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THE EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

INTRODUCTION

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is an interstate compact that furnishes a procedure by which a prisoner currently incarcerated in one state—the "sending state"—can be transferred to another state—the "receiving state"—to dispose of outstanding criminal charges.


2. A compact is an agreement, a contract. The word is applied often to agreements between nations and states. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 557-59 (1983) (negotiated agreement between those two states); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 95 (1938) (agreement entered into by Colorado and New Mexico with approval of Congress); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 185, 209 (1837) (nations and states have the sovereign power to enter into compacts establishing their boundaries). Agreements between nations are usually called treaties. Courts have spoken of compacts as "treaties" between states. See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104; Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985). One major difference between treaties and compacts is that while Congress can invalidate or modify a treaty through subsequent legislation, see Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); F. Zimmermann & M. Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 1925, at 32 (1951), a party to a compact cannot change its terms unilaterally. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.


against him in the receiving state. Its main objective is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition" of these charges to reduce the prisoner and prison officials' period of uncertainty concerning the total length of the prisoner's sentence. This benefits the prisoner, officials working in the penal system and society in general. The procedures governing transfer and disposition of charges may be initiated either by the prisoner or by the prosecuting authorities of the receiving state.

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6. A detainer may be filed for purposes other than prosecuting outstanding charges, for example, to merely question the individual. See Note, The Interrelationship Between Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, and The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: United States v. Mauro, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 285, 289 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum]. This Note, however, will discuss only those situations where detainers are interposed for the purpose of bringing the individual to trial in receiving states. This is the case in approximately one-half to two-thirds of the instances where detainers are lodged against prisoners. See Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3417 & n.13 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).


8. See infra note 63.

9. See infra note 63.

10. See infra notes 63, 128-34 and accompanying text.

11. See infra text accompanying note 127.

12. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III (1982). Article III was included in the IAD so that prisoners could force disposition of any detainer lodged against them. See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 78-79 (distinguishing IAD art. III from art. IV; the former "makes the clearing of detainers possible at the instance of the prisoner"). See infra note 89. Detainers harm the prisoner's current term of incarceration. See Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at 8, 9 [hereinafter cited as Bennett I]. The mere existence of a detainer has caused prisoners to be denied parole. Id. at 9-10. In one case, the court noted that the lodging of a detainer caused the prisoner to be sent to a "maximum medium" security state penitentiary, rather than to an institution for youthful offenders along with his older codefendant, even though the two had prior records that were "practically identical;" it also affected his work assignments and barred him from working outside the penitentiary. See United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1961); see also United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (prisoner will be denied the privileges accorded a well-behaved prisoner, such as trusty status, desirable work assignments within the prison, work outside the prison, and parole, throughout his term solely because a detainer has been lodged against him); Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 464, 283 S.W.2d 162, 165 (1955) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (due to the lodging of a detainer, prisoner ineligible for parole, so that he must serve 15 years in prison rather than possibly as few as 5 years; he will also be denied trusty status); Note, The Effect of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Upon Federal Prisoner Transfer, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 492, 510 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prisoner Transfer]; Note, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Defining the Federal Role, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1017, 1019-20 (1978).

Detainers often have been abused, because the responsible authorities do not need to make out a prima-facie case. Many police departments and sheriffs can file them merely on suspicion. Bennett I, supra, at 9. Mr. Bennett, then the acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, see Bennett, "The Last Full Ounce", 23 Fed. Probation, June 1959, at 20, 20 [hereinafter cited as Bennett II], stated that in fiscal 1958 there were 380 detainers filed against prisoners at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary. See id. at 21. Of those, 211 were withdrawn without prosecution. Id. Bennett referred to them as a "nuisance," and he implied that many were placed in the prisoners' files vindictively. See id. (the lifting of detainers from a prisoner's file "usually" occurred "about the time the prisoners involved were finishing their sentences"); see also Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 810, 415 P.2d 809, 812, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (1966) (en banc) (prosecutor refused to act on
The process established by the IAD is rigorous; the penalties for non-compliance are severe.

filed detainers, despite repeated requests by the prisoners, writing: "As far as I am concerned . . . [the prisoners] can sit and rot in prison for the rest of their lives."). For these reasons, the prisoner may be sufficiently confident of his innocence of the charges underlying the detainer or desirous of minimizing the harm to his present term of incarceration to request disposition of the detainer.

The IAD and its intrastate counterpart, which the Council initially named the "Intrastate Detainer Statute", see Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 76, but later renamed the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), see infra text accompanying note 83, are both intended to give the prisoner subject to a detainer the opportunity to eliminate its harmful effects to his rehabilitation by "provid[ing] a way for him to test the substantiality of detainers placed against him and to secure final judgment on any indictments, informations or complaints outstanding against him." Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 76-77; see also Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3412-13 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).


13. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV (1982). The IAD provides no mechanism whereby the sending state can initiate transfer and disposition of charges. This probably is not accidental, because prosecutors and correction officials in the sending state may have no desire to enforce the IAD strictly against the receiving state. See Bennett II, supra note 12, at 23 ("opposition to [the IAD] may continue to be expected from officials who have no interest in the rehabilitative aspects of criminal justice and who wish to continue manipulating detainers for quasi-judicial and vengeful purposes"). See infra note 52. The author has been unable to locate any cases where the sending state moved to intervene to enforce its rights under the IAD.


15. See id. arts. III(d), IV(e), V(e) (1982). IAD art. III(d) reads, in relevant part:

If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated [under art. III] prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

Art. IV(e) reads:

If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated [under art. IV] prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment [at the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement], such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

Art. V(c) reads:

If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III [(180 days)] or article IV [(120 days)] hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the courts of appeals have disagreed, in the context of habeas corpus proceedings, on the nature of IAD violations. If IAD violations are "strictly jurisdictional" in nature, they may be raised for the first time in federal or state court, same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.

Although there have been no reported challenges to the constitutionality of the time limitations contained in the IAD, the similarly restrictive, legislatively-imposed time limits of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (STA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), see infra notes 102-03, were twice declared unconstitutional by the same district court judge as violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. See United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627, 630 (D. Md. 1981) (Young, J.), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1977) (Young, J.), aff'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); see also United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit rejected Judge Young's position, holding that "trial rights are a proper subject of legislation," and that the time limits contained in the STA do not "intrude upon the zone of judicial self-administration to such a degree as to 'prevent[.] the [judiciary] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.'" United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 698 (4th Cir. 1982) (brackets in original).


This issue may be raised initially on appeal because absence of subject matter jurisdiction is fatal to a prosecution; a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 704 & n.10 (1982); Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1984). Two situations must be distinguished. Certain facts are "strictly jurisdictional," Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893), while other facts are "quasi jurisdictional." Id. (emphasis in original). The latter category of facts, if erroneously found by the court, are subject only to direct attack, and are not subject to collateral attack. See id. This category of facts includes:

allegations and proof of the requisite diversity of citizenship, or the amount in controversy in a Federal court, . . . the fact that one of the heirs of an estate had reached his majority, when the act provided that the estate should not be sold if all the heirs were minors; . . . and others of a kindred nature, where the want of jurisdiction does not go to the subject-matter or the parties, but to a preliminary fact necessary to be proven to authorize the court to act. See id. at 173-74 (citations omitted).


