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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Moultrie, Michael

DIN: 15-A-2262

Facility: Hale Creek ██████████

AC No.: 05-103-21 B

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Appellant challenges the May 2021 determination of the Board, denying SHOCK release and imposing a hold to PIE date. Appellant is incarcerated for several different crimes. In one, he was selling cocaine and heroin, and upon his arrest, had over one ounce of cocaine, over half an ounce of heroin, and a firearm in his possession. In the second, he possessed heroin with the intent to sell it. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the lack of an interview for a SHOCK review violates the 6th amendment to the Constitution. 3) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) the decision failed to offer any future guidance. 6) the decision is defective based upon comments by former Commissioner Manley. 7) the decision illegally resentenced him. 8) the decision is based upon personal opinion. 9) the decision ignored appellant's receipt of an EEC. 10) no aggravating factors exist. 11) the Parole Board Report is inferior to the Inmate Status Reports. 12) the decision is due to a political agenda. 13) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2014 and 2017 regulations, in that the positive portions of the COMPAS and TAP were ignored, the laws are present/future based, and the departure was illegally done in that no scales were mentioned, nor were individualized reasons for the departure given. 14) the hold to PIE date is excessive.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offenses. Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), *lv. denied*, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), *lv. denied*, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter

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of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the incarcerated individual's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board may consider the inmates involvement with weapons. Dean v New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's history of drug and/or alcohol abuse. Matter of Espinal v. New York Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (substance abuse history); Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (substance abuse history and risk of future drug abuse); Matter of Dean v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (3d Dept. 2005) (involvement with weapons and drugs), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 705, 812 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2006); Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005) (history of drug abuse); Matter of Llull v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dept. 2001) (drug abuse); Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 236 A.D.2d 760, 761, 654 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (3d Dept. 1997) (history of alcohol and drug abuse); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994) (history of alcohol abuse); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983) (drug addiction); Matter of Maciag v. Hammock, 88 A.D.2d 1106, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56 (3d Dept. 1982) (problem of alcohol and drug abuse with the concomitant need for programmed counseling).

There is no Sixth Amendment right in connection with a parole release determination. Cf. Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976).

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

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Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole. Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). Appellant's receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from considering and placing greater emphasis on his criminal behavior and record on community supervision. See, e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Berry v. New York State Div. of Parole, 50 A.D.3d 1346, 855 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2008).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an incarcerated individual should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

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We further note that participation in the six-month SHOCK incarceration program is a “privilege.” N.Y. Correction Law § 867. Completion of the program permits incarcerated individuals to be considered for parole in advance of their parole eligibility date. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(a). If parole is not granted, incarcerated individuals are held until their parole eligibility date. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b). The determination whether to parole incarcerated individuals who complete the program may be made without an interview. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b).

Claims revolving around a speech by former Commissioner Manley are without merit as his comments were not made under oath, and create no substantive rights. Matter of Alvarez v Evans, Index # 2804/2013, *Decision and Order* dated July 30, 2013 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co.)(Brands, J.S.C.). Furthermore, Manley has not been on the Board in over a decade, and many of his concerns have been addressed by the enactment of 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.2.

The decision was not made based upon personal opinion. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an incarcerated individual’s crime, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are multiple aggravating factors present here.

The Parole Board Report complies with all statutory requirements.

Appellant’s claim of political pressure is purely speculative and unsubstantiated. Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (3d Dept.), *lv. denied*, 19 N.Y.3d 815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber v. Travis, 264 A.D.2d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 1999).

“‘Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts’; or, put differently, ‘[r]ationality is what is reviewed under . . . the arbitrary and capricious standard.’” Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York

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State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017.

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

The 2014 regulations were repealed by the enactment of the 2017 regulations.

As for the TAP, Corrections Law 71-a and 112(4) have no guarantee of release upon an inmate's successful completion of programs. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a present/future-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014);

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accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense. See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board considered Appellant's COMPAS instrument but expressed disagreement with the low score for risk of arrest, and risk of felony violence, in light of Appellant's extensive criminal history. In so doing, the Board identified the scale from which it was departing and provided an explanation consistent with 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a).

The hold to PIE was legally required.

Recommendation: Affirm.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Moultrie, Michael

Facility: Hale Creek [REDACTED]

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 05-103-21 B

DIN: 15-A-2262

Appearances: Joshua Mitzman Esq.
11 Market Street
Suite 221
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

Decision appealed: May 2021 decision, denying SHOCK release and imposing a hold to PIE date.

Board Member(s) who participated: Coppola, Crangle

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 24, 2022

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

[Signature] Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner
[Signature] Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

[Signature] Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on

03/30/2022 GG