

Fordham Law School

## FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

---

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

---

May 2022

### Administrative Appeal Decision -

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad>

---

#### Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision -" (2022). Parole Information Project  
<https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/876>

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [tmelnick@law.fordham.edu](mailto:tmelnick@law.fordham.edu).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 6)

---

Appellant challenges the May 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for committing two separate murders, 10 years apart. In the first one, appellant injected the victim with a massive lethal overdose of heroin, causing the victim to die, and then stealing his money. In the second one, he first gave the unsuspecting victim valium in alcoholic drinks, and when he got drunk, injected him with a lethal and fatal dose of heroin. They then dumped the body in a nature preserve. This was done to help a female co-defendant use a forged will and deed to steal the victim's property. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision lacks detail. 4) the decision was predetermined. 5) the decision illegally resentenced him. 6) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 7) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2017 regulations, in that the mostly positive COMPAS was ignored, the departure failed to specify any scales, and the laws are now evidence based and present based.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board placing particular emphasis on the callous nature of the offenses does not demonstrate irrationality bordering on impropriety. Olmosperez v Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d Dept. 2014); Garcia v New York State Division of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997).

There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner's present commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offenses. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 6)

---

The extraordinarily serious and violent nature of the crimes are sufficient ground to deny parole. Matter of Secilmic v. Keane, 225 A.D.2d 628, 629, 639 N.Y.S.2d 437, 437 (1st Dept. 1996).

The Board can give greater weight to statements made in the sentencing minutes. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes. Platten v New York State Board of Parole, 153 A.D.3d 1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal's actions upon the victims' families. Bottom v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may take note of the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate's blatant disregard for the law and the sanctity of human life. Campbell v Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2<sup>nd</sup> Dept. 2019).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal behavior. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), *lv. denied*, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), *lv. denied*, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's history of drug and/or alcohol abuse. Matter of Espinal v. New York Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (substance abuse history); Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (substance abuse history and risk of future drug abuse); Matter of Dean v. New York

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 6)

---

State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (3d Dept. 2005) (involvement with weapons and drugs), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 705, 812 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2006); Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005) (history of drug abuse); Matter of Llull v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dept. 2001) (drug abuse); Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 236 A.D.2d 760, 761, 654 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (3d Dept. 1997) (history of alcohol and drug abuse); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994) (history of alcohol abuse); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983) (drug addiction); Matter of Maciag v. Hammock, 88 A.D.2d 1106, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56 (3d Dept. 1982) (problem of alcohol and drug abuse with the concomitant need for programmed counseling).

While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an incarcerated individual's crime, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are multiple aggravating factors present here.

There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 4 of 6)

---

resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

“Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts”; or, put differently, ‘[r]ationality is what is reviewed under . . . the arbitrary and capricious standard.’” Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Bocadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017.

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole.

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 5 of 6)

---

Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 2017 amended regulations don't create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. There is no due process clause liberty interest from a State statute that merely establishes procedural requirements. Cofone v Manson, 594 F.2d 934, 938 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1979); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983) ("The State may choose to require procedures . . . but in making that choice the State does not create an independent substantive right.").

Claims that the Executive Law amendments create objective and evidence based procedures, which creates a liberty interest, are incorrect. Franza v Stanford, 2019 WL 452052 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a present-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming "any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive"). Indeed, the COMPAS does

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Caulfield, Joseph

**DIN:** 05-A-2158

**Facility:** Fishkill CF

**AC No.:** 06-057-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 6 of 6)

---

not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an incarcerated individual should be released. See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amended regulation was intended to increase transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board departs from scales in denying an incarcerated individual release. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.

The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not “depart from” scores in denying release. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from any scale within the assessment. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. Indeed, the Board explicitly stated it did not find Petitioner to be a significant risk for future criminal behavior based in part on his low risk scores (i.e. the Board did not find petitioner was a risk of remaining at liberty without violating the law). The Board nonetheless concluded that, *despite* those low risk scores, release at this time would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards based on other considerations – namely, the senseless, callous and violent nature of the offenses, history of drug and alcohol abuse, impact on the victim’s families, and official opposition to release. This is entirely consistent with the Board’s intention in enacting the amended regulation. Scharff v New York State DOCCS, Index # 2019-53460 (Forman A.J.S.C.).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Caulfield, Joseph

Facility: Fishkill CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 06-057-21 B

DIN: 05-A-2158

Appearances: Jennifer Barton Esq.  
Dutchess County Public Defender  
45 Market Street  
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

Decision appealed: May 2021 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Samuels, Davis


Papers considered: Appellant’s Letter-brief received September 23, 2021


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit’s Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board’s determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit’s Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant’s Counsel, if any, on 11/19/2021 GG.