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Administrative Appeal Decision - Williams, Clark A (2022-06-08)

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APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Williams, Clark	DIN:	81-B-2516
Facility:	Green Haven CF	AC No.:	11-039-21 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 5)

Appellant challenges the September 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant raping a six-year-old girl and causing her death by throwing her from the roof of a six-story building. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to consider the required statutory factors including various aspects of his institutional record; 2) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments by merely returning to the scene of the crime; 3) the Board cited Appellant's misbehavior reports while incarcerated despite other indicators that suggest he has no disciplinary issues; 4) the letter from the District Attorney may be outdated; 5) Appellant was denied a fair hearing, with discussion of negative factors dominating the hearing; 6) the Board's emphasis on the instant offense without citing any aggravating factors was in violation of his due process rights; 7) Appellant's record contrasts favorably with other successful parole applicants; 8) the Board effectively resentenced Appellant; and 9) the decision was predetermined. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such [incarcerated individual] is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); <u>accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. <u>People ex</u> rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. <u>See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Hamilton</u>, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; <u>Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. <u>Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole</u>, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204

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A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel. Herbert</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of two counts of Murder in the second degree and two counts of Rape in the first degree; that the instant offense represents Appellant's first state term of incarceration; Appellant's diminished intellectual capacity,

advanced age, and ability to communicate effectively; Appellant's institutional efforts including completion of ART, vocational programming, and sex offender programming, enrollment in academic outreach, and an extensive number of Tier II and Tier III misbehavior reports including three Tier II misbehavior reports since his last Board appearance; and release plans to live with his sister. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, letters from the District Attorney, and a letter of assurance.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the brutal instant offense, Appellant's poor disciplinary record including three misbehavior reports since his last appearance,

. See Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, Parole Bd. Div., 67 A.D.2d 1108, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dept. 1979), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 707, 418 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979). While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always required to support emphasis on an incarcerated individual's offense, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the Board's decision here was based on the additional considerations outlined above.

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. <u>See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky</u>, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. <u>See Garner v. Jones</u>, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

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Appellant's contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Contrary to Appellant's suggestion, the Board may consider an incarcerated individual's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012). The Board made specific note of the three misbehavior reports Appellant incurred since his last interview. The fact that the COMPAS instrument included a low score for prison misconduct does not provide a basis to disturb the decision.

The Board committed no error in its consideration of official opposition to release. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) requires the Board to consider recommendations of the sentencing court, the inmate's attorney, and the "district attorney." As such, the Board was obligated to consider the official statement it received from the District Attorney. Appellant's suggestion that the recommendation may be outdated is baseless, as a review of the record reveals the latest letter from the District Attorney was submitted in September 2021.

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The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant's contention that the parole interview was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview. <u>Matter of Rivers v. Evans</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); see also <u>Matter of Mays v. Stanford</u>, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d Dept. 2017). While Appellant attempts to label the interview as hostile and focusing on negative factors, a review of the transcript reflects the Board properly carried out its obligation to evaluate Appellant's rehabilitative progress and fitness for parole release.

Appellant's due process claim is without merit. An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

As for allegations regarding parole applicants, "[t]here is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the particulars of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value." <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007); <u>see also Baker v. McCall</u>, 543 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), <u>aff'd</u>, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

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Finally, there is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined. <u>Matter of Gonzalvo v.</u> <u>Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York</u> <u>State Div. of Parole</u>, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); <u>Matter of Guerin v. New</u> <u>York State Div. of Parole</u>, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

Recommendation: Affirm.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Williams, C	Clark	Facility:	Green Haven CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	11-039-21 B
DIN:	81-B-2516			
Appearanc	<u>ees</u> :	Charles J. Greenberg, 3840 Est Robinson Ro Amherst, NY 14228-2	oad - #318	
Decision a	ppealed:	September 2021 decis months.	ion, denying dis	cretionary release and imposing a hold of 12
Board Mer who partic		Davis, Crangle, Mitc	hell	
Papers cor	sidered:	Appellant's Brief rece	eived March 29, 1	2022
Appeals U	nit Review:	Statement of the Appe	eals Unit's Findi	ngs and Recommendation
	aundi .			
Records re	lied upon:		-	role Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Dete	rmination:	The undersigned deter	rmine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:
Du	athere			r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner			
	<u></u>	AffirmedVaca	ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner	1		
$ \rightarrow $	X	AffirmedVaca	ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner			

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 26/25/2622 66

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)