Anyone Can “Think Like a Lawyer”: How the Lawyers’ Monopoly on Legal Understanding Undermines Democracy and the Rule of Law in the United States

Bridgette Dunlap
Fordham University School of Law

Recommended Citation
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol82/iss6/9
ANYONE CAN “THINK LIKE A LAWYER”:
HOW THE LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY ON LEGAL UNDERSTANDING UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Bridgette Dunlap*

INTRODUCTION

Though a person needs a threshold understanding of the law to obey it or enjoy its protection, lawyers in the United States enjoy a near monopoly on knowledge of what the law is and how it works.¹ Widespread ignorance of the law robs it of deterrent effect, deprives those whose rights have been violated of recourse, and undermines deliberative democracy. This Article argues that the low level of legal knowledge in the United States is fundamentally at odds with the ideal of the rule of law and further contemplates a “legal empowerment alternative” for the United States, inspired by the approach that Stephen Golub has argued should supplant our lawyer-focused efforts to build democracies abroad.²

In the U.S. context, legal empowerment would not only require expanded access to legal services, but also a significant commitment to increasing the basic knowledge of nonlawyers. The American legal profession has an opportunity, if not an obligation, to work to counteract the detrimental effects of both the monopoly on legal services and the near monopoly on legal knowledge by promoting and providing basic legal education for the laypeople that the law binds and protects. Laypeople need to be empowered to think more like lawyers; but for this to happen, lawyers will need to “think less like lawyers and more like agents of social change.”³

Part I of this Article argues that failures of the dominant “lawyer-centered” attempts of U.S. legal reformers to build democracies and the rule of law abroad—and the strategies developed to address those failures—

* Human Rights Fellow, Leitner Center for International Law and Justice, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 2012, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks the participants of the Colloquium, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014), the staff of the Leitner Center, Tracy Higgins, Martin Flaherty, Steven Thel, Russell Pearce, Bryan Berry, and Emily Wolf.


3. Id. at 162.
should inform efforts to comport with the rule of law ideal at home. Particularly in a legal system as complex as the United States, the rule of law would require basic legal knowledge and literacy among the public. Part II examines the public misperception of lawyers as general experts with exclusive access to legal knowledge and argues that laypeople need a better understanding of some of the limitations and peculiarities of the lawyer’s work in order to understand the legal system, view the law as legitimate, and participate in its reform. Part III examines public ignorance of basic legal principles through an example of battery in tort and criminal law: the recent rash of incidents of young people taking and distributing photographs of sexual batteries they do not recognize as crimes indicates widespread ignorance of the law, which seriously undermines deterrence and deprives victims of recourse. Part IV first argues that the ABA’s domestic access to justice programs focused on improving access to counsel and mandating civics education should include efforts to empower the public with basic legal knowledge and next considers some approaches to doing so.

I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EFFORTS TO EXPORT THE U.S. MODEL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

My interest in lawyer monopolies began in Cambodia, where the influence of American legal reformers has contributed to the establishment of a very small, protectionist bar that enjoys a monopoly on the provision of legal services.4 The resulting lack of legal counsel deprives most of the population of access to justice and perpetuates major human rights abuses. The well-intentioned work to build an American-style legal profession in Cambodia is part of the decades-long, billion-dollar effort of the United States and other nations to foster democracy by establishing “the rule of law” in developing and postconflict countries.5 Definitions of the rule of law vary widely,6 but in its thinnest conception the term refers to “universal rules uniformly applied.”7 A thicker conception requires that those rules be substantively just.

6. See Rachel Kleinfield, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 31, 32 (identifying five different usages for the term “rule of law”: (1) a government that obeys the law and respects judicial rule, (2) law and order, (3) lack of equality before the law, (4) enforced human rights, and (5) efficient and predictable justice).
7. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 75. Joseph Raz points to the inadequacies of the rule of law, writing:
There is little empirical evidence for, and much scholarly criticism of, the claim that the rule of law project is effective in reforming legal systems, improving access to justice, building democracy, or alleviating poverty.8 Despite this, the dominant paradigm, which Stephen Golub has termed the “rule of law orthodoxy,” endures.9 Donor projects seek to build legal systems in our own image by training judges and lawyers, upgrading courtrooms, buying furniture and computers, drafting laws, establishing court administration systems, and building up bar associations.10 These efforts to “win the hearts and minds of the judicial and political elite” to bring about reform often fail, because the corruption and dysfunction in the existing system benefits those elites.11

Projects typical of the rule of law orthodoxy involve the “rule of lawyers,” who Golub tells us may lack any development experience, be shortsighted about the failings of their own legal systems, and fail to recognize that attorneys are part of the problem in some societies where self-serving bar associations limit access to justice, work against social and economic equality, or subordinate the interests of the poor to those of attorneys or their clients.12 Western “legal missionaries”13 seek to pass laws and build strong judicial systems, but there is little reason to believe that the public will have access to those institutions, the laws will be fairly applied, or that social or economic equality will result.

Golub has proposed a “legal empowerment alternative” to the rule of law orthodoxy, consisting of the use of legal services to advance freedoms, particularly those of the marginalized.14 However, his conception of “legal services” is broader than that typical in the United States. Beyond litigation and lawyer-provided legal advice, “legal services” include enhancing people’s legal knowledge through training, media, and public education,
and developing services by laypeople who impart knowledge to others in their communities.\footnote{Id. at 165.}

Though the United States generally treats the rule of law as something we must build in foreign countries that already exists here, the reality is in fact far from the ideal.\footnote{See Upham, supra note 7, at 83–90 (surveying the ways that the reality in the United States does not match the rule-of-law model); see also Humphreys, supra note 8, at 223 (“In many ways, indeed, the rule of law register might be thought of as standing in for the old language of ‘civilisation’—the mark of accomplishment of the modern; something we have but they do not; that we must help them achieve; and whose presence or absence is itself the determinant and mobilising criterion for a body of other interventions.”); ABA Mission & Goals, A.B.A., www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (noting that “advanc[ing]” the rule of law in the United States consists of promoting “respect” of our existing system).} Here, the solutions that the United States promotes in foreign countries are in place—voluminous legislation, a powerful judiciary, and a specially educated legal profession—but they create barriers to the layperson’s understanding and enjoyment of the protections of the law and ability to play a meaningful role in shaping it. American law is extremely complex—thanks to American lawyers—making access to legal services imperative for one to enjoy equal application of the law. The United States doesn’t suffer from a shortage of lawyers like Cambodia, but it does have a shortage of affordable legal services nonetheless. The “extreme reluctance” of the federal and state governments to make lawyer-provided services available to those of little means, as well as the bar’s near complete refusal to permit nonlawyer services to address the resulting need, is a rejection of the fundamental norm of uniform application of the law.\footnote{See Upham, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that for decades the United States has spent one-ninth the amount per capita as England on civil legal services for low-income people).}

As Frank Upham notes, the policy judgment that uniform application of the law is not worth significant resources indicates that Americans do not believe that the rule of law is imperative for economic growth and stability, as our rule of law promoters claim abroad.\footnote{Id.}

Even if affordable legal services somehow became widely available in the United States, however, the fact would remain that enjoying equal application of the law and participating fully in a society as legalistic and litigious as the United States requires a threshold level of legal understanding.\footnote{See White, supra note 1, at 144 (defining “legal literacy” as “that degree of competence in legal discourse required for meaningful and active life in our increasingly legalistic and litigious culture”).} But our law’s complexity and the lawyers’ monopoly have led to a pervasive perception of law as the exclusive domain of lawyers, such that even highly educated laypeople may lack basic legal understanding.\footnote{See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”), quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).}

As Robert Gordon has recognized, “few other than the lawyers themselves have ever perceived the unique virtues of the courts and
common law as instruments of governance.”21 It is possible that our efforts to export our legal system or our system itself may have fundamental flaws that the legal empowerment alternative does not address.22 The model that the United States seeks to export has proven, at home and abroad, to concentrate power in the hands of those with the money and power to access judicial systems. But because this model is so much more entrenched and stable in the United States than in the countries to which we seek to export it, the empowerment of nonlawyers within our existing system is imperative. Marginally increasing access to legal services will not do this—the legal profession must empower laypeople for greater engagement with the law themselves.

