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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Karimzada, Mohammed

Facility: Woodbourne CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 04-094-18 B

DIN: 98-A-0543

Appearances: Jocelyne S. Kristal, Esq.
19 Court Street
White Plains, NY 10601

Decision appealed: April 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Agostini, Davis

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received June 11, 2018

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:




Commissioner

Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____



Commissioner

Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____



Commissioner

Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 11/25/19.
LB

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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In this *de novo* administrative appeal per court order, Appellant challenges the April 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Matter of Karimzada v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 07830, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7817 (3d Dept. October 31, 2019). Appellant is incarcerated for three separate instant offenses. In the first, the appellant was giving his female victim a ride when he punched her, choked her, and forcibly raped her. In the second, the appellant climbed on top of his female victim in the passenger seat of a car before striking her, choking her, and raping her. In the third, the appellant promised to drive his 17-year-old female victim home from a nightclub but instead pulled over, climbed on top of her, attempted to choke her, forced her into the back seat, and raped her. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board held Appellant to a higher standard of proof than allowed by using the term “convinced” when referring to the deprecation standard set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 2) the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it does not articulate reasons for denying parole release and does not consider Appellant’s rehabilitation and achievements; 3) the Board denied parole release based solely on the nature of the instant offense, and ignored the future-focused legislative mandate of the 2011 amendments to Executive Law § 259-c(4); and 4) Appellant’s low COMPAS scores weigh in favor of his release. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of

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Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses involving the sexual assaults of three different female victims including a 17-year-old girl; Appellant’s criminal history including several misdemeanors; his institutional efforts including a good disciplinary record and completion of ██████, ART, SOCTP, and vocational programming; Appellant’s expressions of remorse; and release plans to live with his brother and work at a family business. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s parole packet, relapse prevention plan, certificates of accomplishment, letters of support, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, and an official statement from the District Attorney.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the violent and deviant nature of Appellant’s offenses that caused his innocent victims unimaginable pain and suffering. See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).

Appellant’s assertion that the Board held him to a higher standard of proof than allowed by using the term “convinced” when referring to the deprecation standard set for in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is without merit. That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.” Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

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The Board’s decision also satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”. Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

The Board satisfies section 259-c(4) in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870; see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

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In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

Recommendation: Affirm.