An Attorney’s Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

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AN ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

INTRODUCTION

As a result of a dramatic growth in the number of legal malpractice suits,¹ there increasingly has arisen the question of whether an attorney should be liable for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.² Most decisions have limited recovery to cases in which the client suffered a physical injury or the attorney acted egregiously.³ Such requirements ensure the claim's genuineness, conserve judicial resources, and protect the attorney from unfair liability.⁴

Some recent decisions, however, have permitted plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress without regard to the degree of the attorney's negligence.⁵ These opinions examine the client interest that the attorney represented.⁶ This approach distinguishes the majority rule by differentiating between the client's personal and pecuniary interests.⁷ This view suggests that personal interests are entitled to greater protection.⁸ Where a personal interest is injured, emotional harm is more likely and the risk of fraudulent claims limited.⁹ When the attorney's negligence harms a

¹. Since the 1960's, there has been a large increase in the number of legal malpractice cases. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice 17 (3d ed. 1989). For a collection of statistics showing the extent of the increase, see id. at 17-29.


⁴. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.


⁶. See, e.g., Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 93-95; Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 459.

⁷. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 455-59.

A personal interest is a non-pecuniary interest. Compare Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222 (injury to liberty interest supported claim for emotional distress) with Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (injury to property interest insufficient to support claim for emotional distress). Examples of personal interests include liberty, see Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222, and the right to child custody, see Hilt v. Bernstein, 75 Or. App. 502, 515, 707 P.2d 88, 96 (1985).

⁸. See, e.g., Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456-59 (emotional distress damages awarded because attorney's negligence injured a fundamental personal right); Hilt, 75 Or. App. at 515, 707 P.2d at 95 (emotional distress recovery denied because the negligence injured a pecuniary interest that did not suffice as a basis for emotional distress award).

⁹. See infra note 98-107 and accompanying text.
personal interest, therefore, the courts that adopt this approach permit the client to recover for emotional distress.\textsuperscript{10}

This Note supports the distinction between pecuniary and personal injuries. It argues that, where breach of duty and causation can be established, a negligent injury to a personal interest justifies the imposition of liability. Part I discusses the background of emotional distress recovery. Part II reviews the standards for liability in legal malpractice. Part III introduces the various methods used to appraise emotional distress claims in legal malpractice actions. Part IV advocates the finding of liability where an attorney negligently harms a client's personal interest. This Note concludes that a client should recover damages for emotional distress where the attorney's negligence harms a personal interest.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A. History

Courts traditionally have rejected plaintiffs' claims where emotional distress was the sole ground of recovery.\textsuperscript{11} Awards were denied because mental anguish was considered to be too intangible to compensate.\textsuperscript{12} Recovery, however, was not entirely foreclosed. Although mental injuries could not independently support an action, damages could be recovered if the emotional distress was parasitic to a physical injury.\textsuperscript{13}

The requirement that emotional distress be parasitic to a physical injury originated in two nearly simultaneous decisions.\textsuperscript{14} First, the Privy Council ruled that a plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress in the absence of an actual physical impact to his person.\textsuperscript{15} Days later, the New York Supreme Court announced the same rule.\textsuperscript{16} The impact requirement initially found wide support in America and was vigorously

\textsuperscript{10} See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1987); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457-59 (Ct. App. 1989).
\textsuperscript{11} See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 360 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser].
\textsuperscript{12} See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109-10, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896) (fright cannot form basis of action); Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. 577, 598 (1861) ("[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress"); see also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1033-36 (1936) (common law reluctant to recognize an interest in one's peace of mind).
\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., Barney v. Magenis, 241 Mass. 268, 273, 135 N.E. 142, 144 (1922) (mental anguish recoverable where it accompanies physical injury); Lynch, 9 H.L. at 598 (same); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 363 (emotional distress parasitic to physical injury recoverable at common law).
\textsuperscript{14} See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 260 (1921).
\textsuperscript{15} See Victorian Rys. Comm'r's v. Coults, 13 A.C. 222, 225-26 (1888). However, this impact requirement was rejected in Ireland and Scotland. See, e.g., Bell v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L.R. Ir. 428 (1890) (Ireland); Gilligan v. Robb, [1910] Sess. Cas. 856 (Scotland) (1910). The Coults decision never found favor in Great Britain, and was eventually overruled by Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
As the law developed, however, courts applied the impact requirement with less vigor. The meaning of physical impact was expanded to include the slightest touching. In addition, injuries suffered as a consequence of the mental harm were held to satisfy the impact requirement.

