the store on a physical medium, or they might pay up front for a downloadable copy from an online gaming platform, often after having the chance to play through the beginning

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40. Brick-and-mortar retailers can use an automated process, Facebook’s Offline Conversions API, to pair their own point-of-sale data on a person with Facebook’s geolocational and other data on the same person. Facebook can then provide the retailer with a “lookalike” audience of potential buyers who might be susceptible to similar marketing strategies. See Thorin Klosowski, How Facebook Uses Your Data to Target Ads, Even Offline, Lifehacker (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://lifehacker.com/5994380/how-facebook-uses-your-data-to-target-ads-even-offline [https://perma.cc/9FQK-4AS2]; Tim Peterson, Facebook Will Target Ads to People Based on Store Visits, Offline Purchases, Calls to Businesses, Marketing Land (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://marketingland.com/facebook-will-target-ads-people-based-store-visits-offline-purchases-calls-businesses-224668 [https://perma.cc/4AAN-2QFX].

41. Ingraham, supra note 39 (listing Experian and TransUnion as U.S. data partners with Facebook).

part of the game—a “demo”—for free. For the most part, this business model continued the straightforward retail model for books and other physical media that held through the twentieth century. Prices for console cartridge video games in the 1990s ran from roughly $60 to $80 in 2019-adjusted terms.

Similar products at similar price points continue to exist for traditional gamers who are willing to pay up front for serious console or PC games—2018’s Red Dead Redemption 2, for instance, a big-budget production that sells for nearly $60. A new category of casual mobile gamers has emerged as well. Light “free-to-play” (F2P) games now make up most of the market. Rather than charging up front, these games’ developers monetize their products mostly through in-app purchases or advertising. In principle, they could sell in-game behavioral data to third-party advertising networks as well, though it is unclear whether such a market has emerged.

There is a clear need for F2P casual games to maximize user engagement. A banner ad in a video game will typically pull only about $2 or $3 per thousand user impressions. Making any significant amount of money from ad impressions requires users to spend massive amounts of time on the game, and even then, an ad-based strategy may not always be lucrative.

Most of the gaming sector has therefore moved to a hybrid monetization model that rests at least partially on in-app “micropayments” from players—small fees that players spend over time to gain small in-game advantages.

44. Kyle Orland & Jonathan Gitlin, Why Retail Console Games Have Never Been Cheaper, Historically, ARS TECHNICA (June 30, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2013/06/why-retail-console-games-have-never-been-cheaper-historically/ [https://perma.cc/ZW49-P5LK].
47. “Reward-based monetization,” a third strategy, is arguably distinct from advertising and in-app purchases, but the differences are irrelevant for purposes of this Article. Under this strategy, developers dispense in-game rewards to players who complete some action that is valuable to a paying merchant. These actions include installing a separate app, watching a video ad, or completing a survey. See Michael Sprague, New Study: The Data Behind Reward-Based Monetization in F2P Games, MEDIUM (May 31, 2016), https://medium.com/tapresearch/new-study-the-data-behind-reward-based-monetization-in-f2p-games-66b031d3ac7e [https://perma.cc/88GU-HGLF].
48. See generally Sifa et al., supra note 24, at 350.
50. See Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions in Games: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, GAMEANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-games-good-bad-ugly.html [https://perma.cc/HFT5-Y6PS]; see also SWERVE, MONETIZATION
F2P games lean heavily on micropayments, and certain big-budget traditional games do as well, typically as a means to lower the retail price. In recent years, the video game industry has captured most of its overall revenue from these post-sale or post-download micropayments.

The usual approach is to allow the user to play for a few minutes or even a few days without any kind of sales pitch. Then some goal is dangled in front of the player, such as the chance to win a new in-game item or to upgrade the player’s character. Achieving the goal usually requires the player to cash in some significant amount of in-game currency that can be either purchased with cash or earned through time on device. The latter option may require hours of tedious work from the player, and the game is often designed to make it impossible to get this work done in one sitting. The user is only allowed to play for ten minutes or so at a time, for example,

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51. See Sifa et al., supra note 24, at 345; see also Ben Lindbergh, *Battlefront, Reddit: The Video Game Pricing Wars That Might Reshape the Industry*, RINGER (Dec. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.theringer.com/features/2017/12/2/16725196/reddit-fighting-microtransaction-exploitation-in-video-games [https://perma.cc/HT8J-5VRN] (“Rather than raise the sticker price and scare away customers on the front end, publishers are, logically enough, opting to tack on costs post-purchase, via paid downloadable content, ‘season passes’ that grant access to all future DLC, and, more problematically, microtransactions.”).


53. See, e.g., Damion Schubert, *Respecting the Player’s Wallet*, GAMASUTRA (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/191264/Respecting_the_players_wallet.php [https://perma.cc/Q68N-DD97] (noting that in *Star Wars: The Old Republic*, “[p]layers are rarely, if ever, prompted to spend money in the first 10 levels, and the player is likely to forget that doing so is even possible”).

54. On June 12, 2019, the author played through the opening stages of *Candy Crush Saga* and *Minion Rush*. In *Candy Crush Saga*, the player runs out of moves and is then given the opportunity to keep playing using “gold bars” and a “Piggy Bank” purchasable for $2.99. In *Minion Rush*, apparently a children’s game, the player is eventually introduced to a set of slot-machine-like “prize pods” and character upgrades called “costumes” that can be purchased through a set of in-game currencies. Revives and prize pods can also be earned by watching a video advertisement.

55. See TTT, supra note 46.


57. In the mobile game *Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mystery*, for example, the player becomes trapped in a “Devil’s Snare,” which appears to slowly suffocate the player’s avatar. At this point, the player runs out of the “energy” that allows them to complete tasks within the game. The player may either pay for some quick energy and escape the snare or wait for hours for the energy to recharge. Julia Alexander, *Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mystery’s In-App Purchases, Wait Times Turning Players Away*, POLYGON (Apr. 27, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://wwwpolygon.com/2018/4/27/17290168/harry-potter-hogwarts-mysterys-devils-snare-purchases-wait-time [https://perma.cc/X6XG-3U8K].
or the user may be required to “check in” every twenty-four hours, or even every four hours, to collect a bonus toward the goal. At some point, an invested player will be worn down to the point where it appears rational to spend, say, $2.99 and skip ahead to the sought-after goal. At this point, of course, another in-game goal appears and the cycle begins again.

Most players never pay, and most of those who do pay very little. Instead, most revenue from micropayments is highly concentrated among a small group of apparent addicts who individually spend thousands of dollars on in-app purchases. One study showed that 0.15 percent of mobile gamers account for 50 percent of the industry’s revenue from micropayments. About 1.9 percent make up 90 percent of revenue. These gamers are called “whales” within the video game industry, and they compensate for the overwhelming majority of gamers who either never pay or who pay very little. In this respect, the video game industry’s revenue structure is coming to resemble that of the gambling industry and the alcohol industry, where addicted customers also account for most of the profits. The term “whale,” in fact, originated in the casino industry.

As in the casino industry, the whale-centered model can be highly profitable. The freemium mobile game *Game of War*, despite its poor critical reception, draws a yearly average

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59. See, e.g., Keza MacDonald, *Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mystery Review: A Shameless Shake-Down*, Guardian (May 4, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/may/04/harry-potter-hogwarts-mystery-review [https://perma.cc/5WHU-Y4NV] (“Hogwarts Mystery pulls the old trick of hiding the true cost of its purchases behind an in-game ‘gem’ currency, but I worked out that you’d have to spend about £10 a day just to play Hogwarts Mystery for 20 consecutive minutes.”).


61. Klubnikin, supra note 50.


of $550 per player—a remarkable figure given the overwhelming majority of players who pay very little.66

This unbalanced revenue structure may give game developers strong incentives to encourage addiction-driven, whale-like purchases. But gaming companies often have a collateral interest in addicting nonpaying players as well. First, a player who keeps playing might pay later on; a player who walks away will not. Second, many mobile games contain a social dimension that is enhanced by widespread participation. In Design Home, for example, players rate and review each other’s attempts at interior design.67 In Marvel Strike Force, players join together in “alliances” to fight major battles and to compare victories—a social dynamic that creates a sense of obligation.68 Nonpaying players who participate in these activities enhance the games’ allure for the whales and potentially promote the games to others.69 For both of these reasons, it is in game developers’ interest to ensure that their customers, both paying and nonpaying, spend as much “time on device” as possible.

B. An Overview of Habit-Forming Design

Developers drive time on device by producing user interface (UI) and user experience (UX) design practices that draw the user into compulsive behavior. Natasha Dow Schüll, a leading researcher of the casino industry, has commented that UX design is “about looping people into these flows of incentive and reward. Your coffee at Starbucks, your education software, your credit card, the meds you need for your diabetes. Every consumer interface is becoming like a slot machine.”70

Insiders in the tech industry share Schüll’s assessment. In a recent BBC documentary, for instance, several former Facebook executives stepped forward to explain how core design features they had personally invented


69. See Schubert, *supra* note 53 (“The game is served well by having a large free-to-play population. . . . Even if only a fraction [of players] are paying for your game, having a free population of a couple million means that you have a couple million people potentially evangelizing the game to their friends and family.”).

exploited weaknesses in human psychology.71 These design features include the “Like” button, the News Feed’s endless scroll, which enables the user to see more posts without stopping to ask for more, and even the choice to use the color red in notification badges.72

Sean Parker, the inventor of Napster and later the first company president at Facebook, told interviewers that UI designers have “exploit[ed] a vulnerability in human psychology” by “giv[ing] users ‘a little dopamine hit’” when doing so would help the company “consume as much of [the users’] time and conscious attention as possible.”73 Aza Raskin, inventor of the infinite scroll at Mozilla, told interviewers behind every phone screen, there are about a thousand engineers who work on increasing addictiveness.74 Leah Pearlman, inventor of the “Like” button, admitted that the feature had her “kind of addicted to the feedback.”75 “It’s . . . exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with,” said Sean Parker.76 “The inventors [and] creators,” he continued, “understood [the addictive potential] consciously. And we did it anyway.”77

The techniques designers use to produce these effects vary, but Nir Eyal’s 2014 bestseller, *Hooked: How to Build Habit Forming Products*, helpfully boils them down to a four-step process. “The ultimate goal of a habit-forming product,” he writes, “is to solve the user’s pain by creating an association so that the user identifies the company’s product or service as the source of relief.”78 The ideal is “unprompted user engagement, bringing users back repeatedly, without depending on costly advertising or aggressive messaging.”79

In the first step, the user is “triggered” to use the product.80 Early on, this trigger is “external.”81 It comes from advertising, or from an invitation from a friend to join Facebook or Instagram.82 Or perhaps the user is “triggered” to download a game from iTunes or the App Store as a response to what Eyal terms the “pain”83 of boredom. After repeated use, the user picks up “internal...
triggers” that prompt the user to take action without any need for outside intervention.84 Simple habit formation may do the job, as the user comes to rely on a phone app as a quick cure for boredom.85 But many apps set goals for the user which encourage the process of internal trigger formation.86 Snapchat’s “streak” feature, for instance, counts the number of consecutive days that two friends have used the platform to communicate with each other.87 If either friend misses a day, then the streak is lost.88

In step two, the triggered user takes action by downloading, registering for, or using the application.89 Scrolling through the Facebook News Feed or “pulling down” to see recent tweets constitutes action, and Eyal advises that successful developers make the barriers to action as low as possible; ideally, the user should be able to act without stopping to think before doing so.90 On Pinterest, for example, users can simply scroll forever without ever needing to hit a “See More” button.91 The user can simply keep scrolling, and the service will keep serving up more pinned items.92 If the user stops scrolling, the site displays some images as cut off at the fold, indicating that there is still more to see.93