A "clear usurpation of power" occurred in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). In
habeus corpus proceedings. The Third and Fifth Circuits hold that a

Kalb, the question presented was whether a state court that had properly exercised jurisdiction originally had its jurisdiction divested automatically when one party filed a petition for bankruptcy. See id. at 435-36. The Court held that through the Frazier-Lemke Act "Congress intended to, and did deprive the [state court] of the power and jurisdiction to continue or maintain in any manner" its proceedings once the state court received notice of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 440. The court granted relief in the collateral proceeding before it. See id. at 436, 443-44. The Court found the statutory exclusion to be "self-executing," id. at 443, that is, the act of filing the petition automatically relieved the petitioner "of the necessity of litigation elsewhere and its consequent expense." Id.

Like the Frazier-Lemke Act, the IAD commands, through mandatory language, that upon the occurrence of IAD violations, the court in the receiving state divest itself of jurisdiction over the charges "with prejudice." Compare Kalb, 308 U.S. at 440 ("The filing of a petition ... shall immediately subject the [petitioner] and all his property ... to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [bankruptcy] court.") (quoting Frazier-Lemke Act § (n) with 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(d) (1982) ("If trial is not had on any [charge] contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such [charge] shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."). id. art. IV(e) ("If trial is not had on any [charge] contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment ... , such [charge] shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.") and IAD art. V(e) (on the occurrence of certain events, "the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the [charge] has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect"). These provisions are statutorily self-executing, just as the Frazier-Lemke Act is.

One reason many courts have not viewed IAD violations as jurisdictional is that in State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 191 A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1963), it was held that the IAD's provisions are not self-executing. See id. at 387, 191 A.2d at 763; see also Gayles v. Hedman, 309 Minn. 289, 291, 244 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1976); State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 147, 257 A.2d 705, 711 (App. Div. 1969) (Kolovsky, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970); People v. White, 33 A.D.2d 217, 221, 305 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (1969); People v. Squitieri, 10 Misc. 2d 209, 209, 291 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The West court correctly held that a court in the sending state had no power to dismiss charges of the receiving state. See West, 79 N.J. Super. at 386-87, 191 A.2d at 762. Its error occurred in confusing the place in which the provisions of the IAD are self-executing with the fact of whether they are self-executing. Although the IAD does "contemplate[] a judicial proceeding or act in the receiving state resulting in dismissal of the pending indictments," id. at 387, 191 A.2d at 763, the very existence of the violation mandates the judicial proceeding or act in the receiving state, making the provisions self-executing. Cf. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 440-43 (1940) (provisions of the Frazier-Lemke Act are self-executing when bankruptcy petition is filed).

violation of the IAD can merit relief under the habeas corpus statutes, although neither court appears to have adopted the position that IAD violations divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction. The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold that IAD violations alone do not warrant relief under the habeas corpus statutes unless the prisoner at least demonstrates that actual prejudice resulted from the violation. The Second Circuit holds that IAD violations never merit habeas corpus relief. The Ninth Circuit has tried to reconcile conflicting intracircuit decisions by ruling that only violations of the IAD's time jurisdiction is such a fundamental defect. See supra note 17. It always entitles a petitioner to habeas corpus relief. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.

19. See Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 590 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Shack v. Attorney General, 776 F.2d 1170, 1173 (3d Cir. 1985).

20. See Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing applicability of rules of waiver); United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (a defendant who raises the IAD violation has an absolute defense).

21. See Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 557-58 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 867 (1980). The Fasano court applied the standard of Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), that claimed non-jurisdictional errors are cognizable in a collateral attack only if the defendant is prejudiced and the error is "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a miscarriage of justice," so that it "present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent," see Davis, 417 U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). See Fasano, 615 F.2d at 557-58.

22. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 263 (1985). In Bush v. Muncey, 659 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982), the court held that a violation of one of the IAD's anti-shuttling provisions is not subject to collateral review at all. See id. at 409; see also Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d at 606-07.


26. Under this view, the prisoner would need to demonstrate that he "in fact suffered the particular harm the IAD was designed to prevent," which is discriminatory treatment due to the existence of the detainer. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 1027-28 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus Review]; see also Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 263 (1985); Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979); Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Third Circuit has stated that prejudice existed due to counsel's failure to raise the IAD violation at trial, since had he done so the complaint would have been dismissed. United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1980). This view of "prejudice" merely restates the proposition that IAD violations are an absolute defense. Failure to raise the issue at trial is not "the particular harm the IAD was designed to prevent." See Federal Habeas Corpus Review, supra, at 1027.

27. See Rivera v. Harris, 643 F.2d 86, 90 n.2 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 454
limitations merit habeas corpus relief because those limitations protect the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the anti-shuttling provisions, which prohibit more than one transfer of the prisoner to the receiving state, do not protect any constitutional right, violations of those provisions do not merit habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit also has produced conflicting intracircuit decisions. One panel's decision implies that IAD violations divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Two later panels rejected this analysis.

One state supreme court has held that IAD violations deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction. This Note argues that under the IAD receiving states agree to exercise their subject matter jurisdiction subject to conditions. Failure of the receiving state to prosecute the prisoner in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the IAD compels the court in the receiving state hearing the matter to divest itself automatically of subject matter jurisdiction over the outstanding charges. This Note concludes that because absence of subject matter jurisdiction always entitles a petitioner to relief under the habeas corpus statutes, habeas corpus relief should be granted whenever a violation of the IAD occurs and the prisoner cannot secure other

28. See Carlson v. Hong, 707 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
29. See infra note 44.
30. See Carlson v. Hong, 707 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
31. See Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). Although the Stroble decision is not explicit in its holding, a later decision of the Sixth Circuit explained that Stroble stands for the proposition that "a violation of the IAD is jurisdictional and deprives a trial court of any power to proceed with criminal proceedings on the indictment." See Mars v. United States, 615 F.2d 704, 705 n.8 (6th Cir.) (answering the dissent, which argued that Stroble was controlling), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
32. See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 536-37 (6th Cir. 1981); Mars v. United States, 615 F.2d 704, 705 & n.8 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); see also United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the contention that IAD violations are jurisdictional, but not mentioning Stroble).
34. The court in the receiving state must first determine that an IAD violation has occurred and then take the required actions because the sending state is powerless to compel such actions merely by enacting the IAD. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
The prisoner should not be required to demonstrate actual prejudice to be accorded such relief; violation of the IAD suffices.

I. Operation of the IAD

Contrary to the view of various courts and commentators, the IAD is not merely a statute. Rather, it is an interstate compact. This distinction is critical because a compact is not subject to unilateral alteration.

A compact establishes a contractual relationship between the signatory states. The terms of the contract created by the IAD govern the prose-
8AD VIOLATIONS

cution of a prisoner of one state by another state. The sending state promises to cede custody over its prisoner to the receiving state for the limited purpose of disposing of all outstanding charges against the prisoner. As consideration for the sending state’s promise to deliver the prisoner, the receiving state agrees to limit its subject matter jurisdiction over the prisoner. The IAD automatically imposes conditions on the receiving state’s jurisdiction through its time limitations and its anti-


40. See 18 U.S.C. app. 2, art. III(d) (1982); id. arts. IV(b) and (e) (acting conjunctively to equal the force of id. art. III(d)).