B. Required Showing for Emotional Distress Recovery

The states use three different tests to evaluate claims for emotional distress damages. A small minority of states continue to require actual physical impact. The majority limits recovery by requiring plaintiffs to prove at least a physical consequence of the distress. Other states view emotional distress as an independent harm.

1. The Impact Rule

Decisions applying the impact rule require proof of an actual physical impact upon the plaintiff. The most convincing rationale supporting

17. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 108-09, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896) (plaintiff could not recover distress damages even though she suffered a miscarriage when nearly struck by defendant's horses); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 15-17, 73 A. 4, 5-6 (1909) (plaintiff, who was temporarily blinded by a flash, could not recover because she was not struck by any material substance); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 363 (initially a large number of American decisions denied recovery absent actual physical impact).

18. See Throckmorton, supra note 14, at 264-65; Magruder, supra note 12, at 1036-42.

19. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980) (being subjected to a series of diagnostic X-Rays held sufficient impact to support an emotional distress claim); Zelinsky v. Chimes, 175 A.2d 351, 353 (1961) (any degree of physical impact, however slight, could support an action for emotional distress); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 363-64 (courts would find impact on the slightest contact).

20. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 556, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982) (plaintiff must prove physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology); Melton v. Allen, 282 Or. 731, 736, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1978) (emotional distress recovery requires physical injury or physical consequences); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 364 (emotional distress authenticated by some objective physical manifestation).


23. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519-20, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978) (requires physical manifestation); Payton, 386 Mass. at 556, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (emotional distress caused by or causing physical harm is recoverable); see also id. at 546 n.5, 437 N.E.2d at 175 (listing of states that require proof of physical consequences); Prosser, supra note 11, at 364 & n.55 (same).


25. See Wishard Memorial Hosp., 512 N.E.2d at 1127-28; see also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
this doctrine is that it provides certainty of liability. The rule has fallen into disfavor and is followed by only two states.

2. The Physical Consequences Rule

a. Direct Victims of the Negligence

Absent physical impact, most states require a showing of some physical manifestation of the distress resulting from the defendant’s breach of duty. The rationale supporting this requirement is two-fold. First, the courts believe that mental injury can be counterfeited too easily. A physical injury requirement would screen out fraudulent claims. Second, without external indicia of harm, courts would be faced with a plethora of questionable claims. Hence, the task of adjudicating these claims would unduly strain judicial resources.

Where the circumstances giving rise to the claim sufficiently negate these concerns, however, the decisions have reflected a greater willingness to accept the distress itself as an actionable harm. In Hagerty v. L

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26. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 363-64.
Texas was the first state to reject the physical impact requirement. See Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 59 (Tex. 1890). For a discussion of the arguments supporting the rule and why they are no longer applicable, see Throckmorton, supra note 14, at 265-81.
28. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 364; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 313(1), 436(1) (1965).
The physical consequence need not be contemporaneous with the negligent act. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed emotional distress recovery where the manifestation appeared fourteen months after the negligent act. See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 159, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1988).
In these states emotional distress alone generally will not support a claim. See, e.g., DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 609, 744 P.2d 705, 709-10 (Ct. App. 1987); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 875-76, 686 P.2d 112, 117-18 (1984); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment a (1965) (negligent actor not liable for emotional distress without bodily harm).
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
& L Marine Services, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that recovery for emotional distress is permissible without a showing of physical injury. Hagerty viewed the physical consequence requirement as unrealistic and doubted its adequacy in determining the existence or extent of mental harm. Rather than requiring physical injury, the decision focused on the circumstances surrounding the claim. It reasoned that where these circumstances authenticate the claim's genuineness and demonstrate the causal link between the negligence and the injury, the plaintiff should recover emotional distress damages regardless of physical injury.

The Fifth Circuit did not disregard the possibility that some claims might be fraudulent. It simply considered the physical injury requirement an unnecessary safeguard in the facts before it, reasoning that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the fear-inducing occurrence may themselves supply sufficient indicia of genuineness." The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its willingness to look beyond physical injury. The New York Court of Appeals has also carved out an exception to the physical injury requirement. In the absence of physical injury, New York will allow a plaintiff to recover damages where "the likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising from the circumstances of the case warrant[s]."

34. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
35. See id. at 317. Hagerty was a merchant seaman aboard a chemical-carrying barge. In an accident caused by a defective valve, he was drenched by a mixture of carcinogenic chemicals. Although the exposure did not cause any appreciable physical injury, it did subject Hagerty to an increased risk of contracting cancer, a risk substantial enough to require periodic medical testing. Hagerty filed suit claiming that the exposure, together with the fear of contracting cancer, had caused him severe emotional distress. On a motion for summary judgement, the trial court found for the defendant. See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 316. The Fifth Circuit reversed. See id. at 317.