The endless scroll monetizes the same human tendency that was illustrated by the famous “bottomless bowl of soup” experiment.94 One group was served a normal bowl of tomato soup.95 The other group was served a bowl of tomato soup that was literally “bottomless”: a tube under the table kept pumping in more soup.96 The group with the bottomless bowls of soup ate on average about 73 percent more soup seemingly because, without having to stop and ask for seconds, they had no opportunity to reflect on how hungry

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84. Id. at 47–51.
85. Id. at 28–31.
88. Id. In 2018, Anne Longfield, Children’s Commissioner for England, called for Snapchat to drop the streak feature. Id.
89. EYAL, supra note 1, at 61.
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id. at 79.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 110.
94. See generally Brian Wansink et al., Bottomless Bowls: Why Visual Cues of Portion Size May Influence Intake, 13 OBESITY RES. 93 (2005). Note, however, that apparent methodological deficiencies have brought the paper under scrutiny as many other papers to emerge from Professor Wansink’s Food and Brand Lab at Cornell University have been retracted. Pete Etchells & Chris Chambers, Mindless Eating: Is There Something Rotten Behind the Research?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2018, 6:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2018/feb/16/mindless-eating-brian-wansink-is-there-something-rotten-behind-the-research [https://perma.cc/RY9V-MTCZ].
95. Wansink et al., supra note 94, at 95.
96. Id. at 96.
they actually were.97 This bottomless approach to the scroll is widespread among social apps today.98

In step three, after the user takes action, the system serves up a “variable reward”—a reward that, as on a slot machine, varies on a random basis.99 The core of the addiction machine, variable rewards’ addictiveness was first discovered in a series of experiments on pigeons and rats.100 These animals were given a food-pellet dispenser with a lever.101 Predictable results meant that these animals would push the lever when they wanted a snack.102 But when the rewards were randomized, the animals would press endlessly on the lever, hungry or not.103

The variable reward is overt in many gaming applications. As explained in Part II, many online games offer “loot boxes” to players in exchange for micropayments of a dollar or two.104 After paying, the loot box opens in an animated sequence to reveal a pseudorandomized set of in-game items such as character upgrades.105 Some items are rare, and some are junk; the similarity to the ups-and-downs appeal of the slot machine is impossible to miss.

Other applications involve a subtler variable reward component. Perhaps the most common application of the variable reward principle is in the “pull to refresh” feature found in most phone apps.106 “Pull down” in Facebook or in your podcasting app, for example, and the app will load a new, and unpredictable, set of updates. The feature contributes nothing to functionality; apps such as Facebook could just as easily notify the user when an event occurs. Instead, it is designed, like the pull of a slot machine or the press of a food-dispenser lever, to engage the user.107 And as for the “loading”? It is usually a contrivance—nothing but a visual animation displayed to whet the appetite.108
Small design tweaks can be extremely effective at enhancing the sense of reward. T. Dalton Combs of Boundless Mind (formerly known as Dopamine Labs) explains how his firm might enhance a product’s addictive neural “kick”: “When you text a friend a ‘Congratulations’ iMessage, you get confetti falling from the top—those little elements are called UI sugar. . . . Then, on a user-by-user basis, we change that sugar to make it more or less enticing to build that habit over time.”

In step four, after collecting the variable reward, the user is encouraged to invest somehow in the product by doing a “bit of work” on it—for example, by updating a Facebook profile or posting a photo to Instagram or Pinterest. This investment is then used to restart the cycle. After sinking this investment into the product, the user becomes “internally triggered” to come back and check on its performance: Who commented? What did they say? How many likes?

The user’s investment can be leveraged to trigger and reward others as well. Post a photo to Facebook with one of your friends in it, and Facebook will send an external trigger to your friend with a push notification. Your friend will then take action by opening the Facebook app, and in return Facebook will show your friend the variable reward of a photo that may be flattering or may be embarrassing. The sweet spot for Facebook, of course, is for your friend’s social anxiety to internally trigger them to check the photo later and see how other Facebook users have evaluated their appearance. Those users, through their own investments, will have variably rewarded or punished your friend with likes, comments, or silence.

Along the way, your friend’s actions and investments will have helped Facebook “improve the product” by giving the algorithms information about what “engages” your friend. Facebook’s algorithms will then incorporate this information into the schedule of “triggers” and “rewards” that it serves.

delay, Instagram wouldn’t feel variable. There’s no sense of will I win? because you’d know instantly. So the delay isn’t the app loading. It’s the cogs spinning on the slot machine.”.

109. Shieber, supra note 3 (noting that “Dopamine Labs predicts they can add 10 percent to a company’s revenues”).


111. EYAL, supra note 1, at 143–47.

112. Id. at 154–61.


115. See Morgans, supra note 107.
to your friend—particularly in the News Feed, the endless scroll of ads and variable rewards that greet users every time they open the app.\footnote{116}

C. What’s the Harm?

Habit-forming design causes at least three types of harm: addiction, strain on social norms, and degradation of public discourse.

1. Extreme Cases of Problem Use

First, there is acute and severe harm that occurs to a relatively small group of “problem users”—time and money losses generally similar to those suffered by problem gamblers. In one extreme case, an anonymous poster on Reddit wrote that the F2P mobile game Final Fantasy Brave Exvius appealed to him as “[a] short format game that I could play for 5 or 10 minutes and put it away.”\footnote{117} He said, “I am currently $15,800 in debt. My wife no longer trusts me. My kids, who ask me why I am playing Final Fantasy all the time, will never understand how I selfishly spent money I should have been using for their activities.”\footnote{118}

This “problem gaming disorder,” as defined by the WHO,\footnote{119} “affects only a small proportion of people who engage in digital- or video-gaming activities.”\footnote{120} The situation is similar to that in the gambling industry, where only a small percentage of the population develops a serious habit.\footnote{121}

Industry leaders in both the tech and the gambling sectors emphasize the behavioral nature of the problem, and they suggest that they are not responsible for the small minority’s problems with impulse control.\footnote{122}

People can develop behavioral addictions to any product, they say, or any behavior, and individual propensities are often a determining factor.\footnote{123}


\footnote{118. Id.}

\footnote{119. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{120. See Gaming Disorder, supra note 6; see also Charlotte Thorensen Wittek et al., Prevalence and Predictors of Video Game Addiction: A Study Based on a National Representative Sample of Gamers, 14 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION 672, 672 (2015) (showing 1.4 percent “addicted gamers” and 7.3 percent problem gamers among a randomly selected sample of Norwegian gamers).}

\footnote{121. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{122. NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN LAS VEGAS 18 (2012).}

\footnote{123. Howard Shaffer, director of the Harvard Medical School Division on Addiction, was one of the first to call slot machines “the crack cocaine of gambling.” Id. But after forming close ties with the American Gaming Organization, an industry group, Shaffer has qualified the “crack cocaine” statement considerably. Id. at 262–65. In an interview with CBS’S 60 Minutes, he told interviewer Leslie Stahl that even actual crack cocaine should not be considered addictive because “[o]nly a small minority” of cocaine users develop a cocaine addiction, “and the same would be true with gambling.” 60 Minutes: Slot Machines: The Big}
But the industry plays a strong contributory role. Both the casino and the mobile gaming industries draw most of their revenue from that same small percentage of vulnerable users.\textsuperscript{124} Developers have strong incentives to drive problem use, just as casinos do, and they make every effort to do so.

The similarity between tech addiction and gambling addiction is less striking outside of gaming, where in-app purchases are less common. But the heavy “gamification” that pervades these applications, together with the developers’ shared imperative to drive engagement at all costs, suggests that the phenomenon of “problem use” extends beyond the gaming sector.

2. Social Norms and Lifestyle

The clinical debate around “gaming addiction” overlooks a more significant consumer protection issue: the average person’s compulsive attachment to smartphones and, in particular, the social media and gaming applications that run on them. One study shows that twentysomethings check their phones eighty-five times a day on average, and that more than half of these check-ins last less than thirty seconds.\textsuperscript{125} The study shows that average Americans use their phones for five hours in total every day.\textsuperscript{126} Still, another study shows that users touch their phones 2617 times per day.\textsuperscript{127}

Norms of constant distraction have emerged to feed these habits. It is now a social norm, for example, for two people eating together to keep their phones face up on the table and check incoming messages during their meal.\textsuperscript{128} It is increasingly common to stop in the middle of a conversation to respond to a text.\textsuperscript{129} One survey by Verizon reports that 77 percent of users turn to their phones first thing in the morning and nearly 90 percent use their phone in the bathroom.\textsuperscript{130}

Governments in liberal societies should not generally take activities off the table simply because they are a waste of time. But it is unclear whether regulation of addictive design would necessarily substitute the government’s judgment for consumers’ judgment. People may be spending much more

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{124} See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.


\footnotesize\textsuperscript{126} Id.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{127} Winnick, supra note 4.


time checking their phones than they realize or prefer. If the regulatory goal is simply to make product design less manipulative, then regulation in principle exists to enhance rather than diminish tech users’ freedom of choice. And of course, any concerns that restrictions on habit-forming design are overly paternalistic can be ignored insofar as the regulation is targeted at children’s products.

It is also worth considering the miscellaneous external harms that flow from compulsive tech use. Early studies indicate drops in productivity, empathy, and general intelligence when smart devices are in the room. High-income workers and executives in the tech industry disproportionately prefer low-tech and no-tech private schooling for their children.

Even to the extent that some of these harms might be called “aesthetic” or “cultural,” recall that governments regulate simple nuisances all the time. Think of the do-not-call list, or the law that attempts to regulate spam email, or the local ordinances that regulate shrubbery and house paint. In each of these cases, the government has stepped in to regulate a mostly aesthetic harm in order to enhance general quality of life.

3. The Public Sphere

The third harm is less focused but more severe: addictive tech’s distortive effect on public discourse and ultimately the democratic process.

There are reasons to suspect that the old marketplace of ideas is undergoing renovation as a state-of-the-art casino. Just like twenty-first-century casinos,
social media platforms surveil their users to ensure that the state of play is always adapting to the players’ emotional needs. For example, “luck ambassadors” in a casino use real-time data from slot machines to anticipate the point when a disappointed or fatigued gambler might be ready to walk away from the machine.136 When that happens, it is time to approach the gambler with a free drink, or tickets to a show, or some other pick-me-up.137 Facebook executives bragged about an eerily similar ability to a group of Australian bankers: the platform can detect when teenage users “feel ‘insecure,’ ‘worthless’ and ‘need a confidence boost.’”138

This is not to say that online platforms necessarily drive engagement by boosting mood. To the contrary, it seems that the most reliable engagement drivers are messages that stimulate feelings of outrage and group identification.139 Many recommendation algorithms—YouTube’s most prominently—have been shown repeatedly to send users along a “radicalizing” path.140 These platforms in essence have devised a guided daydream that monetizes our weaknesses for tribalism and negative rumination.

Social media platforms’ constant pandering to these emotions has likely informed, if not driven, the content of today’s angry tribal politics. But the engagement model has also warped the underlying physics of public discussion. Finding personally interesting content in the pre-internet era required some amount of deliberation or at least intention—a person would find new sources either through friends or through store owners, or maybe by browsing in a bookstore or library. Today’s recommendation algorithms, on the other hand, keep users always “on the rails,” to borrow a term from

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137. See Leslie, supra note 70; Plumer, supra note 27; Selinger, supra note 136; see also John Rosengren, How Casinos Enable Gambling Addicts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/losing-it-all/505814/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3P-AZ29].


139. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

A user with a budding interest does not need to seek it out—the News Feed will ensure that this content finds the user. Importantly, the user may not realize that they are predisposed to engage with a given kind of content; the algorithm takes the work of self-discovery off the user’s hands. In some cases, these recommendations are helpful. But they can also be harmful—for instance, when YouTube helps users “activate” authoritarian tendencies that might otherwise have lain dormant.142

By serving users’ “revealed preferences” rather than stated preferences, user engagement algorithms largely crowd out the individual’s role in cultivating a set of interests and values.143 But as on a slot machine, the device must cultivate an illusion of control to maintain the compulsion. Slot machines carry this principle to an extreme; users are led to believe that they know exactly when to stop the spinning reels, when in truth the payout has already been calculated.144 On YouTube, the effect is more subtle; the user may choose to discriminate among a seemingly endless universe of sources, when in truth the menu of options has already been rigorously pruned to fit the user’s own preexisting temptations.145 Facebook users who “like,” share, and comment on what they see are given an apparent opportunity to express themselves in public discussions, though the recommendation algorithm determines who will see it and when.146

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142. See Dave Hanley & Alicia Hatch, Social Activation, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Feb. 21, 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/tech-trends/2014/2014-tech-trends-social-activation.html [https://perma.cc/2KB4-LYB8] (“The power of social activation is unleashed when others advocate an organization’s message in their own words to their network.”). See generally KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC (2005) (positing that authoritarianism is a predisposition that activates when the authoritarian person is exposed to conditions of normative threat in the form of social difference or disobedience of authority).


144. SCHÜLL, supra note 123, at 82–86.

145. See Aaron Smith et al., Many Turn to YouTube for Children’s Content, News, How-To Lessons, Pew Res. Ctr. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/11/07/many-turn-to-youtube-for-childrens-content-news-how-to-lessons/#an-analysis-of-random-walks-through-the-youtube-recommendation-engine [https://perma.cc/M26K-RRWB] (“The site’s recommendation engine is responsible for more than 70% of users’ time spent watching videos on the platform. These sorts of recommendation systems seek to draw viewers to content that is more engaging to them, potentially keeping them on the site for longer periods of time.”).

Speed reinforces the compulsive flow of a slot machine, and social apps thrive on the same phenomenon.\textsuperscript{147} Social platforms, craving data, strive to make posting as quick and spontaneous as possible; they do not want users to think for too long before they speak or share.\textsuperscript{148} The obvious and unfortunate result is a more hot-blooded and emotionally reflexive media environment than was possible on slower media.\textsuperscript{149} Inevitably, speakers say ill-considered things every day, often triggering cycles of mass indignation and recrimination that enlighten no one and reverberate over multiple news cycles.\textsuperscript{150} “Online mobs” are a commonplace,\textsuperscript{151} and they can easily become real mobs in markets, such as Sri Lanka’s or Myanmar’s, where platforms have not invested heavily in top-down censorship.\textsuperscript{152}

The “fire” of violence and mass hatred that concerned the U.S. Supreme Court in its early free speech opinions appears to catch far more quickly and easily on social media.\textsuperscript{153} Much of this may result from the simple fact that speakers have been placed in such close and constant contact with each other. But it also may be that outside behavioral manipulation has compromised the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Anna Johansson, Social Media Mobs Are Worse for Society Than the People They Shame, NEXT WEB (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/10/31/social-media-mobs-are-worse-for-society-than-the-people-they-shame/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3U-HJGS].
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
role of individual deliberation as the public sphere’s most effective natural safeguard against disaster. And this is to say nothing of the unprecedented opportunities that platforms’ engagement-driving techniques have given saboteurs who look to spread misinformation and engineer social conflict.

The dominant prescription for these problems today is either to encourage or require platforms to take down dangerous content. The fiat-based solution called “content moderation” would be condemned as an unconstitutional prior restraint if it were instituted by a state or the federal government. It is a “private” solution to the mess, but this formalism masks a fundamental betrayal of the free speech concept. Justice Louis Brandeis wrote of free speech both as “an end and as a means” to preserve liberty. Addictive social media architecture threatens free speech in both senses.

II. PROSPECTS FOR REGULATION

Today, the problem of compulsive tech use is not widely understood, or widely acknowledged, as either a serious public problem or a serious private problem for any but the most desperately addicted individuals. There is little public or institutional drive to address it. Scattered K–12 schools require students to put cell phones away during the school day (even as many more have chosen to “innovate” by providing all students with branded, internet-capable tablet devices under discounted contracts with manufacturers). Private nonprofits have run ad campaigns encouraging parents to put their cell phones away at the family dinner table. But the lack of any strong or consistent public response seems to reflect an equivocal position about humanity’s deepening absorption into its “smart” devices: the times and the norms are understood to be changing, some ways good, some ways bad, but almost entirely within a rubric of personal or parental responsibility.

Much of this laissez-faire attitude is rooted in the underlying technologies being so new. There has been no high-profile addiction crisis—nothing in the ballpark of the opioid epidemic, for example—to capture public attention. Even to the extent that the public is aware of the problem, it can at times

154. See Cohen, supra note 143, at 1917–18 (“The modulated society . . . continually adjust[s] the information environment to each individual’s comfort level. Liberal democratic citizenship requires a certain amount of discomfort—enough to motivate citizens to pursue improvements in the realization of political and social ideals. The modulated citizenry lacks the wherewithal and perhaps even the desire to practice this sort of citizenship.”).


appear unlikely that strong regulation is even possible. Too many lawmakers lack basic understanding of the subject matter, as Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s 2018 congressional hearings revealed, and tech industry lobbyists have eagerly offered their own expertise to compensate. The state of the art, moreover, is still primitive and unthreatening compared with what may be coming in the next ten or twenty years. As transformative as early twenty-first-century smartphones have been, the major tech companies are moving toward products that are significantly more invasive and omnipresent.

In 2017, for example, Facebook announced that it plans to roll out its product in “augmented reality”: wearable products that overlay a consumer interface onto the user’s perception of real-world environments. And around the same time, the company announced that it was developing a wearable product that allows the user to type by thinking. At a minimum, these extensions of Facebook’s product will expand surveillance, targeted advertising, and gamification into the entire phenomenological space. At a maximum, user dependency and stimulus response will empower Facebook to transcend the whole concept of “advertising” and sell user stimulus response itself to clients. Much, as always, will depend on Facebook’s own internal culture of ethics and self-restraint.

If future developments along these lines raise public concern, then the regulatory response should escalate with the sense of urgency. Light-touch responses would try to help consumers make good decisions. More dramatic responses would simply disable products’ most dangerous features. Some or all of these protective measures may apply to minors or young children exclusively or, if the sense of emergency is especially pronounced, the protections may apply across the market.

Part II.A discusses the requirements that might be imposed on app developers and distributors as part of an effort to police addictive tech. These run the gamut from simple labeling and disclosure requirements to total product bans, as well as a few more novel intermediate options. Part II.B

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159. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 105 (2019) (“Google and Facebook vigorously lobby to kill online privacy protection, limit regulations, weaken or block privacy-enhancing regulation, and thwart every attempt to circumscribe their practices . . . .”).


describes how these regulatory requirements might come into existence, whether through existing regulatory authority or through new law.

A. Strategies for Regulation

1. Labeling Requirements

As in the field of tobacco regulation, the government may use product labeling to encourage consumers to make good choices. A traditional labeling strategy might require tech products to display general messages about risks associated with tech addiction and overuse. These messages could be tailored to the specific risks that a given product presents. A warning label for Snapchat, for example, could point the user to resources on goal-setting and social obligation as means of driving engagement. Minnesota’s proposed loot box law would require certain games to carry the following label: “Warning: This game contains a gambling-like mechanism that may promote the development of a gaming disorder that increases the risk of harmful mental or physical health effects, and may expose the user to significant financial risk.”

But the adaptable nature of tech products would also enable regulators to move beyond crude general-purpose appeals. Apps might be required to post the amount of time the user has logged, whether in a given session or over a longer period such as a day or a week. Other usage indices—such as the number of posts, likes, logins, swipes, or taps—might be displayed as well.

2. Responsible Use Devices

One step beyond simple disclosure requirements might require apps to look for patterns of problem use and intervene with warnings or invitations to take a break at appropriate times. Some casinos have voluntarily adopted “responsible gaming solutions” such as iView’s Intelligent Gaming Analysis Platform, or iGap. These casinos, Natasha Dow Schüll explains, have adopted the software to insure against burnout and maintain lifelong customers. The concept could easily be adapted to social media platforms, for instance, which have access to a much richer suite of data-analytics tools than casinos do.

After Dopamine Labs (now rebranded as Boundless Mind) came under fire for a 60 Minutes profile describing its ability to make outside firms’ software

165. SCHÜLL, supra note 123, at 283.
more addictive, the firm released a product called *Space* that is designed to help users break away from patterns of compulsive app use. *Space* monitors the phone user’s device use for patterns of addiction and then intervenes between the user and the most alluring apps by forcing the user to wait for several seconds before the app opens. During this interval, *Space* invites the users along for a brief breathing exercise called the “moment of Zen.”

Other major firms have also introduced anti-addiction functionality into their own products in what appears to be the Silicon Valley equivalent of carbon offsetting. Although these features are rarely, if ever, turned on by default, they appear to have real practical value for those who are interested in them. Facebook and Instagram now allow users to check in on their daily use, to turn off notifications temporarily, and to set a timer that goes off when the user exceeds self-imposed limits.

It appears that these firms want to frame the addiction matter as a personal choice and set themselves up as willing helpers for however their customers wish to live their lives. Importantly, however, the anti-addiction measures in apps like Facebook and Instagram are almost always turned off by default and buried in settings menus. But that could change if regulators required app developers to put anti-addiction functionality in the foreground of the UI rather than in an out-of-the-way settings menu, and even more so if the anti-addiction functionality was turned on by default.

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168. See Glaser & Oremus, supra note 110.

169. See id. Helpfully, Boundless Mind designer T. Dalton Combs has suggested to Slate that the company’s mainline addiction products could be put to great use on actual Zen meditation apps if any of their designers were interested in a consultation. See id. “Any meditation app is leaving a lot of Zen on the table by not thinking about how to make a mindful practice a habit of mind,” he mused. Id.


171. Nieva, supra note 170.

3. Bans on Dangerous Features

Regulators could ratchet up the pressure further by requiring app developers to disable various features that are known to drive compulsive use. Over the past year, for example, international regulators have investigated, regulated, and, in some cases, criminalized loot boxes—the pseudo-slot machine alluded to earlier. A pending bill in the U.S. Senate would prohibit their use in video games marketed to minors. A loot box is an in-game item—usually portrayed as some sort of closed container—that gives randomly selected in-game items to the player. The loot box itself is usually purchased with in-game virtual currencies that can be earned slowly through play or bought quickly for real cash. One or two dollars is typical. Loot boxes’ resemblance to slot machines is widely acknowledged. First, they distribute rewards in a pseudorandom scatter that is well-known to drive compulsive use. Second, loot boxes often exploit the same behavioral fallacies as slot machines by exposing users to artificially frequent “near misses.” These near misses create the mistaken impression that the user is closing in on a jackpot and encourage further use. Finally, both loot boxes and slot machines are often operated with tokens rather than actual currency. The exchange rate from dollar to token is typically unwieldy by design so that the user lacks any intuitive grasp of

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173. See infra notes 216–38 and accompanying text.

174. The bill, sponsored by Senator Josh Hawley, would also prohibit “pay-to-win” games marketed to minors. Press Release, Josh Hawley, supra note 8.


177. See id.


179. Wiltshire, supra note 178 (“[T]he dopamine system, which is targeted by drugs of abuse, is also very interested in unpredictable rewards. Dopamine cells are most active when there is maximum uncertainty, and the dopamine system responds more to an uncertain reward than the same reward delivered on a predictable basis . . . .” (quoting Dr. Luke Clark, director at the Center for Gambling Research at the University of British Columbia)).

