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Administrative Appeal Decision - Esquilin, Sharborn (2021-11-19)

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## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Esquilin, Sharborn	DIN:	91-A-8184
Facility:	Otisville CF	AC No.:	03-019-21 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant challenges the February 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for two separate crimes. In one, he tried to steal money from the victim, and when the victim took out his firearm, the appellant grabbed it away from him and shot and killed him. In the second, appellant pointed a gun at the victim and stole her personal property. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision lacks detail. 3) the Board failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 4) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 5) the decision illegally resentenced him. 6) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the mostly positive COMPAS was ignored, and the laws are now future based.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board's denial of parole based on the violent nature of his offenses is not arbitrary and capricious. <u>Matter of Guzman v. Dennison</u>, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006).

The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crimes. <u>Sanchez v Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Dorman v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may consider the inmate's fleeing the area after the commission of his crime. <u>Larmon v</u> <u>Travis</u>, 14 A.D.3d 960, 787 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dept 2005).

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The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal's actions upon the victims' families. <u>Bottom v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may take note of the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. <u>Hakim v</u> <u>Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); <u>Angel v Travis</u>, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate's blatant disregard for the law and the sanctity of human life. <u>Campbell v Stanford</u>, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2<sup>nd</sup> Dept. 2019).

The Board may consider an incarcerated individual's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Espinal v. New</u> <u>York Bd. of Parole</u>, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); <u>Matter of Bush v. Annucci</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); <u>Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive

## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An incarcerated individual has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

"Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts'; or, put differently, '*[r]ationality is what is reviewed under... the arbitrary and capricious standard.*" <u>Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1270 n.1, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (3d Dept. 2014) (quoting <u>Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ.</u>, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974)).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." <u>Matter of Silmon v.</u> <u>Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting <u>Matter of Russo v. New York State</u> <u>Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept.

## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. <u>Fuller v Evans</u>, 586 Fed. Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) <u>cert.den</u>. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a future-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

Recommendation: Affirm.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

Name:	Esquilin, S	harborn	Facility:	Otisville CF	
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	03-019-21 B	
DIN:	91-A-8184	ł ,		N 22	
Appearan	<u>ces</u> :	Christopher Berger E 6 McNamara Drive Campbell Hall, New	Con .		
Decision appealed:		February 2021 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months.			
Board Member(s) who participated:		Samuels, Corley		а 4	
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received September 8, 2021			
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation					
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parol Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.					
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:		ecision appealed is hereby:			
Comr	nissioner	Affirmed Vac	cated, remanded fo	or de novo interview Modified to	
Comr	pissioner			r de novo interview Modified to r de novo interview Modified to	
Comr	nissioner	63 19			

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on  $U[n]_{2021}$  Ge.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)