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# ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Alvarez, Sa	ntiago	Facility:	Cape Vincent CF	
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	05-077-19 B	
DIN:	10-A-0241				
Appearances:		Santiago Alvarez, 10- Cape Vincent Correct P.O. Box 599 Cape Vincent, New Y	tional Facility		
Decision appealed:		April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold to the maximum expiration date.			
Board Me who partic		Coppola, Smith, Dra	ake		
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received June 26, 2019			
Appeals Unit Review:		Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation			
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.			
Final Determination:		The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:			
- Miles			cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	
	nissioner		cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	
1	nissioner		cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

# APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a hold to the maximum expiration date. The instant offense involves the appellant forcing his way into a residence and punching the female victim in the head and face while attempting to pull her out of the apartment by her hair. While incarcerated, Appellant was found with a broken piece of mirror sharpened on one edge. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board's decision is arbitrary and capricious because it relied on the nature of the offense and lack of programming; 2) the Board failed to consider Appellant's positive institutional achievements; 3) the Board's denial amounted to a resentencing; 4) the Board's decision was not sufficiently detailed; 5) the Board relitigated the instant offense; and 5) the Board's hold was excessive. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense involving a violent attack on the mother of his child when there was an order of protection in place and possession of a sharpened piece of broken mirror while incarcerated; Appellant's criminal record including a federal drug conviction and a prior state bid; his institutional record including poor discipline, vocational programming, partial participation in and completion of T4C, ART, and and release plans to live with his wife. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and sentencing minutes.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, that it is a continuation of Appellant's criminal record, and Appellant's poor disciplinary record. See Matter of Boccadisi v. Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015); Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), Iv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017). The Board may also consider an inmate's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), Iv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997).

Insofar as Appellant questions the Board's consideration of his positive institutional achievements, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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<u>denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's contention that the Board relitigated the instant offense is likewise without merit. The Board's decision did not violate the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This doctrine prohibits the relitigation by the same parties and determination of an issue of ultimate fact that has once been determined in a valid and final judgment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970). But the Board is not seeking to relitigate the instant offense. A parole interview is not an adversarial proceeding and there are no disputed issues of fact. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S. Ct. 588 (1971); Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969); Matter of Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 144, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515, 522 (2d Dept. 2018). Instead, the Board is accepting the underlying factual basis for the instant criminal conviction. As such, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is irrelevant.

Finally, the Board's decision to hold an inmate for up to 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); <u>see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans</u>, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). In this case, the maximum expiration date of December 4, 2020 falls within the 24-month period. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold to the maximum expiration date was excessive or improper.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.