180. Id. (describing the role of near-misses in the video game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive).

181. See id. (“A moderate frequency of near-misses encourages prolonged gambling . . . . Problem gamblers often interpret near-misses as evidence that they are mastering the game and that a win is on the way.” (quoting Dr. Clark)).

182. See id.
how much “one more pull” or one more in-game purchase will cost.\textsuperscript{183} Making financial cost an abstraction removes a significant cognitive speed bump.

Loot boxes represent only one tool among a diverse kit of addictive design strategies that might come under scrutiny. Users seem to be drawn in easily by goal-setting, such as in the pursuit of “badges” representing the user’s “achievements.”\textsuperscript{184} Early goals are met quickly, and they gradually become more demanding as the user progresses.\textsuperscript{185} One particularly effective goal-setting tactic is to encourage users to maintain a “streak” of daily use.\textsuperscript{186} The streak increases by one for each day that the user checks in and performs the required action, and many apps bestow badges on users who maintain the streak for some given amount of time.\textsuperscript{187}

Apps also drive engagement by preying on social obligation.\textsuperscript{188} Facebook users, to give the most familiar example, are summoned daily to wish their many “friends” a happy birthday. On Instagram, some conscientious users “Like” all of their friends’ posts and expect the same in return. The platform guards this economy of mutual obligation zealously.\textsuperscript{189} When Rameet Chawla released \textit{Lovematically}, “a platform that automatically likes every

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{183}] Kyle Orland, \textit{ESRB Defends “Fun” Loot Boxes as It Starts Labeling All “In-Game Purchases,”} \textit{Ars Technica} (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/02/esrb-defends-fun-loot-boxes-as-it-starts-labeling-all-in-game-purchases/ (\[https://perma.cc/BT3B-GAVL\]) (“\textit{Quake Champions} has two kinds of coins: ones that can only be earned, and ones that can only be purchased with real money. A lot of loot box games do the same confusing thing.”).
\item[\textsuperscript{184}] Snapchat, for example, gives out trophies such as “Panda Bear” and “Monkey Covering Ears” for sending fifty snaps with the black-and-white filter and one snap without sound, respectively. John-Michael Bond, \textit{How to Fill Your Snapchat Trophy Case Like a Champ}, \textit{Daily Dot} (Mar. 12, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/snapchat-trophies/ (\[https://perma.cc/D3WT-Y6AT\]).
\item[\textsuperscript{188}] See Needleman, \textit{supra} note 186 (“A particularly effective tactic is team-based objectives, since players tend to nudge one another to participate, said Harlan Crystal, technology chief at Pocket Gems Inc. In its strategy game ‘War Dragons,’ for instance, the more players who show up for a daily team battle, the better a team’s chances to win and for members to earn free virtual currency.”).
\end{itemize}
single post that passes your Instagram feed,” Facebook—which owns Instagram—stopped the threat within two hours and “[a]ll posts on Facebook . . . that included links to Lovematically.com were deleted, and any attempts to post these links are still met with an error message.”\footnote{190}

Other platforms lure users in by “notifying” them of tangential events involving people that they know.\footnote{191} This may suggest that either the friend directed this news to the user or that the user is under some social obligation to weigh in—or some combination of the two. But social media posts, unlike email or direct messages, are generally not directed to anyone in particular.\footnote{192} And to the extent that there is a social obligation to communicate about some event—an acquaintance’s birthday, for instance—the obligation may exist largely or entirely because the platform has cooked it up as an engagement driver.\footnote{193}

Sometimes simple aesthetics can drive compulsive use. It is well documented, for instance, that app developers display notifications in bright red because the color inspires a sense of urgency.\footnote{194} Developers use animations of fireworks, explosions, and bursts of light to amplify the sense of reward when a user reaches a goal.\footnote{195} Many applications draw out loading times artificially and accompany them with animations to create a sense of anticipation when users pull down and refresh their screens.\footnote{196}

Snapchat’s “streak” feature combines these various techniques into a particularly potent cocktail of goal-setting, social obligation, randomized rewards, and aesthetic enticement.\footnote{197} Users, typically teenagers, continue their streak with various friends by sending them each at least one “snap” a day.\footnote{198} Breaking the streak is typically received among these younger users as a lack of commitment to the friendship.\footnote{199}

\footnote{190. Id.}
\footnote{191. See Louise Matsakis, Facebook Notification Spam Has Crossed the Line, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-notification-spam-two-factor/ [https://perma.cc/A9JQ-X6ZP] (“It might be somebody that you want to hear from, but you don’t know, the only way to know is to check it.”).}
\footnote{192. See id. (“Now Facebook will nag you when an acquaintance comments on someone else’s photo, or when a distant family member updates their status.”).}
\footnote{195. See Wiltshire, supra note 178 (displaying several of these animations).}
\footnote{197. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.}
\footnote{198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.}
\footnote{199. See Lorenz, supra note 187.
Today, loot boxes are the testing ground for regulating pernicious design features. Regulators could conceivably go much further in the future—“streaks,” arbitrary notifications, and even certain aesthetic elements might come under scrutiny.

Finally, regulators might step in to limit users’ access to certain tech products altogether. It is easy to envision the FTC limiting minors’ access to the kind of habit-forming tech products that are today marketed to children without so much as a warning label. It is also easy to imagine many states’ self-exclusion laws, through which problem gamblers can lock themselves out of casinos, extended to certain apps that either resemble gambling or that already meet the state law definition of gambling.

Lawmakers cutting adults off completely from any behaviorally addictive tech product would seem out of the question today. Not even slot machines, long considered the “crack cocaine” of gambling, receive that kind of regulatory treatment. Over the long run, however, it is possible that we will see tech products dangerous enough to justify this extreme measure.

4. Counter-Addictive Design

A final approach would introduce countermeasures to mitigate the habit-forming effects of persuasive design. Some anti-addictive design might resemble the features discussed above, but without the option to turn them off: time-outs, for instance, after a long period of use. Another approach would allow unlimited use but subject to some degree of transactional friction. Facebook users, for instance, might be prompted to pay some small amount of “postage” before putting up photos or commenting, or they might just be prompted to confirm or review their comment before doing so. Or instead of the overconsumption-encouraging “infinite scroll” included in most apps today, apps might—like Google’s search results—show ten or so results at a time and require the user to “flip the page” after reaching the bottom.

200. As of June 15, 2019, loot boxes appear to be the only area where there is serious talk of regulation.


203. See Arielle Pardes, Quality Time, Brought to You by Big Tech, WIRED (Dec. 31, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-big-tech-co-opted-time-well-spent/ [https://perma.cc/9A2Y-N486] (“On both iOS and Android, it’s now easier to keep track of how many hours you spend on certain apps, and even set app time limits. But neither company has done much to address the persuasive design of those apps.”).
In some Asian countries, some kinds of anti-addiction design are mandatory. In addition to funding rehabilitation programs for tech addiction, the governments of South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand have required that game developers and administrators implement technical features to frustrate minors’ attempts to overuse their products.\(^{204}\) Under “Cinderella” or “Shutdown” laws, game companies must remove gamers under the age of eighteen from their servers between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m.\(^{205}\) China goes even further, requiring developers to incorporate “fatigue” mechanics into their games to make them less enticing after long periods of consecutive use.\(^{206}\) After three hours of use, the value of in-game items and rewards—such as experience points acquired for killing an enemy or ammunition picked up off the ground—must be cut down by half.\(^{207}\) After five hours of use, the player’s character begins to take damage minute by minute.\(^{208}\)

As alien as these laws may seem, they are not impossible as a technological matter. The aversion is cultural and subject to change.

**B. Tools for Regulation**

1. Existing Tools for Regulation

Some regulatory authority already exists to combat addictive tech without new legislation. Gambling law, consumer protection law, and certain common law torts all provide avenues to regulate at least some aspects of addictive tech.

*a. Gambling Law*

Certain applications do more than just borrow from casinos’ approach to design—in fact, they involve either traditional gambling or something that resembles it closely enough to qualify as gambling under the law. So it is fitting that gambling commissions would be the first legal authorities in the United States and Europe to regulate addictive tech design.

Gambling in most jurisdictions, both in the United States and abroad, is defined by three elements: first, the gambler must “stake or risk something of value”; second, “chance is a material factor”; finally, “successful play is rewarded by something of value.”\(^{209}\) These elements can be satisfied just as


\(^{205}\) Ji-Young, *supra* note 11; Sun, *supra* note 11. South Korea’s online gaming platforms must screen users by requiring them to submit a national ID number. Le, *supra* note 11.

\(^{206}\) See Király et al., *supra* note 204, at 508.

\(^{207}\) Id.

\(^{208}\) Id.

\(^{209}\) 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2010).
well in an online setting as in a traditional offline setting, and many jurisdictions already regulate online gambling.210

Now, gambling laws are being tested in two new contexts. First, plaintiffs have brought claims against developers of “social casino” apps—free-to-play mobile apps that contain simulated slot machines, roulette, and other casino games that dispense virtual currency rather than actual cash. Most of these claims have failed,211 but in Washington State they have been successful.212 In Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc.,213 the Ninth Circuit held that Big Fish Casino, a social app, counted as an “illegal gambling game” under Washington law.214 Under a statutory remedy, members of the plaintiff class recovered in-game payments they had made to the game’s distributor—payments that for some individuals amounted to thousands of dollars.215

Second, gambling commissions around the world have considered regulating games that contain loot boxes. Gambling commissioners in the Netherlands216 and Belgium217 have classified loot boxes as gambling under existing regulations and threatened companies that continue to market them to children with criminal fines.218 China and South Korea, which already regulate video gaming heavily, now require game developers to disclose players’ chances of winning.219 Commissioners in the United Kingdom and France have declined to classify loot boxes as gambling on decidedly

213. 886 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2018).
214. Id. at 788.
215. Id.
216. The Netherlands’ gaming authority studied ten loot boxes and determined that four contravened the country’s gambling law because they offered in-game rewards that could be sold in external markets. NETH. GAMING AUTH., STUDY INTO LOOT BOXES: A TREASURE OR A BURDEN? 3 (2018), https://dutchgamesassociation.nl/news/loot-boxes-netherlands-gaming-authoritys-findings/ [https://perma.cc/3EQ3-LCY3]. The regulator found that all ten loot boxes had the potential to be addictive, and that their addictive potential ranged from “moderate” (comparable to bingo) to “high” (comparable to blackjack). Id. at 9.
217. The Belgian Gaming Commission has classified loot boxes generally as gambling without regard to whether their contents can be sold for cash. BELG. GAMING COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT ON LOOT BOXES 10 (2018), https://www.gamingcommission.be/opencms/export/sites/default/jhksweb_nl/documents/onderzoeksrapport-loot-boxen-Engels-publicatie.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9JG-WTZM] (“[I]t is not important if a ‘skin’ in Overwatch, FIFA 18 or CSGO is merely of aesthetic value. What is important is that players attach value to it and that this value is also emphasised by the game developers themselves.”).
219. See id.
technical grounds while still expressing concern. In 2018, U.S. state legislatures took up bills requiring game developers to shield minors from loot boxes and to disclose the odds to adults. Washington State considered a bill to require its gambling commission to investigate the practice.

Loot boxes and social casinos clearly satisfy the “chance” element of gambling. The other two elements present more difficulty. Whether the gambler has provided consideration for the opportunity to play is an open question. For purposes of contract law, users who open loot boxes and play social casinos apps provide consideration even absent cash payment. In Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, the court held that a gambler provided consideration by voluntarily taking a free spin on a casino’s “Million Dollar Wheel.” The court rejected the casino’s argument that the free spin was gratuitous, pointing out that the casino had collected valuable marketing data when the plaintiff had swiped her casino-issued ID card. Gottlieb’s reasoning maps easily onto almost all free phone apps: the user is always providing consumer data in exchange for some in-app experience. But in the same opinion, the Gottlieb court interpreted “consideration” to have a more constrained meaning, at least under New Jersey law. The court deferred to a formal opinion from the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, concluding that the “legislative intent was to exclude from the statutory elements comprising the gambling offense the sort of personal inconvenience which will constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract.”

