Family Courts as Certifying Agencies: When Family Courts Can Certify U Visa Applications for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence

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NOTES

FAMILY COURTS AS CERTIFYING AGENCIES: WHEN FAMILY COURTS CAN CERTIFY U VISA APPLICATIONS FOR SURVIVORS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

Sylvia Lara Altreuter*

Undocumented intimate partner violence survivors living in the United States have limited options for immigration relief. One of the only avenues open to them is the U Visa: a nonimmigrant visa established by the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000. To apply for a U Visa, a survivor must prove to immigration authorities that she was the victim of a crime; suffered substantial abuse; and was, is, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation of her abuser. The statute requires that all U Visa applications be certified by an appropriate official who testifies to the applicant’s helpfulness with the investigation. This certification is a tremendous obstacle for survivors: agencies are under no legal obligation to provide these certifications, the procedure to obtain them is often complicated and time consuming, and the decision-making process is opaque. Moreover, many undocumented survivors fear involvement with the criminal courts or police out of fear of their abusers and deportation.

In response, survivor advocates approach certification creatively and seek certification from less obvious authorities. Undocumented survivors are more likely to be involved in family court proceedings—seeking orders of protection from, or adjudicating custody and visitation disputes with, their abusers—than criminal proceedings. Advocates have likewise turned to family courts to certify U Visa applications. Family courts are unclear on whether they are authorized to certify these applications and are often reluctant to make a final decision.

This Note proposes that family courts are empowered by statutory language and history to certify U Visa applications for undocumented survivors. After a textual and legal process analysis of the statutory provisions regarding U Visa certification, this Note proposes guidelines for

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practitioners seeking U Visa certification from a family court and for family court judges ruling on these applications.

INTRODUCTION

DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON THE BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN PROTECTION ACT, one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas, told the story of Leticia, one of her constituents. Leticia was an undocumented Filipino immigrant who sought protection from her abusive
husband by obtaining a civil order of protection. Leticia’s abuser violated the order of protection and came to her home, so she called the police. When the police arrived, instead of going after Leticia’s husband, they asked for her green card.

The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 (BIWPA) was enacted to protect women like Leticia. BIWPA contains a provision establishing a new nonimmigrant visa—the U Visa—which grants temporary immigration relief to certain noncitizen survivors of “intimate partner violence” (IPV) and victims of similar crimes. The BIWPA was incorporated in the first reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 1994”), a landmark law passed in 1994 to address numerous aspects of sexual and intimate partner violence.

U Visa applications must be certified by “a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating criminal activity.” This certification must attest that the IPV survivor “‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful’ in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.” This certification requirement presents a significant obstacle for survivors.

Regardless of their immigration status, IPV survivors are often reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement to put their abusers in prison, typically out of fear for their safety, love for their intimate partner, and practical concerns about money and housing. Historically, law enforcement has not treated intimate partner violence as a serious concern, which leads IPV survivors to be doubly reluctant to approach law enforcement.

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2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
7. See id. §§ 1001, 1501.
10. Id.
problem, undocumented immigrants are even less likely to get involved with law enforcement out of fear of deportation and cultural barriers to access, like language. In a survey of New York State IPV service providers in the first year of the Trump administration, 74 percent reported having immigrant clients afraid to go to court for fear of encountering immigration enforcement, and 48 percent reported having clients afraid of calling the police for the same reason.

Faced with these fears, advocates often encourage documented and undocumented survivors to seek relief in family court. Through family courts, IPV survivors can, among other things, seek civil orders of protection, secure custody of their children, and divorce their abusers. Family courts allow undocumented survivors to control their own proceedings without the involvement of police or a prosecutor. Reflecting these practices, immigrant advocates have started to turn to family courts to execute law enforcement certifications in support of U Visa applications. The U.S. government has granted U Visas on the basis of these certifications.

Some family courts, however, are reluctant to certify U Visa applications. This Note examines the BIWPA to determine whether family courts can continue, or in some cases begin, to certify U Visa applications. Clarifying the statutory authority for family courts will allow more
undocumented survivors to access the U Visa, escape their abusers, protect their families, and access necessary support services and government resources.

Part I of this Note provides background on the relevant social and legal issues at stake. Next, Part II interprets the U Visa statute through textual and legal process lenses to determine whether family courts can certify U Visa applications. Part III then surveys how family court certifications are currently treated in practice. Finally, Part IV proposes guidelines for when family courts can certify U Visa applications, and it is intended to act as a guide for practitioners advocating for undocumented clients.

I. THE REALITY OF BEING AN UNDOCUMENTED SURVIVOR OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

Intimate partner violence is a public health crisis in the United States.\(^22\) The latest CDC survey on IPV estimates that over one-third of women and almost one-sixth of men in the United States experience abuse from an intimate partner in their lifetimes.\(^23\) Seventy-two percent of all murder-suicides committed in the United States are perpetrated by an intimate partner.\(^24\) Vulnerable populations are especially affected: transgender and gender nonconforming people, people with disabilities, LGBTQ people, and the undocumented are particularly vulnerable to intimate partner violence.\(^25\)

This Part explores the intersections of immigration, IPV, and family courts. Part I.A provides an overview of intimate partner violence as it affects undocumented immigrants. Part I.B describes the importance of family courts for undocumented IPV survivors. Part I.C briefly explains the primary avenue of immigration relief available to undocumented IPV survivors: the U Visa.

A. Undocumented Immigrants and Intimate Partner Violence

In hearings on proposed immigration reform before the House of Representatives, a social worker from the Shelter for Abused Women in Collier County, Florida, shared a drawing and poem by one of her clients, Juana.\(^26\) When Juana was thirteen years old, she followed a family friend,
Juan, from Mexico to Florida, to help him care for his three young children.\textsuperscript{27} She came to the United States without documentation.\textsuperscript{28} However, shortly after Juana arrived in Florida, Juan began to sexually and physically abuse her.\textsuperscript{29} She had their first child at age fourteen.\textsuperscript{30} Constantly fearing deportation and continuing abuse, even as he threatened to kill her, Juana never dialed 911 to seek assistance.\textsuperscript{31} Translated, Juana’s poem read: “I feel that I am alone / in the world / in the town / in the country.”\textsuperscript{32}

Intimate partner violence, also known as relationship violence, domestic violence, or dating violence, “is a pattern of coercive behavior . . . exerted by one intimate partner over another with the goal of establishing and maintaining power and control.”\textsuperscript{33} Abusers assault their partners on every front, including physical, sexual, emotional, financial, medical, and technological.\textsuperscript{34} Survivors’ vulnerabilities are also targeted: for example, people with disabilities, who are more likely to have barriers to financial stability because of employment discrimination and physical isolation, are subjected to a significantly higher level of financial abuse.\textsuperscript{35} As a training manual for IPV counselors explains, “In IPV, perpetrators have on-going access to their victims, know their daily routines and vulnerabilities, and can continue after violent episodes to exercise considerable physical and emotional control over their daily lives.”\textsuperscript{36}

Noncitizens are particularly vulnerable to IPV. One survey estimates that nearly half of noncitizen women in the United States experience IPV,\textsuperscript{37} “Undocumented status gives abusers additional tools of power and control to keep victims isolated and intimidated”;\textsuperscript{38} abusers exploit the immigration status of their intimate partners by threatening to report their undocumented partners to immigration authorities,\textsuperscript{39} by isolating them from services that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Id. at 66–67.
\item \textsuperscript{28} See id. at 66–68.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Id. at 67.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Id. at 68.
\item \textsuperscript{33} SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77.
\item \textsuperscript{36} SAVI Manual, supra note 12, at 77.
\item \textsuperscript{37} See Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 446 (2005) [hereinafter VAWA 2005 Hearing].
\item \textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., Shannon Dooling, ‘I Was Afraid of Him and of Immigration’: Domestic Violence Survivors Take Chance Applying for Special Visa, WBUR (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/09/12/increase-u-visa-applications [https://perma.cc/PHG5-QV9D] (quoting an undocumented survivor as saying, “I was afraid of both of them—of him
would help them acclimate to the United States, and by controlling their immigration applications.40

Often far from their support systems and unable to speak English, undocumented survivors are cut off from social services and legal assistance.41 Undocumented survivors frequently fear seeking the assistance of the police or the courts because of the risk of deportation and misunderstandings about their rights.42 In hearings on the 2005 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 2005”), Legal Momentum, a nonprofit legal services provider, submitted a compendium of stories of noncitizen IPV survivors to Congress, which reflected this fear.43 These stories demonstrated that while many survivors were reluctant to involve police,44 many sought refuge in domestic-violence shelters or with other support services,45 and nearly all went to family court to seek orders of protection46 or to win custody or support for their children.47

B. Family Courts and Undocumented Intimate Partner Violence Survivors

Intimate partner violence is a crime.48 However, IPV survivors are often reluctant to involve criminal courts for several reasons. Survivors often fear the retribution of their abusers; and often they still love their abusers—frequently their spouse, coparent, and someone on whom they are financially reliant—and do not want them to be punished.49 Undocumented survivors are especially reluctant to approach criminal authorities because they fear deportation. Thus, advocates often suggest family law proceedings for undocumented survivors to seek relief from their abusers without risking deportation or criminal punishment.50


42. See LETI VOLPP, WORKING WITH BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN: A HANDBOOK TO MAKE SERVICES ACCESSIBLE 16–17, 28–29 (Leni Marin, ed., 1995).

