June 2023

Administrative Appeal Decision - Salcedo, Dulys (2019-08-09)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Salcedo, Dulys **Facility:** Fishkill CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 01-064-19 B

DIN: 94-A-1581

Appearances: Dulys Salcedo 94A1581
Fishkill Correctional Facility
Box 307
Prospect Street
Beacon, New York 12508

Decision appealed: December 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: Berliner, Alexander, Shapiro

Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received May 17, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ ___ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 8/9/19 cc.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Salcedo, Dulys **DIN:** 94-A-1581

Facility: Fishkill CF **AC No.:** 01-064-19 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 8)

Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The instant offense consisted of the appellant, after months of harassing his estranged girlfriend, in violation of an Order of Protection, purposely shooting her to death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) his conviction is based upon perjury and false testimony at trial, and misconduct by the DA. 3) his tickets at DOCCS are all due to harassment and/or retaliation by DOCCS personnel. 4) [redacted], [redacted] 5) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 6) the decision lacks detail. 7) the Board failed to state any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 8) the decision lacks future guidance. 9) the decision violated his constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release from prison. 10) the decision illegally resentenced him. 11) by using the instant offense again, the decision violates the double jeopardy and collateral estoppel provisions of the constitution. 12) the Board decision was not based upon a preponderance of the evidence. 13) the transcript has errors on it. 14) the 24 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Salcedo, Dulys **DIN:** 94-A-1581

Facility: Fishkill CF **AC No.:** 01-064-19 B

Findings: (Page 2 of 8)

Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered. Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018).

The Board may consider an inmate's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.) (failure to complete all recommended programs), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018).

Inmate's unwillingness to accept responsibility for violent crime is a sufficient basis for denying parole. Webb v Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den. 7 N.Y.3d 709, 822 N.Y.S.2d 483; Okafor v. Russi, 222 A.D.2d 920, 635 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dept. 1995); Epps v Travis, 241 A.D.2d 738, 660 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017 (3d Dept. 1997). The Board may emphasize the inmate's failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016); Okafor v. Russi, 222 A.D.2d 920, 635 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dept. 1995) (unwillingness to accept responsibility) lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017).

Inmate's claiming prison disciplinary violations were invented by corrections officers illustrates appellant's continuing failure to acknowledge responsibility, raising plausible concerns about their rehabilitation. Molinar v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New

York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

The Board may consider the sentencing court's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 168 A.D.3d 1342, 92 N.Y.S.3d 482 (3d Dept. 2019) (Board properly considered sentencing minutes which included court's recommendation against parole); Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017) (same); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Delman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888, 461 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (2d Dept. 1983).

Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider other matters involving the inmate's capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008).

Pursuant to Executive Law sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 474, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706, 708 (2000) (discussing former status report); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept.) (presentence investigation report), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011); see also Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976). To the extent Appellant contends the Board relied on erroneous information in the pre-sentence report, this is not the proper forum to raise the issue. Any challenge to the pre-sentence report must be made to the original sentencing court. Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Wisniewski v. Michalski., 114 A.D.3d 1188, 979 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Vigliotti v. State of New York, Executive Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d Dept. 2012). The Board is mandated to consider the report and is entitled to rely on the information contained in the report. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011). And, once an individual has been convicted of a crime, it is generally not the Board's role to reevaluate a claim of innocence. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Copeland v New York State Board of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017). Alleged improprieties in a criminal trial are irrelevant if convicted. Grune v Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). The Board is obligated to rely upon Appellant's conviction and assume his guilt in making its determination. Executive Law § 259-i; 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 8001.3 and 8002.1, et seq.; Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476-77, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707-708 (2000); Matter of Vigliotti v. State Executive Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d Dept. 2012).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Facility: Fishkill CF **AC No.:** 01-064-19 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 8)

However, a parole interview is not an adversarial proceeding and there are no disputed issues of fact. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S. Ct. 588 (1971); Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969). There are no substantial evidence issues in a Parole Board Release Interview. Valderrama v Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); Tatta v Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006) lv.den. 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750; Harris v New York State Division of Parole, 211 A.D.2d 205, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dept. 1995). A substantial evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community"); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Facility: Fishkill CF **AC No.:** 01-064-19 B

Findings: (Page 5 of 8)

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason

or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The Board's decision to hold the petitioner for an additional 24 months does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Despite the court-imposed minimum period of imprisonment, per Executive Law §§259-i(1)(a) and 2(c), the Board is obligated by law to consider the severity of the inmate's crime in every release decision. Matter of Dantzler v Travis, 249 A.D.2d 841, 673 N.Y.S.2d 221 (3d Dept 1998)(Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against imposing multiple criminal punishments for the same crime in successive criminal proceedings; its protections are not available in administrative parole hearings); By holding the petitioner an additional 24 months, the Board has done nothing more than invoke the authority granted to it by Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d). Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 A.D.2d 960, 592 N.Y.S.2d 831 (3d Dept 1993); Matter of Ganci v Hammock, 99 A.D.2d 546, 471 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dept 1984). per Executive Law §§259-i(1)(a) and 2(c), the Board is obligated by law to consider the severity of the inmate's crime in every release decision. A denial of parole is a decision to withhold early release from the confinement component. It is neither the imposition nor the increase of a sentence, and it is not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. It is the original criminal sentence that is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, not the administrative decision to grant early release from confinement. The Parole Board did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by giving consideration to actions for which the inmate has already been punished. Alessi v Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1983); Bockeno v New York State Board of Parole, 227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3d Dept. 1996); Valentino v Evans, 92 A.D.3d 1054, 937 N.Y.S.2d 737 (3d Dept. 2012). The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to judicial proceedings, and not parole matters. Priore v Nelson, 626 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1980). A denial of parole has the effect of perpetuating the status quo i.e. continued incarceration during the term of the sentence. Therefore, the denial does not give rise to multiple punishment for the same offense. U.S. ex rel. Jacobs v Barc, 141 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. den. 322 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct. 1262, 88 L.Ed. 1581.

As for collateral estoppel, this doctrine (found at the federal level within the Fifth Amendment

clause against double jeopardy, and at the State level in Article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution) merely prohibits the relitigation and determination of an issue of ultimate fact that has once been determined in a valid and final judgment. Ashe v Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed2d 469 (1970). The Board in this case has not in any way, shape or form even attempted to relitigate any previously determined factual issues. Indeed, appellant's brief even states the Board's decision is based upon identical facts. And, the Board is accepting the underlying factual basis for the instant criminal conviction. The Board is not collaterally estopped from basing its reappearance decisions that deny parole on the same grounds that it had invoked in its previous determinations. As per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, and thus it stands to reason that in many cases the same aspects of an individual's record will repeatedly militate against the grant of parole release. Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002). As such, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no relevancy to this case at all.

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, then it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for the denial of parole. Hakim v Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Nelson v New York State Parole Board, 274 A.D.2d 719, 711 N.Y.S.2d 792 (3d Dept 2000); Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002). Per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept. 2010) lv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143.

The transcript is certified. Allegations of an altered tape/off the record comments is not significant enough to warrant judicial review. Graham v New York State Division of Parole, 269 A.D.2d 628, 702 N.Y.S.2d708, 710 (3d Dept 2000), leave to appeal denied 95 N.Y.2d 753, 711 N.Y.S.2d 155 (2000).

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

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Name: Salcedo, Dulys **DIN:** 94-A-1581

Facility: Fishkill CF **AC No.:** 01-064-19 B

Findings: (Page 8 of 8)

Recommendation: Affirm.