II. DISPELLING THE LAWYER’S MYSTIQUE TO EMPOWER THE LAY PUBLIC

This Part discusses public misperceptions of lawyers that impede understanding of how the law works. Part II.A discusses the misperception of lawyers as special by virtue of being generalists with broad knowledge of all areas of law, rather than people with a particular way of thinking and working. Part II.B argues that if laypeople do not understand some peculiarities of “thinking like a lawyer,” the law can seem arbitrary and corrupt, and attempts at reforming it can seem futile.

A. Lawyers Are Not General Experts

The education, exclusivity, and monopoly power of the U.S. legal profession has led to a common perception that lawyers are special. Lawyers may be special, but not for the reasons that the profession and the media commonly present to the public. In particular, given the complexities of the law, most lawyers are not generalists competent to answer any question at hand, but specialists in the law of particular disciplines and jurisdictions.23 But the layperson that asks the lawyer at the cocktail party a tax question may think of lawyers as more generally knowledgeable than we are. The lawyer of the public imagination has the answer whatever the issue or jurisdiction. He doesn’t answer, “That’s not my area. You need a tax attorney.”

22. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 211–13 (arguing that the United Nations’ conception of “legal empowerment,” which differs from Golub’s, is not a meaningful divergence from the rule of law project); see also Upham, supra note 7, at 99 (concluding that neither the U.S. nor Japanese legal systems are likely useful models for other societies and arguing that the formal systems adherents to the rule of law orthodoxy seek to create may not be worthwhile in light of the benefits of informal systems such as Japan’s).
23. A Florida criminal attorney provided an example of media’s tendency to treat lawyers as generalists in a blog expressing frustration with the coverage of the trial of George Zimmerman, which regularly featured lawyers who did not practice in Florida and lacked criminal experience. See Brian Tannebaum, The Embarrassment of the George Zimmerman Verdict, CRIM. DEF. BLOG (July 14, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://criminaldefenseblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-embarrassment-of-george-zimmerman.html.
This does not mean that laypeople should stop asking intellectual property attorneys criminal procedure questions. Ideally, lawyers should have a broad, even if necessarily shallow, knowledge of the law. Any justification for the lawyers’ monopoly and the costly education required to join the profession must rest in part on that presumption. But the lay public needs to understand that U.S. law is extremely complicated, even to lawyers, and varies among jurisdictions. Lawyers, in turn, who may be susceptible to “overconfidence bias,”24 should not further misunderstanding of the legal system by presenting themselves as general experts, though the notion is encouraged by unauthorized practice of law rules.25 Furthering the idea that lawyers have an exclusive ability to understand any law risks discouraging laypeople from learning about particular legal issues that are relevant to their lives or policy preferences.

Lawyers are special not because they have a database of laws in their heads making them experts on whatever legal topic might arise, nor by virtue of an exclusive ability for legal analysis,26 but because they embrace certain counterintuitive processes and principles that can seem strange or


25. The effect of unauthorized practice of law rules on access to justice, and the purported justification for such rules is discussed elsewhere in this Colloquium. One related set of examples that are perhaps minor in comparison but illustrative of the problem of the “specialness” of lawyers are certain pro bono efforts I have been involved in that entail minimal training but are open only to lawyers or law students, such as monitoring elections, which required only a few hours of training and did not entail giving legal advice. Additionally, I represented a woman seeking an order of protection in my first weeks of law school, but a social worker with years of experience in domestic violence generally may not. New York’s Family Court Act permits unrepresented petitioners to have a “non-witness friend, relative, counselor or social worker present in the court room” but that individual is not authorized to take part in the proceedings, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 838 (McKinney 2009). I was participating in Sanctuary for Families’ Courtroom Advocates Program, which has special agreements with some courts allowing law students to represent petitioners seeking orders of protection.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the New York Legal Assistance Group provided webinars and manuals to lawyers who manned makeshift legal clinics offering information about insurance claims, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance, and other relief. See Nicole Wallace, A Nonprofit Pushes To Make Legal Aid Key Part of Disaster Services, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 29, 2013), https://philanthropy.com/article/A-Nonprofit-Pushes-to-Make/142681/; see also N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP., SUPERSTORM SANDY 1 YEAR REPORT, available at http://nylag.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Superstorm-Sandy-1-Year-Report-Summary.pdf. This information might have been especially useful in the hands of the nonlawyer volunteers who went into homes to provide food and debris removal. One “Occupy Sandy” volunteer told me he needed information about how to handle problems encountered, sometimes in the homes of homebound individuals, like power and elevator service that had not been restored, or how to access emergency aid. Equipping those volunteers with New York Legal Assistance Group’s training would likely be foreclosed by concerns about unauthorized practice and assumptions about the capabilities of nonlawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2013).

heartless to the uninitiated. The idea of the lawyer as a member of a profession apart serves the monopoly, but it undermines the functioning of a participatory democracy in which nonlawyers are charged with obeying the law, shaping it through the political process, and applying it as jurors. For this reason, civic participants need to understand what lawyers do and be able to think like a lawyer to some extent themselves.

B. “Thinking Like a Lawyer”

That the goal of a legal education is to learn to think like a lawyer is a law school truism. What it means or should mean to think like a lawyer, and whether teaching law students to do so is a good idea, is the subject of some debate. The term may be a “cliché among law teachers” or “ritual cant,” but it does capture the experience of law students who see themselves as having struggled to master a new way of thinking to succeed in law school that their nonlawyer friends find alien.

I use the term not to enter into the debate as to how a lawyer should think and what constitutes good legal reasoning, but to describe some common elements captured by the law school cliché. Thinking like a lawyer entails the ability to separate one’s assumptions, and moral intuitions from the legal question at hand; attention to detail; an acceptance of counsel’s role in the adversarial system; and a sense that even seemingly plain legal language is filled with terms of art.

One professor illustrated the concept in a story recounted by a student. “Professor Lawson” would tell his students to imagine themselves in a bar a year prior to law school talking about a legal issue over drinks. Students would admit they would have thought a particular behavior was illegal back then, based on their sense of right and wrong, to which he would exclaim:

Well, boys and girls, that’s not true. It is legal. They don’t know over there at the bar what is and isn’t legal. And neither did you, before you

---

27. See Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1421 (1999) (stating that members of the public may see lawyers as “engaged in some sort of deceitful or unethical practice when, in reality, lawyers are merely fulfilling their role in the adversary system”).

28. James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511, 512 (1996) (describing the phrase as “sufficiently common to have become a cliché among law teachers”); Sanford Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on “Thinking Like a Lawyer,” 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)) (“It is probable that everyone who has gone to law school has been told—often by the Dean in a welcoming address—that the purpose of the enterprise of a legal education is to learn to ‘think like a lawyer.’”).

29. See Elkins, supra note 28, at 515–17 (describing conflicting normative conceptions of what it means to “think like a lawyer”); see also MacDowell, supra note 26, at 317–25 (arguing that legal education thwarts development of the consciousness and skills a lawyer needs to work for social change); Levinson, supra note 28, at 1071 (questioning the two propositions that the term implies: “(1) that there is a particular way lawyers think; and (2) that this particular way is also a desirable way”).