43. See VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 391–416.

44. See id.

45. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 398 (Madeline); id. at 400 (Mona).

46. See, e.g., id. at 393 (Sara); id. at 393–94 (Yesenia); id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–98 (Ana).

47. See, e.g., id. at 394–95 (Maria); id. at 397–98 (Ana); id. at 400 (Mona).

48. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,174 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Senator Patty Murray) (“I am very proud to have worked to pass the Violence Against Women Act because, for the first time, our Nation recognized domestic violence for what it is—a violent crime and a public health threat.”).


50. See id. at 145; VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30–34.
Family law is almost entirely the province of state courts.\footnote{1} In medieval England, family law was the province of the church, and ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over “all manners of punishment and determination of pleas which touch matrimony or testament . . . and also of all those other things which touch the correction of the soul.”\footnote{2} This meant that all suits concerning marriage, divorce, legitimacy of children, establishment of paternity, and domestic support were all brought in ecclesiastical courts.\footnote{3} Today, these cases are filed in a state civil court, depending on the structure of the state court system.

Most family law cases are heard in state courts of general jurisdiction.\footnote{4} Some jurisdictions assign all family law cases to special divisions within those courts.\footnote{5} In other states, family law cases are heard within a separate, general court of equity.\footnote{6} Beginning in the twentieth century, states began to create specialized family courts to hear every kind of family case.\footnote{7} This Note will use the term “family court” to describe any of these situations: a judge in a court of general jurisdiction or chancery adjudicating a family law proceeding, a family division judge, or the judge of a family court.

Intimate partner violence figures prominently in many family law proceedings. Undocumented IPV survivors can divorce their abusers in family court,\footnote{8} which allows them to sever legal and financial ties with their...
abusive partners. Survivors can also petition for child custody and visitation in family court to protect their children from their abusers. And family courts are a place where survivors can petition for civil orders of protection. Orders of protection come in several forms: they can require the respondent to stop abusing the petitioner; to stay away from the petitioner and suspend all contact, including indirect contact; or even to leave the family home—all under threat of criminal penalties.

C. Immigration Relief for Intimate Partner Violence Survivors

Family courts are available to litigants irrespective of immigration status. However, immigration relief for the undocumented already residing in the United States is limited. There are two types of visas available to noncitizens: immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visas. Immigrant visas are generally available only to noncitizens who are sponsored by an employer or a family member who is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, or through programs like the visa lottery. Nonimmigrant visas are generally available to travelers, students, reporters, and certain types of professionals like investors, athletes, clergy, and nurses, as well as other workers.

To be granted either type of visa, a noncitizen must be “admissible” to the United States. To be admissible, one must meet a series of stringent requirements. Noncitizens must be healthy; have, at most, minimal criminal records; and be able to support themselves financially in the United States. One of the most significant barriers to admission for

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59. See Sanctuary for Families, 2017 Autumn Uncontested Divorce Project Orientation 26 (2017) (on file with author) ("[D]ivorce allows [survivors] to reclaim their previous identity which was systematically repressed by their abuser and empowers them by allowing them to break free from the abuser.").

60. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 33–34.

61. See id. at 30–32.


63. See VOLPP, supra note 42, at 30.


66. Id.

67. Id.; see id. § 502.6. There are pending executive proposals to eliminate this program.

68. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 65, § 402.1.


70. See id. § 1182(a)(1).

71. See id. § 1182(a)(2)–(3), (6), (10).

72. See id. § 1182(a)(4).
noncitizens is that unlawful presence can bar immigration relief for years, which means that anyone who comes to the United States without documentation or who overstays a student or tourist visa is de facto ineligible for a visa.

The U Visa was novel because the statute allows certain grounds of inadmissibility to be waived, which means that IPV survivors who are otherwise ineligible for visas because they have a criminal record or because they came to or stayed in the United States without documentation can still be granted a U Visa. Thus, for many undocumented IPV survivors, the U Visa is their only option for legal status.

The BIWPA established U Visa criteria by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the primary statutory source of immigration law in the United States. To qualify, an applicant must have been the victim of certain crimes, like domestic abuse and involuntary servitude; been substantially harmed; and aided a “law enforcement official,” prosecutor, judge, immigration authority, or another “local authority” investigating or prosecuting criminal activity. A U Visa holder is authorized to work in the United States for four years and has the opportunity to become a permanent resident after three years.

U Visas are administered by the United States Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS). USCIS is a division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tasked with processing citizenship applications, managing naturalization procedures, issuing immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, and handling various U.S. humanitarian programs. USCIS’s humanitarian programs grant specific immigration relief to specific classes of noncitizens, like asylum to refugees or expedited processing of applications for foreign nationals stranded in the United States because of a natural disaster. The

73. See id. § 1182(a)(9) (establishing the three- and ten-year bars for “unlawful presence”).
76. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.02(3)(c) (2017).
78. See id. § 1184(o).
79. See id. § 1255(l).
80. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1).
81. See id. § 1.02(2).
U Visa is one of these programs. The law authorizes USCIS to grant ten thousand U Visas annually.

USCIS has issued formal and informal guidance with respect to the U Visa process. A federal regulation (the “U Visa Regulation”) establishes the required elements of a U Visa application: a Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status (form I-918), a U Nonimmigrant Status Certification (form I-918, Supplement B), a personal statement, and biometric information. Supplement B is the form of the required law enforcement certification indicating to USCIS that the applicant “has been, is being, or is likely to be helpful to an investigation or prosecution of . . . qualifying criminal activity.” USCIS has also issued an informal resource guide (“Resource Guide”), which is intended to explain the U Visa certification requirement to law enforcement agencies. The Resource Guide explains that while certifying an application does not automatically guarantee the applicant a U Visa, it is required for a U Visa petition to be considered.

This certification is one of the most difficult elements for survivors to obtain. Many agencies have instituted complicated, opaque procedures, have long processing times, and some refuse to certify without explanation. In response, nonprofit organizations have long advocated for a broad and creative approach to the pursuit of U Visa applications.
After submission, USCIS officials engage in an intense review process to determine whether to issue a U Visa. The decision is reviewable de novo by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). AAO decisions are final.

II. INTERPRETING THE U VISA STATUTES

USCIS is authorized to grant U Visas where (1) the survivor “has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of criminal activity”; (2) the survivor “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, to a Federal, State, or local prosecutor, to a Federal or State judge, to [DHS], or to other Federal, State, or local authorities investigating or prosecuting criminal activity”; and (3) “the criminal activity . . . violated the laws of the United States or occurred in the United States.” To enable this fact-finding process, a U Visa petition must include, as set forth in the BIWPA:

[A] certification from a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating

19; see also N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, IMMIGRATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A SHORT GUIDE FOR NEW YORK STATE JUDGES 3 (2009), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/pdfs/ImmigrationandDomesticViolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L3Y-96Q4] (“Cooperating in an abuse and neglect proceeding or giving evidence in a family offense case in Family Court, for example, may qualify as assisting with the investigation of a crime.”). Organizations also have a long-standing practice of sharing information about the certification requirements promulgated by different agencies. See, e.g., ICWC U Visa Zoho Database, IMMIGR. CTR. FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN, http://icwclaw.org/services-available/icwc-u-travel-and-certifier-database/ [https://perma.cc/DHF9-KBQT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (providing a regularly updated, members-only database that currently lists 983 agencies that have certified U Visa applications, ranging from police departments, district attorneys’ offices, state departments of labor, and local child protective services agencies).

96. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5. For example, USCIS fingerprints and conducts background checks on all applicants. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(3) (2018). USCIS may also contact the Supplement B signatory for additional information. DHS RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 90, at 5.

97. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 76, § 28.02(1).

tice_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUT5-2CAH];


100. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I) (2012). Qualifying criminal activity is defined as: [I]nvolving one or more of the following or any similar activity in violation of Federal, State, or local criminal law: rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female genital mutilation; being held hostage;peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned crimes.

Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii).

101. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(IV).
criminal activity . . . . This certification shall state that the alien “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.102

This Part demonstrates that this provision (the “Certification Statute”) authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications. This Part interprets the Certification Statute using relevant tools of statutory interpretation and construction.

The tools of statutory interpretation are plentiful and heavily debated.103 This Part analyzes the Certification Statute using two general categories of interpretative tools: textual and legal process.104 Part II.A will engage in a textual analysis of the Certification Statute, and Part II.B engages in a legal process analysis, examining the BIWPA’s legislative and statutory history.

A. A Textual Analysis of the BIWPA

Courts and scholars generally agree that any analysis of the law should begin with the text.105 However, the appropriate approach to the text is less certain, with different judges advocating for different methods.106 This Note utilizes several of these methods to determine that family courts are authorized by the Certification Statute to certify U Visa applications.