41. See id. art. V(g). The action taken by the sending state in delivering up the prisoner to the receiving state is voluntary. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922) (a state may choose to waive “its strict right to exclusive custody of [the prisoner] for vindication of its laws in order that the other [state] may also subject him to conviction of crime against it”); id. at 261 (no jurisdiction can acquire personal jurisdiction over a prisoner without the consent of the imprisoning jurisdiction); Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370 (1872) (if the governor of the sending state refuses to extradite the prisoner, “there is no means of compulsion”); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109 (1860) (“The performance of the duty [to extradite an individual] . . . is left to depend on the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into with the other States when it adopted the Constitution of the United States, and became a member of the Union.”); see also Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q., 417, 424 & n.31. The IAD gives legal force to detainers. See Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that under the IAD, each participating state gives up “part of its ‘rights’ to hold prisoners”); vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); cf. Hincks, The Need for Comity in Criminal Administration, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at 3, 3 (detainers have no intrinsic power) (pre-IAD statement). The IAD reserves to the governor of the sending state the right to refuse to surrender a prisoner, on his own motion or on the prisoner’s motion. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(a) (1982); see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363 n.28 (1978); O’Connor v. Cole, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 233, 234 (C.P. Cumberland Co. 1980); Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 78.

42. See Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984) (a receiving state can obtain prisoners through the IAD only if it “meets certain conditions” listed in the compact) (emphasis added), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (the IAD empowers states to obtain prisoners, “subject to certain conditions”) (emphasis added), rev’d, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420-24 (1886) (extradition agreement limits the subject matter jurisdiction under which the prisoner is to be tried). Contra Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1978) (the jurisdiction of the court derives from the offense rather than from the IAD).

43. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c) (1982).
shuttling provisions.\textsuperscript{44} The receiving state must accept the sending state's offer subject to these conditions.\textsuperscript{45} By enacting the IAD, the state legislature commands its judiciary and prosecutors, when that state acts as a receiving state, to respect the conditions imposed on its exercise of jurisdiction over the prisoner and the offense.\textsuperscript{46}

The receiving state promises the sending state, and commands its own judiciary, to forfeit subject matter jurisdiction over the charges underlying the detainer "with prejudice"\textsuperscript{47} should any of the participants in the

\textsuperscript{44} See id. arts. III(d), IV(e). The return of the prisoner to the sending state "automatically" extinguishes the detainer. See Burris v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 702 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burris, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); see also Walker v. King, 448 F. Supp. 580, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (permitting only one transfer advances one purpose of the IAD); People v. Reyes, 98 Cal. App. 3d 524, 530, 159 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575-76 (1979) (18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(e) allows only one rendition) (citing Walker, 448 F. Supp. at 586); Hughes v. District Ct., 197 Colo. 396, 400, 593 P.2d 702, 705 (1979) (en banc) (IAD "Article IV(e) allows the receiving state only one rendition"); Commonwealth v. Diggs, 273 Pa. Super. 121, 122-23, 416 A.2d 1119, 1120 (1979) (per curiam) (receiving state must "finally dispose" of all charges before returning the prisoner to the sending state) (dictum). Compare 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(d) (1982) (instructing the court to dismiss the charges with prejudice if the prisoner is returned to the sending state before trial) and id. art. IV(e) (same) with id. art. V(c) (instructing the court to dismiss the charges with prejudice and to recognize that the detainer is without any further "force or effect" if the receiving state refuses to accept the prisoner or does not bring him to trial within the applicable time limit). For this reason, various courts have referred to these sections as "anti-shuttling" provisions. See United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 1985); Burris v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 703 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burris, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 1000 (Colo. 1986) (en banc).

\textsuperscript{45} "It is fundamental that no act constitutes an acceptance unless it is an acceptance of the offer which has been made." Zimmermann & Wendell, \textit{supra} note 39, at 8; accord Iselin v. United States, 271 U.S. 136, 139 (1926); W. Jaeger, \textit{1 Williston on Contracts} § 73 (3d ed. 1958 reprint); Restatement of Contracts § 59 (1932); cf. Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3419 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (amendment of IAD by the Kentucky legislature "expressly notes . . . that it can be 'binding only . . . between those party states which specifically execute the same' amendment") (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. § 440.455(1) (1985)).


\textsuperscript{47} See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982). The sanction of dismissal with prejudice has been described by Congress as having the effect of "bar[ring] any future prosecution against the defendant for charges arising out of the same conduct."
prosecution in either state fail to comply with the conditions of transfer.\textsuperscript{48} This promise is necessary for enforcement purposes because the IAD is interjurisdictional.\textsuperscript{49} The sending state lacks power to order the receiving state to abandon its prosecution when IAD violations occur.\textsuperscript{50} By making the conditional promise to dismiss its charges, the receiving state allows the prisoner, as a third party beneficiary\textsuperscript{51} to the contract between the states, to enforce the IAD by seeking specific performance of the contract.\textsuperscript{52}

Many courts, including some reviewing habeas corpus petitions, have


- See \textit{infra} note 87 and accompanying text.

- See \textit{infra} note 88 and accompanying text.

- The prisoner is classified either as a donee beneficiary to the contract, because the IAD confers upon him, as a third party beneficiary, "a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary," Restatement of Contracts § 133 (1)(a) (1932); \textit{see also} Marlboro Shirt Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 570, 77 A.2d 776, 778 (1951); A. Corbin, 4 Corbin on Contracts § 774 (1951); 2 Williston on Contracts, \textit{supra} note 45, § 357, at 842-43, or as an intended beneficiary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 302 (1981); \textit{id.} at 382 (introductory note to ch. 6). Regardless, the prisoner is vested with rights under the IAD. \textit{See} Williams v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Md. 1978). See \textit{infra} note 52.

- A third party to a contract may enforce that contract when it is made for his benefit. \textit{See}, e.g., Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U.S. 143, 149 (1876); Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Jaffe, 121 Cal. App. 2d 241, 244, 263 P.2d 82, 84 (1953); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 237, 120 N.E. 639, 640, (1918); Restatement of Contracts § 135(a) (1932); 2 Williston on Contracts, \textit{supra} note 45, § 347, at 792-95. Persons affected by interstate compacts and treaties have been recognized to have the capacity to assert rights under them. \textit{See} Hindenlilder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110-11 (1938) (rejecting the assertion that the absence of New Mexico and Colorado, parties to the La Plata River Compact, deprived the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the claim of an affected private litigant); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 30 (1887) (title dispute affecting a landowner involving the Georgia-Florida boundary under a treaty with Spain); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 423-25 (1886) (violation of an extradition treaty between Great Britian and the United States asserted by the prisoner conveyed pursuant to it); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 543 (1884) (Chinese citizen recognized as beneficiary under a treaty between the United States and China, as modified by a subsequent Act of Congress); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 207-10 (1837) (dispute over the Tennessee-Kentucky border; compact between the states "has full validity" and is "obligatory upon the citizens of both states"); \textit{Some Legal and Practical Problems,}
held that prisoners waive the IAD dismissal provisions by failing to raise them in timely fashion.\textsuperscript{53} These courts act under the mistaken impression that the IAD confers purely "statutory" rights.\textsuperscript{54} Actually, as noted above, the terms of the IAD are contractual as well as statutory.\textsuperscript{55} The conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction constitute material parts of the bargain between the states. "Waiver" of these conditions thus amounts to a modification of the contract without consideration.\textsuperscript{56}

Even assuming that modification of a contract without consideration is
ordinarily enforceable,\textsuperscript{57} the sending state has interests that are distinct from those of the prisoner.\textsuperscript{58} The prisoner is powerless to affect the sending state's interests by modifying the agreement between the states because he is not authorized by the IAD to act as the state's agent.\textsuperscript{59} Furthermore, "a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy."\textsuperscript{60} The prisoner is accorded the right to an "expeditious and orderly" trial under the IAD\textsuperscript{61} to further the public interest that "detainers . . . not hamper the administration of correction programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals."\textsuperscript{62} The general public, judges, corrections officials and parole authorities in the sending state, as well as the prisoner, all share this interest.\textsuperscript{63} To allow
prisoners to waive or release deficient prosecutions would thwart the legislative policy that the IAD was designed to effectuate.64

