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APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Smith, James	DIN:	19-B-3003
Facility:	Orleans CF	AC No.:	09-098-21 SC

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 1 of 5)

Appellant challenges the August 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a hold to PIE date. Appellant is incarcerated for several different crimes. Many involved applying for loans using false SS#'s and/or using a false identity, cashing checks on closed accounts, stealing items from a Village government office, and cutting off his GPS device and absconding for six months. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his EEC and its presumption of release. 3) the decision is based upon erroneous information concerning the length of his absconding. 4) the decision is based upon personal opinion and penal philosophy. 5) the letter from the District Attorney has errors on it and constitutes a resentencing. 6) the decision lacks detail. 7) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 8) the Parole Board Report has an error on it. 9) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that they are evidence based, create a presumption of release, and focus on rehabilitation.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. <u>See</u>, e.g., <u>Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Hamilton</u>, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; <u>Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. <u>Matter of Schendel v. Stanford</u>, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); <u>Matter of Campbell v. Stanford</u>, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offenses. <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State</u> <u>Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); <u>Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); <u>Matter of Warren</u> <u>v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter</u> <u>of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The Board may place particular emphasis on the inmate's troubling course of conduct both during and after the commission of the instant offenses. Jones v New York State Board of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505 (3d Dept. 2019).

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The fact that the incarcerated individual committed the instant offense while on community supervision is a proper basis for denying parole release. <u>See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer</u>, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the incarcerated individual's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Lashway v. Evans</u>, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

An inmate's prior absconding may also be considered by the Board. <u>Harden v New York State</u> <u>Board of Parole</u>, 103 A.D.2d 777, 477 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dept 1984).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Porter v. Alexander</u>, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 218 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); <u>Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole. <u>Matter of Milling v. Berbary</u>, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); <u>Matter of Romer v. Dennison</u>, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), <u>lv. denied</u>, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). Appellant's receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from considering and placing greater emphasis on his criminal behavior and record on community supervision. <u>See, e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Berry v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 50 A.D.3d 1346, 855 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2008).

The Pre-sentence Investigation Report says appellant absconded for six months. Pursuant to Executive Law sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 474, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706, 708 (2000) (discussing former status report); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept.) (presentence

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Name: Smith, James

Facility: Orleans CF

DIN: 19-B-3003 **AC No.:** 09-098-21 SC

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investigation report), <u>lv. denied</u>, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011); <u>see also Billiteri v.</u> <u>United States Bd. of Parole</u>, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976). To the extent Appellant contends the Board relied on erroneous information in the pre-sentence report, this is not the proper forum to raise the issue. Any challenge to the pre-sentence report must be made to the original sentencing court. <u>Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford</u>, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); <u>Matter of Wisniewski v. Michalski.</u>, 114 A.D.3d 1188, 979 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Vigliotti v. State</u>, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d Dept. 2012). The Board is mandated to consider the report and is entitled to rely on the information contained in the report. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7); <u>Matter of Carter v. Evans</u>, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

The decision is not based upon personal opinion or penal philosophy.

The error on the PBR is harmless at most. Concerning the information appellant disputes in the DA letter, there is no erroneous information in the Board decision.

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional</u> <u>Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). We further note that participation in the six-month SHOCK incarceration program is a "privilege." N.Y. Correction Law § 867. Completion of the program permits incarcerated individuals to be considered for parole in advance of their parole eligibility date. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(a). If parole is not granted, incarcerated individuals are held until their parole eligibility date. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b). The determination whether to parole incarcerated individuals who complete the program may be made without an interview. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(e); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8010.2(b).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Claims that the Executive Law amendments create objective and evidence based procedures, which creates a liberty interest, are incorrect. Franza v Stanford, 2019 WL 452052 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Appellant claims the 2011 Executive Law amendments create a presumption of release based upon a 1995 court decision. There is no merit to Appellant's claim that a favorable COMPAS instrument gives rise to a presumption of rehabilitation and release. Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the same three-part substantive standard. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to "assist" in measuring an incarcerated individual's rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence. Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an incarcerated individual sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of

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Name:	Smith, James	DIN:	19-В-3003
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the standard—that the individual will "live and remain at liberty without violating the law," the Board could also find that the individual's release would be incompatible with the welfare of society. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the incarcerated individual's assertion that even uniformly low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here.

Recommendation: Affirm.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Smith, Jame	es	Facility:	Orleans CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	09-098-21 SC
DIN:	19-B-3003			
Appearanc	: <u>es</u> :	James Smith 19B300 Orleans Correctional 35-31 Gaines Basin R Albion, New York 14	Facility Road	
Decision a	ppealed:	August 2021 decision PIE date.	n, denying discret	ionary SHOCK release and imposing a hold to
Board Mer who partic		Lee, Alexander, Drak	ce	
Papers cor	nsidered:	Appellant's Letter-br	ief received Nove	ember 22, 2021
Appeals U	nit Review:	Statement of the App	eals Unit's Findi	ngs and Recommendation
Records re	elied upon:	-		role Board Report, Parole Board Release AS instrument, Offender Case Plan.
Final Dete	rmination:	The undersigned dete	ermine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:
<u>EMI</u>	Secure vissioner	AffirmedVac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
	nissioner	AffirmedVac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	nissioner	AffirmedVac	cated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)