The Certification Statute allows for “a certification from a . . . State . . . judge . . . that the alien ‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful’ in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.”107 There are two questions raised by this text: (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must be investigating criminal activity in order to certify.

1. Family Court Judges as State Judges

This first question, whether “State . . . judge” includes state family court judges, can be formulated another way: Does the text surrounding “State . . . judge” narrow the meaning of the term and, thus, exclude family court judges? The key to understanding text is understanding the ordinary meaning of its words: how a reasonable person would read the word in its everyday context.108 Justice Antonin Scalia described this as “whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you

102. Id. § 1184(p)(1).
105. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 26 (2016) (“Like Justice Scalia, we are all textualists: The starting point and usually the answer to a statutory problem is a fair reading of the statutory text on point.”).
106. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 645–90.
funny.”109 If family law is always the jurisdiction of the states,110 it follows that family court judges are always state judges. In its everyday context, a family court judge is a state judge, and this designation would draw no strange looks over a martini.111

However, plain meaning is not always dispositive. For example, in *Yates v. United States*,112 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a fish was a tangible object and decided, all plain meaning and dictionary definitions aside, that a fish was not a tangible object within the meaning of the statute in question.113 Instead, the Court concluded, “Tangible object . . . is better read to cover only objects one can use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the physical world.”114 In *Yates*, the Court applied *noscitur a sociis*115 to narrow the meaning of “tangible object” in the context of the surrounding terms, which all related to documents and records.116

In the Certification Statute, “judge” is surrounded by “law enforcement official,” “prosecutor,” and “other . . . authority investigating criminal activity.”117 Here, *noscitur a sociis* could be applied to narrow “judge” to include only a criminal judge as the surrounding language implies a criminal nature. However, *noscitur a sociis* “is not dispositive if other statutory context suggests a broader reading.”118

Courts utilize other textual aids to determine textual meaning. In *Yates*, Justice Ginsburg discussed another supportive, but not dispositive, textual aid: titles.119 The title of a statute or section can provide context to help resolve ambiguity in statutory interpretation.120 In *Yates*, the statute in question included statute and section titles that supported a narrow construction of “tangible object.”121 Here, the statute and section titles surrounding the Certification Statute are almost uniformly survivor focused: “Establishment of Humanitarian/Material Witness Non-Immigrant Classification,”122 “Protection for Certain Crime Victims Including Victims of Crimes Against Women,”123 “Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act

110. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
111. Cf. *Kram er vs. Kr a mer* (Columbia Pictures 1979) (“Well the problem is that your mommy and I both want you to live with us, see, so that’s why we decided to go see this man, who I told you is the judge, and we let him decide because he’s very wise and experienced about these things.”); *What Maisie Knew* (Red Crown Productions 2012) (“Your mother would have a fit, but I don’t think I’d have a problem squaring it with the judge.”).
113. See id. at 1081–89.
114. Id. at 1081.
115. See id. at 1085 (“[T]he principle . . . [that] a word is known by the company it keeps.”).
116. Id. at 1085–86.
118. Eskridge Jr., supra note 105, at 408.
120. See Eskridge Jr., supra note 105, at 412; Eskridge Jr. et al., supra note 104, at 675–76; Scalia & Garner, supra note 108, at 221–24.
121. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–84.
123. Id. § 1513, 114 Stat. at 1533.
of 2000,”124 “Violence Against Women Act of 2000,”125 and the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.”126 This suggests that a statutory reading should also be survivor focused and that the appropriate reading of the Certification Statute should be broad, to protect as many survivors as possible. To limit “judges” strictly to criminal judges would exclude all IPV survivors where prosecutors have declined to prosecute and law enforcement officials have declined to investigate.127 It would also deny relief to IPV survivors who do not choose to seek criminal assistance, either out of fear of their abuser or deportation.

Purpose clauses can also aid textual construction.128 The purpose clause of the U Visa provision of the BIWPA states that the law is designed to “offer[] protection to victims . . . in keeping with the humanitarian interests of the United States.”129 The purpose clause further explains, without qualification, that “[p]roviding temporary legal status to aliens who have been severely victimized by criminal activity also comports with the humanitarian interests of the United States.”130 But this clause also expounds another purpose: “strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence”131 with the goal of “facilitat[ing] the reporting of crimes to law enforcement officials by . . . abused aliens who are not in lawful immigration status.”132 The purpose clause of the entire BIWPA reflects this dual purpose, as well.133 The first stated purpose of the BIWPA is to “remove barriers to criminal prosecutions of” abusers,134 while the second stated purpose is “to offer protection” to survivors.135

The BIWPA states the congressional findings upon which it is premised in its introductory clause: “[P]roviding battered immigrant women and children who were experiencing domestic violence at home with protection against deportation allows them to obtain protection orders against their abusers and frees them to cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors in criminal cases.”136 These introductory clauses indicate that a balance must be struck between the government’s interests in protecting survivors and prosecuting abusers. This suggests that “State . . . judge” could mean both the criminal

124. Id. § 1501, 114 Stat. at 1518.
125. Id. § 1001, 114 Stat. at 1491.
126. Id. § 1, 114 Stat. at 1464.
127. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
128. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 412 (“Statutory provisions setting forth Congress’s purposes should be given great weight in understanding the legislative purpose(s).”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 108, at 217–20 (“A . . . purpose clause . . . is a permissible indicator of meaning.”).
130. See id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534.
131. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 1533–34.
132. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 1534.
133. See id. § 1502(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1518.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 1502(b)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518.
136. Id. § 1502(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1518 (emphasis added).
judge that oversees prosecution of an abuser and the family court judge that
oversees the civil proceeding allowing an IPV survivor to protect herself.

Judge Frank Easterbrook explains that regulations can also be a useful
textual aid to statutory interpretation: “Let us not pretend that texts answer
every question . . . . [T]he interpreter should go to some other source of rules,
including administrative agencies . . . .”137 This echoes the suggestion by
Professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks that agencies have useful
technical expertise and more time to sensibly interpret statutory language.138

The U Visa Regulation enumerates a list of certifying agencies, including
“agencies that have criminal investigative jurisdiction in their respective
areas of expertise, including, but not limited to, child protective services, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Department of
Labor.”139 The Resource Guide defines certifying agencies as “Federal,
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial government agencies that have criminal,
civil, or administrative investigative or prosecutorial authority.”140 This
shows that USCIS understands the language in the Certification Statute to
include civil agencies like the EEOC—one that is, by design, essentially
powerless.141 It must, therefore, understand the language to include a state
judge with the power to make substantive rules of law.

Ultimately, the text of the Certification Statute, interpreted with the
assistance of textual aids like dictionaries, language canons, and agency
interpretation, authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications.

2. Family Court Judges as Investigators of Criminal Activity

Another key issue in interpreting the Certification Statute is whether, to
make the certification, the certifying agency must be the entity investigating
or prosecuting criminal activity. The Certification Statute requires that the
law enforcement certification state that the U Visa petitioner “has been
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” in the investigation of
criminal activity.142

The statute presents two different answers. First, a linguistic canon, the
last antecedent rule, suggests that the signatory of the certification is not
required to be the authority investigating criminal activity. The last
antecedent rule dictates that “qualifying words or phrases refer only to the
last antecedent, unless contrary to the apparent legislative intent derived from
the sense of the entire enactment.”143 The Certification Statute defines those

137. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
in the Making and Application of Law 1290 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
141. See Chuck Henson, In Defense of McDonnell Douglas: The Domination of Title VII
143. Eskridge Jr. et al., supra note 104, at 670–71; see, e.g., Lockhart v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016) (holding that, in a statute listing “aggravated sexual abuse,
who can make a certification as follows: “[A] Federal, State, or local law
enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local
authority investigating criminal activity.” 144 Here, the qualifying words are
“investigating criminal activity,” and the last antecedent is “other Federal,
State, or local authority.” Applying the last antecedent rule, “investigating
criminal activity” relates only to the last antecedent, not to the preceding
certifying officials. This means that the signatory does not need to be
investigating criminal activity unless “structural or contextual evidence . . .
‘rebuts[s] the last antecedent inference.’” 145

Second, and conversely, using agency guidance as a textual aid, as Judge
Easterbrook proposed, 146 the U Visa Regulation rebuts the last antecedent
inference. The U Visa Regulation states that a certifying judge must have
“responsibility for the investigation . . . of a qualifying crime or criminal
activity.” 147 Thus, if any judge issuing a U Visa certification is required to
conduct an “investigation” of criminal activity, what constitutes an
“investigation” must be understood. This Part asks whether a family court
does investigate criminal activity by exploring what constitutes an
investigation.