Bennett II, supra note 12, at 21; United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1975) ("the psychological strain resulting from uncertainty about any future sentence decreases an inmate's desire to take advantage of institutional opportunities"); 116 Cong. Rec. 14,000 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poft) ("This . . . consideration is especially important in view of the fact that the basic purpose of the entire penal system is to prepare its inmates to reenter society as law-abiding citizens."). Judges may be unsure of the appropriate length of sentence they should impose when the individuals before them may face further prosecution. See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 74; Perry, Effect of Detainers on Sentencing Policies, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at 11, 11-12. Prison officials may be uncertain how to plan and structure the prisoner's rehabilitation program. See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 74; see also Bennett I, supra note 12, at 9 ("because of the indefinite character of many detainers the institutional staff is in no better position to know what the future holds for these men than are the men themselves") (pre-IAD statement). Parole boards are also affected by the uncertainty created by the filing of a detainer. See Bennett I, supra note 12, at 9-10 (noting the "well-established policy" of the Federal Board of Parole, held in common with many state boards of parole, to refuse parole to prisoners subject to detainers) (pre-IAD statement); id. at 10 (detainers serve to undermine parole, "one of the most important aspects of the modern correctional program"). See supra note 12.

A stated goal of the IAD is "to permit the prisoner to secure a greater degree of knowledge of his own future and to make it possible for the prison authorities to provide better plans and programs for his treatment." Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 76-77; see Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3413 n.6 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The [IAD] obviously does not eliminate detainers, but merely provides the means for definitive resolution and imposition of a certain, final sentence."); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360 (IAD is intended to alleviate the harmful effects of detainers by encouraging quicker resolution of the outstanding charges); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (paraphrasing the language used by the Council of State Governments), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4865 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (same). Thus, the IAD creates rights in all of the participants in the rehabilitative process. See United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975) (the sending state's right "not to have its . . . rehabilitative programs unduly hampered" was violated by the same actions that violated the prisoner's rights to a speedy trial and effective rehabilitative treatment).

The protection provided by the IAD often has been confused with the right to speedy trial. See infra note 103. The right to speedy trial is personal to a defendant, and is waivable. See American Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, § 4.1, at 41 commentary (Approved Draft, 1968) (right to speedy trial "is a personal right of the defendant, and thus the right is deemed waived if not properly asserted") (emphasis added). The protection offered to the prisoner is not personal to him because the IAD creates rights in people beside the prisoner. See Groomes, 520 F.2d at 835. Courts, however, have misconstrued the IAD, stating that the rights granted by it are personal to the prisoner. See United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329, 336 n.9 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979); United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). These courts fail to recognize that the IAD reflects different policies than the Speedy Trial Act. See infra note 103.


The public interest represented by the IAD, see supra notes 62-63, and infra notes 126-33, overrides any desire of the prisoner to act contrarily to its provisions. Cf. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1982) (refusing to enforce contract violating both
The position that IAD violations are not subject to waiver comports with the position of this Note that IAD violations divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction.65 The parties to the litigation may not waive the def-

the Sherman Act and the Taft-Hartley Act "only on account of the public interest") (quoting McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669 (1899)).

65. Because the IAD is a compact, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, the party states are free to establish jurisdictional limits. These limits need not be absolute. Thus, the time limitations of the IAD may be extended without triggering the duty to impose its sanctions. "[F]or good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c) (1982). Courts have disagreed on the meaning of "continuance". Compare State v. Lippolis, 55 N.J. 354, 354, 262 A.2d 203, 203 (1970) (per curiam) (unanimously reversing the Appellate Division, which held that a continuance must be obtained "no later than the expiration of the [applicable time limitation]"); State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 143, 257 A.2d 705, 709 (App. Div. 1969)), with Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106-07, 301 A.2d 605, 606-07 (1973) (rejecting the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lippolis explicitly).

The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lippolis rests on untenable rationale. First, the IAD itself is self-executing. See supra note 17. Second, Judge Kolovsky, whose dissent in the Appellate Division was unanimously adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, see Lippolis, 55 N.J. at 354, 262 A.2d at 203, stated that the time in which the receiving state can obtain a continuance must extend beyond the last day of the IAD's time limitation because the IAD is not self-executing. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. at 147, 257 A.2d at 711 (Kolovsky, J., dissenting). Yet the UMDDA, which was drafted concurrently by the same body that drafted the IAD, the Council of State Governments, see Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 77-85, contains the same language as the IAD regarding the granting of "any necessary or reasonable continuance." See id. at 77 (UMDDA § 1(a)); id. at 81 (IAD art. III(a)); id. at 83 (IAD art. IV(c)). These similar provisions, drafted by the same legislative group at the same time, see Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 76-85, should be construed to operate similarly. This is a guideline of statutory construction that has been applied to the UMDDA and the IAD. See People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 374-75, 619 P.2d 72, 73-74 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Barnes v. State, 20 Md. App. 262, 268, 315 A.2d 117, 121 ( Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd, 273 Md. 195, 328 A.2d 737 (1974); State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). Whether the IAD provision is self-executing is irrelevant. Just as it is impossible to obtain a continuance after the expiration of the time period in the UMDDA, see Commonwealth v. Klimeck, 416 Pa. 413, 413-17, 206 A.2d 381, 382 (1965), it should also be impossible to obtain a continuance after the expiration of the IAD time period.


A benefit of a strict interpretation of the IAD's time limitations is a greater reluctance on the part of courts to countenance delay. E.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 105-07, 301 A.2d 605, 606-08 (1973) (charges dismissed when state dilatorily moved for a continuance one day after expiration of the time limit). This advances the goal of the IAD to dispose of detainers in an "expeditious and orderly" manner, see 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982), and gives the sending state the greatest degree of control over its prisoner. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. In light of the policies that the IAD reflects, it is unlikely that a prosecutor's vacation is a reasonable ground for delay in prosecution.
II. LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Analysis of the IAD's language and legislative history reveals the intent that violations of its provisions mandatorily and automatically divest receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction. The receiving state promises the sending state that it "shall" dispose of its detainer(s) in the agreed fashion, and, if it violates the compact's procedures, the appropriate court of the receiving state "shall enter an order dismissing" the indictment, information or complaint "with prejudice." The Council of State Governments, which formulated the IAD, appears to have chosen the word "shall" intentionally. "Shall" is usually a word of mandate rather than of discretion.


67. The IAD was drafted with reference to and was intended to be analyzed in light of the entire body of legal principles applicable to the interpretation of statutes. Cf. Zimmernann & Wendell, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that all compacts are drafted with these principles in mind).

68. There is a distinction between "mandatory" and "automatic". If a defendant may waive the violation, any required consequences are mandatory only after he asserts the violation. Thus, the consequences are not automatically imposed. See text accompanying infra notes 110-12.


70. See id. arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982). In addition, if the prisoner is in the receiving state after that state violates the applicable time limit, the receiving state promises that its "detainer based [on the charges underlying the detainer] shall cease to be of any force or effect." IAD art. V(c). See supra note 44.

71. The Council of State Governments initially proposed the IAD in 1956. See supra note 1. The Council intended that the IAD be analyzed according to the principles of statutory construction. See supra note 67. The word "shall" is normally used to indicate that the delineated action is mandatory. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. The Council itself later described the provisions of the IAD as "mandatory." See infra notes 74, 95 and accompanying text. Finally, when the Council drafted its own speedy trial legislation, it used the word "may," indicating that that statute, in contrast to the IAD, grants discretionary power to courts. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.