30. Elkins, supra note 28, at 512, 515; see also Levinson, supra note 28, at 1071 (arguing that “thinking like a lawyer” should not be dismissed as “ritual cant”).

31. See generally White, supra note 1 (discussing the “invisible discourse of the law”).

came here. That’s why you came to law school. Those people who think something is legal or illegal because it’s right or wrong don’t know what they’re talking about. They’re practicing “bar stool law.” Law school is where you learn what the law is. This is where you find out what is and isn’t legal—what you can and can’t do. What the law really is.33

Professor Lawson railing against “bar stool law” may be a caricature of the arrogant and amoral lawyer, but he identifies two important truths.34 The first is that the law can be counterintuitive or unjust, but lawyers must distinguish between what the law is and what they think it should be. The second is that significant barriers prevent “bar stool pundits,” i.e., civic participants and subjects of the law, from understanding the laws that govern their lives.35

That a lawyer must be able to separate the law from her feelings about it does not mean her work ends with a determination of what the law says about a particular set of facts. The legalistic inquiry need only be a first step that precedes the broader work of considering the best options and arguments in light of what the law says, identifying inadequacies in the law, arguing for its reform, or identifying nonlegal approaches to a problem.

To the layperson, however, the insistence on clarity as to what the law does and does not say can look like an endorsement of the answer. For instance, at a panel concerning a report on the Obama Administration’s drone program, an attorney who coauthored the report and openly and actively opposes the program explained that, as a lawyer, she could not say that the program was illegal.36 Activists in attendance met this admission with derision, perhaps because they could not imagine how such a thing could be legal given their deep conviction that it was wrong, or because they took her refusal to call the program illegal as wavering in her moral condemnation of it.

Lawyers tend to respect the rule of law even in the case of bad laws that may seem illegitimate to the layperson.37 They treat the law as a binding contract that can be renegotiated but remains in force no matter how flawed, while the layperson has less reason to suspend his disbelief as to his having consented to the terms. Many lawyers may be guilty of pretending that the law is itself objective rather than a construct reflecting our society’s biases and power imbalances,38 but it remains necessary to strive for objectivity and accuracy in determining what the law is in order to critique it.

33. Id. at 517.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 518.
37. See MacDowell, supra note 26, at 332–33 (“[T]he paradox of lawyering for social change requires positioning oneself both inside and outside the law.”).
38. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 162 (1989) (“Objectivity is liberal legalism’s conception of itself. It legitimizes itself by reflecting its view of society, a society it helps make by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation, rationality. Since rationality is measured by point-of-viewlessness, what counts as reason is that which corresponds to the way things are.”).
The attention to detail and concern with procedure involved in thinking like a lawyer can look to the layperson like an elevation of form over substance or an attempt to sanitize or rationalize injustice. Many lawyers have a principled commitment to their role in a flawed system or actively work for reform. The uninitiated, however, may see the lawyer explaining the intricacies of the law as uninterested in systemic injustice.39

Understanding how the common law adversarial system works is necessary to believe we have something approaching the rule of law in the United States, rather than a system in which judges decide whatever they want by virtue of their power. The common law system has inherent obstacles to the layperson’s view of the law as predictable, because, counterintuitively for some laypeople, one cannot just read what a statute or the Constitution says but must know the precedent that controls its interpretation. The professional conservatism of Anglo-American lawyers has been attributed to their attachment to the past through precedent,40 but this same precedent can make the law seem arbitrary and unpredictable to the layperson.41

39. This became evident to me as a result of readers’ reactions to pieces I have published online in which I aimed to explain to a lay audience the law relevant to a number of viral media stories. See, e.g., Commentista, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, No, Texas Law Does Not Say You Can Shoot an Escort Who Refuses To Have Sex, RH REALITY CHECK (June 8, 2013, 12:27 PM), rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/08/no-texas-law-does-not-say-you-can-shoot-an-escort-who-refuses-to-have-sex/ [hereinafter Dunlap, Texas Law] (“This entire hand-wring article is unbelievably boring and pedantic. Imagine, a ‘legal analyst’ (aka lawyer)—a profession that prides itself on character assassination and lying for money—scolding journalists because they didn’t wallow in the same obscure legal minutiae that law-liars grow fat on. The judge, the jury, and the legal defense team, deserve all the denigration that can be heaped upon them.”); QuickStriker, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, What the Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong About the Renisha McBride Case, RH REALITY CHECK (Nov. 19 2013, 10:47 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/11/19/what-the-blogosphere-got-dangerously-wrong-about-the-renisha-mcbride-case/ [hereinafter Dunlap, What the Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong] (“This entire hand-wring article is unbelievably boring and pedantic. Imagine, a ‘legal analyst’ (aka lawyer)—a profession that prides itself on character assassination and lying for money—scolding journalists because they didn’t wallow in the same obscure legal minutiae that law-liars grow fat on. The judge, the jury, and the legal defense team, deserve all the denigration that can be heaped upon them.”); Rebecca Binns, Comment to Bridgette Dunlap, How Anonymous Does More Harm Than Good for Sexual Assault Victims, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/02/10/anonymous-harm-good-sexual-assault-victims/ [hereinafter Dunlap, Anonymous] (“Yes, innocent until proven guilty is important. Yes, information accuracy is important. But pointing that out shouldn’t also come at the expense of furthering rape culture yourselves, and rape really isn’t that hard to prove. We need to listen to survivors instead of blame and disbelieve them by default. What this article is is pussyfooting. Pure and simple.”); see also colleen2, Comment to Dunlap, Anonymous, supra (“If you don’t have a problem with the way the current system treats rape and rape victims I can fully understand why you appear to believe that the real damage was caused by speaking the truth.”).

40. Gordon, supra note 21, at 450. (“Anglo-American lawyers in particular are professionally conservative because [they are] attached to the past through common law method, with its respect for precedent. Lawyers promote institutions and procedures that will use their skills, services and reasoning modes: judicial review of legislative and administrative action, trial-type procedures for determining facts, and the like.”).

Another strange aspect of thinking like a lawyer is the commitment to the adversarial process over the search for objective truth. Few Americans, including lawyers, are familiar with civil law systems, but the inquisitional approach in which even the accused is obliged to share what she knows is, perhaps, more intuitive, given that in many contexts one is expected to account for one’s actions and explain inconsistencies in one’s story. Ignorance of the reasons for the right against self-incrimination and its centrality, for better or worse, creates an obstacle to laypeople’s willingness to buy in to the system that has built up around it. The fiction that the truth will emerge from two adversaries telling opposite stories and doing their best to keep information that is true but damaging out of court is central to our legal system, but the lawyer’s work to build a competing narrative regardless of her client’s factual guilt can look like lying to the layperson. Distaste for the legal profession certainly results from some actual bad acts of lawyers, but it would also seem to result from incomplete understanding of the lawyer’s role in the only judicial system we have.

The concept of zealous representation is not as intuitive as a lawyer might think. Laypeople must be educated about the fact that American lawyers have ethical obligations to prioritize the interests of their clients over the truth, the public interest, and justice. This is not to say lawyers must be “hired guns” barred from considering the public interest at all, or that they should not give more consideration to the greater good. It is only to say that the public needs to have a general understanding of the lawyer’s obligations when representing an individual client and the justifications for them, even if those justifications are contested.

42. See generally Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975) (proposing reforms that might alter the balance between lawyers’ ethical obligations to the client and the search for truth).