An ordinary understanding of investigation is not restricted to the work of
a criminal court—the word has wide and general applications beyond
criminal law. Documentary filmmakers investigate their subjects, 148
scientists investigate the natural world, 149 artists undertake artistic
investigation, 150 and there are investigative journalists. 151


144. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1).
145. See Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 965 (quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543
U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005)).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2018). The insertion of the comma after “other authority”
indicates USCIS’s intention to rebut the last antecedent rule. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra
note 104, at 671.
148. See, e.g., Jordan Raup, Errol Morris on Investigation, The B-Side, and
Unpredictability, FILM SOC’Y LINCOLN CTR. (July 10, 2017), https://www.filmlinc.org/daily/
errol-morris-on-investigation-the-b-side-and-unpredictability [https://perma.cc/3E2E-8JZY]
(quoting the documentary filmmaker Errol Morris as saying, “I think I’m an investigator at
heart”).
149. E.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 505 (16th ed. 1992) (quoting biologist
Thomas Henry Huxley as saying, “The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the
expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind”).
150. E.g., Holland Cotter, Ellsworth Kelly, Who Shaped Geometries on a Bold Scale, Dies
at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/arts/ellsworth-kelly-
YUK5-6WEG] (quoting the late abstract artist Ellsworth Kelly as saying, “To me the
investigation of perception was of the greatest interest”).
151. E.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Brothers 1976) (“Well, if you’re conducting
that kind of investigation, certainly it comes as no surprise to you to know that Howard was
with the CIA.”).
investigators, and private investigators. The Google search method, utilized by Judge Richard Posner in United States v. Costello, which is meant to offer contextual clues to understanding terms, reveals more examples of criminal investigation than not ("bureau of investigation," "crime investigation," "criminal investigation," "fbi investigation," "crime scene investigation"), but the results are also driven by recent, high-profile criminal investigations.

Other textual aids echo this broad reading. The Supreme Court uses two other methods to understand ordinary meaning: looking to usages of words by the press and in popular culture. A search of "investigation" in the New York Times database from the year of the BIWPA’s enactment echoes a

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152. Cf. DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944) ("A claims man is a doctor and a bloodhound and a cop and a judge and a jury and a father confessor all in one.").
154. 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
155. See id. at 1044–45 (googling phrases like “harboring fugitives” and “harboring guests” to interpret “to harbor”).
159. Compare Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129 (citing Robinson Crusoe and Moby Dick), with id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing The Magnificent Seven and M*A*S*H).
primarily, but not exclusively, criminal connotation. Examples from popular culture can be found in criminal and noncriminal contexts.

Dictionaries support this inclusive reading. General dictionaries uniformly define investigation as a detailed and systematic inquiry. Legal dictionaries speak more particularly about official and procedural elements, sometimes criminal and sometimes administrative.

These dictionary definitions are reflected in agency regulations. The U Visa Regulation writes a new word into the Certification Statute: “detection.” As a textual aid to investigation, this addition shows that...
USCIS understands “investigation” to require something more than simply identifying criminal activity—something like a systematic inquiry. Guided by these insights, a family court certainly investigates during adjudication. For example, a family court engages in a systematic inquiry of finances in domestic support cases\(^{169}\) and of parental fitness in custody and visitation cases.\(^{170}\) And a family court investigates criminal activity in some specific proceedings, like petitions for orders of protection and violations of granted orders of protection, divorce applications, and, often, custody and visitation cases.\(^{171}\) By a textual analysis alone, a family court does investigate criminal activity\(^{172}\) and is authorized to certify U Visa applications by its litigants.

This Part discussed two questions: (1) whether “State . . . judge” includes state family court judges and, if so, (2) whether the family court judge must be investigating criminal activity in order to certify. To answer the first question, this Part applied noscitur a sociis and examined relevant section and statutory titles, purpose clauses, and agency guidance to determine that state judge does include state family court judges.\(^{173}\) To answer the second question, this Part applied the last antecedent rule and agency guidance as a textual aid to find ambiguity in the text. According to the last antecedent rule, a family court judge does not need to be investigating criminal activity in order to certify a U Visa application, while agency guidance suggests the opposite interpretation.\(^{174}\) Further textual analysis indicates that the Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications in either case. Ordinary meaning, dictionaries, press usage, and the Google-search method define “investigation” broadly as a systematic inquiry,\(^{175}\) which a family court clearly engages in.\(^{176}\) Taken together, a textual analysis indicates that the Certification Statute authorizes family courts to certify U Visa applications.

\(^{169}\) E.g., McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (remanding a child-support case to the trial court for “further investigation” into a parent’s finances).


\(^{171}\) See, e.g., W. VA. RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE FOR FAM. CT. 48a(b) (prescribing that “the circuit court may utilize the investigative and mandamus process” in child abuse and neglect proceedings).

\(^{172}\) But see Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (ruling that, for the purposes of one of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[a] judge in a civil trial is not an investigator, rather a judge”). The Nipper holding, however, is not based on textual arguments. See id.

\(^{173}\) See supra Part II.A.1.

\(^{174}\) See supra Part II.A.2.

\(^{175}\) See supra Part II.A.2.i.

\(^{176}\) See supra Part II.A.2.i.
B. A Legal Process Analysis of the BIWPA

This Part engages with two key methods of legal process theory to address the question of whether family courts are authorized under the Certification Statute to certify U Visa applications. “The legal process methodology was the dominant mode for thinking about statutes for a generation and, in fact, remains highly relevant to issues of statutory interpretation.”177 Two leading legal process scholars, Professors Hart and Sacks, hypothesized that “[t]he meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose” and wrote that “[t]he first task in the interpretation of any statute . . . is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it.”178 And as a way of discerning this purpose, courts looked to a statute’s legislative history.179 New textualists have heavily criticized this method as imprecise, “unnecessary[,] or even inadmissible.”180 But even new textualists have found it necessary to apply this kind of analysis in certain areas.181

Proponents of the legal process school of statutory interpretation maintain that it is the duty of courts, as faithful agents of the legislature,182 to follow legislative history because, while imperfect, it is the clearest indication of the will of Congress.183 Courts are especially inclined to apply a legal process analysis to the Immigration and Nationality Act.184

177. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 506.
178. See HART & SACKS, supra note 138, at 1124–25 (emphasis omitted).
179. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 198–99.
180. Id. at 201; see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 62 (“Am I not a notorious opponent of legislative history? That is indeed my position, and it grows out of a belief that becoming accustomed to mining the debates for clues creates some profound and unwelcome changes in how judges see laws.”).
182. See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. REV. 595, 604 (1997) (“[I]n matters of statutory interpretation, the judiciary must bend to the legislative command. That is the oath and obligation of every judge.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 343 (1986) (“[O]fficial statements of purpose, . . . established by the practice of legislative history, should be treated as themselves acts of the state personified.”); ESKRIDGE JR., supra note, 105 at 209 (“Reliable legislative materials ought to be a rich source of guidance when interpreters figure out the ordinary meaning of statutory language, read in light of the statutory purpose, both understood through the eyes of the legislators responsible for the statute.”); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77 (1994) (“Legislative history . . . can supply information about how the statute is expected to operate, what subjects it addresses, what problems it seeks to solve, what objectives it tries to accomplish, and what means it employs to reach those objectives . . . .”).
184. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit considered the applications by three paroled noncitizens for permanent residency status. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973). In evaluating whether the three applicants had met the statutory requirement of being “physically present” in the United States for seven years, the court rejected the literal meaning of “physically present” because “we are in the never-never land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, where plain words do not always mean what they say.” See id.; cf. MARY MARTIN & KATHY NOLAN, Never Never Land, on PETER PAN ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST (RCA Victor 1954) (“I have a place where dreams are born and time is never planned, it’s not on any chart, you must find it with your heart: never never land.”). The Ninth Circuit instead looked to other factors, including legislative history. See Yuen Sang Low, 479 F.2d at 822–23.
This Part takes two legal process approaches to analyzing the BIWPA. Part II.B.1 examines the legislative history of the statute using a variety of legislative materials. Part II.B.2 seeks to understand the general purpose of the statute using statutory history.

1. Legislative History of the BIWPA

The Supreme Court has considered a wide variety of legislative materials—ranging from an unsigned, handwritten “slip of paper” 185 to district court case citations in a committee report 186—as representative of a statute’s legislative history. However, scholars describe a hierarchy of materials. Conference reports and committee reports are given the most weight, followed by the statements of supporters, congressional silence, and subsequent statutory history. 187 Executive statements, like presidential signing or veto statements, are given the least weight. 188 This Part provides a brief overview of the legislative history of the BIWPA and then examines each of these materials in depth.

The initial version of the BIWPA, the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999 (“BIWPA 1999”), contained the first iteration of the U Visa.189 BIWPA 1999 proposed to grant two thousand U Visas annually to noncitizens who had suffered significant abuse, possessed “material information concerning criminal or other unlawful activity,” and were willing to share, or have shared, that information with a law enforcement or administrative agency.190

There was a hearing on BIWPA 1999 in July 2000.191 A few months later, bill sponsors Representatives Sheila Jackson Lee and Jan Schakowsky successfully moved to include BIWPA 1999 in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA),192 a bill aimed at combating human trafficking, especially sex trafficking.193 In conference, a bipartisan group of senators incorporated the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act into VTVPA, as well.194 The conference report on VTVPA

185. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 588 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the importance of such a document, thought to be drafted by Senator Ellsworth during the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in the Court’s decision in Erie).
186. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.”).
188. See Eskridge Jr., supra note 105, at 254–56.
189. See H.R. 3083, 106th Cong. § 13(b) (1999).
190. Id. § 13(b)–(c).
191. See generally BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1.
included the reauthorization of VAWA ("VAWA 2000"), which included the BiWPA. This report contained a revised version of the U Visa.