36. See id. In the court's opinion "[i]t is doubtful that the trier of fact is any less able to decide the fact or extent of mental suffering in the event of physical injury . . . ." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. Instead the question should be whether the "fear is reasonable and causally related to the defendant's negligence." See id.
40. See id. Hagerty submitted evidence to show his prior knowledge of the chemicals' carcinogenic properties, his realization that his entire body had absorbed the chemicals and a doctor's advice that he undergo periodic cancer testing. From this, the court concluded that Hagerty had submitted "sufficient indicia of genuineness" to defeat summary judgement. See id. at 319.
41. Id. at 318.
ages are speculative is insufficient to bar a claim. Instead, the court and the jury must weed out fraudulent claims.

b. Zone of Danger Rule

The physical consequences approach has been extended to include plaintiffs, usually bystanders, who suffer emotional distress caused by witnessing the physical injury of another. In these cases, courts generally apply the zone of danger rule. This rule requires that the plaintiff be in an area where he could have suffered physical injury, witness the serious injury or death of a family member, and suffer serious physical consequences from this distress. Some states have liberalized the rule’s requirements by increasing the geographic area, expanding the definition of family member, or rejecting the requirement that a physical manifestation be shown.

45. See id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.

In a recent decision, a New York trial court applied these principles to a medical malpractice case. See Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 982, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1987). A patient sued her physician for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from an erroneous cancer diagnosis. Although there were no allegations that the patient suffered physical injury, the judge denied the physician’s petition for summary judgement. The court used the “foreseeability of the asserted wrongful act resulting in emotional injury” as its standard for determining that mental injury was the natural result of the doctor’s negligence. See id. at 984, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Where the natural result of the negligence is emotional harm, therefore, proof of physical injury is unnecessary. See id. at 984-85, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 345.

46. The first recorded case of a bystander recovering for emotional distress is Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (1924). See also Prosser, supra note 11, at 365 (discussing Hambrook); Magruder, supra note 12, at 1038-40 (American courts have followed Hambrook in formulating “zone of danger” rule). In Hambrook, a mother suffered a miscarriage when she realized that her child was in the path of a runaway truck. The court found that the mother’s physical safety was threatened by the defendant’s negligent act because she too could have been injured by the truck. The court considered this a breach of duty regardless of the absence of physical injury. See Hambrook, [1925] 1 K.B. at 157. With the negligence established, the resultant mental distress was merely an unexpected manifestation of a foreseeable harm. See Hambrook, [1925] 1 K.B. at 157-58.


49. The geographic zone is expanded so that a plaintiff need not be in actual danger of physical injury. See General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).

50. The definition of family member has been expanded to include more than immediate family members. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985).

51. In at least one state, physical manifestations are not required. See Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982).
3. General Negligence Cause of Action

The Hawaii Supreme Court became the first\(^{52}\) to recognize a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered any physical manifestation.\(^{53}\) It established "a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress."\(^{54}\) This duty is breached when the defendant's actions would cause "a reasonable man, normally constituted, [to] be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."\(^{55}\)

II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE

A. Conflicting Theories: Tort or Contract

An attorney's liability for negligence is based on the attorney-client relationship.\(^{56}\) Because this relationship is created by agreement, a legal malpractice claim can also be pursued on a contract theory.\(^{57}\) Pursuant to the agreement, the attorney promises to perform certain duties.\(^{58}\) A

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52. In 1968 the California Supreme Court decided Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Cal. 1968) and expanded the boundaries of the "zone of danger" rule. A mother, while outside the zone of danger, witnessed the accidental death of her child. Nonetheless, she was allowed to recover damages for emotional distress. The court ruled that an actor owes a duty of care to any third person who might foreseeably suffer mental anguish as a result of the actor's negligence. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The Dillon Court established three factors to consider in determining whether a bystander is a foreseeable plaintiff: (1) bystander is near the scene of the accident, (2) bystander personally observes the accident, and (3) bystander is closely related to the victim. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. This decision served as a transition from the "zone of danger" rule to a general cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.


54. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.

55. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.


57. See Wade, supra note 56, at 756. An emerging trend, however, seems to require that legal malpractice claims be brought in tort. See, e.g., Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 814, (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Saveca v. Reilly, 111 A.D.2d 493, 494-95, 488 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1985); Schroeder v. Hudgins, 142 Ariz. 395, 399, 690 P.2d 114, 118 (Ct. App. 1984). In a 1983 decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals stated:

[although the attorney-client relationship gives rise to an implied warranty of the attorney to use his best professional skill and judgement, this duty is legal rather than contractual in nature, and a breach of this duty amounts to a tort. Only when an attorney breaches an express warranty of result does an action for breach of contract arise.]


