May 2022

Administrative Appeal Decision - Cruz, Angel (2021-10-15)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Cruz, Angel **DIN:** 94-A-0333

Facility: Otisville CF **AC No.:** 03-038-21 B

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Appellant is serving a sentence of 20 years to life upon his conviction by plea of Murder in the Second Degree. The instant offense involved the Appellant and his two co-defendants, organizing and planning a robbery of an armored vehicle. Concealing his face and carrying a shotgun, the Appellant, along with his co-defendants, attacked two armed guards and stole over $50,000 in cash. During the robbery, the Appellant shot one of the armed guards in the chest and he later succumbed to his injuries. The victim was a retired New York City Police Officer.

In the instant appeal, Appellant, through counsel, challenges the February 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 18-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the Board impermissibly denied release based on the crime without properly considering other factors such as his institutional achievements and remorse; (2) the Board departed from the COMPAS instrument without sufficient reasoning in violation of § 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a); (3) a deprecation finding is not supported by the record (4) the Board improperly resentenced Appellant; (5) the Board failed to provide any recommendations or guidance as to how he can adjust his conduct in the future; (6) the decision to deny parole was predetermined and (7) the 18 month hold is excessive. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such incarcerated individual is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be

presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors including: the instant offense of Murder in the Second Degree; the Appellant's probation status at the time of the instant offense; Appellant's criminal history, including one prior felony drug conviction and three misdemeanor convictions; Appellant's institutional efforts including programing in ART and [redacted] Appellant's poor disciplinary record; and Appellant's documented release plans. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing minutes, Appellant's detailed case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant's parole packet and letters of support/assurance. The facility requested official statements and received correspondence from the sentencing Judge, which the Board reviewed.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses representing a continuation of Appellant's criminal history and Appellant's poor disciplinary record while incarcerated. See Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013). The record establishes the Board acknowledged Appellant's rehabilitative efforts and personal growth along with additional statutory factors but placed greater emphasis on the seriousness of his crime in determining release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and so deprecate the seriousness of the offenses as to undermine respect for the law, as it is entitled to do. Matter of Hamilton 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1272, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, 719 (3d Dept. 2014).

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

Appellant's additional contentions – that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law and denied release despite low COMPAS scores – are likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles

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to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

The Appellant contends that the board should have disregarded his "probable" COMPAS score for ReEntry Substance Abuse. The Appellant argues that this is based on his history of marijuana use while incarcerated, and since New York has legalized the use of marijuana, it should be dealt with in the community and not a reason for his continued incarceration. Despite Appellant's contentions to the contrary, his drug history does not merely include marijuana usage. The Board reviewed the appellant's criminal history, including the pre-sentencing report, which outlined the Appellant's two prior arrests related to criminal possession of crack/cocaine as well as felony drug sale of cocaine. Thus, the COMPAS score was properly considered by the Board in their deliberations.

The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. The Board did not find a reasonable probability that the Appellant will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, *despite* low-risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards. The Board clearly articulated that the Appellant's release "would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would deprecate the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine respect for the law."

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The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005). The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations.

Even when an incarcerated individual's institutional record is exemplary, the Board may place particular emphasis on the violent nature of or gravity of the crime, so long as the relevant statutory factors are considered. The record establishes the Board acknowledged individual's extensive rehabilitative success along with additional statutory factors, but placed greater emphasis on the seriousness of his crimes (involving death of police officer during an in concert attempted robbery) in determining release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and so deprecate the seriousness of the offenses as to undermine respect for the law, as it is entitled to do. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1272, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, 719 (3d Dept. 2014)

The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court, Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007), and the COMPAS instrument's risk score, Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an incarcerated individual should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014). However, here the Board did offer recommendations, specifically stating "[w]e encourage you to maintain a clean disciplinary record and demonstrate your willingness to follow the rules."

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There is also no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

Finally, the Board's decision to hold an incarcerated individual for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 18 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper. See also Matter of Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 A.D.3d 1130, 1131, 14 N.Y.S.3d 515 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Shark v. New York State Div. of Parole Chair, 110 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 972 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (3d Dept. 2013), appeal dismissed 23 N.Y.3d 933, 986 N.Y.S.2d 876 (2014). In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006).

Recommendation: Affirm.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Cruz, Angel **Facility:** Otisville CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 03-038-21 B

DIN: 94-A-0333

Appearances: James R. Pawliczek, Esq.
62 North Main Street, Suite 303
Florida, New York 10921

Decision appealed: February 2021 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Corley, Samuels**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received August 16, 2021

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan, Official Statement of Hon. Gary J. Weber

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ___ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on 10/15/2021 GG.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)