BiWPA 1999 proposed only an optional law enforcement certification. And BiWPA 1999 expressly proposed that this optional certification could be made by a civil court or agency. However, the revised U Visa provisions in VTVPA mandate, not suggest, a law enforcement certification, and its text does not expressly include civil court action or investigation. VTVPA, which included this version of the U Visa, was enacted in October 2000.

a. Conference and Committee Reports

The BiWPA conference report supports broad U Visa certification. In analyzing legislative history, conference and committee reports are given special weight. The discussion of the U Visa in these reports is minimal, but the conference report of VTVPA explains that the BiWPA "makes some targeted improvements that our experience with the original [VAWA] has shown to be necessary," such as "strengthening and refining the protections for battered immigrant women." In its section-by-section analysis, the report described the U Visa as being "for victims of certain serious crimes that tend to target vulnerable foreign individuals without immigration status." It also described the certification requirement: "a judge certifies that the victim has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in investigating or prosecuting the crime."
It is important that the U Visa is described only in terms of helping survivors and that the certification requirement is not described as a tool to reduce immigration fraud.\textsuperscript{204} This indicates that the congressional purpose was to help as many survivors as possible. And this purpose would be best served by allowing as many agencies as possible to certify U Visa applications, including family courts.

\textit{b. Supporters’ Statements}

The statements of a bill’s supporters, especially its sponsors, are given some weight in a legal process analysis of specific legislative intent.\textsuperscript{205} The statements of supporters about the U Visa in the House and Senate during the legislative process were rich and evocative but not necessarily indicative of the intent of Congress as a whole.\textsuperscript{206}

The U Visa had a winding road to enactment. Initially included in the BIWPA proposed in 1999, the provisions were altered and included in VAWA 2000 which was, in conference, incorporated into VTVPA.\textsuperscript{207} Supporters and sponsors spoke at length throughout this process, and their statements illuminate the original intent of the U Visa and the meaning of the legislative changes.

The BIWPA was initially proposed in the House of Representatives by Representative Schakowsky.\textsuperscript{208} Schakowsky proposed the bill in October 1999, during Domestic Violence Awareness Month.\textsuperscript{209} She spoke sympathetically about the wide-ranging effects of intimate partner violence, especially on undocumented immigrants.\textsuperscript{210} She explained that the BIWPA “would expand legal protections for battered immigrant women so that they may flee violent homes, obtain court protections, and cooperate in the criminal prosecution of their abusers without fear of deportation.”\textsuperscript{211}

At the July hearing, another bill sponsor, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Tex.), told stories of undocumented IPV survivors failed by existing immigration legislation.\textsuperscript{212} In her prepared statement, she explained that “immigrant women are caught in an intersection of immigration, family and welfare laws that do[] not positively reflect on their needs and life

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{204} See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{205} ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 105, at 245–48. These statements have fallen out of favor in recent Supreme Court terms. \textit{Id.} at 247.
\item \textsuperscript{206} DWORKIN, supra note 183, at 343 (“It would be absurd, of course, to count every statement any legislator makes about the purpose of a statute as itself the act of the state.”); \textit{see}, \textit{e.g.}, Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 956 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he remarks of but one senator made subsequent to the passage of the bill . . . do not provide a reliable indication of the understanding of the Senate as a whole.”).
\item \textsuperscript{207} See generally infra notes 208–23 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{208} 145 CONG. REC. 26,577–78 (1999); \textit{About Jan, CONGRESSWOMAN JAN SCHAKOWSKY, https://schakowsky.house.gov/about-jan/} [https://perma.cc/6FTF-NZCT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
\item \textsuperscript{209} See 145 CONG. REC. 26,577 (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{210} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{212} See BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 27–30; \textit{see, e.g.}, supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
experiences, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation with few options to redress their situations.”

Likely in an effort to win over her more conservative colleagues, Representative Schakowsky testified at the hearing: “Let me begin by emphasizing what my bill will NOT do: It will NOT open the floodgates to undocumented or unwanted immigrants.”

The bill’s U Visa provisions were watered down in conference. However, its Senate supporters echoed this same intent. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), who championed the immigration measures in the Senate, took a similarly balanced tone. Senator Kennedy described the need for undocumented IPV survivors “to seek protective orders and cooperate with law enforcement officials to prosecute crimes of domestic violence.”

Still, he described the bill’s purpose as being to “make it easier for these immigrants and their children to escape abusive relationships and obtain the help they deserve.” Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), another sponsor, explained, “We also, for the first time, look at battered immigrants. . . . They need to understand their rights, that their bodies don’t belong to anyone else, and they have a right to cry out if they are abused.”

However, other supporters spoke about how the bill would help to facilitate much-needed prosecution of abusers. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) spoke about his time as a prosecutor and explained, “One of the things I learned in my years as a prosecutor is that too often nobody wanted to pursue [IPV] cases. . . . This act, itself, will help focus the attention of law enforcement on this.”

And Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) spoke to the importance of the multiple facets of the bill: “The [domestic violence] hotline is important; the training for police is important; the support for law enforcement is important; the support for battered women shelters is so important. . . . All of this matters.”

The original House sponsors were more measured in their praise of the final bill. Representative Jackson Lee explained that the bill’s intent—to protect the uniquely vulnerable undocumented IPV survivors—was unchanged, but she lamented what was lost. In particular, she lamented the exclusion of BIWPA 1999’s proposal to expand existing law to allow

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213. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 30.
214. Id. at 33.
215. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
216. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,169 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (“I am sitting next to Senator Kennedy who has done so much with the immigration work.”).
217. Id. at S10,170.
218. Id.
219. Id. at S10,173.
220. Id. at S10,176–77.
221. Id. at S10,180.
222. Compare 146 CONG. REC. H9034 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (“The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999, would provide much needed access to battered immigrant victims of domestic violence.”), with id. at H9041 (“I am very disappointed that some missing provisions that were in [the BIWPA] are not in the Conference Report.”).
undocumented immigrants to access public assistance.223 While neither she nor Representative Schakowsky spoke directly about the U Visa provisions, Representative Jackson Lee’s lukewarm statements indicate that something was lost from the original bill.224

Ultimately, these statements indicate that the certification requirement should not be interpreted without caution. The initially optional, very broad certification requirement was transformed into a mandatory, narrower requirement, which disappointed the BIWPA’s sponsors.225 However, the bill’s liberal supporters in the Senate were laudatory and enthusiastic, indicating that the U Visa was still intended to aid survivors. In Part IV, this Note proposes guidelines in keeping with this balance.

c. Debate

This balance is echoed in the congressional debates between supporters and detractors. Congressional debates between supporters and detractors carry limited weight in analysis, partly because legislators interject hyperbolic statements to persuade their colleagues.226 Nevertheless, these debates can help illuminate the issues.227 Here, the discussions at the July hearing are instructive as they show the two battling impulses of the House: to protect undocumented IPV survivors on the one hand, and to encourage cooperation with law enforcement on the other.

In his opening statement at the hearing, Representative Lamar S. Smith (R-Tex.), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, iterated his concerns about the bill.228 He criticized the initial U Visa provisions and pointed out that “many of the benefits created in this bill do not require battered aliens to cooperate with law enforcement officers to enable them to investigate or prosecute the aliens’ abusers.”229 He later posed a question to Leslye Orloff, director of the Immigrant Women Program at the NOW Legal Defense Fund,230 who testified earlier in the hearing: “Do you not think the bill could be improved if we required cooperation with law enforcement officials to go after the abusers?”231 Ms. Orloff advised against such a requirement,232 but Representative Smith was unconvinced and stated, “I have a major disagreement with the bill if it is not going to require

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223. See id. at H9041 (“I . . . deeply regret that there are no provisions in the report that provide access to food stamps to battered aliens; and access to housing, and access to benefits that would enable the alien to avoid battery or extreme cruelty in the future.”).
225. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
226. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 187, at 36–37. Professors Mikva and Lane also distinguish between different types of debate and give hearing and committee debate more weight than “hot” floor debate. See id.
227. See id.
228. BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 24.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Id. at 57.
231. Id. at 73.
232. See id. at 73–74 (“I don’t think it would be wise to have any piece of legislation that requires such cooperation, and, in fact, original VAWA did not for that reason.”).
cooperation with law enforcement officials to try to stop the abuse from occurring.”

