#### Fordham Law School

# FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Information Project — CURRENT

May 2022

Administrative Appeal Decision - DeCarlo, Robert (2021-10-15)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad

#### **Recommended Citation**

"Administrative Appeal Decision - DeCarlo, Robert (2021-10-15)" (2022). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/875

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Information Project — CURRENT at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

### STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name: DeCarlo, Robert DIN: 16-A-2263
Facility: Upstate CF AC No.: 06-048-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant challenges the May 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for two separate instant offenses. In one, he snatched a wallet out of the 65-year-old victim's hand and hit the victim about the face and body before fleeing. In the second, Appellant drove a stolen car through a red light, lost control of the vehicle, and struck a mother and her two daughters. The mother and one of her daughters suffered massive head and body trauma, and the other 12-year-old daughter lost her life. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board focused solely on the instant offense and his disciplinary history without citing any aggravating factors; 2) the Board failed to consider the required statutory factors; 3) the decision amounted to an unauthorized resentencing; 4) the Board exhibited prejudice and bias throughout the unfair proceeding; 5) the decision was predetermined based on the instant offense; 6) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments requiring a future-focused analysis; 7) the decision was conclusory and recited boilerplate language; and 8) the 24-month hold was excessive.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such [incarcerated individual] is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994).

### STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name: DeCarlo, Robert DIN: 16-A-2263
Facility: Upstate CF AC No.: 06-048-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 4)

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses of Manslaughter in the second degree, two counts of Assault in the second degree, and Robbery in the second degree; Appellant's institutional efforts including a poor disciplinary record reflecting multiple Tier III violations since his last Board appearance, denial of an Earned Eligibility Certificate ("EEC"), and completion of most required programming including vocational training, ASAT and the high school equivalency program; and release plans to live with his mother and return to concrete work. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, a letter from the District Attorney, and letters of support.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, Appellant's poor disciplinary record while incarcerated, the fact that Appellant was denied an EEC, and Appellant's need to complete recommended programming. See Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Grigger v.</u> Goord, 41 A.D.3d 1128, 840 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Jones v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505, 506 (3rd Dept. 2019). The Board also expressed concern with the COMPAS instrument's elevated scores for risk of felony violence and reentry substance abuse in light of the reckless instant offense and Appellant's disciplinary issues. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board went on to encourage Appellant to develop a documented relapse prevention plan to help him remain drug-free in the community. See Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always required to support emphasis on an incarcerated individual's offense, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the Board's decision here was based on the additional considerations outlined above.

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

### STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name:DeCarlo, RobertDIN:16-A-2263Facility:Upstate CFAC No.:06-048-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 4)

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

Inasmuch as Appellant asserts bias, there must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), <a href="Iv-decision-level">Iv. denied</a>, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000). Here, there is no such proof. The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant's contention that the parole interview was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview. <a href="Matter of Rivers v. Evans">Matter of Rivers v. Evans</a>, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); <a href="See also Matter of Mays v. Stanford">See also Matter of Mays v. Stanford</a>, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d Dept. 2017); <a href="Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd.">Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole</a>, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006). While Appellant attempts to characterize the panel as subjective and prejudicial, a review of the transcript reflects the Board properly carried out its obligation to evaluate Appellant's rehabilitative progress and fitness for parole release.

There is also no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

Appellant's additional contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30

### STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

# APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: DeCarlo, Robert DIN: 16-A-2263
Facility: Upstate CF AC No.: 06-048-21 B

**Findings:** (Page 4 of 4)

N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations.

Finally, the Board's decision to hold an incarcerated individual for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), <a href="lower-red">lower-red</a> (3d Dept. 2002), <a href="lower-red">lower-red</a> (2002); <a href="lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red"</a> (2002); <a href="lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red">lower-red"</a> (2002); <a href="lower-red">lower

**Recommendation:** Affirm.

### STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

# ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	DeCarlo, R	obert	Facility:	Upstate CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	06-048-21 B
DIN:	16-A-2263	A STATE OF THE STA		
Appearances:		Barry J. Jones, Esq. Washington County Public Defender's Office 383 Broadway Fort Edward, NY 12828		
Decision appealed:		May 2021 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.		
		<b>8</b>		
Board Member(s) who participated:		Berliner, Lee		
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received September 7, 2021		
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation				
	(*)			a 3
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.		
Final Dete	ermination:	The undersigned dete	ermine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:
Coly	Marie	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Che	nissioner		cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Comr	nissioner	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 10/15/2021 66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)