58. See D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 6.
breach of contract may result if these duties are unfulfilled. Because an
attorney rarely warrants his work, 59 a breach of contract action arising
from an express provision is unusual. 60 By representing a client, how-
ever, the attorney impliedly promises to use the skill and knowledge ordi-
narily held by other attorneys. 61 This implied promise duplicates the
attorney's standard of care in tort 62 and is breached where the attorney
fails to represent his client with the requisite skill. 63

In addition to contractual liability, an attorney is accountable for pro-
tessional negligence. 64 The distinction between contract and tort theories
becomes most important when determining the availability of certain de-
fenses. 65 Nonetheless, whether the action sounds in contract or tort, the
court, in determining liability, will examine the same issues and apply the
same standards. 66

B. Cause of Action

The elements of legal malpractice are relatively consistent among the
jurisdictions. 67 The plaintiff must establish (1) a duty arising from the
attorney-client relationship, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causal nexus be-
tween the negligence and the injury, and (4) harm. 68

An attorney has a duty to represent his client with due care. 69 This
duty arises when an attorney undertakes to provide specific professional

59. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 415.
60. See id. at 415 & n.1.
61. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss. 1982); Peters v. Sim-
mons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 404, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1976); see also Wade, supra note 56, at
756-57 & n.11 (courts declare attorney impliedly contracts to use requisite skill and
knowledge).
62. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 417. Compare Peters, 87 Wash. 2d at
404, 552 P.2d at 1055 (failure to exercise requisite skill could constitute breach of con-
Div. 1987) (failure to exercise requisite skill is negligence).
63. See Peters, 87 Wash. 2d at 404, 552 P.2d at 1055.
64. See Gautam, 215 N.J. Super. at 396, 521 A.2d at 1347; Whitehead v. Cuffie, 185
65. See Wade, supra note 56, at 756.
legal malpractice claim); Whitehead, 185 Ga. App. at 352, 364 S.E.2d at 89 (same);
Smith, supra note 1, at 425-29.
68. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
legal services to the client. 70 No clear rules establish when the relationship begins; the issue is largely a question of fact. 71

Malpractice may not be inferred from a bad result. 72 Instead, the plaintiff must show that the attorney breached a duty. 73 An attorney breaches his duty by failing to meet the requisite standard of care. 74 This standard requires that the attorney exercise the skill and knowledge ordi-


This duty, however, is not necessarily limited to the immediate client; the attorney may be liable to third persons. See, e.g., Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191, 191-92 (1971) (attorney liable to any person who reasonably and justifiably relied on the attorney); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987) (attorney liable to beneficiaries of a will where his negligence defeated the testator's intent). See generally 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, 285-359 (discusses attorney's liability absent privity).


The attorney "is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers." See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).

73. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.

74. The attorney's standard of care is explicitly set out in the case of Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954):

When an attorney engages in the practice of law and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client's cause.

Id. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.

narily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{75}

The plaintiff must prove the causal link between the attorney's breach of duty and the injury.\textsuperscript{76} The fundamental principles of causation in a legal malpractice action mirror those in a general negligence action. The plaintiff must prove that but for the attorney's negligence, the injury would not have occurred.\textsuperscript{77} In addition, he must show that his injury was the proximate result of the attorney's carelessness.\textsuperscript{78} This proximate cause requirement insulates the attorney from liability for unforeseeable harm.\textsuperscript{79}

Where the attorney's negligence occurred in the course of a litigation the plaintiff must show that he would have been successful in the underlying case.\textsuperscript{80} This is commonly referred to as a requirement to prove a "suit within a suit."\textsuperscript{81} In addition, assuming the underlying claim is valid, the plaintiff must prove that the initial defendant could have paid the judgement. Otherwise, the attorney's negligence caused no harm, and the client recovers nothing.\textsuperscript{82}

Damage is a substantive requirement of the action and must be proved as an independent element.\textsuperscript{83} It is well-settled that the plaintiff can recover for all damage that is directly and proximately caused by the attor-

\textsuperscript{75} See Bowman, 235 Kan. at 878, 686 P.2d at 120; Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1989); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 856; see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 299A (1965) (professional's standard of care).

Similar circumstances include locality and specialization. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 857. Knowledge of local rules, statutes and practices can be crucial to the proper representation of a client. See id. at 873. Thus locality is often a factor in determining the standard of care. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 299A comment g (1965). States that do consider locality usually apply a statewide standard. See Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 3, 5-6, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1985); Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986); D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 35-36.