This colloquy indicates why the U Visa provisions changed from the suggestion in BIWPA 1999 to the requirement in VTVPA—concern that the original U Visa would not do enough to protect the public safety. This concern is addressed by allowing U Visa applicants to seek certification from an agency that has played some role in helping to “stop the abuse from occurring.” Family courts help to do this in a variety of proceedings.

d. Executive Statements

Executive statements, usually presidential signing statements or veto statements, are given limited weight in statutory interpretation. President Clinton made three statements on VTVPA: one on the passage of the bill in the House, one on the passage of the bill in Congress, and a signing statement. All three statements are laudatory, but the only one to address the immigration provisions is the signing statement. In the signing statement, President Clinton said, “Of great importance, [VTVPA] restores and expands VAWA’s protections for battered immigrants by helping them escape abuse and by holding batterers accountable.” He went on to describe the U Visa provision in the same terms as the congressional debate, as a balance between “greater protection to victims” and “strengthening the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence.”

* * *

Ultimately, the Congress that enacted the BIWPA clearly intended to compromise between the goals of protecting undocumented IPV survivors and punishing abusers. As evidenced by the most authoritative sources of legislative history, Congress intended to expand immigration relief for undocumented IPV survivors to protect otherwise incredibly vulnerable people, but it was clearly concerned that permissive U Visa requirements

233. See id. at 74.
234. See infra Part IV.
239. See generally supra notes 236–38.
241. See id.
242. See supra Parts II.B.1.b–d.
243. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
would “open the floodgates to unwanted immigrants.” Compromise and balance are reflected in the bulk of the U Visa’s legislative history. Any interpretation of the Certification Statute should reflect this compromise.

IPV survivors frequently seek refuge in family court, and Congress, which heard from immigration experts and IPV advocates during the BIWPA’s hearings, knew this. Through the lens of legislative history, family court judges were plausibly authorized by Congress to certify U Visa applications, subject to certain limits. The statements of the bills’ original sponsors especially reflect that the Certification Statute was intended to be narrower than they initially envisioned and that agencies should not freely certify U Visas. The text provides one such limit—that the certifying agency must be the one investigating criminal activity. This intent plausibly rebuts the last antecedent inference and is in keeping with USCIS’s interpretation, expressed through the U Visa Regulation.

2. Statutory History of the BIWPA

One of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule. This rule was described in Heydon’s Case, a 1584 case in the English Court of Exchequer. The dispute centered around the definition of “estate” in an English statute. In seeking to resolve this question, Lord Coke designed a sequence of questions to determine the statute’s meaning, which were targeted to identify the “mischief and defect” in the common law that the statute was designed to remedy and then to construct the statutory meaning in order to give weight to that remedy. This method is still used by modern scholars: Professors Hart and Sacks advised that “[t]he court should then proceed to do, in substance, just what Lord Coke said it should do in Heydon’s Case.” This Part applies this same method to identify the “mischief and defect” that the BIWPA was designed to remedy using statutory history. Statutory history is used frequently by courts with minimal controversy.

Crime became a dominant public issue in the 1960s, spurred by a sudden and intense rise in violence and increasing anxiety about racial and social

244. See supra Part II.B.1.h.
245. See supra Parts II.B.1.c–d.
246. See supra Parts I.B–C.
247. See generally BIWPA Hearing, supra note 1.
251. Id. at 637; 3 Co. Rep. at 7a.
252. See id. at 638; 3 Co. Rep. at 7b.
253. Id.
254. HART & SACKS, supra note 138, at 1378.
256. JENNIFER L. DURHAM, CRIME IN AMERICA 1, 4 (1996).
change in America. 257 It became a dominant political issue in 1964 when Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate, campaigned on a platform of “enforcing law and order.” 258 While Goldwater’s candidacy failed dramatically, crime was placed on the national stage and did not leave for over two decades. 259

The Republican presidencies of those two decades emphasized the punishment of criminals, beginning with President Nixon stoking fears about civil rights protesters and anti-Vietnam protestors.260 This continued into the 1980s, when President Reagan implemented partisan anticrime policy, which emphasized harsh sentencing and erosion of the criminal justice reforms presided over by the Warren Court in the 1960s.261

In 1992, Bill Clinton, then a young Democrat from Arkansas, ran a more conservative kind of campaign than his Democratic predecessors. In its endorsement of his candidacy, the New York Times wrote:

Mr. Clinton has taken strong and consistent positions, often notably more moderate than those of traditional liberal Democrats. For instance, he says to deadbeat fathers who fail to pay child support: “Take responsibility for your children, or we will force you to do so.” Note the words responsibility and force.262

President Clinton’s election was described by a critic as emblematic of “an elite-led, extralegal, and often violent intolerance for the disorder inherent in active citizen agency and a democratic public sphere,” while his supporters described him as “devot[ed] to social justice.”264

As President, one of the largest reforms Clinton oversaw was the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the “Crime Bill”).265 The Crime Bill was a massive anticrime initiative passed after a long, nasty legislative battle.266 It increased funding for police, following Clinton’s campaign promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets; increased funding to build new prisons; instituted the “three-strikes rule” and an assault weapons ban; and earmarked billions for crime-prevention programs.267 One of those spending programs was the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.268 VAWA 1994 authorized $1.6 billion for programs

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257. See id. at 4. See generally Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, America Doesn’t Stop at the Rio Grande: Democracy and the War on Crime, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME 37 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008).
259. See id.
260. DURHAM, supra note 256, at 5.
263. William Lyons, Frightening Citizens and a Pedagogy of Violence, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 257, at 123, 128.
264. Endorsement, supra note 262.
265. See GEST, supra note 258, at 243.
266. See id. at 219–43.
267. See id. at 196–97, 242–44.
seeking to end gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence.269 Recognizing that immigrant IPV survivors are subjected to a particular kind of immigration abuse, VAWA 1994 created a pathway for abused noncitizens married to citizens or lawful permanent residents to handle their own petitions for status.270

BIWPA 1999 was proposed when Congress was returning to VAWA 1994 to reauthorize the spending programs, and was eventually included in VAWA 2000.271 In terms of statutory history, the mischief that VAWA 1994 was intended to cure was clearly crime. The chosen remedy was established by decades of legislation that put more police on the streets, enforced longer sentences for criminals, and built more prisons to house them.272 Congress was driven by “the three ‘P’s’ of police officers, prisons, and prevention.”273 This purpose would telegraph a clear, narrow reading of the Certification Statute: If police, prosecutors, and sentencing authorities have always been the chosen statutory remedies, then criminal courts alone should be allowed to certify U Visas.

However, this conclusion is complicated by the discussions surrounding VAWA 2000, which was included in VTVPA. In the debates on VTVPA, legislators spoke of a different “three Ps”: prevention, protection, and prosecution.274 When BIWPA 1999 was introduced, the mischief remained high crime, but the chosen remedy was no longer so clear. While prosecution of abusers was still preferred, there was a growing recognition that public safety could be achieved through promoting social programs like the National Domestic Violence Hotline and funding local shelters and service providers.275 This trend continued with the passage of VAWA 2005. The hearings on VAWA 2005 emphasized collaboration between service providers and law enforcement to combat IPV.276

Ultimately, the U Visa was established at a turning point, when Congress was no longer so certain that punishment was always the correct remedy to the mischief of IPV. This Note proposes that any interpretation of the Certification Statute should reflect the congressional realization that IPV is not only combated by criminal courts but also by civil courts and agencies.

women [https://perma.cc/YMM4-6WNB] ("To get it passed . . . I added VAWA to a crime bill I had been working on for years that had bipartisan support, put 100,000 cops on the streets, and provided more assistance for law enforcement.").
269. See GEST, supra note 258, at 244.
271. See supra notes 192–95, 199 and accompanying text.
272. GEST, supra note 258, at 242.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., VAWA 2005 Hearing, supra note 37, at 7–9 (statement of Hon. Diane Stuart, Director of the Office on Violence Against Women) ("Through the spirit of [VAWA], the coordinated community response, we have learned that victims are safer and justice is better served when a shelter worker has a strong working relationship with law enforcement and the district attorney, when an emergency room nurse knows to call an advocate . . . ").
III. U Visa Certification in Practice

This Part surveys the current published practices surrounding family court U Visa certification in the United States to inform this Note’s proposed guidelines for family court U Visa certification.

The decision to certify a U Visa application is discretionary and not subject to judicial review or judicial mandamus. Courts and agencies all differ dramatically in their approaches to certification. Family courts themselves are equally uncertain about their power to certify U Visa applications. Some state judiciaries have issued guidance on whether family courts can certify U Visa applications, and the AAO has issued one nonprecedential decision hinting at its approval of the practice of family court certification. Part III.A reviews the limited existing jurisprudence on family court U Visa certification, Part III.B reviews current state-judiciary guidance, and Part III.C describes the sole AAO decision discussing civil court certification.

A. Family Court Cases Addressing U Visa Certification

There are only three published opinions that rule on whether family courts can certify U Visa applications: all come from Queens County, New York, two are authored by the same family court judge, and none agree—not even the opinions written by the same judge.

