June 2023

Administrative Appeal Decision - Carmack, Dylyn (2019-08-23)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Carmack, Dylyn	**Facility:**	Elmira CF
NYSID:	[redacted]	**Appeal Control No.:**	02-031-19 B
DIN:	11-A-2122		

Appearances: James Godemann Esq.
Oneida County Public Defender
250 Boehlert Center at Union Station
321 Main Street
Utica, New York 13501

Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: Berliner, Alexander

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received May 29, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ Commissioner — ___ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ___ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ___ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 8/21/19 kt.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Carmack, Dylyn **DIN:** 11-A-2122

Facility: Elmira CF **AC No.:** 02-031-19 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 18-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for two different crimes. The first conviction was for Attempted Robbery 2nd Degree, in which appellant punched the victim while a co-defendant pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him, and they stole his coat. The second conviction was for Conspiracy 2nd Degree, in which appellant belonged to a violent street gang that over a long period of time murdered and terrorized people and neighborhoods. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board decision illegally resentenced him. 3) the Board failed to state any facts in favor of the statutory standard cited. 4) the Board never explained how they weighed the factors. 5) the decision is based upon erroneous information. Specifically, appellant was not on parole when he committed the second crime.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered. Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d

Dept. 2017); Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018).

The Board decision may mention that he committed one offense while on parole. Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016). Matter of Ward v. New York State Div. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board may consider an inmate's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001).

The Board may take into account an inmate's mental health when denying parole release. See Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227 A.D.2d 863, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 812, 649 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1996); Matter of Baker v. Russi, 188 A.D.2d 771, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dept. 1992); see also Pender v. Travis, 243 A.D.2d 889, 662 N.Y.S.2d 642 (3d Dept. 1997), lv. denied, 91 N.Y.2d 810, 670 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1998); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, Parole Bd. Div., 67 A.D.2d 1108, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dept. 1979), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 707, 418 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 56 A.D.2d 729, 730, 392 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 801, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1977). The Board may take into consideration an inmate's apparent need for psychological counseling in denying parole. Matter of Baker v. Russi, 188 A.D.2d 771, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dept. 1992); Matter of Wright v. Parole Div., 132 A.D.2d 821, 517 N.Y.S.2d 823 (3d Dept. 1987). The Board may consider mental health assistance provided to the inmate during his incarceration; however, it does not mandate release. See Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gssime v. New York State Div. of Parole, 84 A.D.3d 1630, 923 N.Y.S.2d 307 (3d Dept.), lv. dismissed, 17 N.Y.3d 847, 930 N.Y.S.2d 542 (2011).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Carmack, Dylyn **DIN:** 11-A-2122

Facility: Elmira CF **AC No.:** 02-031-19 B

Findings: (Page 3 of 4)

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community"); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The inmate may not review the Board's weighing process or assess whether the Board gave proper weight to the relevant factors, since it is not required to state each factor it considers, or weigh each factor equally or grant parole due to exemplary behavior. Comfort v New York State Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3rd Dept. 2009); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Carmack, Dylyn **DIN:** 11-A-2122

Facility: Elmira CF **AC No.:** 02-031-19 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 4)

Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The decision is not based upon erroneous information. Appellant was convicted of his first offense in May 2011, and was released to parole supervision in November 2011. Appellant was arrested for his second offense in April 2013. The Pre-sentence Investigation Report and the Sentence and Commitment Order both state the second offense took place from 2009-2013. So, the second offense did take place while appellant was on parole. Pursuant to Executive Law sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 474, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706, 708 (2000) (discussing former status report); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept.) (presentence investigation report), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011); see also Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, the decision is not based upon erroneous information.

Recommendation: Affirm.