43. See Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 527, 576 (1997) (noting the expectation that an accused in the French system has an obligation “to contribute information within his knowledge to the common endeavor of establishing the truth”); see also Frankel, supra note 42, at 1053 (“Our commitment to the adversary or “accusatorial” mode is buttressed by a corollary certainty that other, alien systems are inferior. We contrast our form of criminal procedure with the “inquisitorial” system, conjuring up visions of torture, secrecy, and dictatorial government. Confident of our superiority, we do not bother to find out how others work.”).

44. Frankel, supra note 42, at 1053 (“It is permissible to keep asking, because nobody has satisfactorily answered, why our present system of confessions in the police station versus no confessions at all is better than an open and orderly procedure of having a judicial official question suspects.”).

45. See Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1060, 1066 (1975) (responding to Frankel, supra note 42, and arguing our commitment to fundamental values protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments “precludes a single-minded search for truth”).

46. See Gross, supra note 27, at 1406 (suggesting misunderstanding of their role in the adversarial system has more to do with lawyers’ bad image than unethical practices).

47. See Frankel, supra note 42, at 1057–59.

The person equipped to think like a lawyer forces herself to look at the law in the light most favorable to her opponent. She must accept that factually guilty people go free as a result of rules put in place to check government power and minimize the risk of innocent people being found guilty. She must think of how a law might affect someone unlike herself.

When the commentator or legislator thinks like a lawyer, she considers the merits of a law based on how it will actually affect people, the way a lawyer considers the application of the law to her client. This, however, is not what the public typically encounters. Too often, commentators and politicians, even those trained as lawyers, argue for or against laws on the basis of generalizations or make claims about the effect of court decisions they know to be inaccurate. This makes it especially important for laypeople to have basic legal reasoning skills and knowledge so they can critically assess the arguments of their representatives.

The bar stool pundit unfamiliar with thinking like a lawyer may be inclined to write off an unsatisfactory legal outcome as the product of a racist jury or corrupt legal system. Unlawyerly judgments about the reasons for a verdict or a law have the potential to obscure the specific problems underlying injustice or make working to address those problems seem futile. The legal profession needs to empower the bar stool pundits to spot legal questions and learn more, so they can demand their rights, seek counsel, or advocate and vote for reforms rather than seeing the law as hopelessly corrupt.

49. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Declining Influence of Lawyer-Statesmen Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 Nev. L.J. 479, 488–98 (2005) (describing “the tendency of lawyer-politicians to leave behind lawyerly values in favor of the poorer quality values of politics”); see, e.g., Rick Ungar, Ted Cruz and the Doctrine of Pretend Paranoia, FORBES (July 24, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/07/24/ted-cruz-and-the-doctrine-of-pretend-paranoia/ (reporting that Senator Ted Cruz warned that the legalization of gay marriage could lead to pastors who refuse to perform marriage ceremonies or preach against homosexuality facing prosecution for hate speech despite the fact that Cruz is a former U.S. Supreme Court litigator familiar with the First Amendment who knows this is not the case). See generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Presidential Ethics: Should a Law Degree Make a Difference?, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 725, 730 (2001) (arguing that lawyer-politicians should follow the ethics rules even when they are not representing clients).

50. See, e.g., Dunlap, Texas Law, supra note 39 (disputing a viral media narrative attributing the acquittal of a man who shot a fleeing woman to either Texas’s defense of property law or a biased jury).

51. See, e.g., Dunlap, What the Blogosphere Got Dangerously Wrong, supra note 39 (arguing misrepresentation of “Stand Your Ground” laws has the dangerous effect of making people believe they have a greater right to use force than those laws actually provide and that the rush to vilify individual prosecutors obscures systemic problems); see also Dunlap, Anonymous, supra note 39 (arguing that the cyber-activist collective Anonymous's misrepresentation of and interference with rape prosecutions undermines legal protections and reform efforts).
III. THE LIMITS OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL: LEGAL ILLITERACY AND LAWLESSNESS

This Part argues that public ignorance of basic legal principles risks a functional lawlessness that greater access to counsel will not address. Part III.A discusses the American Bar Association’s (ABA) conflicting interests in serving lawyers and improving access to justice. Part III.B examines the ABA’s public education work and argues that efforts aimed at mandating civics education do too little to address the fundamental problem of the typical layperson’s ignorance of her protections and obligations under the law. Part III.C illustrates this by examining examples of public ignorance of the tort and crime of battery, and Part III.D focuses on the recent rash of young people taking and distributing photographs of sexual batteries they do not recognize as crimes or torts.

A. The American Bar Association’s Approach to Access to Justice

Though legal professions extol the equal application of the law and its availability to all, they generally do too little “to secure practical access to justice.”52 The ABA prides itself on its commitment to access to justice and advocates for legal aid funding and pro bono legal assistance but has not made widespread access to legal services a reality.53 There is reason to doubt that the ABA’s latest effort, discussed below, will have a meaningful impact on access to counsel. Regardless, more low-cost legal services would be insufficient to enfranchise members of a lay public whose knowledge of their rights and responsibilities is so lacking that they may not know to seek counsel. The focus on lawyer-provided services as the solution risks perpetuating this knowledge problem.

In an October 2013 article, ABA President James R. Silkenat wrote, “Our nation is facing a paradox involving access to justice.”54 He went on to explain that too many people cannot afford lawyers no matter how urgent the issue, while “too many law graduates in recent years have found it difficult to gain the practical experience they need to enter practice effectively.”55 Silkenat explains that the American Bar Association is “uniquely positioned to connect the unmet legal needs of our society and the unmet employment needs of our young lawyers.”56 Unfortunately,

52. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 451.
54. Id.
55. Id. It is debatable whether the problem is properly framed as one of graduates lacking practical experience given the traditional use of an apprenticeship model. Arguably, the problem is actually a shortage of employers willing to train young attorneys given the availability of more experienced attorneys due to the contraction in the legal market, technologies and other service models replacing some lawyer services, an increased number of law graduates, and the chronic underfunding of legal services that makes even low-paying jobs providing services to the poor competitive. But what is indeed a “paradox” is that a country with as many lawyers as we have has such a severe access to justice problem. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2001).
56. Silkenat, supra note 53, at 8.
these interests may conflict. The loss of legal jobs may exacerbate the already protectionist impulses of the American legal profession, which has a monopoly that extends to services that lawyers are not providing. Training paralegals to provide services has been a particularly effective empowerment strategy abroad, but it is generally foreclosed by unauthorized practice rules in the United States. Lawyers might train laypeople in other fields, such as social work, to, for example, provide representation in eviction proceedings or to obtain orders of protection. We might prefer that these services be provided by lawyers. But short of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services being overturned or a massive new commitment to public funding of civil legal services—a kind of public works project for lawyers that would solve the access to justice problem and the employment problem all at once—the bar’s best efforts to address unmet legal needs with more lawyer-provided services are almost certain to fall short.

The ABA has convened a Legal Access Jobs Corps Task Force to identify ways to address the access to justice “paradox” by increasing opportunities for new lawyers to serve the poor. Examples of such initiatives seem promising and worthwhile, but ultimately all appear to come down to new funding models for lawyer services. However, funding on the scale that would be necessary to comport with the rule of law ideal that we promote around the globe appears impossible in the near term given the widespread hostility to government in the United States and the lack of consensus about our obligations to create conditions for equality.

---


58. See Suzanne J. Schmitz, What’s the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic Violence Advocates and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 295, 317 (2004) (arguing that the bench and bar have not met the needs of domestic violence victims and should support lay advocates’ ability to do so). Landlords are much more likely than tenants to have representation in housing court, and tenants have a dramatically increased likelihood of success if represented. Matthew Desmond, Tipping the Scales in Housing Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov., 13, 2012, at A35 (describing unpublished research). The New York Senate has a bill, pending in the Judiciary Committee, that would allow tenants to be represented by nonlawyers in eviction proceedings, but those nonlawyers must not be paid. See S. 427, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).

59. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that there is a “presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty” in a case concerning an unrepresented, indigent woman who lost her parental rights).

60. See id. at 26–27.

61. Silkenat, supra note 53, at 8.

62. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Robert Gebeloff, Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1 (“Many people say they are angry because the government is wasting money and giving money to people who do not deserve it. But more than that, they say they want to reduce the role of government in their own lives. They are frustrated that they need help, feel guilty for taking it and resent the government for providing it. They say they want less help for themselves; less help in caring
The access to justice initiatives cited by Mr. Silkenat, such as postgraduate Legal Access Jobs Corps and law school–based clinics that would serve indigent populations, are consistent with a continued dependence on lawyers. Putting more of the bar’s indebted and unemployed new members to work fulfilling unmet legal needs is an excellent idea, but the emphasis on new attorneys getting experience to make them more competitive raises the concern that the interests of lawyers will take priority over those without access to justice. Indeed, of the four goals the ABA outlines for the achievement of its mission, the first is to serve the members of the ABA, and the last is to advance the rule of law and ensure “meaningful access to justice for all persons.”

If the Job Corps is a low-paying stepping stone to more lucrative work, it will risk making serving the poor seem like a temporary, charitable endeavor for novices who need more training for “real” legal work, rather than an obligation society must meet in order to establish the rule of law. The Job Corps could marginally increase access to services while fortifying the idea that only lawyers can serve our vast unmet legal needs or understand the law, which is at the heart of the access to justice problem.

A true commitment to legal empowerment on the part of lawyers would necessarily entail some efforts to make ourselves less needed, less special, and less wealthy. But it might also create new opportunities if we expanded the conception of the role of a lawyer. If we accept that the bar will never be able to provide enough pro bono and low-cost, individual representation to give everyone equal access to justice—given the ubiquity and complexity of the law in the United States—we can think honestly and strategically about what the American bar’s role should be in promoting the rule of law domestically. This might involve educating laypeople and empowering them to address their own legal needs and those of people in their for relatives; less assistance when they reach old age.”); Richard A. Epstein, In Praise of Income Inequality, DEFINING IDEAS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/140746; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 228 (2008) (describing hostility towards the government as a theme in the 1994 election and pronounced in the National Rifle Association).

63. Cf. Elizabeth Chambliss, It’s Not About Us: Beyond the Job Market Critique of U.S. Law Schools, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2013) (arguing that the conversation about legal education should focus on the interests of consumers and clients, rather than law students and lawyers).

64. ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 16.

65. Benjamin Barton predicts in this Colloquium that the letter of lawyer regulation will not change anytime soon, but technologies and workarounds will lead to a practical change in who can practice law. The weakening of the lawyer monopoly out of court will benefit consumers, who will enjoy lower cost services. The monopoly will endure, however, in the courtroom. See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3079–80 (2014). If Barton is correct, legal services will become more accessible for everyone but those who need them most: people who cannot afford representation in eviction proceedings, creditor lawsuits, parental rights determinations, and the like.
communities in ways currently forbidden by unauthorized practice of law rules.66

B. The Limits of Civics

The ABA has a number of initiatives aimed at public education on the law, primarily focused on information for consumers of lawyer-provided services and advocacy for civics education. Civics education is undeniably vital to a functioning democracy and is lacking in the United States.67 The ABA’s advocacy is an important effort to keep it in the public school curriculum given No Child Left Behind’s emphasis on tested subjects like math and reading.68 Yet the vision of civics and law education, most prominently promoted by the ABA through both advocacy for mandatory civics standards and youth summits, seems incomplete in its lack of focus on practical legal knowledge and legal reasoning skills.

The ABA’s conception of what the citizenry most needs to know aligns well with the continued primacy of lawyers. Its civics education efforts focus heavily on “respect” for the rule of law, which ostensibly already exists in the United States. Specifically, this entails respect for the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. The former

66. New York is piloting a program in which nonlawyer “navigators” supervised by three nonprofit organizations assist unrepresented litigants. However, the navigators are prohibited from giving legal advice and may address the court only if questioned by a judge. Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, No. AO/42/14 (Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/pdfs/AO-42-14.pdf (relating to the Court Navigator Program). Predictably, the state bar association expressed concern, and proponents had to assure lawyers that the navigators would not hurt their economic interests because they will assist people too poor to pay an attorney. See Joel Stashenko, State Bar Seeks Assurances on ‘Navigator’ Plan, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 2014, at 1, 1 (“[State bar president David] Schraver said lawyers are concerned about the breadth of the navigator’s role. ‘The concern is that the navigator not cross the line into practicing law,’” he said.”). The New York Times editorial board praised the plan and told lawyers not to feel threatened. Editorial, Better Lawyering for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A26. It failed to note that the navigators are, in fact, prohibited from doing any “lawyering for the poor.”


68. While the ABA is right to criticize the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), it is unclear to what, if any, extent it is to blame for the public’s lack of civic knowledge, especially given that earlier generations of Americans also had little civics knowledge, as was recognized in an article about the ABA’s efforts in the ABA Journal. See Marc Hansen, Flunking Civics: Why America’s Kids Know So Little, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 32, 35 (“While it’s true that most young Americans don’t know all that much about politics and government, they know as much as their parents did and more than their peers in other countries, says Peter Levine, director of the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, and one of the leading researchers in the field . . . . Levine says that schools are still teaching civics as much as or more than ever before. The amount of time devoted to social studies in elementary and middle school has remained pretty constant over the years, he says, and the amount of time devoted to social studies in high school is up substantially, although the mix of courses has changed appreciably since the 1950s. Civics and problem- or discussion-oriented classes are less common today than they were in the 1950s, he says, but political science, economics and social studies classes are more common.”).
name of the ABA’s civic education commission, the Commission on Civic Education and the Separation of Powers,69 highlights this emphasis on protecting the role of the courts, as does that of a recent event entitled “Law Day: No Courts, No Justice, No Freedom.”70 This emphasis, motivated by attacks on the judiciary,71 is in keeping with a history of bar associations’ proclivity to join in resistance to authoritarianism only once their autonomy is threatened.72 It is also in keeping with the emphasis of ABA rule of law promoters abroad on promoting the prestige of judiciaries.73

An alternative approach would place greater emphasis on knowing one’s rights and obligations, but lawyers can be unfriendly to the spread of general rights consciousness that would permit legal remedies against the powerful clienteles on which they depend.74 Less ominously, lawyers may see themselves as having an exclusive role in mediating those rights based on their special knowledge or skill. This leaves the subjects of the law without an adequate knowledge of it, which undermines the rule of law in even its most formalist sense of a set of predictable rules, uniformly applied. A basic civics education is imperative for a citizen to be able to shape the law through participation in the democratic process.75 But an