The “thing of value” element has become the sticking point. Courts and gambling commissions that have declined to identify social casinos and loot boxes as gambling have generally done so by adopting an artificially constrained definition of “value.” First, they require an aftermarket to

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220. See id. The question for the European regulators comes down to the cash value of in-game rewards. The Netherlands and Belgium pointed to the existence of real-world aftermarkets for virtual goods. Id. The United Kingdom and France declined to recognize these aftermarkets on the ground that many games’ terms of service prohibit aftermarket trading. Id.


223. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

224. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.


226. Id. at 327–30.

227. Id.


230. Id. (citing Att’y Gen. of the State of N.J., Formal Opinion No. 6—1983 (June 1, 1983)).

exist for the in-game items. Second, the items must be transferable between accounts; the fact that players can sell their account passwords does not qualify. Finally, if the game developer’s terms of service forbid users to sell their virtual winnings for cash, then the winnings are not considered valuable.

This final requirement makes no sense. The law does not normally hold that goods lose their value if the transaction is illegitimate. Think of bribery, for example. Bribery, too, requires that the briber offer a “thing of value” to the bribee. An offer of unlawful narcotics would presumably qualify despite the goods’ legal illegitimacy. Why, then, should a gambling transaction be considered valueless because it violates another contract’s terms—an adhesion contract, no less? It appears that many gambling commissions are simply hesitant to move into unfamiliar terrain and that this excessively formal approach to the “thing of value” element protects them from doing so. The effect of this final requirement is to allow video game and social casino developers to effectively opt out of gambling regulations through contractual boilerplate.

At some level, the whole conversation around aftermarkets comes across as a distraction. By extending or enhancing play, virtual items obviously deliver value to players who want them. This value is what gamers pay for when they drop quarters into arcade machines, or when they purchase “skins” for their avatars in online social games. Unless we are to understand these transactions as something other than contractual interactions, the intangible or make-believe nature of the items, contrary to what at least one court has said, should make no difference. There is no substantial difference between the purchase of an in-game item and a license to access a non-resellable e-book for a Kindle reader; both involve value exchanges.

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234. See Mason, 851 F.3d at 320 n.3; Phillips, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 735; see also Holden, supra note 211, at 95 (“The reliance on terms of service agreements that feature certain components including: non-redeemability of in-game items, non-transferability of coins to third-parties, and the revocability of license to access the account have formed the basis for the avoidance of gambling laws by social casino operators.”).

235. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 348 F. App’x 910, 911 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming defendant’s criminal conviction where he accepted OxyContin in lieu of cash).

236. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.

237. Mason, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 469 (“The laws of California and Maryland do not trifle with play money, and so Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.”).

Jurisdictions may differ in their approaches to these questions, to be sure. Some jurisdictions’ gambling laws may be more accommodating to expansive rather than restrictive definitions of “value.”239 But absent some clear intent to exclude nonmonetary value, a hornbook definition of gambling would cover social casinos and loot boxes alike, and perhaps other monetization techniques to come.

Plausible interpretations exist, then, that would give gambling commissioners jurisdiction over essentially any online game of chance—including games of chance where no actual cash is exchanged. That is about as far as an ambitious gambling commissioner could go without overreaching. But within reason, gambling commissions are already well positioned to regulate some of the most habit-forming monetization mechanics in gaming today.

b. Consumer Protection

The FTC has provided the country’s closest approximation of a common law of privacy.240 In particular, the agency has used its power under the FTC Act to police “unfair and deceptive practices” to pursue tech firms that violate their own advertised privacy policies.241 Absent a specific mandate to deal with habit-forming design techniques, the FTC may be able to adapt its privacy approach to the problem.

Generally, the FTC has focused on deceptive practices and used its broader power over unfair practices sparingly.242 The FTC would likely bring that same approach to the problem of habit-forming tech design. An unfair practice must satisfy three criteria that probably would be difficult to fulfill: first, the practice must cause substantial harm to consumers; second, the harm must not be reasonably avoidable by the consumer; third, the injury caused by the practice must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefit to competition or consumers.243

239. One classic question involves whether free replays on pinball and video arcade machines constitute “things of value.” See S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Coin-Operated Pinball Machine or Similar Device, Played for Amusement Only for Confining Reward to Privilege of Free Replays, as Prohibited or Permitted by Antigambling Laws, 89 A.L.R.2d 815 § 5(a) (2019) (“The most controversial questions have been whether free replays are ‘property’ or ‘things of value.’”).

240. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (“It is fair to say that today FTC privacy jurisprudence is the broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United States—more so than nearly any privacy statute or common law tort. The statutory law regulating privacy is diffuse and discordant, and common law torts fail to regulate the majority of activities concerning privacy.”).

241. Id. at 604 (describing this power as the FTC’s “lynchpin function”).

242. See Zahr K. Said, Mandated Disclosure in Literary Hybrid Speech, 88 WASH. L. REV. 419, 446 (2013) (“Historically, the FTC has very rarely exercised its authority to pursue those engaged in unfair methods of competition and instead has focused almost exclusively on deceptive actions, statements, or practices.”).

The first and third elements of unfairness pose problems for any near-term attempt to regulate habit-forming design. The unformed state of the research on behavioral addiction may make a determination of “substantial harm” appear too conjectural. More significantly, the close tie between addictive design and app monetization would provide an avenue for tech companies to argue that their techniques for “driving engagement” are what enable them to offer software either cheaply or for free.

This calculus could change over the long term, however, as market conditions change. Causal theories linking design and behavioral addiction may gain wider acceptance. Better data analytics capabilities and a more absorbing user experience may come to intensify the habit-forming effect. Certain monetization strategies may come to look more like simple rent-seeking with little to no consumer benefit at the margin. And at least where major industry players like Google and Facebook are concerned, consumer-risk exposure may no longer be reasonably avoidable. In that environment, the FTC could engage in enforcement actions or rulemaking directed at habit-forming technology as an unfair practice. One would hope that by this point Congress would have provided the FTC or some other authority with a more specific mandate to combat the problem.

In the near term, deceptiveness offers a more promising ground for regulation—most likely regulation of apps marketed to children. The agency defines deception as a “representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” When it has reached settlements with tech companies for deceptive practices, the Commission has preferred for obvious reasons to target firms that breach express promises. But in some deception cases the Commission has also settled with developers who breached reasonable consumer expectations rather than an express representation.

Habit-forming children’s apps offer the clearest target for rulemaking or enforcement under the Commission’s deceptive practices jurisdiction. In Google’s Play Store and Apple’s iTunes Store, children’s apps are generally found in the “Family” section. But this reassuring label often conflicts with the developer’s aggressive monetization model. In some cases, children have been lured into apps that have parted them from their parents’ money at

245. See supra Part I.
247. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 240, at 626–34.
248. See id. at 666–72.
casino-like rates of thousands of dollars per hour.\footnote{The FTC has pursued Apple and Amazon over billing practices that allowed children to rack up thousands of dollars in microtransactions without their parents’ consent. In Apple’s case, the company’s billing software discreetly left users’ credit card authorizations in effect for fifteen minutes after each payment was made. Parents authorized app purchases for their children, and the children went on fifteen minute in-app shopping sprees without their parents’ knowledge. The FTC pursued this unannounced extension of payment authorization under its unfairness authority. FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55569 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2016); Apple Inc., FTC File No. 112-3108, 2014 WL 1350287 (F.T.C. Mar. 25, 2014).} Even assuming that the parents avoid these kinds of charges, it stands to reason that few parents would expect such a manipulative presence from a game that sits in the “Family” section of the Google Play Store.\footnote{See Erik Allison, The High Cost of Free-to-Play Games: Consumer Protection in the New Digital Playground, 70 SMU L. Rev. 449, 470 (2017) (“While a parent should be able to tell their child ‘no,’ it is a deceptive practice on the part of the game for a game to entice children into making all the steps for a purchase except the authorization.”).}

Part of the appeal of the “deceptive practices” approach to enforcement is that it would not require the FTC to take any position on the ultimate harmfulness or efficacy of habit-forming design. All that matters is whether certain aggressive monetization techniques conflict with the parent’s reasonable expectation.\footnote{“[T]he Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material.” Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164 (1984).} As in the FTC’s recent settlement with a firm that misrepresented its baby mattresses as “organic,” the uncertain state of the underlying science is simply irrelevant.\footnote{See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Illinois Firm Barred from Making Misleading Baby Mattress Claims (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/09/illinois-firm-barred-making-misleading-baby-mattress-claims [https://perma.cc/9PS9-T4Q4].}

In the course of these enforcement efforts, the FTC can begin to develop a “common law” of habit-forming tech in the same way that it has developed a “common law” of online privacy.\footnote{See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 240.} Companies marketing children’s apps might be put on guard against incorporating certain suspect features in their products—features that may range from loot boxes to dual currency systems to overbearing notifications.\footnote{See supra Part II.A.} In the process, regulators could catalyze the creation of a set of industry norms that might later be incorporated into rulemaking.

c. Common Law Torts

Tort law, in principle, might provide a means for some plaintiffs to receive compensation for injuries that flow from compulsive tech use. But the case law on behavioral addiction is not particularly inviting.

First, several lawsuits have alleged that casinos and video slot machine manufacturers owe problem gamblers a duty of care; none have
succeeded.256 In Stevens v. MTR Gaming Group, Inc.,257 the widow of a suicidal problem gambler sued a slot machine manufacturer on strict product liability and negligent design and failure to warn theories.258 The court held that the state’s pervasive regulation of the gambling industry259 precluded any inference that the legislature would have meant to leave casinos or game manufacturers stuck with a common law duty of care.260 Courts in other states have reached the same result through similar reasoning.261

Unlike their counterparts in the gambling industry, the tech companies who might sit as defendants in a tech-addiction tort case do not belong to heavily regulated industries. In principle, that should make the early gambling cases easy to distinguish; in tech, there is no regulatory apparatus to displace the ordinary tort law duty of care.

The First Amendment, however, may still prevent plaintiffs in tech-addiction tort cases from receiving compensation. In Watters v. TSR, Inc.,262 the plaintiff attempted to link the publishers of Dungeons & Dragons, a tabletop role-playing game, to the suicide of her adult son.263 The Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment to the publisher, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to establish fault or causation.264 The court also held that strict product liability was out of the question given the case’s First Amendment salience.265 The court noted that courts should “avoid applying the common law in a way that would bring the constitutional problems to the fore.”266

Beyond Watters, the record for gaming addicts—or anything else that might offer a clear precedent for product liability on account of tech

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256. David M. Ranscht, Problem Gambling Is Funny, 6 UNLV GAMING L.J. 59, 74 (2015) (“Several lawsuits have been initiated, and have been almost uniformly unsuccessful.”).
258. See id. at 61. The plaintiff alleged that the machines “employ[ed] algorithms and other features that deceptively cause gamblers to play longer, more quickly, and more intensely. The machines are allegedly designed to cause physiological change in brain functioning, which promotes the loss of willpower and curtails the capacity to make rational decisions . . . . [B]y their construction and programming, the machines erode the players’ ability to walk away before they have exhausted their available funds.” Id. The plaintiff also sued the casino, alleging that it had “facilitate[d] the compulsive behavior engendered by the machines by targeting affected patrons with marketing ploys such as offering complementary [sic] food and lodging, and by tendering lines of credit on terms that would not otherwise be bargained for.” Id.
259. In particular, the state had set up an administrative approval process for gambling devices, a “self-exclusion” program whereby problem gamblers could bar themselves from casinos and established a statewide “Compulsive Gambling Treatment Fund.” Id. at 65. The court inferred that the legislature must have intended these administrative remedies to exclude any tort law duty of care. See id. at 67.
260. See id. at 63.
262. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
263. Id. at 379.
264. See id. at 380–84.
265. See id. at 382.
266. Id. at 383.
addiction—includes only one other case. In Smallwood v. NCSoft Corp., the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii allowed a similar set of claims to survive a motion to dismiss, but the suit’s pro se plaintiff did not proceed further. Unfortunately, the underlying complaint is so crudely drafted that it is somewhat hard to know what to take from the court’s reasoning.

