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## Administrative Appeal Decision - Dushane, Brian (2021-12-23)

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## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Dushane, Brian	DIN:	02-A-4309
Facility:	Cayuga CF	AC No.:	07-009-21 B

**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 1 of 5)

Appellant challenges the June 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is for shooting the victim to death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision was due to bias. 3) the Black Board Commissioners were biased and racist against appellant because he is white, in violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution. 4) the decision lacks detail and is based upon personal opinion. 5) the decision failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 7) no aggravating factors exist. 8) the decision illegally resentenced him. 9) the Board never reviewed the sentencing minutes. 10) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the mostly positive portions of the COMPAS were ignored, and the laws are now forward based.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. <u>See</u>, e.g., <u>Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Hamilton</u>, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; <u>Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. <u>Matter of Schendel v. Stanford</u>, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); <u>Matter of Campbell v. Stanford</u>, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense. <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State</u> <u>Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); <u>Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); <u>Matter of Warren</u> <u>v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter</u> <u>of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The seriousness of the offense is a proper consideration and the record further shows incarcerated individual attempted to minimize his role during the interview. <u>Matter of Serrano v. New York</u> <u>State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole</u>, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999).

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Facility: Cayuga CF

**DIN:** 02-A-4309 **AC No.:** 07-009-21 B

**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 2 of 5)

The Board may conclude that drug trafficking leads to violence, as long as there is some support in the record. <u>Comfort v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3d Dept. 2009).

T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering insight." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an incarcerated individual's crime, <u>Matter of Hamilton</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are multiple aggravating factors present here.

There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. <u>Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry</u>, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), <u>lv. denied</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v.</u> <u>Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); <u>Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole</u>,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007).

There is no merit to his equal protection claim. <u>Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of</u> <u>Parole</u>, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010); <u>Matter of Tatta v. Dennison</u>, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2006); <u>Matter of DeFino v. Travis</u>, 18 A.D.3d 1079, 795 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); <u>Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of</u>

### **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The claim the Board failed to take into account the recommendations of the sentencing court is without merit as the Board had the sentencing minutes before them and did review them. Serrano v Dennison, 46 A.D.3d 1002, 846 N.Y.S.2d 808 (3d Dept. 2007); Martinez v Evans, 108 A.D.3d 815, 968 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dept. 2013). That the Board did not expressly discuss them on the record is of no consequence. Johnson v Dennison, 53 A.D.3d 962, 860 N.Y.S.2d 758 (4th Dept. 2008); Karlin v Alexander, 57 A.D.3d 1156, 870 N.Y.S.2d 130 (3d Dept. 2008) lv.den.12 N.Y.3d 704, 876 N.Y.S.2d 705; Miller v New York State Division of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726 (2d Dept. 2010); Evans v Dennison, 75 A.D.3d 711, 903 N.Y.S.2d 282 (3d Dept. 2010). The Board may refer to them without putting this on the record. Veras v New York State Division of Parole, 56 A.D.3d 878, 866 N.Y.S.2d 813 (3d Dept. 2008); Lugo v Evans, 89 A.D.3d 1356, 932 N.Y.S.2d 919 lv.app.dism. 18 N.Y.3d 975 (2012).

The Board may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, including conduct for which the inmate was not convicted, as long as

## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Dushane, Brian	DIN:	02-A-4309
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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 4 of 5)

evidence of said conduct is in the record, and it is not the sole basis for the Board's decision. <u>Williams v Travis</u>, 11 A.D.3d 788, 783 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dept. 2004); <u>Nunez v Dennison</u>, 51 A.D.3d 1240, 857 N.Y.S.2d 810 (3d Dept. 2008); <u>Fransua v Alexander</u>, 52 A.D.3d 1140, 860 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dept. 2008); <u>Brower v Alexander</u>, 57 A.D.3d 1060, 867 N.Y.S.2d 801(3d Dept. 2008) <u>lv. den.</u> 12 N.Y.3d 707, 879 N.Y.S.2d 53.

"Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts'; or, put differently, '*[r]ationality is what is reviewed under . . . the arbitrary and capricious standard.*" <u>Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting <u>Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ.</u>, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." <u>Matter of Silmon v.</u> <u>Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting <u>Matter of Russo v. New York State</u> <u>Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Appellant's COMPAS results contained two categories with elevated scores. In any event, the Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors. <u>Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord <u>Matter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense. <u>See Matter of Montane v.</u> <u>Evans</u>, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Natter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for

## **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, release decisions. considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

#### **Recommendation:** Affirm.

## ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Dushane, B	Brian	Facility:	Cayuga CF
NYSID:		■.	Appeal Control No.:	07-009-21 B
DIN:	02-A-4309			and a second
Appearan	<u>ces</u> :	Brian Dushane 02A4 Cayuga Correctional P.O. Box 1186 Moravia, New York	Facility	* *
Decision a	appealed:	June 2021 decision, d	lenying discretio	nary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.
Board Me who partie	and the second	Davis, Drake	÷.,	
Papers co	nsidered:	Appellant's Brief rec	eived October 18	3, 2021
Appeals I	Jnit Review:	Statement of the App	eals Unit's Findi	ngs and Recommendation
<u>Records r</u>	elied upon:			role Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Det	ermination:	The undersigned dete	ermine that the d	ecision appealed is hereby:
m	pph	AffirmedVa	cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Shale	nisgioner	Affirmed Va	cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Com	nissioner up Ufal		cated, remanded fo	or de novo interview Modified to
Lom	nissioner		2	

# If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 12/23 board 66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)