Some cases have refused to hold that statutes directing administrative action within a statutory time period and using the word "shall" are in fact mandatory unless the statute "both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision." St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Brock, 769 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fort Worth Nat'l Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47, 58 (5th Cir. 1972)), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1985) (No. 85-949); see Thomas v. Barry, 729 F.2d 1469, 1470 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ward v. Fremont Unified School Dist., 276 Cal. Ap. 2d 313, 322, 80 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1969); State ex rel. Taylor v. Wade, 360 Mo. 895, 899, 231 S.W.2d 179, 181 (1950) (en banc). The IAD does include consequences for a failure to comply with its provisions. See supra note 15.

Of course, construction of a statute must ultimately rest on legislative intent. See Escoe, 295 U.S. at 493-94; United Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453
provisions of the IAD advances the intent of its drafters that receiving states dispose of detainers in an “expeditious and orderly” fashion.\textsuperscript{73} The Council itself later described the procedure as “mandatory.”\textsuperscript{74}

The drafters’ inclusion of penalties for noncompliance supplies further evidence that the provisions of the IAD are mandatory.\textsuperscript{75} The IAD does include penalties—dismissal of the outstanding charges with prejudice and, when the prisoner remains in the receiving state after the occurrence of the violation, nullification of the “force and effect” of the detainer.\textsuperscript{76} These sanctions apply if the receiving state fails to comply with the IAD’s time limits and its anti-shuttling provisions.\textsuperscript{77}

Moreover, the procedures enacted in the IAD embody the substance of the receiving state’s duty to dispose of its detainers in an “expeditious and orderly” fashion. The procedures under which the prisoner is to be prosecuted form the subject matter of the IAD; they are matters of substance. They represent a determination of what constitutes an “expeditious and orderly” disposition by the receiving state.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, application of another guideline of statutory construction, that provisions relating to the subject matter of the statute are mandatory,\textsuperscript{79} further demonstrates that the IAD’s provisions are mandatory and automatic.


75. See supra note 72.
76. See supra note 15.
77. See supra note 15.
78. Many courts have dismissed the IAD as nothing more than a set of “procedural rules.” E.g., United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 351, 619 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1981); see Gray v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (D. Kan. 1978) (specifically referring to IAD art. IV(e)), aff’d per curiam, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979); cf. State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. 30, 34-35, 383 A.2d 437, 438-39 (App. Div.) (referring to defendants’ ground of appeal, violation of IAD art. III(a), as merely a procedural defect in the prosecution), certification denied, 77 N.J. 479, 391 A.2d 494 (1978). This attitude conforms with a characterization of the IAD’s provisions as conferring purely “statutory” rights. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. But see Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1095 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dissenting in part) (“where, as here, a procedural requirement does further a substantive purpose, it is judicial disregard of the statutory design that is inappropriate”) (emphasis in original), rev’d, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
However, the right of a state to prosecute a prisoner protected by the IAD is conditional. Failure to comply with these rules is fatal to the prosecution. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. See 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 393, 401 (1979) ("[p]rocedural violations [of the IAD] are not mere technical defects").
Another guideline of statutory construction states that the placement of conditions on a statutory right within the statute itself acts to destroy that right when the conditions have not been met. The IAD creates a right in the receiving state—the right to extend its personal jurisdiction extraterritorially and to obtain a prisoner from another state so that it may prosecute him. The IAD restricts the exercise of this right as it creates it, imposing time limits and a prohibition of multiple transfers on the receiving state. This adds support to the contention that failure to comply with the provisions of the IAD acts to divest courts in receiving states of the right to prosecute the prisoner.

Finally, the conclusion that the provisions of the IAD are mandatory and automatic comports completely with the intent of its drafters. Of necessity, the Council simultaneously proposed two acts to deal with the problem of detainers. One, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), concerned itself with the disposition of intrastate detainers. The other, the IAD, governed interstate detainers. The UMDDA expressly divested courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the outstanding charges when the enacting state failed to bring the prisoner to trial within the time limits provided in the act. The IAD did not expressly compel the same result, but its drafters stated that “[t]he [Interstate] Agreement on Detainers applies the same principles embodied in the intrastate act to the interstate field.”

The reason that the IAD does not expressly compel divestiture of sub-

80. See, e.g., Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926); William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1925); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886). The Supreme Court has stated that the lapsing of a statute of limitations contained in a statute, a condition on the statutory right created, is jurisdictional, limiting the power of the adjudicatory body. See United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638, 642 (1918); see also Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 363-65 (1943) (citing Louisville Cement Co. with approval); cf. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811-13, 826 (1980) (reinstating the decision of the district court that an employee’s failure to comply with a filing deadline deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction).

81. The use of a compact to extend jurisdiction extraterritorially was first demonstrated in the New York-New Jersey Compact (“Treaty”) of 1834, “which extended the criminal jurisdiction of each party state over particular water areas beyond the actual boundary line.” Zimmermann & Wendell, supra note 39, at 41; see 1 The Port of New York Authority, The Port of New York Authority Treaties and Statutes 4-6 (1948); cf. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1006 Interpleader Compact (McKinney 1976) (extending personal jurisdiction extraterritorially).

82. See infra text at notes 87-91.

83. Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 76.

84. Id. at 78.

85. In the event that the action is not brought to trial within the period of time as herein provided, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untired [indictment, information or complaint] be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

86. Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 78.
ject matter jurisdiction is that it is "interjurisdictional." The drafters were limited by the principle that a state cannot constitutionally enact legislation that compels another state to act. The Council of State Governments nevertheless desired that the IAD operate as the "interjurisdictional counterpart" of the UMDDA. Since the Council desired to apply the same principles embodied in the UMDDA to the IAD, it follows that it intended to impose the same harsh penalty found in the UMDDA—withdrawal of subject matter jurisdiction—though the drafters were limited by the interjurisdictional nature of the compact.

87. See id.
88. Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ("Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction."); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (normally a statute will be construed "as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power"); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 97 (1823) (opinion on rehearing) (it would be absurd to believe one state could enact a law obligatory upon another state); see United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1979) ("as originally drafted for application only among the several states of the Union, the IAD must have contemplated 'separate geographic and distinct jurisdictional units' when it used the term 'State'"); United States v. Umbower, 602 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Being designed for adoption by state legislatures, the IAD contemplates independent and geographically distinct sovereign state units."); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980); cf. Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 438 (1985) ("[s]he States are equal to each other 'in power, dignity and authority'") (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (Illinois anti-takeover statute struck down because of its "extraterritorial effect").

This limitation of power affects various aspects of the detainer system. Detainers, by themselves, lack legal force. Hincks, supra note 41, at 3; see Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Statutes, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 88, 96-97 (1975) ("one state has no power to compel another state to deliver up a prison inmate for prosecution"); cf. State v. Fender, 268 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1980) (although a state may deliver a writ of habeas corpus to another state, "the seeking state cannot compel the jurisdiction having custody to return the accused for trial"). Even under the IAD, the contracting states "cooperat[e]," see 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982), so that a court in the sending state may not directly affect the outstanding charges in the receiving state. Narel v. Liburdi, 185 Conn. 562, 570, 441 A.2d 177, 182 (1981) (in action based on the IAD, the "court of the sending state", lacking extraterritorial jurisdiction, is powerless to dismiss the underlying charge [of the receiving state]); cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); accord Gayles v. Hedman, 309 Minn. 289, 291, 244 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1976); State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 387, 191 A.2d 758, 762 (App. Div. 1963); People ex rel. Albuquerque v. Ward, 116 Misc. 2d 634, 635, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1982).