Hardly a promising record, in short. But these cases are not totally plaintiff-preclusive either. Recall that tobacco plaintiffs had logged a decades-long string of defeats before the first plaintiff award came in Cipollone v. Liggett Group. By the late eighties, however, an improved medical understanding of nicotine’s addictive qualities plus an emerging public consciousness of nicotine’s risks and the industry’s malfeasance helped Cipollone’s plaintiffs to succeed. The history of product litigation over behavioral addictions is short, and it is too early to predict that similar developments will not eventually come through.

2. New Tools for Regulation

The existing regulatory capacity to police habit-forming design is limited. Social casinos, loot boxes, and similar devices that have not yet emerged can at least in principle be regulated in the same way that gambling is regulated. Depending on the jurisdiction’s approach to gambling, these regulations could include licensing procedures, odds disclosure requirements, self-exclusion programs where problem gamblers can lock themselves out of regulated gambling establishments, and so on. Consumer protection agencies, meanwhile, are well-positioned to police certain children’s apps that are monetized through aggressive habit-forming design. But for better or worse, no governmental entity today appears to have authority to police habit-forming design beyond the gaming sphere. That authority will have to come from a new place.


269. See generally id.


271. See Riley, supra note 270, at 1128.

272. Such a role would outgrow naturally from the FTC’s responsibility for enforcing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which regulates commercial websites’ use of personally-identifying information on children under the age of eighteen. See 15 U.S.C. § 6505(a)–(e) (2012); see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (2019).
a. Piecemeal Legislation

Over time, Congress may adopt legislation that attacks individually offensive design techniques piecemeal. It is not too hard, for example, to imagine a statutory scheme designed to curb intrusive and misleading push notifications within phone apps—sort of a successor to the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act’s regulation of spam email. Another law might require mobile devices to come prepackaged with software to notify users when their app usage has exceeded reasonable limits—a utility similar to iOS’s Screen Time app but turned on by default.

b. A General Mandate

Or Congress may grant a general mandate to an agency—most likely the FTC but perhaps even the Consumer Product Safety Commission—to regulate predatory design practices that tend to promote behavioral addiction. Vague as that may sound, addiction itself is a rather elastic term even among clinicians; it is no vaguer than similar terms, such as “unfair,” that are often found in enabling legislation. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), in fact, contains language to the same effect: the potential for “psychological or physical dependence” is a criterion left to the discretion of administrative officials.

Efficacy, of course, is another question. New applications and platforms arise constantly, and those that already exist are always updating their design. New addictive designs are always emerging, and developers can vary them quickly in response to enforcement. But this is not a totally unique or unprecedented concern. The problem exists in the narcotics sector as well, where drug labs constantly tweak chemical compounds to avoid the application of the CSA’s “Schedule I.” Regulators have struggled to meet these innovations. The gambling industry, too, has its own colorful history of cat and mouse.


277. See id. at 1111.

278. One machine popular in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, sold borderline-worthless one-minute phone cards for a quarter a piece. See generally Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 749 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 2012). Each card entered the purchaser in a
c. Dry-Up-the-Market Approaches

Finally, legislatures could address these problems from the outside, and not by restricting the contents of habit-forming tech products in themselves, but by blunting or destroying the incentive to make them in the first place.

For products with advertising-based monetization models, the remedy is clear: either restrict targeted advertising or make it less lucrative through taxation. Within the short run, privacy regulation along the lines of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation279 may provide some help along these lines. Over the long run, and for reasons that transcend the addiction issue, governments should move toward a more general ban on the behavioral advertising industry—a radical move that would clearly violate the First Amendment and that would create a need for wider structural regulation to fund online content.280 Such a program is beyond the scope of this Article, but it would surely blunt the incentive to drive engagement.

For products that are monetized through in-app purchases, there may be less dramatic solutions. The law might, for example, set up caps on the total amount merchants could collect from a single user within a year. Today, many microtransaction-based games are designed to target “whales”: the 0.15 percent of users who account for half of the revenue in the average microtransaction-financed game.281 These “whales,” spending thousands of dollars on average on a single game,282 would appear to be problem users.283 As long as they make up game developers’ biggest profit center,284 though, developers will likely continue to design casino-like products that are optimized for problem use.

A new statute might allow big spenders to retrieve every dollar spent in excess of some reasonable limit. The limit could equal a dollar figure fixed by regulation—say, $100 per app—or it could be calculated on some floating


280. See generally Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).

281. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

282. This is a rough extrapolation from the data indicating that 50 percent of mobile gaming revenue comes from 0.15 percent of players. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. If that is the case, then the top 0.15 percent of players will pay at least $1000 so long as revenue is at least $2000 and the game raises $3 per player.

283. See supra Part I.C.1.

284. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
basis. One approach might say that for a given app, the limit should equal the total in-app expenditure level by users at the ninety-ninth percentile. Merchants and platforms such as Google Play and the iTunes Store could then be made jointly liable to provide quick refunds to any user who exceeds the limit. Ideally, this policy would enlist the major platforms as enforcers against predatory design practices.

III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES

Even modest efforts to regulate addictive design will likely be challenged as infringements on free expression. How the law should handle these challenges, however, is unclear. Two first-order questions arise.

The first is a question of what Frederick Schauer has called “coverage.”285 The coverage inquiry is distinct from the question of whether a type of speech will ultimately be protected from regulation or not.286 Instead it asks, in a given case, whether the First Amendment has any salience at all.287 In cases involving speech in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, or insider trading, or obligations under a written contract, defendants do not even suggest that their use of language would entitle them to First Amendment protections.288 Gambling operations are treated as similarly “uncovered”; though litigants have occasionally raised First Amendment challenges to gambling laws, their arguments have never been taken seriously.289 But the range of coverage is always expanding,290 and the Supreme Court has articulated no outer limit that might help to determine whether various addictive design techniques should be considered First Amendment subject matter at all.291 The case law is marked in places by language suggesting essentially total coverage for software,292 and tech industry lawyers have encouraged this maximal approach.293 But the case law is much likelier to reveal an approach that does not extend to design techniques for habit-forming technology.
not regard all software design as equally expressive for purposes of the First Amendment.

A second question has to do with regulatory means and ends and their adequacy relative to whatever standard of heightened scrutiny might be in play. The most obvious governmental purpose for regulating addictive design will have to do with public health, and in particular the public health of children who might be exposed to these products. But there are deeper regulatory purposes at play as well—most prominently, a concern for the health of the same public sphere that the Free Speech Clause exists to protect.

A. Coverage

Addictive design cuts across a variety of speech contexts that may be protected by the First Amendment. At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Kater* has introduced gambling regulation to the world of consumer video games, a medium that has been recognized to contain strong expressive salience for First Amendment purposes. Further regulation of addictive tech, even if it only affects products marketed to children, could cut closer to core constitutional territory. In particular, Justice Anthony Kennedy recently recognized social media platforms as “the most important places . . . for the exchange of views” in the twenty-first century. Proponents of any consumer measure to deal with addictive design—beginning with the loot box bills now being considered in several states—should expect a First Amendment challenge.

The outlines of such a challenge are obvious enough: video game companies speak when they design video games. When the government restricts loot boxes, it burdens games that contain one particular kind of content. Facebook speaks by maintaining its service. When the government requires Facebook to tell its users how long they have spent on the device, it compels Facebook’s authors to speak a message that is not their own. And so on; these arguments lend themselves to efficient mass production. After all, if UX design is just another expression for software’s content, then virtually any law that regulates software should count as a content-discriminatory law of the sort that triggers strict scrutiny under today’s interpretation of the First Amendment.

These arguments’ viability, however, depends heavily on the level of generality that is chosen to define the problem. First, a software product might be viewed holistically, as a single, unified article of speech. On this generalistic account, laws that reach in and regulate a loot box, for example, have the effect of burdening one aspect of the speaker’s “message.” This way of thinking has the advantage of simplicity, and it fits well with the current Supreme Court’s austere First Amendment style. But carried to its logical conclusion, this approach would also require strict constitutional

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294. See *Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc.*, 886 F.3d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2018).
scrutiny in any case involving the regulation of software. This holistic view is not likely to survive sustained contact with twenty-first-century regulatory problems involving 3D-printable consumer products, cryptocurrency speculation, and so on.297

Second, a piece of software might be viewed specifically, as a consumer product that integrates speech components with nonspeech components.298 This approach would acknowledge the expressive components in various kinds of applications—literary or character elements in video games, shared media content in social media, etc.—without assuming that other purely mechanical components such as login credentialing or memory caching are expressive by association. The question then becomes whether regulated items such as loot boxes, or infinite scrolls, or bright red notification badges constitute speech for First Amendment purposes on their own merits.

As the following section demonstrates, courts have not yet chosen between the holistic and the particular approach.

1. The Holistic Approach

If laws regulating addiction mechanisms in games or social media were challenged on First Amendment grounds, the challengers would likely cite certain relatively recent Supreme Court opinions as broad authority for the proposition that the medium being regulated is all but inviolable. Challengers might cite Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n299 for the proposition that video games are broadly protected.300 Challengers might cite Packingham v. North Carolina301 for the proposition that social media and its platforms are essentially inviolable.302 And challengers might cite Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.303 in support of a "rule that information is speech"—a rule that could be interpreted to cover just about everything that happens on computers or the internet.304

But a fair look at the case law reveals that the courts have never really said these things, and indeed they have never extended any special constitutional protection to tech products or the internet beyond what the First Amendment would ordinarily furnish in a low-tech setting.

