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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Mullady, Joseph Facility: Greene CF
NYSID: [REDACTED] Appeal Control No.: 01-060-19 B
DIN: 89-A-7177

Appearances: Joseph Mullady 89A7177
Greene Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 8
Coxsackie, New York 12051

Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Crangle, Demosthenes, Davis

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 28, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner


 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 5/10/19 

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Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is for shooting a man to death after breaking into this residence. The appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is based upon erroneous information in that he was acquitted of intentional murder, but found guilty of felony murder. And under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Board can't use intentional murder. 2) use of the sentencing minutes in his case is illegal because the Judge was ultimately removed from the bench for misconduct, and she can't order the Parole Board to deny parole release. 3) the decision is the same as prior decisions. 4) the Pre-sentence investigation Report has errors as it is due to biased police officers and relies on triple hearsay, in violation of the confrontation clause of the 6th amendment to the constitution. 5) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 6) the Board failed to make required findings of fact, and the decision lacks details. 7) the decision was predetermined. 8) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 9) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that they are rehabilitation and forward based (meaning you can't use the instant offense and criminal history), and the COMPAS is a scientifically based instrument which must be followed. Also, no SASSI review was done, and the Board didn't explain the departure from the COMPAS.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

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The record establishes that the Parole Board properly considered not only the crimes committed, but also the fact that they were committed while petitioner was on parole release, in addition to petitioner's criminal history, the COMPAS risk assessment instrument, his institutional programming and his plans for release. He made no showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Larry v. Travis, 303 A.D.2d 797, 797, 755 N.Y.S.2d 329 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Wiley v. State of New York Dept. of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 139 A.D.3d 1289, 32 N.Y.S.3d 370 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board may assign greater weight to appellant's history of violence, Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Board of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept 1983); People ex rel. Henson v Miller, 244 A.D.2d 729, 664 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept 1997), leave to appeal denied 91 N.Y.2d 809, 670 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1998); Vasquez v New York State Division of Parole, 215 A.D.2d 856, 626 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dept 1995); Ward v New York State Division of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d Dept. 2016); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 2017).

That inmate's prior criminal record and brutal nature of offense for which incarcerated resulted in parole denial does not reflect irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Remorse is a permissible factor. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board can give greater weight to statements made in the sentencing minutes. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes. Platten v New York State Board of Parole, 153 A.D.3d 1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017).

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The Board is obligated to consider the sentencing minutes where available and any recommendations of the court. Matter of Standley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 1169, 1170, 825 N.Y.S.2d 568, 569 (3d Dept. 2006).

The Board may consider the sentencing court's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 00663, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 662 (3d Dept. Jan. 31, 2019) (Board properly considered sentencing minutes which included court's recommendation against parole); Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017) (same); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Delman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888, 461 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (2d Dept. 1983). The Board is not bound by the court's recommendation, and there is nothing in the record in support of appellant's claim that the Board did not exercise its discretion. Chaipis v State Liquor Authority, 44 N.Y.2d 57, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1978). And the fact that the sentencing Judge may later have run into legal trouble is irrelevant.

There is nothing in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report or the sentencing minutes in support of appellant's claim that the murder was not intentional. In fact, both documents support the intentional murder claim. Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976); Lee v U.S. Parole Commission, 614 F.Supp. 634, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carter v Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept. 2011) lv. app. den. 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011). To the extent the appellant complains about the information contained within the pre-sentence report, the Board is mandated to consider it, is not empowered to correct information therein, and is entitled to rely on the information contained in the report. See, Executive Law §259-(a)-1; Executive Law §259-(1)(a); (2)(c)(A); May v New York State Division of Parole, 273 A.D.2d 667, 711 N.Y.S.2d 349 (3d Dept. 2000); Richburg v New York State Board of Parole, 284 A.D.2d 685, 726 N.Y.S.2d 299 (3d Dept. 2001); Payton v Thomas, 486 F.Supp. 64, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Baker v McCall, 543 F.Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affirmed 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams v Travis, 11 A.D.3d 788, 783 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dept. 2004); Sutherland v Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 1028, 881 N.Y.S.2d 915 (3d Dept. 2009); Wisniewski v Michalski et.al., 114 A.D.3d 1188, 979 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dept. 2014). The inmate is not permitted to collaterally attack the presentence report. Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 766, 768 (3d Dept. 2004); Simmons v Travis, 15 A.D.3d 896, 788 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dept. 2005). The inmate can't challenge the accuracy of information in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report, as that challenge should have been made to the original sentencing court. Manley v New York State Board of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1209 (3d Dept. 2005) lv. den. 6 N.Y.3d 702 (2005); Champion v Dennison, 40 A.D.3d 1181, 834 N.Y.S.2d 585 (3d Dept. 2007). lv. dism. 9 N.Y.3d 913, 844 N.Y.S.2d 167. Carter v Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept. 2011) lv. app. den. 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011); Vigliotti v State of

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New York, Executive Division of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d Dept. 2012); Wisniewski v Michalski et.al., 114 A.D.3d 1188, 979 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dept. 2014); Del Rosario v Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016).

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Bridget v. Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010).

That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.” Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative factfinders. People ex rel. Johnson v New York State Board of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept 1992); Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed2d 712 (1975). And, Courts presume the Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. Garner v Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1371, 146 L.Ed2d 236 (2000). The decision was not predetermined. Dean v New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dept. 2005) lv. den. 6 N.Y.3d 705 (2006); Hakim-Zaki v New York State

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Division of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006). There is no merit to the inmate's contention that the parole interview was improperly conducted or that he was denied a fair interview. Black v New York State Board of Parole, 54 A.D.3d 1076, 863 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d Dept. 2008); Rivers v Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 2017).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in parole release. Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).

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The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017.

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of

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Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”). Indeed, the COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should be released. See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amended regulation was intended to increase transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board departs from scales in denying an inmate release. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.

Appellant argues COMPAS has limitations requiring consideration of special risk assessments when an inmate presents with a history of substance abuse and sex offenses. However, there is no requirement that the Board consider additional risk assessments beyond the COMPAS instrument. Matter of McCarthy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 3664/18, *Decision/Order/Judgment* dated Oct. 18, 2018, at 3 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Ceresia, S.C.J.). The COMPAS instrument simply suggests that in the case of inmates with elevated substance abuse scores, an additional assessment such as a Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (“SASSI”) might be useful upon release.

The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. For

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Mullady, Joseph

DIN: 89-A-7177

Facility: Greene CF

AC No.: 01-060-19 B

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example, the Board did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, *despite* low risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards. This is entirely consistent with the Board's intention in enacting the amended regulation.

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

The 2017 amended regulations don't create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board's interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018).

Recommendation: Affirm.