89. See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 78. Although the phrase "interjurisdictional counterpart" refers only to IAD art. III, by which a prisoner can request disposition of the detainer, see id., this is so because there is no counterpart in the UMDDA to IAD art. IV, which is an extradition agreement. Since the penalties imposed for violation of either IAD art. III or IAD art. IV are the same, see 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(e) (1982), the effect of the entire IAD should be to act as the "interjurisdictional counterpart" of the UMDDA.

90. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text at notes 82-89. But see Yackle, supra note 88, at 101 n.76 (since the language of the IAD does not mirror that of the UMDDA, "apparently the prisoner must move for dismissal"). The analysis in that footnote rests on the flawed analysis of State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 387, 191 A.2d 758, 763 (App. Div. 1963). The West case is discussed supra at note 17.
The Council acted under the belief that delay in prosecution of charges underlying detainers harmed the sending state's rehabilitation program.\(^9\) The IAD provides the sending state with the means of minimizing that delay. The sending state retains the greatest amount of control over its prisoner\(^9\) through mandatory and automatic IAD provisions.

One extrinsic aid adds to our understanding of the intent of the Council of State Governments when it formulated the IAD. One year after proposing the IAD, the Council proposed speedy trial legislation.\(^9\) In its prefatory comments to that legislation, the Council referred to the IAD, and its "mandatory" provisions.\(^9\) In contrast to the IAD, the Council's speedy trial legislation grants discretionary power to the court.\(^9\) Further, the speedy trial legislation provides that the defendant must move for dismissal to secure the right.\(^9\) These differences underscore the mandatory nature of the IAD requirements.

### III. Determining Congressional Understanding of the IAD's Provisions

In 1970, Congress adopted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers on behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia.\(^9\) Congress' understanding of the provisions of the IAD is indicative of the understanding other parties had of its terms. Moreover, the IAD is "a federal law subject to federal construction."\(^9\)

The legislative history of the IAD gives no indication that the severity of the penalties for noncompliance was debated.\(^1\)\(0\) The bill joining the

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93. Under the IAD, "for all purposes other than [for the disposition of the receiving state's charges underlying its detainer], the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending State . . . ." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. V(g) (1982).


95. See id. at 17.

96. On the defendant's application, the court "may" dismiss the charges. Id. at 18. Under principles of statutory construction, "may" ordinarily indicates that discretion exists. See, e.g., United Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453 (4th Cir. 1985) (dictum); Matzke v. Block, 732 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1984); City of Newark v. Blumenthal, 457 F. Supp. 30, 32 (D.D.C. 1978).

97. Council of State Governments—1957, supra note 74, at 18. Section 2 would allow the court to dismiss the charges sua sponte, see id., or on application of the prosecutor, see id., but practically speaking the burden of vigilance would lie with the defendant.

98. See supra note 3.


100. See generally 116 Cong. Rec. 13,997-14,000 (1970) (proceedings in the House of Representatives); id. at 38,840-38,842 (proceedings in the Senate).
United States and the District of Columbia as parties to the IAD passed without opposition. Thus, there is no direct evidence of Congress' understanding of the IAD. However, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (STA) provides an extrinsic aid in determining the congressional understanding of the harsh nature of the IAD's sanctions. Like the IAD, the STA is intended to produce quicker resolution of outstanding criminal charges. Furthermore, the STA, like the IAD, contains the sanctions.

101. See 116 Cong. Rec. 14,000 (1970) (House of Representatives); id. at 38,840-41 (Senate).


103. Both the IAD and the STA contain time limits within which the defendant must be brought to trial. Compare 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III (a) (1982) (prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days of delivery of his request for disposition of the detainer to the appropriate authorities of the receiving state) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV (c) (1982) (prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving state) with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c) (1982) (defendant must be brought to trial within 100 days of arrest or service of summons). However, the IAD is not speedy trial legislation. Its speedy trial provisions are merely measures designed to effectuate the goal of the Council of State Governments to reduce the anti-rehabilitative effect of long-standing detainers. See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 75 (objective to be achieved is “that detainers will not hamper the administration of correction programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals”); see also Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878, 882 (3d Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401 (1985); People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 392, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 88 (County Ct. 1960); Bennett I, supra note 12, at 10; Meyer, Effective Utilization of Criminal Detainer Procedures, 61 Iowa L. Rev. 659, 674 (1976); Note, Convicts—The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 828, 855-56 (1964); Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum, supra note 6, at 298-99 (1979); Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial For Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 Yale L.J. 767, 775 (1968). The emphasis of the IAD on reducing harm to the sending state's rehabilitation program is hinted at by the roster of participants who reviewed proposals for the disposition of detainers, which included:

- representatives of such groups as the state police, prison societies and correctional associations, bar associations, state legislators, members of commissions on interstate cooperation, state and local parole and probation officials, district attorneys, state correctional and prison officials, states attorneys general, and the United States Department of Justice.

Bennett II, supra note 12, at 22 (emphasis added); see United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 350 & n.17 (1978); Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1959, at 167 (1958); Convicts—The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, supra, at 855 n.225.

tion of dismissal of prosecutions for violations of its requirements. The legislative history of the STA reveals Congress' understanding of nonetheless, the legislators realized that with passage they were also incorporating the IAD's primary goal, the reduction of uncertainty to prisoners' terms of incarceration. See 116 Cong. Rec. 38,842 (1970); id. at 13,999.

One of the reasons courts have not policed IAD time limitation violations strictly is that they perceive the prisoners to be raising "speedy trial-type arguments." See United States ex rel. Hollemen v. Duckworth, 770 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 828 (1986); Foran v. Metz, 463 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 603 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979); Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193, 196-97 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984); Hunter v. Franza, 405 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 262 Pa. Super. 211, 217, 396 A.2d 720, 723 (1978). The association of the IAD with the STA leads courts to accept the argument that the prisoner has waived his rights, since speedy trial rights are subject to waiver. See Duckworth, 770 F.2d at 692; Johnson, 442 So. 2d at 196; Franza, 405 So. 2d at 1036-37; Thompson, 262 Pa. Super. at 217, 396 A.2d at 723.

Congress contributed to the confusion of the statutes by incorporating § 3161 into the STA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j) (1982). This section is intended to extend "the right to a speedy trial to prisoners." See H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7427. In Mauro, the Supreme Court added to the confusion when it stated that if the different time limitations contained in the STA and the IAD are both applicable to a particular prosecution, "the more stringent limitation may simply be applied." See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 357 n.24 (dictum). This language is problematic. If it refers to the shorter time period of the two, then a prisoner and his sending state will be denied the benefit of dismissal with prejudice contained in the IAD, because the STA grants the court discretion to order dismissal without prejudice. See infra text at note 115.

The potential problem is resolved by applying the guideline of statutory construction that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 285 (1983); see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1979); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976). The IAD applies only to prisoners, while the STA applies to all criminal defendants. In a case where a prisoner asserted rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) in conjunction with a petition seeking habeas corpus relief, the Court stated that only the "more specific act," habeas corpus, should apply, for "strong policy" reasons. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973). Similarly, there are strong policy reasons why the IAD should be applied rather than the STA when both are available. First, the two statutes protect different rights. The STA is intended to enforce the constitutional right to speedy trial, see H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7402, while the IAD has the goal of advancing prisoner rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982). Second, the STA has the objective of assisting "in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial," see H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7401, while the IAD's objective is to remove detainers as a hindrance to "the administration of correction programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals." See Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 75. Third, the concern of Congress that dismissals with prejudice under the STA would return some malefactors to society unrehabilitated, see infra note 123 and accompanying text, is not applicable to prisoners being prosecuted in receiving states under the IAD because they will be returned to their original correctional facility in the sending state if the prosecution is dismissed. See infra text accompanying note 122; see also 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(g) (1982).

both the IAD'S manner of operation and the severity of its sanctions through the legislators' debates over the dismissal provisions contained in the STA.