298. In the world of tangible objects, there is no such thing as pure speech; even a book contains paper stock that is intuitively distinct from any expressive content. The perception that software is different because of its intangible or conceptual nature is ultimately delusive. Credit, debt, governments, corporations, family relationships, and so on are all intangible and conceptual, and all intersect in various ways with activities that may be expressive for First Amendment purposes. But that is no reason to say that these phenomena are somehow shot through in every dimension with First Amendment significance.
300. See id. at 790.
302. See id. at 1734.
304. See id. at 571 (“The State asks for an exception to the rule that information is speech, but there is no need to consider that request in this case.”).
a. Games

In Brown, the Supreme Court invalidated a California law that prohibited the sale or rental of violent video games to minors and required them to be labelled “18.”\textsuperscript{305} Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-justice majority, dispelled any notion that video games might deserve subordinate First Amendment status:

Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{306}

None of the justices seemed to disagree on this initial point.\textsuperscript{307}

From here, Justice Scalia proceeded with a conventional content-discrimination analysis.\textsuperscript{308} By singling out video games based on their content, the California statute opened itself up to strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{309} Supposing for the sake of argument that children’s well-being, broadly defined, constituted a compelling state interest, Justice Scalia nevertheless found the means-end fit lacking.\textsuperscript{310} The available social science, he wrote, had failed to establish a strong causal connection between the video games and any actual violence.\textsuperscript{311}

Brown never says that all video games are speech, and the Court had no occasion to do so. Instead the case asked only whether portrayals of violence that occur in video games are speech—for those are all that the statute regulated. So while challengers to a loot box law would inevitably cite

\textsuperscript{305} Brown, 564 U.S. at 789.
\textsuperscript{306} Id. at 790.
\textsuperscript{307} Justice Thomas’s dissent proposed, somewhat tangentially to the other justices’ discussion, that “speech to minor children bypassing their parents” is an unprotected category for originalist reasons. Id. at 822 (Thomas, J., dissenting). It is unclear where Justice Thomas would come down on the question of whether video games might be speech at all. He writes: “The Court holds that video games are speech for purposes of the First Amendment and finds the statute facially unconstitutional. I disagree.” Id. at 838–39. But which of these two points does Justice Thomas disagree with? That video games are speech, that the statute is facially unconstitutional, or both? The bulk of Justice Thomas’s discussion about the history of speech to minor children bypassing their parents would seem to assume, even if it is an unprotected category, that some kind of speech for First Amendment purposes is going on. Even regulations of unprotected low-value speech can offend the First Amendment if a law discriminates within the unprotected category based on content or viewpoint. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). But Justice Thomas does not conduct an R.A.V. analysis here.
\textsuperscript{308} Brown, 564 U.S. at 799–803 (majority opinion).
\textsuperscript{309} See id. at 799.
\textsuperscript{310} The social science, he reasoned, failed to support the selective application of the law: realistically violent games like Grand Theft Auto and cartoonish games like Sonic the Hedgehog alike were shown to rile kids up. Id. at 800–01. Second, Justice Scalia found the law to be underbread insofar as it permitted children to buy the games with their parents’ permission. Id. at 802. If these games were really so harmful, he reasoned, then why not bar them to children altogether? Id.
\textsuperscript{311} See id. at 800–02.
Brown as support for a thoroughgoing First Amendment protection for video games, the analogy is superficial. Only three justices of the Brown Court discuss the features that distinguish videos games from media traditionally protected by the First Amendment—and far from suggesting that games as such deserve total protection, they express concern about interactive video games’ special potential for harm over and above noninteractive media.312

A clear reading of Brown, then, leaves many aspects of gaming outside the First Amendment’s coverage. No member of the Court addresses the relatively questionable “speechiness” of austere, nonrepresentative video games such as Pong or Candy Crush. Video gambling machine operators have tried and failed in lower courts to invoke Brown in defense of “entertaining display[s]” that simulate slot machines.313 There is simply no “video games as speech” doctrine that offers any shelter to the various behavioral techniques that games and other types of “gamified” applications use to drive engagement.

b. Social Apps and Platforms

The law extends certain extraordinary protections to online platform owners under the Communications Decency Act of 1996314 (CDA). Section 230 provides that online platform owners may not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided.”315 The CDA has indeed taken on such a strong protective aura that tech platforms have begun to raise § 230’s shield against liability in situations where it has no clear relevance. The general counsel for Lyft, for example, has taken the position that the CDA protects it from vicarious liability for the torts of its drivers.316 Under these

312. Id. at 806 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We should not jump to the conclusion that new technology is fundamentally the same as some older thing with which we are familiar. . . . There are reasons to suspect that the experience of playing violent video games just might be very different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or a television show.”); id. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would find sufficient grounds in these studies and expert opinions for this Court to defer to an elected legislature’s conclusion that the video games in question are particularly likely to harm children.”).

313. Telesweeps of Butler Valley, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 3:12-CV-1374, 2012 WL 4839010, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Telesweeps of Butler Valley, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 537 F. App’x 51 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Unlike in Brown, the simulated gambling programs at issue here do not contain plots, storylines, character development, or any elements that would communicate ideas.”); Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 749 S.E.2d 429, 437 (N.C. 2012) (“While Brown confirmed that First Amendment protection extends to video games, the Court struck down the state law at issue because it was a content-based restriction on violent video games. Here [the video gambling ban] applies regardless of the content of the video game.”); cf. Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee County, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (“[W]hat Candy Lab’s game lacks in compelling literary tropes, it makes up for by employing ‘features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).’”); Alfarah v. City of Soledad, No. 5:15-CV-05569-EJD, 2016 WL 3456697, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2016) (“In general, playing or offering games is conduct, not speech.”).


hyperprotective conditions, there has been no need for courts to engage seriously with the question of how much protection the First Amendment itself might provide to online platform owners.

Even so, expectations have been set high. Online platforms today are widely considered the First Amendment equivalent of newspaper editors. Whatever the merit of this perhaps overly flattering analogy, it nevertheless would seem to reach only a corner of a Facebook’s or a Google’s operations—namely, the companies’ decisions to rank or censor content. Even if Facebook really is comparable to a newspaper, a decision to regulate addictive user design may be no more offensive than laws requiring the use of recycled newsprint. Just because an organization does a lot of editing does not mean that this editing permeates the entire enterprise.

Then there is Justice Kennedy’s arresting remark in 2017’s Packingham v. North Carolina that the internet, particularly social media, “is the most important place[] . . . for the exchange of views.” Tonally, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in that case creates an unmistakable sense of anticipation that somebody involved with social media, whether users or the platforms themselves, will soon receive a new shelter under the First Amendment. Some banned social media users have cited the case to imply that social platforms are state actors. Social media operators may someday cite Kennedy’s words in support of a Lochner-like freedom of contract between platform and user.

But the case, much like Brown, really says very little at all—only that it was overkill for the state of North Carolina to bar a released sex offender from most social media for life. If a similar law applied in real space—say, one that made it unlawful for a convicted sex offender to communicate with people in public places such as streets and parks—it would have traversed the free speech pale. Packingham says that total exile from major social platforms is unacceptable by the same token.

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318. These laws may raise First Amendment concerns, however, if they are imposed differentially. See generally Richard Madris, Comment, Recycled Newsprint Laws and Differential Taxation of the Press, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1069 (1994) (urging that recycled newsprint laws are unconstitutional because they affect only newspapers).


321. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (“This case is one of the first this Court has taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet. As a result, the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.”).
First Amendment logic hardly suggests that social platforms or applications should be any less regulable than privately owned physical spaces. All Packingham really means is that social platforms are not subordinate forums within the First Amendment order.

Reno v. ACLU,322 the 1997 case that extended robust speech protections to the internet for the first time, is similarly modest: it raises online speech protections up to the level of offline speech protections, but it does not suggest that they go any higher.323 The CDA provisions at issue in Reno imposed a heavy age and identity verification requirement on online publishers who distributed certain sexually explicit materials that were defined as inappropriate for minors.324 The law was overbroad in that it encompassed protected nonobscene materials and would have required consenting adults to disclose personally identifying materials before viewing them.325 It would have been struck down if it had been applied to brick-and-mortar bookstores.326 The government apparently hoped that the CDA might get by under a lenient standard similar to the one applied to broadcast media.327 The Court declined the invitation. But nothing in the opinion suggests that online publishers or merchants should enjoy protections beyond what they would get offline.328

c. Computer Code

When the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ordered Apple to unlock the encrypted phone of the San Bernardino shooter, the company argued that to do so would constitute “compelled speech.”329 Such arguments rarely win the day in court, though judges nevertheless take them more seriously than they should.

The theory that computer code is a form of speech dates back to the Northern District of California’s 1996 decision in Bernstein v. United States Department of State,330 where the judge reckoned that computer programming languages should be treated as the equivalent of natural languages such as English or German.331 On this theory, statements communicated in code deserve the same formidable battery of First

323. See id. at 870 (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”).
324. See id. at 857–61.
325. See id. at 881–82.
326. See id. at 864–65 (comparing the CDA unfavorably with a New York statute restricting minors’ access to nonobscene erotic magazines).
327. See id. at 866–67 (declining to extend FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), which upheld FCC regulations against profanity in primetime broadcasts).
328. See generally id.
329. See Panzarino, supra note 293.
331. See id. at 1435 (“This court can find no meaningful difference between computer language, particularly high-level languages as defined above, and German or French. . . . Even object code, which directly instructs the computer, operates as a ‘language.’” (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934–36 (9th Cir. 1995))).
Amendment protections as statements communicated in a natural language.\textsuperscript{332}

The Bernstein argument has had very little practical effect. Academics who wanted to use computer code for illustrative purposes have won victories.\textsuperscript{333} But in cases about actual consumer-grade software, courts have consistently used a watered-down First Amendment analysis to avoid following Bernstein’s flawed logic through to its preposterous conclusions.\textsuperscript{334}

2. The Particular Approach

There is a simple appeal to an approach that says “video games are speech,” or that “social media is speech,” or that software generally is speech. But the costs of heightened scrutiny across the board will pile up quickly. First Amendment law will eventually have to draw some lines among the internet’s various uses and acknowledge that most of them are nonexpressive. It is at this point, after the generalistic approach’s easy answers fall away, that courts might begin to evaluate specific aspects of addictive design on their own First Amendment merits.

\textit{a. Addictive Design as Conventional Message-Bearing Speech}

At least some of the design elements in question communicate some kind of easily articulable message. When Facebook tells you that you have twenty-nine likes, it is telling you that you have twenty-nine likes. And when app icons use stop-sign red dots to get your attention, the message is: “Hey! Over here!”

But messages should not be dismissed as eligible First Amendment content just because they are austere.\textsuperscript{335} Even simple commercial solicitations count. \textit{Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman}\textsuperscript{336} frames “the communication of prices,” apart from any surrounding advertising content, as a form of speech.\textsuperscript{337} A New York law that banned credit surcharges but not “cash discounts” regulated merchants’ communicative choices in such a way as to potentially summon First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{332} The analogy proves little, however, unless you assume that statements in English or German qualify categorically for First Amendment protections. They do not, of course; natural language has many strictly practical uses—in contracting, in conspiring, in insider trading, and so on—that contain no First Amendment dimension.

\textsuperscript{333} See generally Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).

\textsuperscript{334} Langvardt, supra note 297, at 772–75.

\textsuperscript{335} Cf. Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 749 S.E.2d 429, 437 (N.C. 2012) (finding that a video gambling machine announcing “‘winner,’ or ‘you lose,’ or ‘good job,’ or ‘too bad,’ or simply show the amount of money won” is not protected speech because “the announcement is merely a necessary but incidental part of the overall noncommunicative activity of conducting the sweepstakes”).

\textsuperscript{336} 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).

\textsuperscript{337} See id. at 1151.

\textsuperscript{338} Id. at 1146–47.
Clip-art-level visual content may also incline a court toward extending protection to certain elements of interface design. In a recent case, Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee County, the Eastern District of Wisconsin extended protection to Texas Rope ’Em, a Pokémon Go–like scavenger hunt in which users travel to real world locations to collect cards that the player could add to a hand of poker. Despite the game’s lack of the “plot, character or dialogue” elements that made the difference in Brown, the court found protected content in the “Western-themed virtual environment, complete with a Texas-themed game title, color scheme, and graphics, allowing the player to corral favorable playing cards using an animated lasso.”

