

Fordham Law School

## FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

---

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

---

June 2023

### Administrative Appeal Decision - Rodriguez, Rodolfo (2019-07-10)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad>

---

#### Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Rodriguez, Rodolfo (2019-07-10)" (2023). Parole Information Project  
<https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/1482>

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [tmelnick@law.fordham.edu](mailto:tmelnick@law.fordham.edu).

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Rodriguez, Rodolfo Facility: Shawangunk CF

NYSID: [REDACTED] Appeal Control No.: 12-070-18 B

DIN: 95-A-3656

Appearances: Marshall Nadan Esq.  
P.O. Box 4091  
Kingston, New York 12402

Decision appealed: November 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Berliner, Smith, Shapiro


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received April 22, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 7/10/19 66.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Rodriguez, Rodolfo

**DIN:** 95-A-3656

**Facility:** Shawangunk CF

**AC No.:** 12-070-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 5)

---

Appellant challenges the November 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for several different crimes. In one case while committing an armed robbery he shot and killed a police officer who was trying to stop it. In other convictions, he robbed at three different male victims at gunpoint. And in a third conviction, he sold a controlled substance. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his deportation order, as well as his request for CPDO status. 3) no aggravating factors exist. 4) the DA letter is old and should not be relied upon. 5) the Board ignored the wishes of the sentencing court and illegally resentenced him. 6) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the statutes are future and rehabilitation focused, and the COMPAS was ignored. Nor was any valid reason given for a departure, as is required by the 2017 regulations. And the COMPAS has an error as well, as, contrary to the COMPAS, he does have family support.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016);

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Rodriguez, Rodolfo

**DIN:** 95-A-3656

**Facility:** Shawangunk CF

**AC No.:** 12-070-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 5)

---

Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017)(shooting of police officer); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

There is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering insight. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). Insight is relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense. Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002) (limited insight into why crime committed). Matter of Ward v. New York State Division of Parole, 26 A.D.3d 712, 809 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dept.) (lack of insight) lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 702, 818 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2006).

The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct on the victims. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 1997); Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal's actions upon the victims' families. Bottom v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Rodriguez, Rodolfo

**DIN:** 95-A-3656

**Facility:** Shawangunk CF

**AC No.:** 12-070-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 5)

---

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The existence of a deportation order does not require an inmate's release, but is merely one factor to consider. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Samuel v. Alexander, 69 A.D.3d 861, 892 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2d Dept. 2010). Petitioner's contention that, given the deportation order, it was irrational to conclude that his release would be incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community is without merit. Matter of Kelly v. Hagler, 94 A.D.3d 1301, 942 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept. 2012); see also Matter of Hunter v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1178, 800 N.Y.S.2d 799 (3d Dept. 2005). Although the Board's determination did not specifically reference the deportation order, the Board plainly was aware of its existence and, in any event, was 'not required to assign equal weight to or discuss every factor it considered in making its determination. Matter of Abbas v. New York State Division of Parole, 61 A.D.3d 1228, 877 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dept. 2009). The Board denied parole, which encompasses CPDO. Executive Law § 259-i. The Board was not required to explicitly discuss CPDO in the decision. Borrell v. Superintendent of Wende Corr. Facility, No. 12-CV-6582 CJS MWP, 2014 WL 297348, at \*7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), appeal dismissed (Oct. 31, 2014).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Rodriguez, Rodolfo

**DIN:** 95-A-3656

**Facility:** Shawangunk CF

**AC No.:** 12-070-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 4 of 5)

---

v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 2019).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. The 2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018).

Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”. Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Rodriguez, Rodolfo

**DIN:** 95-A-3656

**Facility:** Shawangunk CF

**AC No.:** 12-070-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 5 of 5)

---

The alleged COMPAS error was discussed during the interview, and did not in any way play a part in the Board decision. So at most, even if there was an error, it would be harmless error. Inmate informed Board of alleged errors (as to confession) during interview and there is no indication in the record to suggest the controverted information served as a basis for the decision. Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017). If the Board did not rely upon it, then it is mere harmless error. Matter of Gardiner v. New York State Div. of Parole, 48 A.D.3d 871, 850 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dept. 2008).

The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

The Board departure from the COMPAS does in fact comply with the 2017 regulations. Due to appellant’s numerous instant offenses, and continuous disciplinary problems, his release would deprecate the serious nature of the crimes.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.