June 2023

Administrative Appeal Decision - Glass, Jacqueline (2019-12-09)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Glass, Jacqueline **Facility:** Albion CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 02-035-19 B

DIN: 16-G-0799

Appearances: Joanne Best, Esq.
Orleans County Public Defender
1 South Main Street, Suite 5
Albion, New York 14411

Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Smith, Coppola**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received July 24, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 12/9/19 LB.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Glass, Jacqueline **DIN:** 16-G-0799

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Appellant was sentenced to three and a half to seven years upon her conviction of Burglary in the third degree, Grand Larceny in the fourth degree, Identity Theft in the second degree, and CPSP in the fourth degree. In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision is in violation of law, arbitrary and capricious because the Board emphasized her poor record on parole without adequately weighing her institutional accomplishments, release plans and other factors or conducting a current risk analysis; and (2) the 24-month hold is excessive. These arguments are without merit.

Generally, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted unless the Board determines that an inmate meets three standards: "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board must consider factors relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). An EEC does not automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).

In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-

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by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, nor did they change the substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses committed while on parole; Appellant's criminal history with four prior State terms and multiple parole violations; her institutional record including good behavior, work in Industry and receipt of an EEC; her substance abuse history to which she attributed prior crimes and statement that she was clean for several years; and release plans to go to a shelter, seek work in her trade and pursue her education. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant's case plan and the COMPAS instrument.

After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release. See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the fact that prior sentences did not deter Appellant from committing the instant offenses, that she was on parole for Burglary 2 when she committed the offenses, and her poor record on parole. That the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history – including prior failures while under community supervision – as opposed to other positive factors does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans,

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105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990). That the inmate committed the instant offense while on community supervision also is a proper basis for denying parole release. See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014). In addition, the Board noted Appellant's need to use the time to develop and document appropriate residential, employment and relapse prevention plans. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii). This was reasonable in view of her criminal history and explanation that she committed the instant offenses because she could not find a job.

As for the length of the hold, the Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

Recommendation: Affirm.