Courts have recently begun to consider whether attorneys practicing in recognized specialty areas should be held to a heightened standard of care. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1 at 865-67. Increasingly, these courts have suggested that "an attorney undertaking a task in a specialized area of law must exercise the degree of skill and knowledge possessed by those attorneys who practice in that specialty." Id. This heightened standard applies only if the area of law is truly a specialty. Whether an attorney is acting as a specialist is determined from the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 869. The court should consider: (1) whether the state bar or the American Bar Association recognizes the area as a specialty, and (2) the defendant attorney's own characterization of his practice. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith note 1, at 869-70; Restatement (Second) Torts § 299A comments c, d, e (1965).


\textsuperscript{77} See Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 371, 732 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1986); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 412.


\textsuperscript{79} See id. at 399, 521 A.2d at 1348-49.

\textsuperscript{80} See Wade, supra note 56, at 769.

\textsuperscript{81} See id.

\textsuperscript{82} See D. Meiselman, supra note 56, at 43-44; Wade, supra note 56, at 770.

\textsuperscript{83} See Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1256 (10th Cir. 1980).
ney's negligence. 84

III. RECOVERING FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE

It can be reasonably expected that the client will suffer some degree of emotional harm when the attorney's efforts conclude with an unfavorable result. 85 The vast majority of appellate decisions that have considered the issue have held that an attorney is not liable for emotional distress damages where the attorney's conduct has been merely negligent. 86 There is an emerging trend, however, that allows a client to recover for emotional distress. 87

A. Majority Rule

Under the majority rule, damages for emotional distress are awarded only when the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury or the attorney has acted egregiously. 88 Although the rule is widely applied, 89 there is less consensus on its supporting rationale.

The most widely accepted rationale is rooted in the law's general mistrust of emotional distress claims and its fear of excessive litigation. 90 Absent a physical injury or egregious conduct, the claim's genuineness is highly suspect. 91 Moreover, because the "parties in all [cases] make substantial emotional investments in their causes and suffer mental anguish in the event of an adverse result," allowing such claims would open the floodgates of litigation. 92

Another rationale is based on the dual contract/tort nature of legal

89. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
91. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).

In Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 306 S.E.2d 340 (1983), aff'd 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984), defendant law firm erroneously advised Hamilton on the securities aspects of structuring his company's debt. As a result, Hamilton was indicted and tried for securities fraud. Hamilton was acquitted and filed a
malpractice. Most states deny recovery for emotional distress for breach of contract unless the breach amounts to an independent tort or the contract is personal in nature. When courts sense that an attorney's liability flowing from tort principles is too high, they frequently apply contract law limitations to legal malpractice. Thus, these decisions apply the "independent tort" requirement to legal malpractice and it "is transformed into the requirement of additional misconduct beyond . . . ordinary professional negligence . . . ."  

B. Decisions Allowing Emotional Distress

The developing trend emphasizes the client's injured interest in determining the extent of the attorney's liability for emotional distress damages. Where the attorney is protecting a pecuniary interest, emotional malpractice suit against the law firm; he claimed damage for emotional distress. See id., 306 S.E.2d at 341.

Hamilton failed to prove physical injury or egregious conduct. The jury, however, returned a $1,000,000 verdict; $38,206 as compensation for the attorney's fees and the remainder as general damages, including emotional distress. The trial judge directed a verdict for Hamilton, but only for the amount of the attorney's fees. See Hamilton, 167 Ga. App. at 411-12, 306 S.E.2d at 344.

Hamilton's appeal was denied. The appellate court regarded his emotional distress as an injury incapable of independently supporting a negligence action. See id. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344. The court viewed the firm's obligation to Hamilton as among the many moral obligations inherent in society that cannot be enforced by the courts. See id. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344. It feared that recognizing such a cause of action would be a precursor to an inordinate increase in litigation that would needlessly consume judicial resources. See id. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344; see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (the potential for opening the floodgates of litigation weighs against recovery for emotional distress caused by ordinary negligence). Absent a contrary policy consideration, therefore, Hamilton's mental tranquility could not be protected by the courts. See Hamilton, 167 Ga. App. at 416, 306 S.E.2d at 344.