Courts analyzing video gambling machines, on the other hand, have been less generous. “[M]erely stat[ing] whether a player has won a prize by displaying a depiction of, for instance, three cherries,” has been held insufficient for First Amendment protection. It is unclear what accounts for the difference between the three cherries and the simple “Wild West” images in Texas Rope ’Em. It may have less to do with the “speechiness” of these images as such and more to do with an unspoken decision to lay off the First Amendment where gambling is concerned.

b. Addictive Design as Abstract Expression

Other addictive design techniques cannot be said to convey any message at all. These elements—such as the “infinite scroll” of your News Feed, the “pull to refresh” capability of your podcasting app, or the flashing lights and sounds that intensify the ritual of opening a loot box—fit even less easily into the First Amendment domain than the clip-art-level expression of Texas Rope ’Em. But the Supreme Court has stressed that a clear and particularized message is not necessary to invoke constitutional protection. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., a touchstone in discussions about abstract expression, the Court upheld a parade organizer’s right to exclude a gay and lesbian organization from marching in a St. Patrick’s Day festival. The state’s public accommodation law generally prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—conduct that in most instances is not considered expressive for First Amendment purposes—and it was unclear what message, if any, the parade organizer intended to send. But Justice David Souter wrote for the Court that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition

339. 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
340. See id. at 1141.
341. See id. at 1146.
343. See generally Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318 (2018) (arguing that the First Amendment is less likely to cover situations, such as sexual harassment, where strong social norms mandate clear consequences for the speech).
345. See id. at 580–81.
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.\footnote{Id. at 569 (citation omitted).}

Developers may argue that much of what makes addictive design work rests within this zone of sensory abstraction. Notification badges are more effective in bold colors—red in particular—and in certain organizations of physical space.\footnote{Paul Lewis, “Our Minds Can Be Hijacked”: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a Smartphone Dystopia, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-silicon-valley-dystopia [https://perma.cc/7ZWD-PYXW] (“When smartphone users glance at their phones, dozens or hundreds of times a day, they are confronted with small red dots beside their apps, pleading to be tapped. ‘Red is a trigger colour,’ [former Google ethicist Tristan] Harris says. ‘That’s why it is used as an alarm signal.’”).}

Many apps and games put on little productions for the purpose of building suspense before user events. When a Twitter user “pulls down” to see recent tweets, the top of the screen shows a short animation. Loot boxes in video games put on a more elaborate show. The box typically sits isolated in an austere, empty space and begins to quake. It then explodes open with a blinding flash accompanied by noises and music. Stars or confetti fly into the air, and finally the user’s new in-game items are revealed.\footnote{Bailey, supra note 221 (“When an elite soccer player is opened in the game FIFA 18, fireworks explode and confetti falls. Overwatch’s items soar into view to a triumphant tune.”).}

What these phenomena lack in an articulable message, they possess in terms of sheer aesthetic force.

Such arguments can easily be carried too far, though. It is significant that Justice Souter chose three artists to illustrate his point and that \textit{Hurley} itself arose in the context of a parade.\footnote{Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bise xual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559, 569 (1995).} Art and parades, however inscrutable their meaning, are almost purely expressive phenomena by definition. Even if the expression defies articulation, it is there. But that is not obviously the case for abstract design choices—say, stripes on wallpaper—that do not occur within the context of some kind of expressive \textit{work}. To extend \textit{Hurley}’s protection to images generally, sounds generally, or UX design generally, would disregard the possibility of nonrepresentational meaning—a critical distinguishing feature of art itself.

One reason to protect Pollock’s work despite its nonrepresentational nature would be to say that the choice not to represent any particular subject matter is \textit{itself} meaningful. In this respect, any public decision to withhold protections from work that “doesn’t depict anything” or “that my three-year-old could draw” would discriminate not only in terms of content, but along even more troubling lines of taste and culture.\footnote{Cf. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (upholding requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts “take[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” when awarding artistic merit grants).}
As for instrumental music, it may often carry clear national, ethnic, or cultural messaging that no liberal society has any business prohibiting. And where the message is harder to discern—say in the work of John Cage or the noise artist Merzbow, any attempt to suppress that kind of material would reflect a troubling authoritarian concern with suppressing cultural subversion.  

Red badges, infinite scrolls, and other nonrepresentational features of the consumer interface lie far outside these concerns, which makes it hard to say that elements of UI design should command any degree of First Amendment coverage on their own intrinsic merits. A more persuasive theory would hold that these aspects of design receive protection because of their attention-grabbing or attention-holding role—their monetizing role—in relation to products that are expressive for other reasons.

c. Addictive Design as an Auxiliary to Speech

The instinct that habit-forming design techniques intersect with First Amendment coverage is understandable. Yet it is hard to give any persuasive account for why most gamification tricks—badges, loot boxes, infinite scrolls, streaks, and so on—should count either as speech or as the sort of content that cannot be burdened without triggering strict scrutiny. There is no good reason to say that either software, the internet, social platforms, video games, or other “gamified” applications should be treated as pure speech. And even if some design techniques—the two-second pyrotechnics display that occurs when a loot box opens, for instance—might be viewed as speech standing alone, techniques such as YouTube’s autoplay function or Twitter’s pull-to-refresh design are hard to rationalize as First Amendment material. The best that can be said for them is that they sit adjacent to the real expression—the “literary and dramatic elements” in video games, the conversations about life, news and culture within social media, and so on.

This is not to say that adjacent is a bad place to be. First, the addictive UX in social media and video games helps to monetize the content. If engagement suffers on Facebook, Facebook’s ability to deliver core speech suffers as well. And the same is true for video games that are financed largely or entirely through advertising or microtransactions. Any restriction against the use of some addictive design technique—say, autoplay—would presumably burden speech financially. If that burden applies on a content-discriminatory basis—as if educational video platforms were permitted to use autoplay but others were not—then strict scrutiny should apply. But
as long as a law regulated autoplay across the board, without respect to the content of the video or the identity or message or viewpoint of the platform, then a law regulating autoplay should probably be considered akin to a time, place, and manner restriction calling for relatively deferential review.

Second, and more broadly, there might be prophylactic reasons not to allow regulation of design components that are bound up so closely with expressive subject matter. Loot boxes sit alongside fully protected literary and dramatic content that should not be disturbed. Autoplay is sewn into YouTube and Netflix, the new century’s answer to broadcast media.\footnote{355} Even if certain design elements are only doubtfully expressive, courts may choose to err on the side of caution in light of the design elements’ close association with material that is \textit{clearly} expressive. But practically speaking, the protective buffer can only extend so far if courts are to avoid the \textit{Lochner}-like absurdities that would follow from wholesale constitutional protection for tech.

\textbf{B. Degrees of Scrutiny}

So far, this Article has addressed only the basic question of whether the First Amendment is in play at all when the government regulates addictive design. But in those cases where the First Amendment does come into play, it will become necessary to determine how far the Constitution’s protections extend. Here lie the usual black-letter questions about the appropriate level of scrutiny, the adequacy of the means-end fit, and so on.

This Article discusses a couple of doctrinal details that can be made out today, but the likely state of the doctrine over the next decade or so is too fluid to speak with precision. The Supreme Court’s almost limitless view of the reach of “speech,” together with its determination to apply strict scrutiny to every form of content regulation, is plainly unsustainable within an economy and society that is increasingly built around information both as an economic resource and as an apparatus of industrial control.\footnote{356} To date, courts have not formulated a clear and workable theory to describe software’s...


\footnote{356} See Ashutosh Bhagwat, \textit{When Speech Is Not “Speech,”} 78 \textsc{Ohio St. L.J.} 839, 843–50 (2017) (describing a “coverage crisis” in which the Supreme Court increasingly views all forms of communication and information sharing as speech and applies strict scrutiny to content regulation of all kinds).
place in the universe of First Amendment speech, let alone worked out a doctrinal framework.

One point is relatively clear today, and that is that certain modest efforts to regulate habit-forming apps can probably slide in under rational basis review. This is for two reasons. First, the First Amendment’s protections for commercial speech do not extend to deceptive advertising. Second, the Court has allowed the government to require product labeling where doing so is reasonably related to the goal of preventing consumer deception. When the government requires advertising content to consist of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” the Court has held that those requirements are not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”

Above, this Article suggested that near-term regulatory efforts may include a crackdown on aggressive monetization in children’s products. Under their authority to police deceptive practices, the FTC or similar state-level agencies could push developers either to remove certain habit-forming features from children’s products or to attach warning labels for parents. At least some of these measures should be able to avoid heightened scrutiny altogether even assuming that the First Amendment covers the app in question.

Beyond this point, however, the degree of First Amendment protection, if any, is wide open. One aspect of this contingency has to do with the basic question discussed above: whether the design techniques under regulatory scrutiny constitute speech for First Amendment purposes and, if they do, on what basis? The answers in this area will inform the question not only of whether the regulation of addictive UX design brings the First Amendment into play at all, but also of whether that regulation should count as truly content discriminatory or not. If a loot box is considered “speech,” then a loot box ban is content discriminatory. If a loot box is not considered “speech,” on the other hand, then a ban on loot boxes may be considered a content-neutral burden on video games that profit from loot boxes.

And it may well turn out that the Court determines the level of scrutiny based on broader equities rather than the formal divide between content-based and content-neutral regulation. Most of the Supreme Court had an easy time applying the formal approach, and ultimately strict scrutiny, in a low-stakes case involving the ill counsels of violent video games. But in cases involving international terrorism or even “speech advocating drug use,” even

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357. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”).
358. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 628 (1985) (“[A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”).
359. Id. at 651.
360. See supra Part II.A.
361. See supra Part II.A.
today’s highly speech-protective Court has shown itself startlingly capable of inventing new and more deferential tests. If a strong consensus emerges that behavioral manipulation by big tech constitutes a serious threat to the public, then the Court’s First Amendment doctrine may adapt to that consensus in unpredictable ways.

The level of scrutiny will depend still more broadly on the long-term status of tech platforms and computing within the constitutional order. The issues here are important enough to public policy and challenging enough to existing doctrine that it would not be surprising to witness a period of deep doctrinal modification at the Supreme Court over the coming decades.

Today, tech platforms call on the First Amendment and its statutory adjunct, § 230 of the CDA, as a regulatory shelter. It seems clear that this shelter is beginning to weaken. In 2018, Congress qualified § 230 for the first time in the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act, a law that holds platforms liable for knowingly assisting, facilitating, or supporting sex trafficking. And on the First Amendment front, it becomes harder every year to maintain the posture that computing and the internet consist either entirely or even mostly of expressive activity. It will not be long before courts are forced to mark off certain nonexpressive uses of information as either unprotected or less protected.

It is even possible that some app developers and online platforms may face a total reversal of fortune with respect to free speech law and norms. If the legal and policy communities come to view the largest online platforms as de facto regulators of speech and society, then courts may constitutionalize their activities through some modification of the state action doctrine. Or, as this Article’s author has urged in a previous paper, courts may allow government extra room to ensure that these private regulators protect civil rights and liberties. The effect in either case would be to put big tech on the back foot and to give government a free hand.

CONCLUSION

This Article has focused mainly on developers’ efforts, through applied behavioral science, to maximize time on device by encouraging users to form habits. But note that habit-forming design represents only a crude application of a wider technology of behavioral manipulation that grows more sophisticated every year.

It is too indirect to say that Facebook and Google monetize their products by “placing ads.” It is better to say that these firms’ actual “product” consists

363. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 2 (2010) (holding that the law may prohibit giving “material support” for lawful activities of designated foreign terrorist organizations); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (holding that schools may prohibit speech, here “BONG HITS 4 JESUS,” that can be reasonably interpreted as advocating drug use).
364. See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text.
366. See id.
367. See generally Langvardt, supra note 280.
in the ability to raise the odds that a targeted consumer will perform a desired action following a behavioral cue. At some point, through pervasive surveillance and conditioning and visual stimuli embedded in users’ contact lenses, some tech developers may become so good at raising the odds of a purchase that probability approaches certainty and persuasion approaches control. As the always PR-challenged Boundless Mind (formerly Dopamine Labs) boasts in their own promotional materials, “we’ve built a Skinner box more powerful than anything B.F. [Skinner] himself could have imagined in his wildest dreams.”

Even now, after all of the criticism that has been leveled against big tech, the basic threat to freedom and dignity has received relatively little public attention. But the issue is simply too immense to ignore forever. There will eventually be calls to impose some restraints on overreaching platforms, and to extend some shelter to objectors who wish to disconnect from the behaviorist machine. Doing so will involve deep political, practical, and most likely constitutional difficulty. By taking habit-forming design seriously, as a legitimate subject matter for public concern and later for public regulation, we can begin to develop the social capacity to confront those challenges skillfully.

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370. Some notable books over the past year or so, however, have taken the free will problem on directly. See, e.g., BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY (2018); ZUBOFF, supra note 159.