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Administrative Appeal Decision - Westfall, Kevin (2019-02-27)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Westfall, Kevin

Facility: Collins CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 03-153-18 B

DIN: 93-B-1389

Appearances: Charles Greenberg Esq.
3840 East Robinson Road
#318
Amherst, New York 14228

Decision appealed: March 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18-months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Smith, Crangle


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 27, 2018


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/27/19 *66*

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Westfall, Kevin

DIN: 93-B-1389

Facility: Collins CF

AC No.: 03-153-18 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 5)

Appellant challenges the March 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 18-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision illegally resentenced him. 4) the decision was predetermined. 5) the decision was almost identical to prior decisions. 6) the Board releases other inmates with far worse records. 7) the interview was not done in a fair and unbiased manner. 8) the decision is based upon erroneous information as appellant does have a good release plan. 9) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now future focused. 10) the 18 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crimes, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Westfall, Kevin

DIN: 93-B-1389

Facility: Collins CF

AC No.: 03-153-18 B

Findings: (Page 2 of 5)

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The fact that the appellant had a prior violation of probation is also a basis for denying parole release. Velasquez v Travis, 278 A.D.2d 651, 717 N.Y.S.2d 702 (3d Dept 2000); Vasquez v New York State Division of Parole, 215 A.D.2d 856, 626 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dept 1995); People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Board of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept 1983).

The Board decision was not erroneous as only a part of the release plan did the Board find to be deficient. The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole. Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016).

Prior disciplinary matters may also be considered. Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013) (while inmate's behavior improved since last interview, Board was concerned with disciplinary violation accumulated beforehand); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.) (multiple disciplinary violations while incarcerated), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Bridget v. Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010).

There is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the particulars of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value. Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Westfall, Kevin

DIN: 93-B-1389

Facility: Collins CF

AC No.: 03-153-18 B

Findings: (Page 3 of 5)

Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. People ex.rel. Johnson v New York State Board of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept 1992); Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed2d 712 (1975). And, Courts presume the Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. Garner v Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1371, 146 L.Ed2d 236 (2000). The decision was not predetermined. Dean v New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dept. 2005) lv. den. 6 N.Y.3d 705 (2006); Hakim-Zaki v New York State Division of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006). There is no merit to the inmate's contention that the parole interview was improperly conducted or that he was denied a fair interview. Black v New York State Board of Parole, 54 A.D.3d 1076, 863 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d Dept. 2008); Rivers v Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 2017).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Westfall, Kevin

DIN: 93-B-1389

Facility: Collins CF

AC No.: 03-153-18 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 5)

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007) (same). No such proof exists here.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime. Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate's crimes, the criminal history, the prison disciplinary record, the program accomplishments and post release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Westfall, Kevin

DIN: 93-B-1389

Facility: Collins CF

AC No.: 03-153-18 B

Findings: (Page 5 of 5)

A positive COMPAS score does not create any guarantee to release, but rather is only one factor considered by the Board in exercising its discretion when making a parole determination. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); Dawes v Beale, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); Byas v Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); LeGeros v New York State Board of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Wiley v State of New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 139 A.D.3d 1289, 32 N.Y.S.3d 370 (3d Dept. 2016). Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002).

Recommendation: Affirm.