95. See Bauman, supra note 93, at 1158-62, 1164-65.
96. See id. at 1164; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
97. See Bauman, supra note 93, at 1158-62, 1164-65.
98. Compare Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987) (emotional

In Dorsey v. Purvis, 543 So.2d 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988), Purvis negligently represented Dorsey in a criminal trial. As a result, Dorsey was convicted and sentenced to a 50 year jail term. Dorsey sued his attorney for malpractice. He was awarded the entire attorney's fee, but was denied an emotional distress award. See id. at 703-04. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. It considered the attorney's culpability too slight to warrant liability. See id. at 704. The court stated:

[A]ppellant was awarded all damages under the contract count to which he would have been entitled under the malpractice count. No theory would have supported damages for mental anguish.

'There can be no recovery for emotional distress, where [the legal malpractice] does not involve any affirmative wrong-doing but merely neglect of duty, and the client may not recover for mental anguish where the contract which was breached was not predominantly personal in nature.'

Id. (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 273).
97. See Bauman, supra note 93, at 1165.
98. Compare Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987) (emotional
distress damages are severely limited.\textsuperscript{99} Where the interest is personal, however, courts adopting this view are more willing to compensate emotional harm.\textsuperscript{100}

In \textit{Wagenmann v. Adams},\textsuperscript{101} the First Circuit departed from the majority rule and allowed a client to recover emotional distress damages from a negligent attorney.\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Wagenmann} did not address whether distress damages are appropriate for an injured property right.\textsuperscript{103} However, the decision considered the situation "completely different where . . . the lawyer's malpractice results in a loss of liberty."\textsuperscript{104}

The First Circuit thus recognized a distinction between pecuniary and personal interests. \textit{Wagenmann} argued that where a personal interest is injured, the resulting emotional harm is real and significant.\textsuperscript{105} In the court's view, attorneys are liable for any direct damages caused by their negligence. Under this view, therefore, they should also be responsible for the emotional distress that results when they negligently injure a personal interest.\textsuperscript{106} The court dismissed the potential for fraudulent claims reasoning that any such risks were small when a liberty interest was injured.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{99. See Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 456 (1989); Hilt, 75 Or. App. at 513-15, 707 P.2d at 95-96.}
\item \textit{100. See, e.g., Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (negligence caused improper murder conviction); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 788-89, 562 P.2d 540, 544 (Or. 1977) (negligence caused client to lose custody of her child).}
\item \textit{101. 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).}
\item \textit{102. Wagenmann was accused of various crimes and was ordered to undergo evaluation at a state psychiatric hospital. His court-appointed attorney, Healy, failed to take any action on Wagenmann's behalf. Through the independent efforts of a court psychiatrist, Wagenmann was released and the charges dropped. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 205.}
\item \textit{103. See id. at 222.}
\item \textit{104. Id.}
\item \textit{105. See id.}
\item \textit{The California Court of Appeals recently adopted this reasoning. See Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457-58 (Ct. App. 1989). The California court strongly argued that an injury to a personal interest directly causes emotional distress. See id. at 456-57. In the court's view, "emotional distress damages necessarily result from the loss of ... liberty due to no other reason than lawyer malpractice." Id. at 456.}
\item \textit{106. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987). The court wrote: "there is little room to doubt that the harm Wagenmann suffered due to Healy's bungling was real and significant, and that the injury was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances." Id.}
\item \textit{107. See id. "[B]oth foreseeability and indicia of genuineness [are] important factors in considering whether recovery for emotional distress should be allowed. We note that both these factors have been established rather conclusively in the present case." Id. at 222 n.19 (citations omitted).}
\end{itemize}
IV. ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES

A. The Majority Rule Does Not Protect Important Client Interests

The majority rule is too restrictive. By ignoring the unique nature of personal interests, it fails to protect the client adequately from the emotional harm that results when a personal interest is injured. Although most decisions purport to redress the harm proximately caused by negligence, most erect barriers that limit emotional distress recovery. Where the attorney is negligent in representing his client’s personal interests, the rationales supporting these barriers are inapplicable.

Courts need only consider the circumstances surrounding the claim to satisfy their concerns regarding the genuineness of the distress. The circumstances “may themselves supply sufficient indicia of genuineness.” Where a personal interest is invaded, such indicia are extensive.

Many opinions have argued that the emotional distress caused by the malpractice is likely to be so insignificant that adjudicating such claims would unduly burden judicial resources. Where a personal interest is injured, however, the emotional harm is likely to be substantial. For example, where the attorney’s negligence results in a client’s loss of liberty, the impact on the individual is great. The Supreme Court has characterized the personal loss resulting from involuntary commitment as having “a very significant impact on the individual.” Another example is the painful effect of losing custody of one’s child. This is evidenced by a recent study which concluded that divorced fathers who lost custody of their children suffered from a greater degree of depression and anxiety.