71. See American Bar Association Commission on Civic Education and the Separation of Powers, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/op/greco/civic_ed.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (“Current tensions among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches have brought to the fore the basic principles of separation of powers that have supported and sustained our republic for more than 200 years. Recent attempts to intimidate judges, cut court budgets, and dramatically alter the jurisdiction and other fundamental characteristics of courts have raised serious concerns about unhealthy and unwarranted infringements on the separation of powers, and their effect on public perception of the judiciary and public understanding of the importance of separation of powers.”).
72. Gordon, supra note 21, at 457 (“Bar associations—not generally the most courageous or liberal-minded of institutions—have been most likely to join in resistance to authoritarian rule where they had some traditions of autonomy they were motivated to defend.”).
73. HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 198 (“[I]f law is to rule, its priests and guardians must be tended. An important background theme in rule of law projects has been to increase the prestige of the judiciary. . . . Funding judicial associations and supporting regular conferences on themes such as the role of judges in society, or the importance of the rule of law, are all intended to address these shortcomings, to nurture professional pride, and to sensitize the courts to their public role . . . . [T]his will lead to greater ‘societal respect’ (the term used in one USAID document for ‘legitimacy’), which will in turn boost their capacity to apply the law independently.” (citations omitted)).
74. Gordon, supra note 21, at 451 (noting the efforts of U.S. bar associations to undermine personal injury bars with ethics rules prohibiting solicitation and contingency fees, tort reform efforts, and unauthorized practice prosecutions even in markets that lawyers do not serve).
75. Ilya Somin argues that intractably low levels of voter knowledge are not due to poor access to political information or low levels of education but are the result of “rational ignorance,” because voters have little incentive to acquire political information given the insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1293–94 (2004).
understanding of governmental institutions and the separation of powers is not enough to provide a threshold awareness of the content of the law that governs daily life.

In a 2011 paper on legal knowledge in the United States, the ABA Commission on Civic Education lamented the fact that more Americans could name a judge on American Idol than name the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. While this may be demoralizing to denizens of the judicial branch, it seems unlikely to either indicate or cause an impediment to a person’s participation in American democracy or awareness of her rights. It is perhaps even a sign that our courts are less personality driven than the political branches. Regardless, not being able to name Chief Justice John Roberts is, in my view, not nearly as big a problem as not knowing, for example, what a tort is.

C. Ignorance of Legal Basics: The Example of Battery

Americans need to know that they are bound by the criminal and civil law in order to understand that they can be held responsible for harming someone, even by accident. They need to know what their rights are in order to seek recourse when they are violated. They need to know what a tort is in order to pursue civil remedies when the criminal justice system fails them or isn’t the appropriate forum.

The average citizen does not need to know all the elements of the prima facie case for common law battery, for example, but she does need to get the gist: that intentionally touching someone without permission is generally a tort and often a crime. It might seem obvious to a lawyer, but the normalization of violence, as well as the treatment of women’s bodies as public in our society, can obscure the fact that it is not just mean or rude to touch without consent but illegal. If we taught citizens from a young age that starting a fistfight or groping a person is a tort (and in many jurisdictions a crime even without an injury), it would give notice to would-be perpetrators of the significance of the action, bring greater opprobrium to everyday violence, and empower victims with the knowledge that their treatment is not acceptable. A person who is

76. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON CIVIC EDUC. IN THE NATION’S SCH., supra note 67, at 2.

77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 18 (1965) (“(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.2(a) (2d ed. 2003) (“But in addition to these more obvious bodily injuries, offensive touchings (as where a man puts his hands upon a girl’s body or kisses a woman against her will, or where one person spits into another’s face) will also suffice for battery under the traditional view. The modern approach, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, is to limit battery to instances of physical injury and cover unwanted sexual advances by other statutes. This is the prevailing view in those jurisdictions with new criminal codes . . . . [A] minority of these codes follow a much broader view, sometimes extending the crime to any touching or physical contact, but more often requiring that the contact be ‘offensive,’ ‘insulting or provoking,’ or done ‘in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.’” (citations omitted)).

78. Id.
experiencing physical harm may respond differently if she understands the perpetrator’s actions are a violation of her rights that society has not just stigmatized but outlawed. This awareness is conducive to seeking counsel, reporting crimes, or setting boundaries in interpersonal relationships. There is a long history in this country of violence against women, in particular, not being treated as a “real crime,” which scholars have traced to coverture laws and a public/private distinction that functionally deprives women of the protection of the law.79 But it also reflects an inadequate understanding or acceptance of the most basic obligations of citizens to each other.

A perennial example of the public’s lack of understanding of battery is the pie in the face of the public figure.80 Protesters attempt to hit some controversial figure, often a political conservative, in the face with a pie and media commentators treat it as harmless silliness.81 When the pie thrower is charged, reports may mention he was charged with assault or battery but fail to define the crime.82 Never is there any explanation of the fact that “unlawfully touching” a person, including by a substance put in motion, or making a person fear an unlawful touching, is a crime in the jurisdiction.83

79. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 155–56 (2000) (arguing that the Court should uphold the right of rape victims to bring federal claims against their rapists under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), as within Congress’s remedial powers because, historically, under legal doctrines such as coverture, a woman’s legal identity was subsumed upon marriage into that of her husband, who had the right to chastise her. Such doctrines “legitimated, amplified, and gave legal force to malign impulses, and left women more vulnerable to violence and discrimination than they otherwise would have been” (citing RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 19 (1988)); see also G. Kristian Miccio, Male Violence—State Silence: These and Other Tragedies of the 20th Century, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 339, 344 (2002) (“The liberty to beat wives, a liberty the common law granted husbands through the doctrine of coverture, is still part of our common culture. Such violence is pervasive, and it is manifestly gendered.”). Feminist theorists have critiqued the conception of a line between the private and the public that places deprivations of liberty by private actors, such as private violence against women, outside the realm of constitutional concern. Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 857 (2000).


81. See Timothy Stenovec, Pie in the Face: Rupert Murdoch, Ann Coulter, Bill Gates and Tom Friedman Have All Gotten It, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2011, 6:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/19/rupert-murdoch-pie-in-the-face_n_903757 .html#s311920 (“While it remains to be seen whether Jonnie Marbles will be punished for his attempted pieing of Rupert Murdoch, clowns from generations before are sure looking down, knowing that their legacy lives on.”).


83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Ms. Magazine, an organization one would expect to be particularly sensitive to the nonconsensual touching of women,84 celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary in 2011 of antigay activist Anita Bryant being hit in the face with a pie by posting an artist’s rendering, in a pop-art style, of Bryant’s cream covered face on its Facebook page.85 A student who threw a pie at Ann Coulter during a speaking event indicated his lack of understanding of his actions by telling a reporter, “When throwing a pie can be called assault and bombing civilians called collateral damage, you gotta laugh to stay sane.”86 Another pie thrower indicated he did not grasp that he had committed a crime (and tort) when he distributed a manifesto under his real name in the days after his stunt that “provided a complete and detailed confession to committing the crime of battery against William Kristol according to the prosecutor.”87 We might want to dismiss these incidents as the work of people with poor judgment, but their surprise at facing legal consequences for throwing things at people, and the consistent media reaction, indicates a lack of the most basic knowledge of the law among even college-educated citizens.

I am not suggesting that more young people should be prosecuted for pie-throwings and school-yard fights (especially in light of racial and class disparities in who benefits from prosecutorial discretion).88 I am, however, saying that everyone should be aware that “no hitting” (more precisely: “no touching without permission”) is not just good etiquette, but the law, even if the law is enforced in only a minority of instances of unwanted touching. Nor am I suggesting that normalized violence results primarily from ignorance of the law, and therefore educating students about the law is the

84. Ms. Magazine, a feminist magazine that played an important role in the women’s movement, was “the first magazine to feature domestic violence on its cover.” Issuer We Hope Steinem Keeps Fighting For . . ., DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009, at 37. Ms. is currently published by the Feminist Majority Foundation, whose mission is to “advance women’s equality, non-violence, economic development, and, most importantly, empowerment of women and girls in all sectors of society.” Mission and Principles, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., http://www.feminist.org/welcome/mandp.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).


best path to changing the culture. Research on teaching empathy to students is perhaps more promising in this regard. But where there is a failure of empathy, awareness of the law should deter perpetrators and empower victims.