The STA was originally introduced in the Senate on June 9, 1970, and in the House of Representatives on September 9, 1970. The IAD was enacted on November 25, 1970. Thus, Congress became aware of the STA prior to passing the IAD. The original version of the STA provided the same sanction for STA violations as the IAD provided—dismissal of the charges with prejudice. There were, however, two important limitations on the use of the sanction: 1) the STA expressly required the defendant to move for dismissal, and 2) failure by the defendant to move for dismissal before trial constituted waiver of the right to dismissal.

Section 3162(a)(2) of the STA states that under certain conditions "the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." There is no doubt that dismissal is mandatory in these situations. However, dismissal is not "automatic, since the defendant is expressly required under section 3162(a)(2) to move for dismissal if not brought to trial within the prescribed time." During hearings on the STA, Senator Percy argued against conditioning dismissal on a motion by the defendant:

If, after [the applicable time period within the bill] has expired, the accused has not been brought to trial, despite the readiness of the defense and the court, and no good cause has been shown for the delay, the charges should be automatically dropped. The defendant should not have to move the court to have the charges dismissed; it should be the automatic result of the denial of a basic right.

108. See 116 Cong. Rec. 18,846 (1970) (S. 3936). This sanction was retained when the STA was reintroduced by Sen. Ervin the following year. See Speedy Trial: Hearings on S. 895 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 232 [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 895]; 117 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1971). Introducing S. 895, Sen. Ervin remarked that it was almost exactly the same bill as its predecessor. "The only real difference in [S. 895] and S. 3936 which was introduced last year is that the new bill does not provide for specific additional penalties for crimes committed while a defendant was released awaiting trial." 117 Cong. Rec. 3407 (1971).
Since the IAD and the STA employ similar language, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress understood the IAD penalty to be mandatory. Furthermore, since the IAD, unlike the STA, contains no requirement that the defendant move for dismissal, Congress must have understood the IAD sanction to be automatic. Consistent with this distinction, the IAD does not contain language permitting waiver of the right to mandatory dismissal, indicating that none is possible.\textsuperscript{114}

Congress clearly understood that dismissal with prejudice is a very harsh sanction. The STA had to be amended to vest the trial court with discretion to order dismissal with or without prejudice before the bill could be passed.\textsuperscript{115} Senator Ervin, principal sponsor of the bill, stated: "[O]n the Senate side opposition to this dismissal with prejudice provision was so intense that passage would have been impossible [unless it were changed]."\textsuperscript{116}

The Justice Department, as an interested party, commented to Congress on both the IAD and the STA.\textsuperscript{117} The Department's position regarding dismissal is enlightening. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights about the original sanction of dismissal with prejudice contained in the early versions of the STA, then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist stated:

\begin{quote}
[It may well be, Mr. Chairman, that the whole system of Federal
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{114} See supra note 59.
\textsuperscript{115} 120 Cong. Rec. 41,794-96 (1974); see id. at 41,578 (remarks of Rep. Conyers) (noting that the House Subcommittee on Crime was ready to "yield" to the "pressures" for the amendment); id. at 41,778 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("I understand that an amendment will be offered by the committee to remove the mandatory dismissal with prejudice and immunity language, and providing for a dismissal with or without prejudice as the court finds to be appropriate. This amendment must be adopted if the bill is to pass."); id. at 41,576 (remarks of Rep. Latta) (opining that unless the dismissal sanction were modified, the STA "should be referred to as the 'Let the Criminal Go Act of 1974'"); id. at 41,577 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (voicing support for the proposed amendment of the dismissal sanction to be offered by Rep. Cohen); id. at 41,578 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) (if the amendment allowing dismissal without prejudice were adopted, "90 percent of the legitimate objection to the bill will have been resolved"); id. at 41,794 (remarks of Rep. Conyers) (explaining, after the offer of the amendment, that because of time pressure to recess, "it would be far more prudent for all of us, regardless of our feelings about this amendment, to accede to it in the interests of enacting speedy trial legislation").
criminal justice needs to be shaken by the scruff of its neck, and brought up short with a relatively peremptory instruction to prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges alike that criminal cases must be tried within a particular period of time. That is certainly the import of the mandatory dismissal provisions of your bill.\footnote{118}

The Department initially supported the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, but its support was contingent on enactment by Congress of new restrictions on the use of the writ of habeas corpus.\footnote{119} Failing to convince Congress to reform the habeas corpus laws, the Department requested that Congress modify the sanction provided in the STA, out of "fear of wholesale dismissals in jurisdictions with overloaded criminal calendars."\footnote{120} In contrast, the Justice Department urged passage of the IAD, expressing no reservations as to its sanctions.\footnote{121} Because IAD defendants are already incarcerated, dismissals under the IAD would not release alleged criminals to society.\footnote{122} The possibility that such releases would occur was a real fear of Congress when it considered the STA.\footnote{123}

Thus, it appears that Congress passed the IAD with the knowledge that


120. \textit{See} 120 Cong. Rec. 35,965 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Conyers); \textit{see also Hearings, Speedy Trial Act of 1974, supra} note 116, at 387 (statement of Rep. Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.) (the effect of the sanction was "lessened" "as the insistence of the Department of Justice"); 120 Cong. Rec. at 35,873 (same); \textit{Speedy Trial: Hearing on S. 754 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-12 (1973) (statement of J. T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (expressing the fear that the sanction of dismissal with prejudice imposes too great a cost on society).


122. \textit{See} Hoss v. State, 266 Md. 136, 148, 292 A.2d 48, 54 (1972) (while dismissing kidnapping charges, court notes that its decision "is not likely to expedite" the prisoner's release by the sending state).

123. \textit{See Speedy Trial: Hearing on S. 754 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1973) (statement of J. T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (under the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, "[s]ociety suffers . . . because . . . guilty defendants would not be convicted and would thus, unrehabilitated, continue to be a threat to the community"); \textit{see also} H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (minority views of Reps. Hutchinson, McClory, et al.) ("The danger of a dismissal with prejudice sanction is that defendants who may have committed serious crimes would be released into society.") (emphasis in original), \textit{reprinted in} 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7457; 120 Cong. Rec. 41,576 (remarks of Rep. Latta) ("[The American people] do not want these criminals out in society to redo their crimes."); \textit{id.} at 41,778 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (expressing
any violation of its conditions causes mandatory and automatic divestiture of jurisdiction.

IV. Policy Concerns

The position advanced by this Note would invalidate some convictions for reasons having nothing to do with guilt or innocence. However, the Council of State Governments determined that if detainers remained outstanding against a prisoner, the benefits accruing from conviction in the receiving state would be outweighed by the harm to the prisoner’s present rehabilitation. They concluded that “society is the real loser in collecting its debt from the offender [when detainers remain unresolved for long periods]. Much money is spent in extra periods of imprisonment, and embittered offenders become recidivists, pyramiding the expense of law enforcement.”

The Council focused on the problems detainers created for the penal system in the sending state. Detainers were found to have “plagued penal administrators, courts and institutional personnel,” . . . “cling[ing] leechlike to penal progress.” The Council found that the detainer system affected four distinct groups within the state where the prisoner is presently incarcerated: judges, correctional officials, parole authorities

124. See Prisoner Transfer, supra note 12, at 517; cf. Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 120 (statement of W.H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (inclusion of the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for violations of the STA’s time limits “encourages the overall interest of society by occasionally letting a guilty defendant free”).

