May 2022

Administrative Appeal Decision - Martin, Milton (2019-04-29)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Martin, Milton	**Facility:**	Fishkill CF
NYSID:	[redacted]	**Appeal Control No.:**	05-036-18 B
DIN:	94-B-1301		

Appearances: Cynthia Kasnia, Esq.
316 Main Street, Suite 8
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

Decision appealed: April 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15-months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Davis, Shapiro, Berliner**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 27, 2018

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

Commissioner	___ **Affirmed**	___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**	___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner	✓ **Affirmed**	___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**	___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner	✓ **Affirmed**	___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**	___ **Modified to** _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 4/30/19 kc.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

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APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant was sentenced to 21 years to life upon his conviction by plea of Murder in the second degree, Attempted Murder in the first degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the second degree. In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the April 2018 determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 15-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision is unlawful because there is no indication if the Board sought an official statement from Appellant's attorney in the criminal proceeding; (2) the decision is arbitrary and capricious because the Board relied on the instant offense in the absence of any aggravating circumstances as well as his criminal history without appropriate consideration of the COMPAS and other factors such as his institutional record and future plans; (3) the decision thereby constitutes an illegal resentencing and violated the presumption of release afforded Appellant; (4) the denial of parole was in violation of due process; (5) the decision fails to provide adequate details and is unsupported; and (6) the 15-month hold is excessive. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter

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of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834. In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant killed his girlfriend by shooting her in the head and then fired shots at responding police officers, and Appellant's repeated characterization of his behavior as "reckless"; his criminal history including a prior voluntary manslaughter conviction in CA stemming from the shooting death of an ex-girlfriend; his institutional record including participation in New Day Mind and ART and good discipline; and release plans included in his "thorough" parole packet. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the sentencing minutes, Appellant's case plan and the COMPAS instrument. In addition, Appellant was given the opportunity to raise additional matters during the interview and explained that he had learned from his programs and changed.

During the interview, the Board noted the D.A. and Appellant's trial attorney did not respond to requests for official statements and Appellant expressed his belief that his attorney retired from practice. Insofar as Appellant now objects that the Board did not seek an official statement from his attorney, the record confirms a letter was sent requesting a recommendation in 2008. Based on current court records, it appears the attorney is deceased.

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After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant murder and violence coupled with shooting at local police demonstrating an unwillingness to follow rules and respect the law, Appellant's prior criminal history including the voluntary manslaughter conviction, and his failed attempt to address his behavior despite prior court interventions. See Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Marcelin v. Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (3d Dept. 1999). The Board acknowledged low COMPAS scores in several areas, but departed from those scores in view of his criminal involvement and history of violence. "[T]he serious nature of the crimes for which the [inmate] was incarcerated and his prior criminal record [ ] are sufficient grounds to deny parole release." Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994); see also Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter of Wright v. Travis, 284 A.D.2d 544, 727 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dept. 2001). Appellant's apparent ability to do well in prison does not render the Board's decision irrational, particularly, whereas here, his crime involves intimate partner violence. See Matter of Marcelin v. Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d 639. And while the Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors, see Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014), the Board relied on additional considerations here.

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). Similarly, there is no merit to Appellant's vague claim that he is entitled to a presumption of release. See, e.g., Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 74-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-85 (1980) (finding no entitlement to release at any particular time because the parole system is discretionary).

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An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982. The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: namely, Appellant's instant offenses and his prior criminal history. Moreover, the reasons stated are sufficient grounds to support the determination. See, e.g., Matter of Scott, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87; Matter of Marcelin, 262 A.D.2d at 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 640. The Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Finally, the Board's decision to hold an inmate for up to a maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 15 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

Recommendation: Affirm.