I use the pie-throwing example because it is not unreasonable for a layperson not to know that throwing something without causing an injury or even making contact could be a crime. It is much harder to understand the rash of recent examples of young people witnessing, recording, and distributing video of the touching or penetration of incapacitated women and their apparent failure to comprehend that they were witnessing or committing a crime and a tort.

D. Ignorance of the Law and the Steubenville Rape Pattern

In the most famous case of a minor raped in front of her peers, which occurred in Steubenville, Ohio, witnesses did not recognize that a perpetrator penetrating the incapacitated victim’s vagina with his fingers constituted rape. One witness explained that he did not try to stop the rape

---

89. See Jennifer Kahn, Can Emotional Intelligence Be Taught?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2013, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (reporting on a number of programs designed to teach students emotional intelligence); Pam Belluck, For Better Social Skills, Scientists Recommend a Little Chekhov, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/i-know-youre-feeling-i-read-chekhov/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting findings that after reading literary fiction, people performed better on tests measuring empathy, social perception, and emotional intelligence). But see Katherine Beals, How To Teach Empathy, OUT LEFT FIELD (Oct. 20, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://oilf.blogspot.com/2013/10/how-to-teach-empathy.html (arguing that such programs are expensive and detract from core subjects like social studies and world history, which teach empathy for people outside the student’s peer group).

90. For another illustration of widespread ignorance of battery, see Bridgette Dunlap, Learn Your Rights: Touching a Pregnant Person’s Stomach Is Illegal and Has Been for Some Time, RH REALITY CHECK (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://threalitycheck.org/article/2013/11/05/learn-your-rights-touching-a-pregnant-persons-stomach-is-illegal-and-has-been-for-some-time/ (discussing a story that went viral misreporting that Pennsylvania had passed a law making it newly illegal to touch a pregnant woman’s stomach without consent). Contrary to the media narrative, authorities issued a citation to a man who repeatedly touched a pregnant woman against her will under Pennsylvania’s existing harassment law, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (West 2000), under which physical contact “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another” is a summary offense.

91. See Connor Simpson, The Kids at the Steubenville Rape Party Told Cops They Should Have Stopped It, WIRE (March 24, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/03/steubenville-police-tapes/63463/; see also Nina Burleigh, Sexting Shame and Suicide, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 26, 2013, at 46 (reporting that three boys allegedly removed the clothing of an incapacitated 15-year-old girl (who later killed herself), drew all over her body with marker, digitally penetrated her, and took photos that were passed around her school); Abigail Pesta, Thanks for Raining My Life, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/thanks-running-my-life-63423 (reporting that two sixteen-year-olds stripped a girl and took pictures while digitally penetrating her); Stephen Harper ’Sickened’ by Alleged ‘Sexual Criminal Activity’ Linked to Rehtaeh Parsons Tragedy, NAT’L POST (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/11/harper-decries-criminal-activity-in-n-s-teens-death/ (reporting that a girl killed herself after four boys allegedly assaulted her and distributed pictures).
because “at the time, no one really saw it as being forceful.”92 Another tweeted, “If they’re getting ‘raped’ and don’t resist then to me it’s not rape.”93 The prosecutor explained that testifying witnesses “don’t think that what they’ve seen is a rape in the classic sense.”94 These statements and the actions of the many witnesses indicate ignorance of the fact that it does not take a certain kind of penetration, amount of force, or injury to commit rape in Ohio and many other states.95

Media coverage of the case treated the story as a cautionary tale about the dangers of social media rather than rape.96 This and similar cases demonstrate the prevalent misperception that the crime of rape is defined by popular understanding of the term rather than statute.97 If “classic” rape is something akin to rape at common law, there is widespread ignorance that the law has changed.98 Argument over what kind of penetration should constitute rape misses the point that the definition is not arrived at via opinion poll, and also suggests a lack of awareness that one can commit tortious and criminal batteries other than rape without any penetration or injury.

94. Id.
95. O HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (“‘Sexual conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.”).
97. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Miley Cyrus, Steubenville and Teen Culture Run Amok, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-cohen-miley-cyrus-steubenville-and-culture-run-amok/2013/09/02/1eecefa6-11af-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html (implying that the case did not concern a genuine rape and thus obscuring the fact that digital penetration is rape: “The first thing you should know about the so-called Steubenville Rape is that this was not a rape involving intercourse. . . . Obviously, she was sexually mistreated”).
98. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105, 1133–61 (1986) (explaining that “force” or “threat of force” was traditionally an element of the crime of rape and assessing two reform models). The Model Penal Code has provided for a third-degree felony of “gross sexual imposition” involving forms of nonconsensual sex that do not involve force or threat of force. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2009). Michigan’s statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(a) (West 2004), was amended in 1983 to expand the crime to include penetration with objects and offensive sexual touching, male victims, and female perpetrators. Estrich, supra, at 1148. It dispensed with the term “rape” like many states that labeled the expanded crime criminal sexual conduct or assault. Id. Estrich warned that the well-intentioned renaming aimed at shedding the “common law baggage” associated with rape “risks obscuring the unique meaning and understanding of the indignity and harm of ‘rape.’” Id. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003) (detailing out-of-date sexual offense provisions of the Model Penal Code that misrepresent the progressive thinking of the Code’s reporters and are out of step with modern attitudes and rape statutes).
What is additionally frightening is the Steubenville prosecutor’s speculation that only one in a thousand teens would realize that taking or distributing a video of a naked minor is illegal.99 If our society provided young people with a basic understanding of the law that governs their lives, they would assume this was illegal, regardless of whether the criminal laws of their state have caught up with cyberbullying, because sending around naked pictures of someone is almost certainly the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, among others.100 Victims who knew the law was on their side might seek help rather than engaging in self-harm, as has occurred in multiple instances.101

That there have been so many cases of young people committing and distributing pictures of sexual batteries is obviously a much deeper problem than ignorance of the law. However, ignorance deprives the law of its deterrent effect and deprives victims of recourse and support. We can say everyone knows these things are wrong, but prosecutors are dealing with boys “who seem to think they are committing pranks with phones and passed out girls.”102 This kind of confusion would not be possible if high school students were taught that any kind of offensive touching is illegal and that there is such a thing as a privacy tort. Where morality and empathy have failed, we can at least be clear about the law. The ignorance of perpetrators, victims, and the public is contributing to lawlessness.103

100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012) (“An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”); see also Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 390–91 (2011) (“Cyberbullying is actually just a new term that encompasses several very old wrongs: intentional torts.”); 4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 51.04[2] (2d ed. 2005) (“[R]evenge porn[, the distribution of intimate pictures online by a former mate,] may justify other tort claims as well, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
101. See Burleigh, supra note 91, at 46 (reporting on the suicides of Audrie Potts, Jill Naber, and Rehtaeh Parsons). It is, of course, impossible to know to what extent the photos are the cause of these women’s suicides.
102. Id. (”[T]he young men committing them are not seeing them as crimes, they see them as pranks. And there’s no point in pulling a prank unless you share it.” Anderson said parents and educators need to talk to younger boys about informed consent. ‘When I speak to students, I tell boys that if a young woman isn’t of age, she isn’t capable of giving informed consent. . . . And those cases, if you have sex, you can go to jail. And the jaws drop, because right away the think of the sex they had at a party last weekend, where everybody was wasted.”).
103. Battery provides just one example of legal rules every American should know. Others include basic principles of contract law. Too many laypeople think signing a contract is the end of their rights because they are not aware that contract provisions can be void as against public policy or what a contract of adhesion is. The idea that signatures are magic also leads laypeople to believe that they cannot enter into a contract without a writing or have rights outside a contract, such as those provided by statutes and ordinances. This perpetuates power imbalances between individuals and the corporations, landlords, and employers with whom they contract, because a person who assumes she has no rights has no reason to obtain counsel, attempt to negotiate on her own, or even look up available legal information.
IV. TEACHING LEGAL BASICS