125. See Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978) (contending that although the government was “technically precluded from proceeding further” in its prosecution, the court retained jurisdiction and could proceed to judgment); see also United States v. Schrum, 504 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Kan. 1980) (reluctantly granting relief), aff’d per curiam, 638 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1981); People v. Cella, 114 Cal. App. 3d 905, 921, 170 Cal. Rptr. 915, 923-24 (1981) (refusing to grant relief). The courts’ irritation with IAD claims manifests the belief that the provisions of the IAD are merely “procedural rules”. See supra note 78.


128. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978) (“[t]he adverse effects of detainers . . . are . . . for the most part the consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers” while a prisoner is incarcerated); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1975) (purpose of the IAD is to “minimize the adverse impact of a foreign prosecution on rehabilitative programs of the confining jurisdiction”); People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 392, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (Those who participated in the formulation of the IAD “were . . . primarily concerned with the planning and carrying out of programs for prisoner rehabilitation.” Delay in disposition of outstanding charges was objectionable because it impeded their functions.).

and individual prisoners themselves. The Council proposed that states adopt the IAD for the purpose of maximizing rehabilitative opportunities for prisoners by minimizing the uncertainty caused by extended detainers. Clearly defined procedures for prosecution of the charges underlying detainers benefit judges, corrections officials and parole authorities in the sending state as well as prisoners. It allows those officials to make informed decisions regarding the prisoner's status earlier in the prisoner's term.

The purpose of both the UMDDA and the IAD is to provide a system in which "detainers will not hamper the administration of correction programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals." These Acts place the objective of current rehabilitation above that of the determination of guilt or innocence. In fact, one of the reasons that the Council desired to foster prompt settlement of detainers was so that the receiving state and the sending state could "cooperate in planning effective rehabilitation programs for the prisoner."

The position that violations of the IAD mandatorily and automatically divest courts in receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction provides the best means of achieving the Council's stated aim that "[e]very effort should be made to accomplish the disposition of detainers as promptly as possible." Imposition of the harshest possible penalties against a receiving state that fails to comply with the provisions of the IAD fosters the greatest degree of compliance with the IAD's terms. The IAD places reasonable limitations on prosecution by receiving states. The

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131. See supra note 63.
132. See supra note 63.
134. Council of State Governments—1956, supra note 1, at 75.
135. Id. (emphasis deleted).
136. See Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978) ("The sanction of dismissal with prejudice . . . is a relatively severe sanction designed to compel prosecutorial compliance with the procedures set forth in the IAD."); State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 145, 257 A.2d 705, 710 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) ("The sanction [of dismissal with prejudice] is a prophylactic measure to induce compliance in the generality of cases."); rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106-07, 301 A.2d 605, 607-08 (1973) (refusing to grant a continuance requested one day late) (quoting State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. at 145, 257 A.2d at 710, with approval); Note, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Defining the Federal Role, supra note 12, at 1033 (1978) (the penalty "is intentionally harsh to prevent abuse of the detainer and to encourage prompt and speedy disposition of pending charges"); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (adopting the position of the American Bar Ass'n "that the only effective remedy for denial of speedy trial is absolute and complete discharge") (quoting American Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 4.1 at 40 commentary (Approved Draft 1968)) reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7430; Steinberg, Dismissal With or Without Prejudice Under the Speedy Trial Act: A Proposed Interpretation, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 14 (1977) ("only by a vigorous judicial application of the remedy of dismissal with prejudice will the prosecution be deterred from noncompliance with the [STA's] time limits").
states have agreed to these limitations for the greater benefit of society. When the IAD's limits are violated, deficient prosecutions should end and the rehabilitative process should resume.

V. THE MAURO DECISION

Some courts and commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court implicitly held in United States v. Mauro that IAD violations do not divest courts in receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction. In Mauro, the Court noted that the cases under review concerned the scope of the United States' obligations under the IAD. The cases posed the particular question "whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, used by the United States to secure the presence in federal court of state prisoners, may be considered either a 'detainer' or a 'request' within the meaning of the [IAD]." The Court stated that it "granted certiorari . . . to consider whether the [IAD] governs the use of writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by the United States to obtain state prisoners." The Court held that the writ "is not a detainer within the meaning of the [IAD]," but also held that "the United States is bound by the [IAD] when it activates its provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and then obtains his custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum."

Having decided that question, the Court stated that it agreed with the Second Circuit "that respondent Ford's failure to invoke the [IAD] in specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the District Court did not result in a waiver of his claim that the Government violated Art.

137. Besides the fact that the IAD is a contract, see supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text, it is also a statute which must be enacted by each party-state.

138. See supra text at note 127.


140. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. That the question is still open is indicated by Justice White's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 106 S. Ct. 263 (1985). See id. at 264 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

141. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), was consolidated with Mauro. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 340.

142. "[A] federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a federal court order commanding the immediate production of a prisoner at a federal trial. . . . Upon being served with a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the state authority . . . turns the prisoner over at once to the federal custodian." United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), rev'd, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); see Prisoner Transfer, supra note 12, at 492. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants federal courts the authority to issue such writs. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(5) (1982); see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 357 (1978); Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 613 n.4, 618-19 (1961). When the United States acquires a prisoner by this writ, it need not comply with the provisions of the IAD. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349; see L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 97 (1979).


144. Id. at 349 (footnote omitted).

145. Id.

146. Id.

147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
IV(c). From this, courts and commentators have concluded that because the Court did discuss the issue of waiver, violations of the IAD are waivable, and therefore, they cannot affect the subject matter jurisdiction of a court.

This conclusion, however, is erroneous. The Justice Department raised the issue of waiver in its petition for certiorari in *United States v. Ford*. The Department presented as a question whether Ford, "by failing to raise the issue in the district court, waived the claim that his indictment should have been dismissed for violation of the [IAD]." The government contended that IAD violations are subject to waiver. Ford’s attorneys argued that Ford did not in fact waive his claim under the IAD. The Court held that the defendant had repeatedly asserted his rights under the IAD, thus rendering moot the question whether waiver was, in fact, possible. Thus, the Court did not take the opportunity to discuss the question whether IAD violations are waivable.

**CONCLUSION**

The IAD should be recognized as curtailing, when necessary, subject
matter jurisdiction. The language of the IAD and the intent of its draft-
ers indicate that any violation of the IAD's provisions is intended to
divest courts of jurisdiction mandatorily and automatically. Congress
and the Justice Department also appear to have understood the IAD's
provisions to have this effect. Therefore, because violations of the IAD
divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction, relief should be granted with-
out requiring a prisoner to demonstrate actual prejudice stemming from
the violation. Acceptance of this interpretation may preclude or nullify
some prosecutions. The drafters of the IAD decided that these results
were preferable to extended, disorderly prosecutions associated with de-
tainers. They accorded the prisoner's rehabilitation program prece-
dence over the receiving state's interest in prosecution. Although the
result may seem objectionable in individual cases, the severe penalties of
the IAD were included because of a legislative determination that the
benefit to society from strict enforcement of the IAD would outweigh
occasional losses of prosecutorial power over individual prisoners.

Thomas R. Clark

157. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text. See State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J.
Super. 137, 142, 257 A.2d 705, 708 (App. Div. 1969) (murder indictment dismissed be-
cause of failure to comply with the IAD's provisions), rev'd on other grounds per curiam,