108. See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965).
117. See id. at 426.
ATTORNEY LIABILITY

when compared to divorced fathers who retained custody.\textsuperscript{119} In these cases, the burden on the court’s judicial resources pales when compared to the seriousness of the loss.\textsuperscript{120}

Courts also consider the attorney’s culpability when evaluating his liability for emotional distress.\textsuperscript{121} When attorneys negligently harm a client’s personal interests, it is not unreasonable to hold them liable for emotional distress because where a case implicates a personal interest, the attorney can readily foresee that emotional harm could result from his negligence.\textsuperscript{122} It would be unfair, therefore, to shield the attorneys from their own negligence at the client’s expense.\textsuperscript{123}

B. The Underlying Principles of Tort Law Favor Extending Malpractice Liability

Allowing distress damages where the client’s personal interests are harmed would comport with the fundamental principles of tort law. When deciding whether to extend liability, courts must balance competing interests,\textsuperscript{124} considering several factors: (1) the need for compensation, (2) precedent, (3) the defendant’s culpability, (4) convenience of administration, (5) the parties’ capacity to bear the loss, and (6) deterrence.\textsuperscript{125}

First, the victimized client should be compensated. Although the plaintiff has suffered only mental harm, it does not lessen the fact that

\textsuperscript{119} See id. at 56, 61-64.

\textsuperscript{120} The risk of increased litigation should not prevent courts from granting relief on meritorious claims. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 566-67, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (1965). Rather, judicial resources should be expanded to meet the need. See id. at 567, 214 A.2d at 16; see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 361-62 (courts obligated to make precedent where the wrong calls for redress).

\textsuperscript{121} See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{122} Emotional distress is “virtually a guaranteed result” where the attorney’s negligent representation causes a loss of liberty. See Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 457 (Ct. App. 1989); supra note 114.

\textsuperscript{123} See, e.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987) (client’s emotional distress foreseeable, and therefore actionable, where attorney negligently caused client to be placed in a mental institution); Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (where client’s liberty interest is involved, attorney’s negligence is sufficiently culpable to allow distress recovery); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 361 (“[w]here the concern is to avoid imposing excessive punishment upon a negligent defendant, it must be asked whether fairness will permit leaving the burden of loss instead upon the innocent victim.”).

Requiring personal injury or egregious conduct without considering the interest involved can lead to illogical, and even unfair, results. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222. Where the attorney’s negligence causes pecuniary harm, the loss is measurable and can be recovered. See id. Where the negligence causes a loss of liberty, however, the client is not compensated. See id. Because there is no physical injury, the law recognizes no harm to compensate. This result cannot be tolerated. “That [the attorney] was guilty of malpractice in the defense of [a personal right], rather than in the prosecution of a civil claim for damages, is no reason artificially to shield him from the concomitant consequences of his carelessness.” Id.

\textsuperscript{124} See Prosser, supra note 11, at 17-18.

\textsuperscript{125} See Prosser, supra note 11, at 20-26; see also L. Green, Judge and Jury 97 (1930) (listing five factors).
injury has occurred.\textsuperscript{126} Harm to a personal interest virtually guarantees that emotional distress will result.\textsuperscript{127} Moreover, placing a monetary value on emotional pain is not an impossible task.\textsuperscript{128} A jury can determine the existence and extent of the harm, and when appropriate, award adequate compensation.\textsuperscript{129} Recovery for emotional distress, therefore, must be allowed where harm and causation are established and where the circumstances surrounding the claim adequately guarantee its genuineness.\textsuperscript{130}

Second, the scarcity of precedent supporting recovery should not bar the claim.\textsuperscript{131} A fundamental goal of our legal system is to redress all substantial wrongs.\textsuperscript{132} A meritorious claim, therefore, should not be defeated solely because it is novel.\textsuperscript{133} Rather, courts are to examine whether there has been a wrong that can be redressed.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, there is growing support for establishing liability where a personal interest is injured.\textsuperscript{135} This emerging trend, coupled with the judiciary's obli-

\textsuperscript{126} See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 919, 616 P.2d 813, 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832 (1980) ("emotional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress"); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) ("that mental and emotional distress is just as "real" as physical pain"), overruled in part by, Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 985 (1984) (Procanik overruled that part of Berman that held that child born with birth defects could not recover emotional distress damages from negligent doctor); see also Pros-
s, supra note 11, at 360 ("Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no less real an injury than 'physical' pain.").

\textsuperscript{127} See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{128} See Berman, 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d, at 14.


\textsuperscript{131} Unlike contract and property law, where stability and predictability are crucial, tort is an area in which the rule of \textit{stare decisis} is limited. See Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965).

\textsuperscript{132} See Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (1961).

