Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

June 2023

Administrative Appeal Decision - Rosario, Anival E (2022-03-30)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad

Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Rosario, Anival E (2022-03-30)" (2023). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/1468

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 6)

Appellant challenges the November 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is for shoplifting over \$6,000 worth of merchandise from Target during the course of four visits to the store. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision lacks details. 4) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 5) the proceeding was done in an adversarial manner, and wasn't impartial. 6) the Board failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 7) the decision illegally resentenced him. 8) it wasn't appellant's fault he hadn't completed programming as he had only recently arrived in DOCCS custody. 9) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no TAP was done, the positive portions of the COMPAS were ignored, and the laws are now rehabilitation and future based.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense. <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State</u> <u>Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); <u>Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); <u>Matter of Warren</u> <u>v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter</u> <u>of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the incarcerated individual's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter</u>

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 2 of 6)

of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

After considering the relevant factors, the Board was allowed to place greater emphasis on the incarcerated individual's criminal record including prior failures while under community supervision. See, e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's history of drug and/or alcohol abuse. <u>Matter of Espinal v. New York Bd. of Parole</u>, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (substance abuse history); <u>Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (substance abuse history and risk of future drug abuse); <u>Matter of Dean v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (3d Dept. 2005) (involvement with weapons and drugs), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 705, 812 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2006); <u>Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005) (history of drug abuse); <u>Matter of Llull v. Travis</u>, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dept. 2001) (drug abuse); <u>Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 236 A.D.2d 760, 761, 654 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (3d Dept. 1997) (history of alcohol and drug abuse); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994) (history of alcohol abuse); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983) (drug addiction); <u>Matter of Maciag v. Hammock</u>, 88 A.D.2d 1106, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56 (3d Dept. 1982) (problem of alcohol and drug abuse with the concomitant need for programmed counseling).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Espinal v. New</u> <u>York Bd. of Parole</u>, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); <u>Matter of Bush v. Annucci</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); <u>Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Jones v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole</u>, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505, 506 (3rd Dept. 2019); <u>Matter of Allen v. Stanford</u>, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); <u>Matter of Barrett v.</u> <u>New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); <u>see also Matter</u>

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 3 of 6)

of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's need to complete rehabilitative programming even where a delay in commencement is through no fault of the individual. See Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997).

The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole. <u>See, e.g., Matter of Delrosario</u> <u>v. Stanford</u>, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry plans in case immigration does not deport incarcerated individual); <u>Matter of Murphy v. State of New York</u> <u>Exec. Dep't Div. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate release plan).

While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an incarcerated individual's crime, <u>Matter of Hamilton</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are multiple aggravating factors present here.

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); <u>Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 4 of 6)

per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

The interview was not done in an adversarial manner. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007).

"Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts'; or, put differently, '*[r]ationality is what is reviewed under... the arbitrary and capricious standard.*" Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 5 of 6)

N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting <u>Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ.</u>, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." <u>Matter of Silmon v.</u> <u>Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting <u>Matter of Russo v. New York State</u> <u>Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. <u>Fuller v Evans</u>, 586 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) <u>cert.den</u>. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

Due to appellant only having been in custody a very brief time, a TAP was not yet prepared. In making a parole release decision, the Board must consider the most current case plan that may have been prepared by DOCCS. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a rehabilitation/future-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Montane v. Evans</u>, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>see also Matter of Hawthorne v.</u> <u>Stanford</u>, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); <u>Matter of LeGeros</u>, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; <u>Matter of Robles v. Fischer</u>, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Rosario, Anival	DIN:	21-A-1146
Facility:	Woodbourne CF	AC No.:	11-100-21 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 6 of 6)

386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); <u>Matter of Montane</u>, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. <u>Matter of King</u>, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. <u>See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

Recommendation: Affirm.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Rosario, Ar	nival ,	Facility:	Woodbourne CF			
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	11-100-21 B			
DIN:	21-A-1146			. ·			i an
Appearan	<u>ces</u> :	Anival Rosario 21A Woodbourne Correc 99 Prison Road P.O. Box 1000 Woodbourne, New Y	tional Facility			aj E	
Decision a	appealed:	-		scretionary release and im	posing a	hold of	12
Board Me who partic		Berliner, Samuels, L	ee	•			
Papers con	nsidered:	Appellant's Letter-b Appellant's Supplen		vember 19, 2021 of received January 26, 202	22	·	
Appeals L	<u>Jnit Review</u> :	Statement of the App	peals Unit's Find	ings and Recommendatio	n .		47
<u>Records r</u>	elied upon:			arole Board Report, Interv n 9026), COMPAS instru		iscript,	Parole
Final Deta	ermination:	2,		lecision appealed is hereby		й б ул .	· • •
Comm	nissioner	>		· .	dified to _		
Comm	nissioner			or de novo interview Mo	dified to _	۲. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2 2 2
Comm	nissioner					- * - 7 	한 국가 1

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 03/30/302266

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)