277. See Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 225–27 (5th Cir. 2010).
280. See infra Part III.B.
281. See infra Part III.C.
1. *In re Rosales*

A family court judge certified a U Visa application in *In re Rosales*. The U Visa applicant, Ms. Rosales, had previously petitioned the Queens County Family Court for an order of protection against her abusive husband. The court held an inquest and granted Ms. Rosales a final two-year “stay away” order of protection. The judge that presided over the original proceeding had since retired, and a different family court judge certified Ms. Rosales’s U Visa application on his review of the transcript of the inquest and her family offense petition. In its opinion, the court ruled, without any analysis, that “[a] State or local Judge qualifies as a certifying official under [the U Visa Regulation].”

2. *In re Clara F.*

Three years after the decision in *In re Rosales*, a different family court judge in Queens County, Judge John Hunt, declined to certify a U Visa application. In *In re Clara F.*, the applicant, Ms. F., commenced two family offense proceedings, one visitation proceeding, and one child support proceeding in Westchester County Family Court. In connection with the second family offense proceeding, the Westchester County Family Court found that the respondent committed attempted assault in the third degree and harassment in the second degree and entered a two-year “stay away” order of protection in favor of Ms. F. However, for reasons unclear to the Queens County Family Court judge, Ms. F.’s request for U Visa certification was referred to Queens County.

In refusing to honor Ms. F.’s request, the Queens County court observed that the family offense proceeding was not a criminal one and that “the Family Court had no role in presiding over any prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of a defendant.” However, the court nevertheless directed Ms. F. to make her request to the Westchester judge that adjudicated her family offense petition, which implied that its denial was only the “reasoned judgment” of the court and that other courts might reasonably rule differently.

283. Id. at *7–9.
284. Id. at *8.
285. See id. at *7–10.
286. Id. at *1–2.
287. 32 N.Y.S.3d 871 (Fam. Ct. 2016).
288. This is the type of proceeding to seek a civil order of protection in New York State family courts. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney 2018).
289. Clara F., 32 N.Y.S.3d at 873.
290. Id.
291. Id. (“Apparently, for reasons of ‘administrative convenience,’ the application was referred to this Court which has had absolutely no contact with either of the parties and no involvement with any of their judicial proceedings.”).
292. Id. at 875.
293. Id. at 875–76.
3. In re Patricia C.

Later that year, Judge Hunt again declined a request to certify a U Visa application in In re Patricia C.²⁹⁴ Five months prior to the ruling, Ms. C. sought an order of protection from the court against her husband.²⁹⁵ Ms. C.’s family offense petition described her husband’s verbal, emotional, financial, and physical abuse.²⁹⁶ She also explained that she filed a report with her local police precinct.²⁹⁷ At the inquest, the court found that her husband committed aggravated harassment in the second degree and harassment in the Second Degree, and it entered a two-year “stay away” order of protection.²⁹⁸ Ms. C. then applied to the family court for U Visa certification.²⁹⁹

In its refusal, the court explained that “[t]he Family Court is not a criminal court and it exercises no criminal jurisdiction,” and “[t]he family offense proceeding which was commenced by Patricia C. is a civil proceeding.”³⁰⁰ It further explained that, while a family offense proceeding has criminal characteristics, the final adjudication “does not constitute a criminal conviction.”³⁰¹ The court also declined to certify Ms. C.’s U Visa application on the basis of her involvement with the police and suggested that Ms. C. instead bring her request directly to the police department.³⁰²

Judge Hunt’s two opinions clearly conflict: his opinion in In re Clara F. suggests that family courts can certify U Visa applications, while his opinion in In re Patricia C. states that family courts are never authorized to certify U Visa applications. However, the commonalities in the two opinions are instructive. Both make clear that the applicant has another recourse, which implies that he might have ruled differently had there been no involvement with another court or the police.³⁰³ And both opinions make clear that a family offense proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.³⁰⁴

B. State Approaches to U Visa Certification

State judiciaries have also taken a stance on the issue of family court U Visa certification. Representative groups of the New York and Minnesota judiciaries have argued that family court judges may issue U Visa certifications. On February 14, 2017, the Advisory Council on Immigration Issues in Family Court circulated an advisory memorandum among the New York family courts, which offered guidance on the role of the family courts in U Visa petitions.³⁰⁵ The Council’s memorandum took a much more liberal

²⁹⁵. Id. at *1.
²⁹⁶. See id. at *1–2.
²⁹⁷. Id. at *2.
²⁹⁸. Id. at *3–4.
²⁹⁹. Id.
³⁰⁰. Id. at *6.
³⁰¹. Id. at *7.
³⁰². Id. at *8–10.
³⁰⁴. See Patricia C., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4701, at *6; Clara F., 32 N.Y.S.3d at 875.
³⁰⁵. See NY Advisory Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2–3.
approach than that expounded in *In re Clara F.* and *In re Patricia C.* It explains that it is well within the role of family court judges to certify U Visa applications in a wide range of cases.\(^\text{306}\) Two years earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court had issued an advisory opinion allowing for the possibility that a state court judge “presiding over a civil case such as an Order for Protection or dissolution [of marriage] proceeding” may certify a U Visa application, but only if the applicant is likely to be helpful in a later criminal trial.\(^\text{307}\)

C. Administrative Appeals Office Decision

The appeals office within DHS has also considered family court U Visa certification. USCIS’s initial decision on a U Visa petition is reviewable de novo by the AAO.\(^\text{308}\) AAO decisions are primarily nonprecedential, meaning they “do not create or modify USCIS policy or practice” and “do not provide a basis for applying new or alternative interpretations of law or policy.”\(^\text{309}\) The AAO has issued no precedential decisions on U Visa certification, but in one of its nonprecedential decisions, the AAO ruled that USCIS must grant U Visas based solely on a family court proceeding, even where the IPV survivor refused to pursue criminal prosecution.\(^\text{310}\)

In that case, a U Visa applicant sought an order of protection in family court, spoke with the police, and refused to pursue criminal charges.\(^\text{311}\) She submitted a certification executed by the presiding Illinois judge.\(^\text{312}\) The certification detailed the petitioner’s cooperation in a civil-order-of-protection proceeding.\(^\text{313}\) USCIS initially denied her U Visa application because “obtaining a protection order, in itself, does not qualify as reporting criminal activity.”\(^\text{314}\) The AAO reversed and held that this statement “misstates the applicable standard.”\(^\text{315}\) The AAO also found that the petitioner’s refusal to sign a criminal complaint, in light of the available evidence (her testimony that she was financially dependent on her husband), was not unreasonable and that this also misstated the applicable standard.\(^\text{316}\)

\(^{306}\) See id.


\(^{308}\) See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.

\(^{309}\) USCIS, supra note 98, § 1.5.

\(^{310}\) Petitioner (Admin. Appeals Office Mar. 17, 2015), 2015 WL 1505717. The file number and the petitioner’s name were redacted by USCIS. See USCIS, supra note 98, § 3.15.

\(^{311}\) Id. at *4.

\(^{312}\) See id. at *3.

\(^{313}\) Id.

\(^{314}\) Id.

\(^{315}\) Id.

\(^{316}\) Id. at *3 n.2.
There is clearly no consensus on whether family courts can certify U Visa applications. The jurisprudence is unsettled, and the AAO has issued no final determination. Undocumented IPV survivors, already vulnerable in so many ways, need a settled legal standard.

IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: A FAMILY COURT MUST BE ABLE TO CERTIFY THAT THE IPV SURVIVOR WAS HELPFUL IN A PROCEEDING THAT HINGED ON A FINDING OF IPV

Part II of this Note explained that family courts are authorized to certify U Visa applications. A textual analysis of the BIWPA shows there is a limit to this authority; while on its face the statute empowers any state judge to certify a U Visa application, its surrounding text somewhat narrows the definition by requiring some kind of involvement with investigating IPV, protecting IPV survivors, or facilitating the reporting of IPV. The legislative history of the BIWPA shows that the Certification Statute was a compromise between two forces in Congress: one interested in protecting undocumented IPV survivors and the other interested in facilitating the cooperation of undocumented survivors with police and prosecutors. The statutory history of the BIWPA, compared with the Violence Against Women Act, shows a shift, albeit an incomplete one, from a punitive approach to crime to a collaborative approach to intimate partner violence. This Part proposes guidelines for family court U Visa certification within these bounds.

No court or agency has yet established a framework that is supported by the Certification Statute. The Queens County Family Court—the only court to have published decisions on the subject—offers three different options: a family court may unequivocally certify on the basis of observed criminal activity, a family court must be presiding over the fact-finding stage of a proceeding in order to certify an application, or a family court may unequivocally not certify. The judicial opinions on whether a federal court presiding over a civil proceeding can certify a U Visa application offer another array of options for certification. In response to this vacuum, this Part proposes a framework for family court U Visa certification that is supported by the Certification Statute.

This Note proposes that to certify a U Visa application, a family court must be able to certify that the IPV survivor was helpful in a family court proceeding that hinged on a finding of intimate partner violence.

