June 2023

Administrative Appeal Decision - Thomas, Richard (2019-11-25)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Thomas, Richard **Facility:** Orleans CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 02-190-19 B

DIN: 85-A-4642

Appearances: Joanne L. Best, Esq.
Orleans County Public Defender
1 South Main Street, Suite 5
Albion, NY 14411-1449

Decision appealed: February 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Smith, Coppola**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received July 2, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ Commissioner — **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 11/25/19 LB.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the February 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The instant offenses involve the appellant raping, sodomizing, and sexually abusing a female victim in a state park while pressing a large steak knife against her, stabbing her in the leg during the attack. Four days later, Appellant raped, sodomized, and sexually abused another female victim in the same state park. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the entire parole file was not made available to counsel; 2) Appellant was prejudiced by the use of video conferencing; 3) the 24-month hold was excessive; 4) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it improperly focused on factors such as the instant offense and Appellant's disciplinary record without considering factors such as low COMPAS scores and release plans; 5) Appellant's failure to complete required sex offender programming is due to his refusal to admit guilt; 6) prior denials were based on the same reasons; and 7) the decision was conclusory and made only a cursory reference to the required factors. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole,

157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses involving the deviant sexual assault of two female victims; his institutional record including numerous disciplinary violations but improvement since 2016, pursuit of his high school equivalency, and refusal to participate in sex offender programming; and release plans to live with his son's grandparents. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and the sentencing minutes.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses and Appellant's failure to complete recommended sex offender programming. See Matter of Dolan v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Yourdon v. New York State Div. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 820 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 801, 828 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2007); Matter of Bockeno v. New York State Parole Bd., 227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dept. 1996); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018). In Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000), the Court cited with approval a New Hampshire case upholding a denial of parole for failure to take sex offender programming notwithstanding the inmate's refusal to admit guilt.

An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in his parole file, Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Comm'r of New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000). The Board may consider confidential information. Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014).

The use of video conferencing technology to conduct parole release interviews is permissible. It does not prejudice the inmate and is consistent with the requirement that a parole candidate be "personally interviewed." Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Mack v Travis, 283 A.D.2d 700, 723 N.Y.S.2d 905 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); see also Yourdon v.

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Johnson, No. 01-CV-0812ESC, 2006 WL 2811710, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006); Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

Appellant's claim that the Board gave only cursory consideration to certain factors is without merit. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). The record reflects the Board considered the appropriate statutory factors including the instant offenses, Appellant's disciplinary record, his release plans, the case plan, and the COMPAS instrument.

Appellant's contention that the Board did not properly consider his many low COMPAS scores is likewise without merit. In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v.

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Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Appellant objects to the fact that the Board decision is based on the same reasons given after his last appearance before the Board. However, as the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears, it follows that the Board may deny release on the same grounds as relied upon in previous determinations. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); see also Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 110, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008).

Finally, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Recommendation: Affirm.