I cannot claim to know the optimal way to impart legal knowledge in a
country struggling to teach its students basic math and reading, as I am not
an education scholar. There are, however, some models worth mentioning
briefly. A number of bar associations have programs aimed at engaging
lawyers pro bono and training public school teachers to provide legal
education, known as Law-Related Education (LRE). The ABA holds an
LRE conference every two years that focuses on civic education, but this
might be an opportunity to integrate legal education into the existing work
with teachers, as some state bars have done.104

One of the most established LRE programs, “Street Law,” emphasizes
practical legal knowledge.105 Founded at Georgetown Law Center in 1972,
there are street law programs in every U.S. state that teach public school
students and community groups about housing, employment, child custody,
abuse and neglect, consumer law, criminal law, the juvenile justice system,
police procedures, domestic violence, sexual assault, and other legal
topics.106 Street Law programs also aim to teach young people “where
rules and laws come from, how they can be changed, and why they are
essential to society.”107 There are multiple models,108 but they often consist
of law students teaching semester- or year-long courses in public high
schools.109 By most, if not all, accounts, these programs provide invaluable
experiences to both the law student instructors and the high school
students110 and provide additional benefits such as pipeline programs that
foster diversity in the legal profession.111

Though they serve critical public service objectives, Renee Newman
Knake notes that four decades of Street Law and other LRE programs have
not democratized legal education.112 She proposes that law schools band

---

104. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Teaching Children About the Law, Md. B.J., May/June 2006,
at 10, 14 (“We educate young people on how the law impacts their daily lives as citizens.
Having people understand how a bill becomes a law is only one aspect . . . . Understanding
how that bill affects them, in terms of zoning, a contract or even in the context of a crime, is
something our schools have never covered, but it is critical for our kids to understand. These
future adults will be consumers of the civil and criminal justice system, yet they have little or
no understanding of it.”).
and Social Justice Education, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 2011, at 225, 225 (Frank S. Block ed., 2010).
106. Matthew M. Kavanagh & Bebs Chorak, Teaching Law As a Life Skill: How Street
Law Helps Youth Make the Transition to Adult Citizenship, 18 J. JUV. JUST. & DETENTION
SERVICES 71, 72 (2003).
107. Id.
108. See Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 230 (describing the credit-bearing model, the
nonclinical pro bono model, and the law student organizations model).
110. See generally Grimes et al., supra note 105; MacDowell, supra note 26; Pinder,
supra note 109.
111. Kavanagh & Chorak, supra note 106, at 73.
112. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281,
1305 (2013).
together for a systematic public information campaign aimed at increasing public awareness of one’s rights and how lawyers can help. This is a creative solution to the problem of people not hiring lawyers as a result of not realizing that they have a legal problem or knowing how to access affordable services. That is a different (though related) problem than the lack of general knowledge of the law necessary for daily life and participation in a democracy apart from specific legal problems that lawyers can address. But practical knowledge, like the type imparted in Street Law programs, might stimulate demand for legal services by increasing the public’s awareness of their rights and how the legal system works.

The impact that law school–based Street Law programs can have is limited for a number of reasons. First, according to proponents, the “primary rationale” for such programs is the professional development of law students rather than the education of the general public. Additionally, widely replicating the model would prove difficult, as it is extremely time intensive and requires unusually dedicated students and teachers. At Georgetown, law students take a two-hour seminar, teach three hours per week, and spend six “often grueling” weeks preparing for a mock trial competition.

There is also significant prep time required for class since the law student teachers must create their own lesson plans. The program relies on first-time teachers reinventing the wheel rather than educators improving their skills over time and refining their curriculum. One Street Law alumna notes, “Some would argue that a program like Street Law belongs in a graduate school of education and not in a school of law,” but discounts this as the concern of those afraid to stray outside the traditional law school curriculum. However, one can acknowledge the value to law students but still believe that training teachers who intend to teach would be a better use of resources. The Georgetown model could be subject to some of the same criticisms leveled at Teach For America—that young people who are not starting careers as teachers are thrown into urban classrooms with little training, contributing to the de-professionalization of teaching.

---

113. Id. at 1312–16.  
114. Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 229.  
116. Id.  
117. See id. at 215.  
118. But see Grimes et al., supra note 105, at 225 (“While the sessions can be led by experienced experts—law teachers and practicing lawyers—they are often most effective when done by law students whose task is to learn the material themselves before helping others to understand it. Law students often strike an immediate rapport with school pupils, in part because they may not be many years senior to their target audience.”).  
119. Pinder, supra note 109, at 226.  
Proponents argue that Street Law programs are most effective when sponsored by law school clinics. However, the efforts of law clinics are necessarily piecemeal, though they can be laboratories to develop approaches aimed at systemic change and have historically played an important role in public interest law. As in the case of the ABA’s emphasis on law school clinics and postgraduate fellows to provide legal services discussed above, relying too heavily on clinics risks fostering the idea that imparting basic legal knowledge is an act of charity by generous lawyers rather than an obligation of a society committed to the rule of law.

Professional educators could, however, teach Street Law, other practical LRE curricula, and the form of dialogic argument taught through law. Street Law has published a number of textbooks and provides information explaining how the curriculum aligns with “Common Core” requirements on its website. The ABA could add advocacy for basic practical legal education to its work for state-mandated civics programs.

Law school–based Street Law programs have the benefit of programs tailored to the legal needs of particular inner-city communities, but these topics also have a place in a core curriculum for all populations. The ability to recognize when one’s rights have been violated by police officers may be particularly important in a community targeted by “stop and frisk,” but this knowledge is also “practical” for students who seldom interact with police, in that it is useful for evaluating public policy and understanding how the law affects others. Community-specific workshops on specific legal issues, like those taught by pro bono attorneys for Street Law, might also be expanded, but would need to supplement universal basic legal education for the law to be predictable and uniformly applied.

CONCLUSION

The rule of law is a nebulous concept, but central to the ideal promoted by the United States abroad and at home is the notion that universal laws must be uniformly applied. The formalist reliance on procedures and institutions is inadequate to achieve uniform application of the law where those institutions are inaccessible due to lack of knowledge and counsel. In the United States, the lawyers’ monopoly has led to a view of the law as the

121. Grimes et al., supra note 105. Golub also sees law school clinics as an important tool for legal empowerment. Golub, supra note 2, at 173–74.


123. A recent study found that students who took a class in dialogic argument improved their writing significantly more than students who took a class that involved much more instruction and practice in expository writing. Deanna Kuhn & Amanda Crowell, Dialogic Argumentation As a Vehicle for Developing Young Adolescents’ Thinking, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 545–52 (2011).

exclusive domain of lawyers, leaving laypeople with inadequate knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. This ignorance deprives citizens of the protection of the law and the norms it represents, because wrongdoers are undeterred by laws they are not aware of, victims do not claim rights they do not realize they have, and government actors have limited incentive to address problems that go unrecognized by the public.

Furthermore, the lack of understanding of how the law works and what lawyers do discourages laypeople from learning what the law is and how it could be improved, impairing the discourse and political process that should lead to just laws. The current approach of the U.S. legal profession is consistent with its rule of law orthodoxy abroad, but promoting respect for the judiciary and access to lawyer-provided services exclusively leaves laypeople too dependent on the legal profession to mediate the laws that govern their lives.