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Administrative Appeal Decision - Nieves, Gerranimo (2022-03-30)

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APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Nieves, Gerranimo DIN: 82-A-5173

Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.: 10-045-21 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant challenges the September 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is for robbing two victims by having them tied up, and killing one of them by stabbing him 26 times. The other victim played dead and managed to survive despite being stabbed and being seriously injured. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision is the same as prior decisions. 3) the decision lacks detail. 4) the decision failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 5) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 6) the Board has released other applicants with worse records. 7) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law as the COMPAS was ignored, and the laws are now rehabilitation based. 8) the 24 month hold is excessive.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal behavior. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <a href="look left: left

The fact that the incarcerated individual committed the instant offense while on community supervision is a proper basis for denying parole release. See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:Nieves, GerranimoDIN:82-A-5173Facility:Woodbourne CFAC No.:10-045-21 B

Findings: (Page 2 of 4)

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the incarcerated individual's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board has discretion, and may recount the crimes against the inmate in the decision and conclude the inmate's propensity for violence outweighs the alleged positive institutional record. Vargas v New York State Board of Parole, 20 A.D.3d 738, 797 N.Y.S.2d 783 (3d Dept); Valerio v Dennison, 35 A.D.3d 938, 825 N.Y.S.2d 574 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may take note of the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. <u>Hakim v Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); <u>Angel v Travis</u>, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate's blatant disregard for the law and the sanctity of human life. <u>Campbell v Stanford</u>, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2nd Dept. 2019).

Appellant objects to the fact that the Board decision is based on the same reasons given after his last appearance before the Board. However, as the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an incarcerated individual appears, it follows that the Board may deny release on the same grounds as relied upon in previous determinations. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); see also Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 110, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008) (affirming parole decision, which was worded similarly to two prior denials of parole affirmed by court).

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Nieves, Gerranimo DIN: 82-A-5173

Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.: 10-045-21 B

Findings: (Page 3 of 4)

Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

"There is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the particulars of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value." <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007).

"Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts'; or, put differently, '[r]ationality is what is reviewed under... the arbitrary and capricious standard." Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. <u>Fuller v Evans</u>, 586 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) <u>cert.den</u>. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a rehabilitation-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Nieves, Gerranimo DIN: 82-A-5173

Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.: 10-045-21 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 4)

"assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense. See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

Recommendation: Affirm.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Nieves, Ger	rranimo	Facility:	Woodbourne CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	10-045-21 B
DIN:	82-A-5173			
Appearances:		Donna Lasher Esq. P.O. Box 1081 Rock Hill, New York 12775		
Decision appealed:		September 2021 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.		
Board Member(s) who participated:		Lee, Coppola, Demosthenes		
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received January 28, 2022		
Appeals Unit Review: Sta		Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation		
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.		
Final Determination:		The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:		
Comm	nissioner	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Jomm	, niss k oper	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner .	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 03/30/2022.46

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)