\textsuperscript{133} See Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.J. 176, 178, 44 N.E. 773, 774 (1896); Prosser, \textit{supra} note 11, at 18.

\textsuperscript{134} See Kujek, 150 N.J. at 179, 44 N.E. at 774.


In \textit{Gautam v. De Luca} a New Jersey appellate court reversed an emotional distress award because the clients suffered only economic harm. See Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 394, 521 A.2d 1343, 1349 (App. Div. 1987). The court emphasized that the relationship between the attorney and clients had been predicated upon an economic interest. See \textit{id}. at 400, 521 A.2d at 1349. By limiting its decision to the facts before it, the court left open the question of whether attorneys are liable for emotional distress when they negligently injure a personal interest. See \textit{id}.

Subsequently, two United States district courts considered whether \textit{Gautam} barred a client's emotional distress claim where the attorney's negligence caused a loss of liberty. See \textit{Snyder}, 708 F. Supp. at 1464; Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D.N.J. 1988). In each case the attorney was retained to defend a criminal charge. Both courts held the attorney liable, distinguishing \textit{Gautam} on the ground that the attorney-client relationship was predicated on a personal interest rather than an economic interest.
gation to redress substantial wrongs, favors the extension of liability.

Third, although the attorney did not willfully harm the client, his carelessness is sufficient justification for imposing liability. Courts resist subjecting a negligent attorney to liability for purely emotional harm\(^\text{136}\) because they consider emotional injury unforeseeable.\(^{137}\) Where a personal interest is harmed, however, emotional distress is not only foreseeable, it should be expected.\(^\text{138}\) In essence, the attorney is on notice that his negligence will cause emotional harm. Thus, simple negligence does warrant imposition of liability.\(^\text{139}\)

Fourth, allowing recovery will not unduly burden the judicial resources. Because of limitations on these resources, courts adjudicate only serious wrongs.\(^\text{140}\) Where a personal interest is harmed the plaintiff's claim is serious and valid. Many decisions have recognized that emotional harm results when a personal interest is injured.\(^\text{141}\) In guarding against a "flood of litigation," courts must not ignore these valid claims.\(^\text{142}\) To do so would deny the plaintiff full justice, and defeat the very purpose of the judicial system.\(^\text{143}\)

Fifth, the attorney is in a better position to bear the loss than is his client. When determining liability, courts weigh the parties' relative ability to absorb the loss.\(^\text{144}\) An attorney can insure against the risk of liability by buying malpractice insurance.\(^\text{145}\) This cost can be passed on to clients as an operating expense. By this means a potentially disastrous loss to an individual plaintiff is spread among a much larger group.\(^\text{146}\)

Finally, imposing liability on the attorney will have a deterrent effect.\(^\text{147}\) Where the attorney is responsible for the emotional harm caused

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136. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
137. See id.
138. See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 222; Snyder, 708 F. Supp. at 1464; Holliday, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
139. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 22-23.
140. See id. at 23-24.
141. See supra note 114.
143. See id. at 522, 448 N.E.2d at 1344, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
144. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 24-25.
145. See generally 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 1, at 715-68 (discussion of legal malpractice insurance).
146. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 24.
147. Cf. Prosser, supra note 11, at 25 (liability is a strong incentive to prevent harm).
by his negligence, he has a strong incentive to act more diligently.\textsuperscript{148} Analogously, one purpose of strict products liability is to induce manufacturers to design and build safer products.\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, attorneys should be induced to represent their clients' personal interests more carefully by exposing attorneys to liability for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.\textsuperscript{150}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Traditionally, an attorney has been insulated from liability for negligently inflicting emotional distress on his client. Absent physical injury or egregious conduct, most decisions hold that the harm caused is insufficient to support damages for emotional distress. This rule is too restrictive and provides little protection for important personal interests.

An emerging trend, however, allows a client to recover for emotional distress where the attorney's negligence injures a personal interest. This trend reflects the view that emotional distress naturally results when such interests are harmed. Although no injury is shown, the genuineness of the claim can be guaranteed by the surrounding circumstances. Where limitations are to be placed on emotional distress damages, the determination should turn on the nature of the plaintiff's interests and not the nature of the defendant's negligence.

Courts have recognized that substantial emotional harm results when a personal interest is injured. Allowing emotional distress damages in these situations would fully compensate those victimized by attorney negligence.

\textit{Joseph J. Kelleher}

\textsuperscript{148} See id. at 25-26.
\textsuperscript{149} See Speiser, supra note 145, at 109 & n.12.
\textsuperscript{150} Cf. id. (to avoid liability, manufacturers produced safer products).