317. See supra Part II.
318. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part I.A.1.
320. See supra notes 122–36, 201–04 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part II.B.1.
322. See supra Part II.B.1.
323. See supra Part II.B.2.
324. See supra Part III.A.1.
325. See supra Part III.A.2.
326. See supra Part III.A.3.
327. See supra note 278.
By a textual analysis alone, family courts are authorized to certify U Visa applications whether or not they are adjudicating a proceeding hinging on IPV.\textsuperscript{328} Reading its text in a vacuum, the Certification Statute only requires helpfulness to an investigation of criminal activity, regardless of who conducts it.\textsuperscript{329} However, the role of the judiciary is to act as a faithful agent of the legislature, not to interpret in a vacuum.\textsuperscript{330} Part II analyzed the purpose of the legislature in enacting the BIWPA by looking to its legislative and statutory histories. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to limit the ability of the government to grant U Visas while still protecting IPV survivors.\textsuperscript{331} The statutory history indicates that the BIWPA came at a turning point in Congress’s approach to violent crime.\textsuperscript{332} And because the statute was written at this turning point, this Part proposes a guideline that both balances the desire to facilitate the punishment of criminals with the desire to stop crime and empowers IPV survivors to protect themselves.\textsuperscript{333} This proposed guideline is supported by textual interpretation that allows family courts to certify U Visa applications, legislative history that requires limits on that certification, and statutory history that allows those limits to be relaxed.

Part III.A offers a framework for what constitutes intimate partner violence, Part III.B offers a framework for what constitutes helpfulness, and Part III.C offers a survey of which types of proceedings hinge on a finding of intimate partner violence.

\textbf{A. What Constitutes Intimate Partner Violence}

This Note proposes that family court judges are only authorized to certify U Visa applications where the intimate partner violence is in violation of criminal statutes. Intimate partner violence encompasses a great deal of behavior that is not codified as criminal. For example, abusers sometimes publish intimate photos of their partners to humiliate them or exert control over their lives, a practice called “revenge porn” or “nonconsensual pornography.”\textsuperscript{334} Nonconsensual pornography is not illegal in every state,\textsuperscript{335} but it is clearly IPV.\textsuperscript{336}

This Part proposes that family court judges should, in order to fulfill the balance required by the Certification Statute, only certify U Visa applications

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{328} See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{329} See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{330} See Kaye, supra note 182, at 604.
\item \textsuperscript{331} See supra Part II.B.1.
\item \textsuperscript{332} See supra Part II.B.2.
\item \textsuperscript{333} See supra Part II.B.2.
\item \textsuperscript{336} See Citron & Franks, supra note 334, at 351.
\end{itemize}
when there is a violation of existing criminal law. Since the decision to certify a U Visa is committed solely to the discretion of the certifying authority, how a family court judge determines a violation of existing criminal law should be left to her discretion.

B. What Constitutes Helpfulness

This Part offers examples of what actions survivors can take to meet the helpfulness requirement of the Certification Statute, including filing initial family court pleadings, testifying in family court, and entering into settlement agreements with their abuser.

First, filing initial pleadings is helpful. An investigation is a broad and systematic inquiry. IPV survivors who petition the court for relief from IPV are initiating that systematic inquiry. A family court may certify a U Visa application at this early pleading stage. Not only has the IPV survivor already been helpful but the filing indicates a willingness on the part of the survivor to be helpful in the future at the fact-finding stages. Even if the petition is withdrawn, as is often the situation in IPV cases, the survivor has indicated a willingness to be helpful.

Second, testifying in family court is helpful. It takes tremendous bravery for IPV survivors to testify in open court about their abuse. By testifying about their abuse, survivors are helping family courts in the fact-finding process. In fact, most family court proceedings call for testimony to aid in making a final determination. IPV survivors who testify about their abuse at any point meet the helpfulness element.

Finally, entering into a settlement agreement is helpful. IPV survivors who testify or file a pleading demonstrate helpfulness with family court investigation even if they reach a settlement. Settlement indicates, at minimum, a willingness to be helpful in the investigation of criminal activity in two ways. First, a survivor who settles with her abuser has still likely detailed the IPV she suffered in her initial pleadings. Second, entering into a settlement agreement plausibly indicates a willingness to enforce that agreement. It is a crime to violate orders of protection (even those entered on consent), custody agreements, and child support agreements. A survivor who enters into one of these agreements thus has indicated a willingness to pursue these criminal penalties in the event of violation.

337. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 273.6 (2018) (providing that violating a protective order is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment).
342. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.03 (West 2017) (providing that violating a custody order is a felony).
343. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law §§ 260.05–.06 (McKinney 2018) (providing that refusal to pay child support is a class A misdemeanor or class E felony).
C. Which Proceedings Hinge on a Finding of Intimate Partner Violence

This Part outlines certain proceedings where a family court is investigating criminal activity and is therefore authorized to certify a litigant’s U Visa application. Family law is a matter of state law. Therefore, which types of proceedings hinge on a finding of IPV vary from state to state. This Part analyzes a few different types of proceedings that would qualify under this framework based on the laws of three of the states with the highest numbers of undocumented people: California, Texas, and New York.

Every state has some version of a civil order of protection that is intended to aid survivors of intimate partner violence. Statutory requirements vary, but family court judges typically must make a factual or legal determination that IPV occurred or is imminent. For example, in California, a family court must find that there is “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” before entering a protective order. Family courts adjudicating an order of protection are always empowered to certify a U Visa of the petitioner because these proceedings always hinge on a finding of intimate partner violence.

A family court judge is also authorized to certify U Visa applications in certain state divorce proceedings. Every state has some version of no-fault divorce. However, most state no-fault divorce laws require a finding of something like “irreconcilable differences” or ‘irretrievable breakdown of the marriage” before granting a divorce. If intimate partner violence is argued as a basis for that irretrievable breakdown, this Part proposes that the presiding family court judge is authorized to certify a U Visa application. Some states enacted no-fault divorce law to supplement the fault schemes. For example, in Texas, cruelty is a ground for divorce. Cruelty is established by “[a]ny conduct of one spouse sufficient to raise a reasonable fear of bodily harm in the other,” including physical and verbal abuse, threats, and sexual abuse. Ultimately, a family court adjudicating a

344. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
350. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1922 (2012); see, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2017) (“[T]he court may grant a divorce without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.”).
351. See, e.g., 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2270 (2017).
353. 39 TEX. JUR. 3D FAMILY LAW § 353 (2017).
354. See id.
355. Id. § 355.
356. See id. § 357.
divorce where the divorce could only be granted on a finding of IPV, as in
the no-fault or fault-based schemes described above, is authorized to certify
a U Visa application.

Some states require that courts consider IPV in custody and visitation
determinations. Where an IPV survivor is helpful in a custody and visitation proceeding in which IPV is alleged and investigated—where, for example, she describes IPV in her custody petition or testifies to IPV in the adjudication—the family court is authorized to certify her U Visa application.

Family court determinations of spousal and child support can also hinge
on IPV. However, this is rare. In New York, only “egregious conduct” is relevant in fixing a domestic support obligation—for example, in Stevens v. Stevens, an intermediate appellate court in New York affirmed a downward modification of spousal support where the recipient was physically abusive, verbally abusive, and unfaithful in the marriage. Family courts adjudicating domestic support proceedings should, thus, only certify U Visa applications in the rare case where IPV is a factor considered by the court.

Family court determinations of paternity can also, in rare cases, consider IPV. California law recognizes multiple types of legal fathers. Biology is not the determinative factor, and courts may consider domestic violence in granting paternal rights. However, in New York, paternity is established solely by biology, which can be proven by DNA testing or by evidence of a sexual relationship between the parents around the time of conception. In a state like New York, a family court should not certify a U Visa application for a parent who testifies about intimate partner violence during a paternity proceeding because it has no weight in judicial analysis. However, a court may certify a U Visa application for the parent that testifies about IPV during a California-style paternity proceeding, where the proceeding may hinge on that testimony.

CONCLUSION

Undocumented IPV survivors are in an incredibly vulnerable position. Survivors are often in immediate physical danger from their abusers who use the survivors’ immigration status as a weapon. And there are often many obstacles barring undocumented survivors from seeking assistance.

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357. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2017).
28 (Mar. 27, 2012).
359. 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 2577 (2017).
361. See id. at 710.
362. In re P.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 2011) (“There are three types of fathers in juvenile dependency law: presumed, biological, and alleged.”).
363. See id. at 561–65 (declining to automatically grant parental rights to a child’s biological father despite genetic testing results).
Obtaining temporary legal status allows survivors to access that assistance. The BIWPA was intended to facilitate this access.

Although the law enforcement certification requirement restricts who can access the U Visa, statutory interpretation shows that this requirement was not intended to bar immigration relief to survivors who choose to protect themselves and their families by going to family court instead of approaching a prosecutor. Legal authorities should recognize that family courts may certify U Visa applications where the IPV survivor was, is, or is likely to be helpful in a proceeding hinging on a finding of intimate partner violence. This Note recommends guidelines for U Visa certification in the hopes that IPV advocates will be able to obtain certification for as many clients as possible, that family courts will confidently certify the U Visa applications of its litigants, and that as many undocumented survivors as possible will be able to overcome one more unnecessary obstacle to safety and obtain legal status.